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ABSTRACT
The resolution of protracted (or “frozen”) conflicts in Cyprus and Kosovo has been a
long-standing item on the agendas of the UN Security Council, European regional organizations,
and powerful third states. This study conducts a multi-level analysis of conflict resolution in
these protracted conflicts that conceptualizes actors within disputed territories not strictly as
clients of powerful patron states, but as independent political actors with their own agency in
conflict. While international negotiations proceed at one level, facilitated by international
organizations and experienced mediators, actors ‘on the ground’ within ‘local regimes’ pursue
their own interests and are often sites of conflict between hard-line ‘spoilers’ and more
cooperative players who favor a settlement. In this study I conduct two in-depth case studies that
trace the dynamics of local-level competition during negotiations to identify specific
mechanisms that contribute to or spoil implementation of a settlement. Findings indicate that
while powerful patron states (Turkey and Serbia) are willing to revise national policy towards the
conflict when compensated by mediators (manipulative mediation), they face the uncertainty of
local-level actors for whom a settlement is not necessarily beneficial. To reduce the uncertainty
of potential ‘spoilers’ on the ground, patron states in turn manipulate local-level political
competition to marginalize hardliners by altering reward structures and providing political
patronage to cooperative players.
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1

INTRODUCTION: PROTRACTED CONFLICT & RESOLUTION

On 24 April 2004, one week before Cyprus was to join the European Union, the Greek and
Turkish Cypriot communities, living in separate partitioned zones of the island since August
1974, voted in simultaneous referendums on reunification. The Turkish Cypriots of the selfdeclared and internationally-unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC),
reversed the position long-held by their leaders and voted overwhelmingly for the reunification
of Cyprus as a single state that would accede to the EU the following week. The two years
leading up to this referendum on the UN Secretary General’s proposal for unification, known as
the Annan Plan, had been characterized by changes to geostrategic preferences within Turkey, as
well as a marked rise in pro-reunification movements within the TRNC itself. The unveiling of
the Annan Plan in 2002 saw the mobilization of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots rallying in
support of reunification with the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus and in opposition to their
intransigent leaders. Though the Annan Plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side, which
entered the EU without the TRNC the following week, this demonstrated a shift within the
TRNC that would govern its policies and political competition in the following years. The
militarized ceasefire line was reopened allowing travel from one side to the other, TRNC leaders
appeared before the EU, Council of Europe, and governments of European states to improve
their foreign relations, and even as the Republic of Cyprus remained governed by an opponent of
reunification until 2008, the TRNC pushed for restarting negotiations.
Nine years later in Kosovo, in November 2013, the ethnic-Serb community within
Kosovo ended its long-standing policy of boycotting Kosovo’s institutions and participated en
masse in elections for the first time since Kosovo’s de facto separation from Serbia in June 1999.
Only months before this election, Kosovo Serb leaders in the Serb-dominated municipalities
north of the Ibar/Ibër River had unilaterally declared their autonomy and rejected the authority of

2
Kosovo’s institutions in Prishtina.1 As in the case of Cyprus, this precipitous change within the
Kosovo Serb community towards cooperation followed changes to Serbia’s own foreign policy
preferences, as well as the rise of a more moderate Kosovo Serb political force mobilized at the
municipal-level after 2009. Since the 2013 and 2017 elections in Kosovo, the Belgrade-backed
Lista Srpska party has come to dominate Kosovo Serb politics both at the central and local levels
in Kosovo. And while it has intermittently boycotted participation in protest of the Kosovo
Government’s policies, it has not returned to a blanket policy of boycott as a rejection of
Kosovo’s sovereignty.
Taken individually, or as snapshots of specific events, these may appear to be seemingly
unremarkable episodes of political change - Turkish Cypriots rallying in support of a new policy
position and Kosovo Serbs electing a new clientelistic political party. Situated within the larger
contexts of both cases and identity conflicts in general, however, these changes are perhaps a bit
more remarkable. For one, these anecdotes illustrate precipitous changes to deeply ingrained or
protracted societal conflicts that are both simple in the sides’ intractability and complex in the
relationships between actors, states, and organizations that simultaneously make them intercommunal, trans-national, and international conflicts. There is no shortage of scholarly or
journalistic analogies in these cases to Gordian Knots - knots in which the harder one pulls in
attempting to untie it, the tighter it becomes. Accordingly in likening these conflicts to the
Gordian Knot, the implication is that the harder one works to resolve it, the more complex it
becomes (e.g., Franks & Richmond 2008; Heraclides 2011). The purpose of this study is to
identify what occurs in such cases between internationally-led peacemaking and local-level
changes such as those observed in Cyprus in 2004 and Kosovo in 2013. In this regard, this is not

1

Throughout this manuscript I use dual spellings of place names where appropriate.
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a frequentist study seeking to identify average trends, which would of course demonstrate that
these are the most difficult conflicts to resolve, but rather to identify the specific mechanisms
that precede outcomes. That is, how was the “knot” loosened in these cases?

1.1

Protracted Conflict

The first obstacle to studying the resolution of conflicts such as Cyprus and Kosovo is in
identifying what types of conflicts they are. They simultaneously exhibit conditions of intra-state
ethnic conflicts that vary in terms of violent outbursts, trans-national conflicts with ethnic groups
propped up by proximate ethnic kin-states, inter-state rivalries, and larger international
geopolitical conflicts. Drawing from the work of Edward Azar and others (1978), such conflicts
are protracted in that hostile interactions extend over long periods of time with sporadic
outbreaks of violence that fluctuate in intensity, and involve the whole of society in defining the
scopes of national identity and social solidarity, with stakes that are high or even perceived as
existential for the sides. Perhaps most relevant to the difficulty in resolving protracted conflicts
are the irreconcilability of sides’ preferences, derived from long-standing historical beliefs and
perceptions within groups that make concessions a threat to most basic values (Colaresi &
Thompson 2002). This irreconcilability may be as basic as one group’s preference to exist, at
least in a certain form, and another group’s preference to erase them, either through physical
elimination or the destruction of cultural symbols or language that denotes their identity.2 In such

2

Consider, for example, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in which the primary factor driving conflict initiation was the
assimilation of Kurds as Turks rather than a separate national identity. Or, for example, the tactics of Serbian forces
in Kosovo, which not only included physical violence to drive out ethnic-Albanians, but the destruction of cultural
sites and symbols, such as the demolition of the League of Prizren house and planting of a garden over it, to erase its
existence under Serbian dominion.
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conflicts, the objective of establishing political control over an area or a group goes hand-in-hand
with systematic human rights violations (Chinkin & Kaldor 2017).
In relating protracted conflicts to other forms of intra-state conflict, they do not
necessarily exhibit the same conditions of onset, patterns of violence, and duration as noted in
widely-read “brush-clearing” studies of intrastate conflict (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Collier
et al. 2004; Blattman & Miguel 2010). Protracted conflicts have a self-replicating aspect, by
which seemingly minor or insignificant events can precipitate the onset of violence, while the
cessation of inter-group fighting does not necessarily equate to peace (Colaresi & Thompson
2002). In this sense emotions, and in particular fear and hatred, underpin protracted conflicts
fueled by dominant myths and narratives of past victimhood or beliefs about future repression,
replicated and manipulated by entrenched group-level elites. For Example, initiation of conflict
in Cyprus was underpinned by Turkish Cypriots’ fear that if they lost they would be erased from
the island, as their ethnic kin had been from Crete when it was annexed by Greece after the First
Balkan War. It was in this social and emotional context that a Turk being harassed by an ethnicGreek policeman precipitated the longest-standing conflict on the UN’s agenda. This, of course,
is not to give credence to primordialist theories of ethnic conflict and their roots in “ancient
hatred” or “civilizational incompatibility” (e.g., Huntington 1993; Kaplan 1993; Van Evera
2001). Rather as less superficial studies have argued (Halperin 2008; Petersen 2011), individual
members of identity groups within protracted conflicts experience these emotions on a more
regular basis, often egged on by elites and elite-level discourse, which precipitate certain action
tendencies, such as “fight or flight,” and beliefs that the other can not be reasoned or
compromised with.
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Resolving such conflicts, or untying these Gordian Knots, is constrained by not only the
rationalist concerns of violent civil conflict, but the emotional and psychological constraints
attached to prevalent memories or social meanings within identity groups (Kroneberg &
Wimmer 2012). In contrast with expectations about the duration of intra-state conflicts (Collier
et al. 2004), there is no distinguishable endpoint to protracted conflicts whose persistence is
indeterminate. It follows that scholars of protracted conflicts have theorized that they are not
resolvable through precipitous actions and that external intervention in peacemaking can have
the effect of making conflict worse (Azar et al. 1978; Aggestam 2006).

1.2

Purpose and Argument

In this study I approach the issue of protracted conflicts from the position that ascribing their
persistence to simple “unresolvability” is insufficient. From a normative standpoint these
conflicts were abhorrent in nature, in that one side seeks to strip another of its right to exist in a
given form, and continue to inflict heavy material and social costs on the societies experiencing
them, even if they do not escalate again into physical violence. From an empirical standpoint,
though, a nuanced reading of these cases, and protracted conflicts more broadly, finds that they
are not static cases over time, but are rather dynamic processes with changing preferences
towards resolution and cooperation, affected in part by elites’ preferences, resource availability,
and external influences (Crocker et al. 2004). What, then, occurs at more in-depth levels to
produce these changes?

6

Table 1.1. Terminology
Concept

Definition

Example:

Local
Regime

Complex of actors, institutions, resources, and strategies
that determine the conduct of subnational politics
including linkages to higher tiers of authority3

Municipal governments; ethnic enclaves
in Cyprus or Kosovo

Parent
State

The state which a separatist group or self-declared
political entity is legally a part

TRNC is legally a part of Cyprus;
Kosovo Serb community legally a part of
the territory of Kosovo4

Patron
State

External state which provides separatist or rebel groups,
or self-declared entities with resources and access to
survive outside of state institutions

Turkey as the patron state to the TRNC;
Serbia as the patron state to Kosovo
Serbs

To this end, I refrain from macro-level or large-n cross case analysis, to focus the
analytical attention of the study on the identification of mechanisms. This requires an in-depth
understanding of the various relationships and conditions of these conflicts identified above,
including local intra-state level competition, inter-state conflict and rivalry, and internationallyled interventions whether to escalate or resolve conflict. Importantly, this further requires an indepth understanding of the strategic and social contexts in which changes occur in order to
pinpoint specific pathways of change (see Falleti & Lynch 2009). With this in mind, the
argument that I develop in this study proceeds in three stages.
In the first stage, given the existence of a protracted conflict, an international mediator
engages with the sides in a conflict with the goal of resolving the conflict, or at least, in-keeping
with the tenets of liberal peacebuilding, inducing mutual participation in shared institutions.
International organizations and mediators, though, face the problem of with whom to engage. In

Definition derived from Gel’man & Ryzhenkov’s (2011) study of post-Soviet subnational politics.
Kosovo’s status as independent is not legally recognized by the UN, however its territorial integrity is legally
defined under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
3
4
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the intra-state setting, engagement with a self-declared political entity or separatist group can
undermine resolution by conveying some form of “legal personality” to enforce an agreement
(see Fortin 2017; Caspersen 2018), thereby strengthening separatist claims or undermining the
position of the de jure state government. Alternatively, international organizations can engage
with such groups’ “patron states” or legally recognized external states upon which they rely to
survive (as opposed the “parent states” of which an unrecognized state or entity is legally a
part).
The second stage of the argument is then that the mediator must induce cooperation from
the patron state. Mediators have at their disposal various types of strategies for engagement that
can generally be dichotomized into facilitative strategies that bring parties together to
communicate and manipulative strategies which provide benefits or side-payments to
compensate for concessions (Beardsley et al. 2006). Patron states, though, benefit in some way
from their support for a side in a protracted conflict, whether it is in attaining rationalist security
concerns in a neighboring state (Anderson 2019) or appeasing nationalist or hawkish
constituencies at home, especially when they share an ethnic identity (Zellman 2019). While the
influence of external patron states on conflict initiation and duration has been explored
extensively (Gleditsch 2007; Cederman et al. 2009; Anderson 2019), it has been paid far less
attention in the studies of peacemaking and conflict management.
In order to receive the benefits of mediation, particularly manipulative mediation, the
patron state must then ensure that its client group, involved in conflict, accepts a settlement. The
third stage of the argument is then that the patron state must alter its client “local regime” in
order for a settlement to be accepted and/or implemented. While existing outside of recognized
[parent] state institutions, these groups, often determined by shared ethnic identity, develop their
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own parallel institutions of governance and protection, determined by the ability of local-level
elites to provide for their groups. This is, of course, influenced by the resources and support
transferred from patron states to local regime elites. However, where a settlement would see
local elites’ positions of power curbed, they have incentives not to cooperate, even if their
external patrons prefer it (King 2001; Zurcher et al. 2013). Accordingly, in order to attain the
international benefits of mediation, patron states must manipulate local-level political
competition within their client local regimes to facilitate cooperation within mutually acceptable
institutions, thereby accepting the institutional and organization reality of the post-conflict state.
The argument can be summarized as: to induce change in protracted conflicts, external
mediators must provide conditional rewards to patron states, who in order to receive benefits
must manipulate local-level competition within client local regimes to favor cooperative
outcomes.

1.3

Methodology: In Search of Mechanisms

To reiterate the purpose of this study, it is in linking international peacemaking in protracted
conflicts with political change at the local level, specifically with regard to cooperation in
mutually acceptable institutions of the parent state. In research design terms, the causal or
independent variable would be “mediation” and the outcome or dependent variable would be
“participation in institutions.” A cursory analysis would simply expect to find that changes in
types of peacemaking or mediation proposals would produce change within local regimes’
politics, either to accept the post-conflict organization of the state or reject it in favor of the
status quo (Call 2008; Ishiyama & Widmeier 2013). The aim of this analysis though is the
identification of specific mechanisms through which mediation translates to local level change:
what happens between A and B to make B change the way that it does (Mahoney 2015; Beach
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2016, 2021)? If the process can be described as A→M→B, where M constitutes the mechanism
or sequence of operational links that interact with in-case context, then the objective is to identify
what constitutes M. And a complementary, but necessary, component of this is to identify the
“in-case context” which these mechanisms affect.
In mapping the argument outlined above into this type of research design, it takes the
form of A→M1→X→M2→B, where X is the change in policy by the patron state. There are then
two specific mechanisms which require identification. First is M1 which constitutes the
mechanism that links mediation to a change of patron state policy towards a protracted conflict.
Second is M2 which constitutes the mechanism linking that change of policy by the patron state
to the local regime’s participation in the parent state’s institutions. The first step in this analysis
is then to explore potential theoretical mechanisms for M1 and M2, drawing from previously
developed scholarship of peacemaking, ethnic conflict, and conflict resolution. These
theoretically-driven mechanisms then inform the type of “mechanist evidence” sought in specific
cases (Beach 2021). In-case evidence is then drawn from four sources: (1) secondary literature
on the cases, (2) official reports from international organizations, (3) local and international
media operating within the case locations during the periods of analysis, and (4) primary
interviews with political actors within the subject local regimes.
To pinpoint specific pathways or changes, this requires quite in-depth analysis that
reflexively analyzes actors, preferences, and activities, considering context-specific evidence
(Falleti & Lynch 2009; Beach 2021). For example, a more superficial process tracing analysis of
this question in these cases, might find that the causal mechanism linking A→B or X→B is a
change of local-level preferences. The objective of this more in-depth analysis is to identify what
caused preferences to change. To accurately identify in-depth changes, this further requires a
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sound knowledge of the context in which changes occur and the broader context in which they
are situated (Adcock 2015). Accordingly, each case study includes in-depth context that situates
mechanistic evidence in the broader conflict resolution context and its changes over time, and in
the pathology of the “local regime” existing outside of the recognized parent state. In keeping
with best practices for process-tracing this requires evaluation of all possible explanations and
conditions within the cases, including the context in which different political actors make
decisions. In total, the two cases studies combined are developed using more than 200 primary
documents, 50 primary interviews, and 11,000 local and international news articles.
Finally, the cases themselves were selected for two useful aspects: in-case variation and
cross-comparison. The importance of the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo themselves is that they
have occupied considerable resources, energy, and attention of international organizations and
third-party states. Resolution of the conflict in Cyprus has been the longest standing item on the
UN Security Council’s agenda, and Kosovo has been the site of perhaps the most comprehensive
internationally led statebuilding project in history, ongoing since 1999. Having persisted for so
long, there is considerable in-case variation within Cyprus and Kosovo, in terms of who the
mediators are and what are their strategies, as well as in terms of how local regimes develop over
time. Comparison between cases is then useful for two reasons. One, on a general level, is that
they have spanned different amounts of time, which should dispel arguments that resolution was
simply due to time since violence. For example, institutional change was observed in Kosovo 14
years after the Kosovo War ended, but no such change was observed in Cyprus for 40 years after
fighting. The other is at the more nuanced, in-depth level, at which Cyprus and Kosovo display
notable variation between the development of local regimes. The Turkish Cypriot local regime
was highly institutionally developed and involved directly in the peacemaking process. The
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Kosovo Serb local regime was never consolidated and was consistently contested within the
group, with minimal access and input to the peacemaking or mediation process - something that
was at least in part by design.

1.4

Overview of Manuscript

The remainder of this study proceeds in seven more chapters.
The following chapter, Chapter 2, situates this study within the larger theoretical context
of “conflict management” - the ostensibly holistic study of ending violent conflict, including
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking. While these have been generally well-developed
research programs, protracted conflict and its implications for social cohesion and identity have
often been neglected or mentioned only in passing as “the most difficult” cases to resolve or as
aspects of other types of conflict (Colaresi & Thompson 2002). Accordingly, by situating
protracted conflicts within the larger study of conflict management, potential explanations and
obstacles to resolution can begin to be identified. Furthermore, through reviewing core concepts
of mediation as a form diplomatic peacemaking, potential mechanisms for inducing changes to
patron states’ policies (M1) can be identified.
Chapter 3 then theorized potential mechanisms linking changes in patron state policies to
changes in cooperation at the local regime level (M2). This chapter provides an in-depth
overview of local regimes and their origins in conflict processes, drawing largely from studies of
ethnic group politics, decentralization, and rebel governance. At their core, local regimes develop
as institutions of exchange, characterized by reciprocal relations between elites who provide key
services and group members who provide political support in return. Relations to external patron
states is an important source of political legitimacy as well as the resources needed to acquire
and maintain leadership positions within local regimes. Ultimately this gives patron states an
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ability to affect local regime politics both by conditioning support on certain demands and also
on the ability of leaders to maintain their status within groups.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 analyze the case of Cyprus. Chapter 4 provides a contextual
overview of the origins of the Cyprus conflict and a diplomatic history of international actors’
efforts to resolve it beginning in 1955. This chapter focuses specifically on how preferences
towards the Cyprus conflict within Turkey were affected over time by both changes to
international mediation and, perhaps more importantly, domestic politics within Turkey. Chapter
5 then traces the development of the local regime within the Turkish Cypriot community and its
links to the Turkish government in Ankara. While Ankara was crucial to the development and
survival of the Turkish Cypriot local regime outside of the recognized Republic of Cyprus’
institutions, the local regime possessed a notable degree of autonomous agency, due in large part
to the Turkish Cypriot leaders’ relations with the Turkish military and nationalist parties in
Turkey. The findings of this case study indicate that Turkey’s preferences regarding Cyprus
changed when it was (1) appended to Turkey’s accession to the EU, and (2) when a reformist
party came to power that weakened the hold on government of the military and
rightist/nationalist parties. To induce cooperation within the Turkish Cypriot local regime,
Turkey engineered a series of cooperative coalitions that marginalized traditionally intransigent
powerholders and weakened the nationalists’ position in opposing cooperation. Simultaneously
Ankara lent support to the pro-settlement political parties that gained traction and support of
unions in the 1990s. However, as Turkey’s preferences changed, and EU accession became less
likely and less appealing, it reversed this strategy and supported anti-reunification factions while
marginalizing Turkish Cypriot pro-settlement and pro-EU forces.
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Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 then turn to the case of Kosovo. Chapter 6 provides the
contextual overview of the origins of Kosovo War and subsequent efforts to find a diplomatic
resolution to the issue of Kosovo, focusing particularly on engagement with the Serbian
government in Belgrade. In contrast to Cyprus, this process and the Serbian perspective have
been less of a focus of prior scholarship, which has in general focused more on the conflict
international mediators or agreement implementation. This overview, however, is key to
analyzing subnational change within Kosovo and demonstrates that Serbia’s consistently
intransigent position on Kosovo since 1998, often presented as a zero-sum position, meant that
until 2011 it had unfavorable proposals or solutions foisted upon it, which ultimately limited its
influence in the resolution process.
Chapter 7 then traces the changes to the Kosovo Serb local regime in relation to
mediation and the changing preferences within the Serbian government. Similar to the Cyprus
case, Serbia’s preferences at the state-level were consistently opposed to cooperation or
concessions on Kosovo until the issue became explicitly tied to its EU accession perspective.
Unlike in Cyprus, Serbia’s intervention in the Kosovo Serb local regime meant creating a new
political entity, a dominant party in the Lista Srpska, that coopted existing institutions of
exchange and successful local leaders to establish a hegemonic position in the Serb community
by controlling access to patronage derived both from Belgrade and Prishtina. Unlike prior
political leaders, though, the Lista Srpska participated in Kosovo’s centralized institutions, rather
than claiming to be an autonomous entity.
Lastly, Chapter 8 concludes the analysis by comparing the findings of both cases in more
generalizable terms, considering other applications of the findings, and considering the ethics of
the findings in relation to liberal peacebuilding. In conclusion, I situate the findings of this study
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in two larger areas of study. One is the classical liberal tradition of international negotiations
(Putnam 1988), which argues that domestic conditions within states affect their behavior in
international negotiations. However, this study adds a “third level” to Putnam’s (1988) “twolevel game” at which states must create subnational conditions within local regimes for
agreements to be implemented, and for them to receive benefits of mediation. The other area is
the more specific field of “stabilitocracy-building” (Bieber 2018, 2020), by which international
actors, and the EU in particular, have aimed to reduce instability in troubled or post-conflict
states, not by building liberal democracies, but by supporting leaders and parties who provide
stability. The findings of this study, again, add another level to this concept. Such leaders’
positions as providers of stability mediated their ability to engineer cooperative subnational local
regimes in-line with their preferences.
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2

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT & PEACEMAKING

In his early treatises on European integration and the European Coal and Steel Community, Jean
Monnet wrote that “in order to solve intractable problems, it is sometimes necessary to change
the context.”5 The context which Monnet and the other architects of the modern European Union
sought to change was the rivalry between France and Germany which had erupted into three
conflicts that devastated Europe in the preceding 75 years. The solution they envisioned was the
creation of mutual interdependence between France and Germany for the materials necessary to
make war - coal and steel. As scholars of the EU’s nascent conflict management strategies,
developed during and after the Yugoslav Wars, have argued, this model of peace-throughinterdependence has been exported to troubled areas on Europe’s periphery (Visoka & Doyle
2016). This has been a cornerstone of EU policy not only in conflict-affected areas such as the
Western Balkans, but also proactively to prevent possible violent conflicts in other settings. For
example, the EU quickly integrated post-communist and post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe
under the threat of hardline revisionism (Cameron 2007).6 This strategy was more than simple
diplomatic engagement by a powerful regional organization to prevent violent disputes. Rather, it
altered the national context in which conflicts and rivalries developed, making it economically
and socially costly for revisionist leaders to foment conflict.
Drawing from this concept of “altering context” in which conflicts occur, this chapter
situates this study in the broader context of liberal peace and diplomatic conflict resolution.
Outlined by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali following the Cold War’s end as
seeking to foster sustainable peace through development in conflict-prone settings, “liberal

5

Published in the Proceedings of the Centenary Symposium organized by the Commission of the European
Communities, in honor of Jean Monnet (10 November 1988).
6
The EU notably used its own political models of movement and minority rights to prevent nationalist conflicts with
ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania, and ethnic Russians in the Baltic states. See also: Vachudova (2005).
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peace” converged with Monnet’s concept of changing contexts in which conflicts occur
(Boutros-Ghali 1992; Walter 2015). Diplomatic engagement alongside intervention and
statebuilding in conflict settings was viewed as an important component with third party
mediators attempting to change conflict environments by altering beliefs, perceptions, costs, and
rewards. The consensual nature of diplomatic engagement, and the requisite implementation of
necessary domestic policy to preclude violence conflict, meant that ultimately power remained in
the hands of states. On the one hand, states and their governments could be incentivized to
change policies. On the other hand, they faced domestic constraints especially on salient national
issues or issues that were costly to leaders’ positions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004;
Levitsky & Way 2006).
The purpose of this chapter is then to specify potential mechanisms by which the context
of protracted conflicts can be changed, specifically through engagement with patron states. The
mechanism that this chapter develops, after providing an overview of liberal peace concepts, is
that a state, and more specifically a patron state which supports a “client” group in conflict, can
be induced to change policies towards a protracted conflict with tangible incentives to revise its
status quo policies. Given the social importance of these conflicts, even in patron states, to
national identity, the rewards for a new policy in-line with a mediator’s preferences must be
sufficient to offset the political costs that leaders will incur domestically. One specific
mechanism through which this may be realized is by linking conflict resolution to EU accession
processes, which does not simply provide one-off side payments in exchange for concessions,
but rather provides long-term reward structures with intermediate benefits that alter domestic
political competition.
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2.1

Liberal Peace

The theoretical starting point of this study is in the liberal peacebuilding paradigm in which
international organizations and third states aim to sustainably rebuild conflict-ridden states as
singular organizations. This is not to say that the objective is a centralized state, as
decentralization or federalism are often a part of liberal peacebuilding (Hartzell & Hoddie 2003),
but rather that local authority is derived from state institutions rather than separatist or rebel
claims to challenge the central government (Call 2008). At its core, liberal peacebuilding sought
to advance beyond traditional approaches of peacekeeping to foster sustainable peace through
economic and political development and inclusion, affording aggrieved groups access to the state
and containing disputes within robust institutions (Barnett 2006; Walter 2015). This includes
various forms of power-sharing between groups in the key fields of state power, such as
administration, security, economics, and territory (Hartzell & Hoodie 2003).
Power-sharing within a single institutional framework necessitates extending state
authority to peripheral areas and establishing a hierarchical linkage between groups and the
central state. Local political competition can be a means of accessing resources from the state
and securing representation, while also encouraging coalition-building beyond regional factions
(Brancati 2006; Gel’man & Ryzhenkov 2011; Jackson 2021a). As Roger Petersen (2011)
concisely summarizes it, liberal peacebuilding became akin to a series of rationalist cooperation
games, such as the iterated prisoners’ dilemma (Figure 2.1). Foreign peace interveners’ aim was
to create an equilibrium of mutual participation by providing incentives to participate and
credible coercive enforcement if one side broke the “rules of the game.” If the prisoners’
dilemma is only played once, the dominant strategy is to “exit.” However, if punishment for a
side that “cheats” is credible from foreign actors, then sides may be induced to play repeatedly
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and gain benefits from long-term participation that outweigh the costs they would incur for
exiting.7

Figure 2.1. Prisoners' Dilemma.

Commitment to institutions, though, is especially difficult for the numerically inferior
side, or the less powerful side not in control of government, as it fears domination by the other
group if it lays down its arms and makes itself vulnerable (Fearon 1994a, 2004). Trust in the
other side is particularly low after conflict and sides have poor information about others’ future
intentions from which to make choices (Posen 1993; Wolff 2011), often meaning that the weaker
side does not believe rules will be enforced if the stronger side “exits.” The role of foreign peace
actors is then to reduce uncertainty about the other sides’ intentions and increase trust in
institutions, particularly trust that rules will be enforced and punishments credibly meted out. In
this respect, foreign military and police missions act in an interim coercive capacity, and new

If the payoffs are ordered as Y>X>T>Z then in a single shot game with incomplete information, “exit” is the
dominant strategy. However in an iterated playing of the game, if enforcement of rules is credible, then a side will
participate in, for example, three cycles of the game if 3X ≥ Y+2T.
7
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building rule of law institutions - police and judiciary - is a primary early objective for
peacebuilders (Rubin 2008; Lake 2010; Jackson 2021b).
The intended outcome of liberal peacebuilding, even in the presence of robust foreign
interventions capable of providing coercive enforcement and with notable resources to develop
institutions such as Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Timor Leste, have rarely been realized.
On the one hand, democratic institutions and elections provide regular benchmarks, information
about preferences, and sanctioning mechanisms (Matanock 2017). On the other hand, liberal
democratic politics and economics, the foundations of liberal peacebuilding that underpin
inclusive institutions, are inherently competitive and generate instability in fragile settings
(Diamond 1990; Barnett 2006). In the interest of stability, foreign interveners may forego strong
institutions to favor certain key parties, loyal western-educated allies, and patrimonial power
networks that capture institutions (Belloni & Strazzari 2014; Ejdus 2017; Bieber 2018; Jackson
2020). Over-reliance on international support can likewise undermine institutional capacity,
weakening trust in new institutions and allowing opportunists to entrench themselves with
foreign support and “compromise” the institution-building process. Similarly, beliefs that foreign
actors will act to minimize their own costs and operate on short time horizons, undermines trusts
in their enforcement of institutional rules (Barnett et al. 2014; Lake 2016). Rather than
transforming beliefs about power disparities or enforcement, they instead foster beliefs that the
other side is becoming more powerful under international patronage while preparing to renege on
institutional commitments after interveners withdraw.
A tangential logic of international peacebuilding contends that the greater problem of
over-reliance on international actors is not institution capture by devious actors, but
marginalization. Critical peace scholars argue that the monopolization of the peace process by
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international actors, pursuing internationally-driven objectives and projects, ignores the local
needs and realities of those in post-conflict settings. Local actors are thus subjects of
peacebuilding rather than participants in it (Autesserre 2014; Ejdus 2017). In response to these
power imbalances, local actors assert their agency by consciously undermining foreign
preferences: what critical peace scholars label “resistance” (Richmond 2012; Mac Ginty &
Richmond 2013; Ejdus & Juncos 2018). In the terms of the rationalist intervention games (Figure
1), while cooperation may be attainable and yield the value X, the local need is for X’, which is
not received by playing by the internationally-mandated institutional rules. To pursue their own
preferences then, local actors undermine new institutions, coopting them for their own interests
and exploiting gray areas such as enforcement and implementation.8
Both explanations contribute to an understanding of why institution-building in postintra-state conflict settings fail. Strategic concerns about the other side’s intentions limit
cooperation, while marginalization by international actors fosters resentment and resistance. In
the context of protracted conflicts, though, both explanations may be exacerbated by the beliefs,
emotions, prevalent images of conflict, and an overall sense of victimization (Crocker et al.
2004). For example, mutual cooperation may be materially beneficial for two sides, but it is
obstructed by the social meanings attached to it within respective groups (Kroneberg & Wimmer
2012). Emotions, such as fear, hatred, and anger over violence inflicted during conflict, or
resentment over one group’s loss of status makes cooperation difficult. Action tendencies

This concept of ‘politics of resistance’ has been a popular explanation of peacebuilding shortcomings in Kosovo.
However, a limited definition of the ‘resistance’ has resulted in conceptual stretching in studies of local-level
peacebuilding. For example, both Van der Borgh (2012) who argues that Kosovo Serbs are building separate
governance institutions, and Lončar (2016) who argues that peacebuilders interfere in daily routines, contend this is
the “politics of resistance,” yet they explain drastically different observations at different units of analyses with
different outcomes.
8
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attached to such emotions as fear or anger may be “fight or flight” whereby group members
prefer to isolate themselves from the “other.” Or, emotions such as hatred and resentment may
have attached action tendencies pursuant to “destroying the other” as it can not be reasoned with
or trusted (Halperin 2008; Petersen 2011, 2012). Importantly, these emotions are not inherent in
groups, as primordialists would suggest, but manipulated by group elites to prolong conflict
(Petersen 2011).
Accordingly, it is not surprising to see Turkish Cypriot and Kosovo Serb elites present
their resistance to liberal peacebuilding or mutual institutions as existential, to prevent expulsion
by the Greeks or conquest by “Muslims.” And it is similarly unsurprising to see cooperative
group elites, willing to participate in institutions, derided as “national traitors” or not “true” coethnics (Jackson 2021a, 2021c). In such contexts, seemingly rational strategic actions taken by
foreign interveners can have the opposite effect and exacerbate the emotional aspects of conflict.
Take for example 2006 when the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) removed
Kosovo’s Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi from power over his opposition to administrative
decentralization, something the Serbs in Kosovo and Belgrade had been pushing for since 2002.
Kosumi was replaced by Agim Çeku, a moderate local partner who pledged to implement
decentralization and who, married to an ethnic-Bosniak, had pledged his general support for
improving interethnic relations. However, having been both a former commandant of the
insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army and an artillery officer in the Croatian Army that prosecuted
Operations Flash and Storm in 1995 that expelled hundreds of thousands of Serbs from Croatia,
his appointment antagonized Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade who refused to engage with any
government that Çeku headed.
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The following chapter, Chapter 3, explores questions of group-level leadership and
incentives to cooperate or not after conflict. The remainder of this chapter turns to diplomatic
peace efforts in conflict, specifically internationally-led mediation, and explains how it alters
domestic preferences, or the “context” in which conflict occurs. As noted in the introductory
chapter (Chapter 1), the broader focus on mediation and engagement with states is due in large
part to existing international norms and preferences that preclude engagement directly with
separatist or unrecognized entities (Caspersen 2018; Cantir 2020), but also the acknowledged
need for mediators to engage external states and regional powers in resolving protracted conflict
(Crocker et al. 2004). In both the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo local regime leaders have been
included in internationally-led talks, but so too have their patron state governments. Though this
may contradict norms upholding the territorial integrity of states-in-conflict, it also implicitly
recognizes the role of patron states and their status of guarantors of a settlement.
2.2

Mediation: Diplomatic Peacemaking

Internationally-led peacebuilding, outlined above, often occurs alongside diplomatic engagement
with warring sides to reach a settlement (Lepgold & Weiss 1998; Crocker et al. 2004; Rothchild
& Emmanuel 2010). Broadly defined, mediation is the involvement of a third party in abating or
resolving conflict through consensual diplomatic engagement (Zartman & Touval 1985).
Mediation often follows a triadic pattern in which parties engage individually with the third party
mediator (shuttle or proximity talks), and with one another under the mediator’s guidance (direct
talks). Within generally acknowledged frameworks, this official party-mediator interaction is
considered “track one” diplomacy. Additional “track one-and-a-half” diplomacy between parties
and third party NGOs, and “track two” between unofficial actors, contribute to the mediation
process. A combination of “tracks” has been argued to be most effective in conflict resolution
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(Bercovitch & Gartner 2006; Gartner & Bercovitch 2006; Böhmelt 2010). In protracted conflicts,
such as those in Cyprus and Kosovo, non-permissive environments and intolerance for
cooperation, disguised as “security measures” can hamper “track two” diplomacy (Hoch et al.
2017). For example, in 1999 the TRNC government banned inter-communal contact to prevent
Turkish Cypriot opposition groups from meeting with Greek Cypriot parties. Or, in 2000 Kosovo
Serb leaders blacklisted community leader Ranđel Nojkić for brokering the end of an armed
standoff with UNMIK. It is thus key for mediators in protracted conflict settings to engage
interlocutors beyond the official parties, including neighbors and regional powers, their NGOs,
and their opposition parties, in order to alter the broader conflict environment (Crocker et al.
2004).
Though scholars have identified the importance of “track two” diplomacy and unofficial
actors in mediation processes, as additional channels of communication, the nature of mediation
as consensual means that ultimately decision-making power rests with the sides’ leaders.
Agreement must be accepted by parties, not imposed upon them (Bercovitch & Houston 2000).
Given the need for consensual participation, the first challenge for mediators is securing
participation, which requires that parties perceive a possible settlement as superior to the status
quo (Kleiboer 1994; Zartman 2000; Greig 2001). As William Zartman (2001) argues, sides must
realize they are in a “mutually hurting stalemate” in which neither side can escalate to victory.
When sides view conflict as existential to their groups’ survival, the costs of ongoing conflict, or
“frozen conflict,” may be preferred to concessions.
The parties then face the issue of whether or not to accept mediation, influenced in part
by their perceptions about a possible solution, as well as their perceptions and beliefs about the
mediators themselves. If the objective of mediation is for sides to recognize the costs of the
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status quo and find a “least bad option,” then their perceptions and beliefs are influenced by the
characteristics of the conflict such as intensity, duration, and the relative strength of sides (Greig
& Diehl 2006; Greig & Regan 2008; Beardsley; 2010). Parties would then be more likely to
accept mediation by mediators with whom they have an existing relationship and whom they
consider to be “unbiased” in their provision of information (Böhmelt 2009; Melin & Svensson
2009; Crescenzi et al. 2011). Similarly parties would be inclined to accept mediation from a
mediator who is biased in their favor, as information they conveyed would be most credible,
hence some sort of preference alignment between parties and mediators (Kydd 2003; Smith &
Stam 2003).
In seeking to alter the context of conflicts through transforming sides’ perceptions,
beliefs, and incentives for cooperation, mediators generally have three types of strategies
available to them. The first, and least intrusive, is facilitation by which the mediator brings
together parties who would otherwise not talk to one another for regular meetings to increase
information and build trust. Misperceptions about the other side and its intentions may be altered
through communication and sharing information (Zartman & Touval 1985; Svensson 2007;
Bronstein et al. 2012). In the setting of intractable conflicts, even getting the sides to sit and
engage in talks can be considered a breakthrough. As a foreign diplomat in Cyprus noted in
1980, bringing the sides to the same table to talk was an achievement in itself.9 However, when
measured against the goal of altering the context of conflict, facilitation’s focus on
communication does not directly alter costs and incentives for sides, and only alters beliefs so
much as sides believe the credibility of information being conveyed (Bercovitch & Gartner
2006).

9

Quoted in The Times (12 December 1980).
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A second mediation strategy, often regarded as the most effective in complex or intense
conflicts is manipulation. Manipulative strategies aim to alter sides’ strategic calculations
through incentives and sanctions (carrots and sticks) that alter decision-making (Zartman &
Touval 1985, Beardsley et al. 2006; Gowan & Stedman 2018). Mediators can reward cooperative
positions or sanction intransigent ones, in theory altering perceived outcomes of decisions.
Rewards provided by mediators, such as development aid, preferential trade, relief from
economic embargoes, or membership in an organization can compensate for the political costs
incurred by making costly concessions (Carnevale 1986, Beardsley et al. 2006, Rothchild &
Emmanuel 2010). Similarly economic sanctions or embargoes may raise the domestic costs for
certain decisions taken to block concessions or escalate a conflict (Peksen 2019).
The third type of mediation strategy, often complementary to both facilitative and
manipulative mediation, is formulation by which the third party mediator proposes and advocates
certain solutions, sets the rules of talks, and engages outside assistance to increase information
from international and regional stakeholders (Zartman & Touval 1985, Beardsley et al. 2006).
This approach was employed by the UN in both Cyprus and Kosovo. In Cyprus, UN-appointed
envoys convened talks under the auspices of Good Offices, and then proposed a series of
formulated solutions between 1965-2004 (Fisher 2001). Similarly, in Kosovo, UN-appointed
envoy Martti Ahtisaari convened seven months of consultations between the sides, the
information from which he drafted the Ahtisaari Proposal for Kosovo’s status (Weller 2008).
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Table 2.1. Mediation Strategies
Strategy

Effect

How…

Examples

Facilitation

Increases information,
communication, and trust
between parties

Organizing regular meetings,
providing ‘good offices’ for
neutral location

Cyprus: UN Good Offices
as neutral facilitator

Formulation

Finding new solutions by
mediator proposing, advocating,
and constraining agreements

Mediator hosting sets the rules
for mediation, including who
participates, and acceptable and
unacceptable solutions

Ahtisaari talks on Kosovo:
consultations with parties to
draft comprehensive
proposal

Manipulation

Mediator offers rewards to
parties of offset certain political
costs of concessions needed for
a settlement

Mediator(s) offer sidepayments, international status,
or long-term restructuring to
induce cooperation

Rhodesia: US offering
economic aid to white
Rhodesians to end Bush
War

2.3

Domestic Costs in Mediation

For concessions to be made in mediation, mediators must induce some form of change to a side’s
perceptions, beliefs, and costs of a conflict to arrive at settlement that is “less bad” than the
conflictual status quo (Bercovitch & Houston 2000; Melin & Svensson 2009). Interlocutors in
talks, though, are not solely accountable to mediators or other sides in a conflict, but also to
domestic or group-level constituents. Drawing from Robert Putnam’s (1988) logic of two-level
games, negotiations occur simultaneously in two political spaces. At the first level, the appointed
interlocutor, officially representing a party to a conflict, sits at the negotiating table with other
interlocutors and mediators to reach a settlement. At the second level is the domestic audience or
veto players whose approval is needed for an agreement to be accepted, ratified, or implemented
in practice or in domestic legislation. Ultimately the preferences of veto players at the second
level constrain the possible agreements that an interlocutor can reach at the first level (Putnam
1988).
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As IR scholars of liberalism have generally argued, the basis of international cooperation
is then alignment of domestic preferences, whether ideational, economic, or rent-seeking
interests that determine policy (Moravcsik 1993, 1997). Enforcement of preferences is then not
an external mechanism but domestic constraints imposed by key constituents. If interlocutors are
unable to secure those preferences in talks, the domestic veto players can remove them (Putnam
1988; Moravcsik 1999). The logic of manipulative mediation is then to introduce new rewards
and punishments to this second level with the intention of increasing the range of possible
agreements that will be accepted by second-level veto players, which in turn expands the
possible agreements an interlocutor can reach at the negotiating table (Bercovitch & Jackson
1997; Eisenkopf & Bächtiger 2013).
In the context of protracted conflicts, though, intransigent policies at the second level
(domestic political space) are often tied to concepts of national identity and are salient for the
general population and their leaders. For example, Kosovo’s centrality in the concept of broader
Serbian national identity (Judah 1997), has made the prospect of concessions on Kosovo
domestic taboo and, as Filip Ejdus (2020) argues, triggered a crisis of identity in Serbia. As in
James Fearon’s (1994) conceptualization of “audience costs,” sides remain locked in costly
suboptimal positions due to fears of losing support for climbing down from a dispute.10 It should
thus be expected that the weaker a domestic coalition’s position is during a protracted conflict,
the less likely it will be to climb down, or make concessions that will be politically costly to its
support (Crocker et al. 2004). While Fearon’s argument relies on a disputed mechanism that
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This argument builds heavily on Bueno de Mesquita and others’ (2005) conceptualization of the selectorate and
the winning coalition. Regime type is indicated by the size of the selectorate which has a say in selecting the
leadership, while the winning coalition is the group of actors who garner private benefits from their candidate being
selected. In a non-democratic regime, certain sectors such as the military, favored firms, or key identity groups often
form the winning coalition and are also capable of removing the leader for unfavorable policy. See: Weeks (2008);
Snyder & Borghard (2011).
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democratic audiences would punish a leader, Kenneth Schultz (1998) argues that international
actors can also receive information from a domestic opposition regarding preferences towards a
new policy. A weak coalition, then, that opposes concessions may have its negotiating position
undermined by a strong domestic opposition that signals a different position on talks.
In applying these observations more directly to the practice of mediation, and
manipulative mediation more specifically, there are two potential mechanisms through which
second-level constraints on an interlocutor could be altered in order to expand the set of possible
agreements - sticks and carrots, or sanctions and rewards (Gowan & Stedman 2018). The most
readily observable form of “sticks” are economic sanctions leveled by an external state, group of
states, or international organization, against one side. Economic sanctions are deliberate actions
or withdrawal from previous relations with the purpose of punishing the target party by depriving
it of economic value and coercing compliance with certain preferences of the sending party
(Galtung 1967; Hufbauer et al. 1990). Sometimes described as “short-of-war” measures
(Hultman & Peksen 2017), economic sanctions follow the logic of “compellence” in that once
they are deployed, at least in theory, they continue until the target changes its behavior (see
Schelling 1966). The efficacy of sanctions, though, is indeterminate. Economic sanctions may
have the opposite intended effect and strengthen target regimes by depriving civil society and
opposition groups of resources or providing a pretext for further crackdowns (Peksen & Drury
2015; Marinov & Nili 2015). Or sanctions can cause a “rally-around-the-flag” effect that
increases domestic support for the regime as constituents view it as a victim and the economic
hardships they endure as “patriotic” (Marinov 2005; Ang & Peksen 2007; Peksen 2019). Sticks
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may leverage concessions through compellence, but also may strengthen support for the regime
and weaken opposition.11
Rewards, or “carrots,” on the other hand provide some form of benefit to targets in
exchange for compliance with senders’ preferences. In the short-term, mediators and thirdparties may offer one-off benefits such as economic or development aid, or a preferential trade
deal, in exchange for concessions (Zartman & Touval 1985; Beardsley et al. 2006). In essence,
the third party is “compensating” the domestic veto players for costly concessions. If a regime
expects to incur serious domestic costs for concessions, the rewards it receives could be used to
benefit development or increase wages, offsetting political costs or dampen backlash (Carnevale
1986). For example, the United States’ strategy in sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War
sought to create stability in conflict states by offering development aid packages in exchange for
certain outcomes. In Rhodesia, the US offered the white Rhodesians led by Ian Smith
development aid for concessions in ending the Bush War, and in Angola offered the Angolan
government development aid to settle the Angolan Civil War without the continued deployment
of Cuban forces (Zartman & Touval 1985). A similar strategy was pursued by the US in Cyprus
in 1978 with the failed “ABC Plan” which offered development aid to the Turkish Cypriot side
in exchange for returning to the Republic of Cyprus institutions and making territorial
concessions (Fisher 2001).12
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Frye (2019) argues against the broad generalization of a “rally-around-the-flag” effect using survey data from
Russia, but does note a polarizing effect in public opinion towards the issue areas that the sanctions are in response
to.
12
This failed due in large part to negative views of the US on both sides of the ethnic divide in Cyprus. Turkey was
locked in a dispute with the US over an arms embargo and the Greek Cypriots were skeptical of US involvement,
which the Greek Cypriot left blamed in part for failing to prevent the 1974 coup d’etat that led to the Turkish
invasion. In this case, the mediator had little credibility with the sides.
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A unique form of “carrot” relevant to both the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo is the
prospect of European Union membership in exchange for concessions. By nature, EU
membership or accession is a manipulative process, whereby applicant states must execute EUprescribed domestic reforms in line with the EU’s Acquis Communautaire in order to make
progress towards membership and receive intermediate rewards such as preferential trade,
tranches of aid, visa liberalization, or the status of “candidacy” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig
2009). Conflict resolution may fit into such chapters of the Acquis as Chapter 23 - Fundamental
Rights, Chapter 24 - Justice Freedom and Security, Chapter 30 - External Relations, or more
commonly Chapter 35 - Other issues. Failure to implement necessary reforms, or concessions in
the case of a settlement, results in accession being stalled and intermediate rewards being
withheld - the “conditionality” process of accession (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004; Sasse
2008; Trauner 2009). In this respect, the EU has a comparative advantage in manipulation, as it
not only provides one-off or incremental rewards for compliance, but ultimately transforms
domestic payoff structures in the longer-term in “locking in” certain standards and mechanisms
(Tocci 2007; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009; Bergman & Neimann 2015). In contrast to
Zartman and Touval’s (1985) claim that mediators can not act as permanent “chaperones,” EU
accession as a part of mediation or conflict resolution, does lock-in or reorient certain positions
that rule out conflict or at least make escalation highly costly for domestic parties.
As with economic sanctions, or “sticks,” EU accession conditionality has disparate
effects, due in large part to the context of the receiving state. As Frank Schimmelfennig (2005)
argues, EU conditionality has the effect of solidifying existing cleavages in receiving states, and
therefore its transformative effects are constrained by ex ante party constellations. Others argue
that EU conditionality has the capacity to moderate nationalist parties and preferences within
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receiving states (Vachudova 2008, 2014). Denisa Kostovicova (2014) argues that in the case of
Serbia, intransigent or nationalist parties maintained a rhetoric opposing EU conditions with
regard to Kosovo to avoid public backlash, while simultaneously working to implement EUmandated conditions. Accordingly, domestic actors tempered hardline positions and how they
appealed to constituents in order to receive long-term external rewards (Moravcsik & Vachudova
2003). Conversely, though, EU aid and the prestige that candidacy brings to regimes can
ultimately undermine democratic institutions by weakening opposition and selectively using
reforms to target opposition or media (Börzel & Risse 2003; Kostovicova & Bojičić-Dželilović,
2006; Börzel, 2011). And, though regimes may not begin the accession process with devious
objectives in mind, prolonged timeframes subject to exogenous shocks, changes of domestic
government and the political will of EU member states reduces the credibility of incentives for
meeting conditionality. Hence both the appeal of rewards from the EU may change over time, as
may beliefs about the credibility of membership or long-term rewards being awarded, though the
rewards themselves or conditions do not change (Anastasakis, 2008; Grabbe, 2014; Kmezić,
2014; Ker-Lindsay et al., 2017).
To summarize, mediation can take facilitative or manipulative forms, both of which could
include formulation. The key distinction between these strategies is whether or not the third party
mediator offers some form of material reward or threatens some form of material or economic
sanction in exchange for concessions, outside of what benefits may be attained strictly through
the terms of a settlement. The logic underpinning manipulative mediation is that the threat of
sanctions or the perspective of rewards can alter decision-making calculus at the “second level”
of negotiations - the domestic space constraining the range of possible agreements an
interlocutor can agree to. An expanded domestic space in negotiations can expand the set of
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possible agreements that can be reached, with the aim being for the ranges of possible
agreements of the two sides to expand in such a way that they reach some overlap or common
areas they are willing to make concessions on. The three pathways in which domestic political
decision-making can be altered are: (1) economic sanctions, or “sticks,” that impose a continuing
cost on a target until it changes policies; (2) one-off or shorter term rewards that “compensate” a
potentially costly concession domestically; and, (3) longer term restructuring of reward
structures, best exemplified in the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo by European Union accession.
Importantly, for any of these pathways to be successful in altering domestic policy towards a
protracted conflict, they have to be accepted by the key political coalitions in the patron state.

2.4

Identifying Mechanisms

Drawing from this review, a few mechanisms can be identified that link mediation by
international actors to changes of preferences in protracted conflicts (Figure 2.2). Based on
points identified above and in the preceding chapter (Chapter 1), it is expected that mediators
will engage more openly with patron states rather than local regimes. Engagement with separatist
or unrecognized local regimes violates certain international norms of sovereignty that preclude
their recognition (Caspersen 2018; Coppetiers 2018). Direct engagement with such groups,
pursuant a settlement, assumes their capacity and legitimacy to enforce a settlement, conferring a
“legal personality” and strengthening separatist claims (Fortin 2017). Similarly, manipulative
engagement directly with local regimes can provide them with the resources and aid needed to
persist outside of state institutions, and likewise strengthen claims to autonomy or self-rule.
However, in-keeping with best practices of process tracing (Bennett & Checkel 2015), direct
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engagement between mediators and local regimes is still treated as a possible explanation, and
case evidence either confirming or refuting its mechanistic role is considered.

Figure 2.2. Mechanisms Linking Mediation to Policy Change.

Figure 2.2 identifies six potential mechanisms linking internationally-led mediation to policy
change within patron states. Mechanisms 1 and 2 involve direct engagement with local regimes,
which then communicate new preferences back to their patron states, presumably able to
leverage some change in policy, or signal to the patron state government that status quo policies
are insufficient. These two mechanisms are derived primarily from the theoretical concepts of
peacebuilding and the aim of peacebuilders to engage minority groups or weaker sides in
mutually acceptable state institutions as a means of redressing grievances (Call 2008). The
linkage between patron states and local regimes is explored in greater detail in the following
chapter (Chapter 3). The other four mechanisms are engagement directly between the mediator
and the patron state. Importantly, the outcome being observed is not the existence of these types
of engagement, most likely all forms of engagement are observable, but rather what type of
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engagement produces a change in the patron state’s policy towards the conflict. Mechanism 3
involves facilitative mediation, and Mechanisms 4, 5, and 6 manipulative mediation in which the
inducement is either a “stick” (sanction), short-term or one-off reward, or long-term payoff
structure. These mechanisms are summarized in table 2.2.
Table 2.2. Mechanisms.
Pathway

Outcome

1.

Facilitation w/ local
regime

Local regime engages in dialogue with
mediator and other side; alters beliefs about
others’ intentions

Joins mutual institutions in parent
state; conveys preference to patron
state

2.

Manipulation w/
local regime

Mediator “buys off” local regime leaders with
payoffs or government positions; individual
benefits payoffs exceed status quo benefits

Joins mutual institutions in parent
state; conveys preference to patron
state

3.

Facilitation w/
patron state

Mediator engages in dialogue with patron state;
provides assurances about other side;
communicates information from other side

Patron state alters beliefs about
other sides’ intentions or
preferences; changes policy to fit
new beliefs

4.

Manipulation w/
patron state:
sanction

Third-party sender imposes economic sanctions
on patron state with condition to alter policy for
sanctions to end

Patron implements new policy inline with conditions for sanctions
relief

5.

Manipulation w/
patron state: one-off
reward

Third-party offers patron state a one-off benefit
such as an aid package in exchange for
concessions

Patron state implements new
policy in order to receive reward;
lasts until reward is dispersed

6.

Manipulation w/
patron state: reward
structure

Third -party organization offers patron state
membership and long-term rewards in
exchange for concessions; membership favored
by key constituency in patron state

Patron state changes policy, if
supported by key elements of
government; credibility of rewards
declines over time.

2.5

Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been twofold. First, to situate protracted conflicts within the
larger context and research program of liberal peacebuilding after intra-state conflict, with the
intended outcome of building mutually-acceptable state institutions in which previously warring
sides participate. This is not to say that conflict ends or its underlying causes are precipitously
resolved when a side agrees to participate in mutual institutions. Rather that is the point at which
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conflict and its underlying causes and disputes begin to be resolved in an institutional setting
rather than using violent or contentious means. The underlying reasoning is that access to
institutions and the durability of institutions to contain disputes prevent recurrent violent conflict
(Walter 2015). The second purpose was to identify specific theoretically-defensible mechanisms
linking internationally-led peacemaking and mediation to specific changes to policies of patron
states towards protracted conflicts. Table 2 identifies and outlines six specific mechanisms which
are evaluated in Cyprus and Kosovo using case-specific historical evidence in Chapters 4 and 6.
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3

LOCAL REGIMES & DIAGONAL LINKAGES

In April 2003, after TRNC President Rauf Denktaş rejected the initially proposed Annan Plan for
reunification, the European Union communicated to Turkey that its bid for membership, begun
in 1999, required that it “strongly support efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the
Cyprus, building on the initiatives of the United Nations Secretary General, which remain on the
table.” A week later, restrictions on intercommunal contact and travel across the UNadministered ceasefire line between the TRNC and the Republic of Cyprus were lifted at
Ankara’s behest and talks on the Annan Plan resumed the following year (UNSC May 2003).13
In December 2011, after the EU withheld candidacy for membership from Serbia, EU High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton stated the condition that
Belgrade “exert maximum pressure on those in Kosovo preventing agreements from being
implemented.”14 Withholding of Serbia’s EU candidate status came after nine months of EU
mediated “technical dialogue” between Belgrade and Prishtina, which had stalled in fall 2011
after violent unrest in northern Kosovo blocking the implementation of agreements on customs
and border controls. When Serbia successfully completed the technical dialogue in March 2012,
including implementation, the EU granted it candidacy.15
What these anecdotes illustrate, in the context of these two protracted conflicts, is that
support for an agreement or a settlement by the patron state was not enough. In order to receive
the benefits of mediation, they had to implement agreements within their client unrecognized
local regimes, the TRNC and the parallel Serb administration in northern Kosovo. What these
anecdotes further illustrate is that in the context of both cases, client local regimes had their own

13

Quoted in Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (15 April 2003, 22 April 2003).
Quoted in AFP (11 December 2011).
15
Agence Europe (29 March 2011).
14
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agency and ability to veto settlements. For the Turkish Cypriots who were directly engaged in
the settlement process, this meant walking away from the table and blocking domestic policies
for implementation. For the Kosovo Serbs, who had little input in the settlement process, this
meant using violence and contentious displays to prevent implementation and undermine talks.
These actions taken to undermine talks approximate the “spoiler problem” in peace negotiations:
conscious acts of violence or subterfuge taken to undermine peace processes by actors whose
livelihoods, values, or worldviews are threatened by a settlement (Stedman 1997). These
examples further approximate the distinction between “internal” and “external” spoilers: those
who are party to the peace process who use institutional means to undermine agreement; and,
those outside of the process who must use extra-institutional means such as violence or public
unrest.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify mechanisms by which a patron state can
influence the decision-making of a local regime, in particular with regard to participation in the
parent state’s institutions. These mechanisms are largely based on an overview of three areas of
literature. First is an overview of a “local regime” that develops during and immediately after
ethnic conflict. Drawing from Gel’man & Ryzhenkov (2011), a local regime is disaggregated as
a complex of actors, institutions, resources, and strategies that determine the conduct of
subnational politics and links to higher tiers of authority. This relates directly to the second area:
elite preferences and incentives to cooperate or “spoil.” And this is followed by an overview of
ways in which local regimes are linked to external patron states. Ultimately I draw from these
three areas to identify the potential mechanisms linking patron states’ changes of policy to local
regime elites’ choice to accept the reality of the post-conflict state and participate in institutions,
or reject that reality in favor of the status quo.
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3.1

Conceptualizing the Local Regime

To restate the objective of liberal peacebuilding outlined in the previous chapter, foreign peace
interveners in a civil conflict aim to develop a strong institutional structure of the state that can
contain conflict and provide alternative means to violence to redress grievances (Call 2008;
Walter 2015). Democratic institutions have been, at least in theory, the intended outcome of
liberal peacebuilding, due to advantages that election cycles provide in revealing information
about sides’ intentions and preferences, regular monitoring, and a way for voters to sanction
parties (Matanock 2017). The question facing armed groups, particularly non-government, or
rebel armed groups after conflict is whether or not to accept the reality of the post-conflict state
and contest elections in the first place. In a simple form, this choice can be cast as a basic
prisoners’ dilemma, with certain expected values attached to the choices of “participate” or
“exit” (Petersen 2011). If the intended outcome is for mutual participation, then peacebuilding
begins from a position of mutual non-cooperation. A war such as the Russian Civil War, in
which neither side fully controlled the government, would approximate an “exit;exit” situation.
More common, though, are intra-state conflicts in which one side controls the machinery of the
state and the other side contests it, whether a rebel group seeking to overthrow a regime or a
separatist group seeking to secede from the state, approximating a “participate;exit” situation.
The difficulty in peacebuilding is then convincing the weaker or numerically inferior side, which
is not in control of government, to participate (Fearon 1994).
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Figure 3.1. Prisoners' Dilemma.
Numerous strategic factors influence the non-government side’s decision to cooperate or
not, but one additional factor is their group-level institutions. More developed group-level
institutions or “bush bureaucracies” that develop during conflict can result in a lower likelihood
of participation after fighting ends (Ishiyama & Widmeier 2013, 2019). While drawing heavily
from previous rigorous work on rebel and criminal governance, I conceptualize this more
broadly as local regimes: complexes of institutions, actors, resources, and strategies that
determine the conduct of local politics and links to higher tiers of political authority (Gel’man &
Ryzhenkov 2011). This broader definition, derived from the study of federalism in post-Soviet
Russia, is useful in that it does not depend on the presence of ongoing conflict to exist but can
persist in post-conflict states, and persist as political divisions after they are reintegrated into the
hierarchical structure of a parent state, while retaining their key aspects ex ante.
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Table 3.1.Local Regime Components.
Aspect

Example:

Actors

Individual elites in decision-making positions
at the local-level

Mayor or governor (hierarchical state); warlord,
chieftain, organized crime boss

Institutions

Modes of exchange between elites and local
public: what the elites provide to public in
exchange for support, tribute, or taxation

Municipal taxes in exchange for public services;
“pork” in exchange for political support; a
protection racket

Resources

Goods and/or funds necessary to provide
services to group or local public in exchange
for support

Budget or VAT transfers from line ministries
(hierarchical state); funds to pay salaries; militia
to provide protection

Strategies

Means that elites use to pursue or maintain
positions by appealing to constituents and
other officials; influenced by available
resources

Clientelism - distributing civil service posts to
supporters; ethnic closure - preventing group
members from seeking services from non-coethnics

While in the state of “exit” from state institutions, groups develop their own localized
institutions of exchange. As states lose capacity to provide essential functions and services
during intra-state conflict or crises (Milliken & Krause 2002), identity groups tend to turn inward
for those services, chief among which is protection either from other groups or the state itself
(Lake 2017). Locally this approximates Mancur Olson’s (1993) “stationary bandit” who in order
to maximize efficient extraction, stakes out a population under their protection to whom they
provide security in exchange for tribute or political support. In contrast to a “roving bandit” who
plunders a population then moves on, the stationary bandit’s rewards are based on the longevity
of their position and their protection of the population in order to maximize the tribute they
receive. This concept of governance has four facets: elites who provide services, a population
that receives those services, the type of services provided, and the type of tribute paid by the
population in return.
Firstly, institutions of exchange form between local publics and local elites who require
certain key services in the absence of state authority. These institutions range in complexity. At
the most basic end they can approximate organized criminal protection rackets in which those

41
with guns and training protect others in exchange for support, but also use their positions to deter
“clients” from seeking protection from other providers (Jackson 2021c). At the more developed
end, local institutions can include judicial, tax collection, and bureaucratic administrative
structures. More developed institutions generally equate to longer perceived time horizons, with
institutional structures intended to increase efficient control over populations or areas for a
longer time (Arjona 2016). Importantly for these institutions to function, there is an identified
group which receives their benefits. Benefits distributed on the basis of ethnic identity restrict
distribution to a relatively stable group in the short term (Fearon 1999, Laitin & Van der Veen
2012), and facilitate efficient distribution through existing networks and shared practices
(Habyarimana et al. 2007). Accordingly, as states collapse into crisis or intra-state conflict, group
identities are often restructured to narrower, more exclusive, sets of traits that more clearly
define group membership and who receives finite benefits (Chandra 2012; Chandra & Boulet
2012). What this often means, though, is where group members are geographically concentrated,
non-members are removed either by killing them off or forcibly expelling them (Chinkin &
Kaldor 2017). Expropriation of non-members’ property then serves both as a resource for ingroup distribution and as an obstacle to future settlements (Jenne 2010).
At the head of these group-based institutions are ethnic elites whose positions are
determined by their ability to provide services required by the group. As Charles Tilly (2003)
argues, a critical relationship in any system of governance is between administrators and
“violence entrepreneurs” or those actors capable of deploying organized violence. In a
consolidated state setting this would mean the relationship between an executive and the military
or police services capable of using organized violence to enforce rules or protect the state. In a
non-consolidated or conflict setting, this relationship is decentralized and key “violence
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entrepreneurs” can be warlords, militia leaders, paramilitaries, or gang leaders capable of
mobilizing organized forms of violence (Tilly 2003). Accordingly in conflict settings, such
“violence entrepreneurs” may be the notable local elites providing protection to their groups or
have considerable influence or even veto power over group-level elites (Driscoll 2015). For
example, for the Turkish Cypriot elite, which had few distributable resources while living in
cramped and blockaded enclaves from 1964-74, their relationship with the paramilitary TMT was
critical to their governance. The TMT provided protection, prevented Turks from leaving
enclaves for better-served government-held areas, and enforced local rules including
conscription that kept their fighting capability high (Jackson 2021c). Aside from the provision of
protection and the influence of “violence entrepreneurs,” group-based elites are also those who
have access to black and gray economies capable of providing key goods such as food or
medicine during conflict (Koehler & Zürcher 2003). Such actors, whose positions within groups
rise based on their ability to provide goods and services during conflict, come to resemble a
wartime nouveau riche. Those who may have had skilled careers prior to conflict may abandon
them for the in-group benefits of smuggling or warlording (Andreas 2004; Reno 2009).
On the other side of these institutions of exchange, group-members pay tribute to group
elites in return for protection and other services. In Olson’s (1993) conceptualization, this takes
the form of taxation as a form of extraction beneficial to elites over time. However, tribute is not
strictly material or monetary and can take the form of political support, loyalty, and trust for
elites which allows them to maintain their positions of power within the group and speak on the
group’s behalf (Stroschein 2017; Blattman et al. 2021). To maintain their status, though, elites
must have the ability to satisfy group-level demands. As the need for protection decreases after
conflict, patronage derived from formal and/or informal institutions is necessary to maintain
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support (Darden 2008; Jackson 2021a). Patronage inducements can include public works, funds
for development, favors with the bureaucracy, or local civil service posts, distributed not in
exchange for bribes, but in exchange for continued political support (Chandra 2004; Kitschelt &
Wilkinson 2007). As Kanchan Chandra (2004) argues, in rigid ethnic settings, party order and
loyalty is based largely on distribution of these inducements to members. While in ethnicallymixed electoral districts, parties can maintain support on ethno-nationalist appeals or by
opposing other groups (Manning 2004), in ethnically distinct areas, maintaining support requires
tangible benefits (Chandra 2004). Elites then require continued access to resources as a source of
patronage for supporters and can condition their participation in mutual institutions which allow
access to patronage (Jackson 2021a).
When intra-state fighting ends without an outright victory for one side over the other,
these local regimes persist into the “post-conflict” period (Arjona 2014). This is perhaps most
evident in the so-called “frozen conflicts” of the post-Soviet space in which fighting has ended,
but the outcome is indeterminate, and the numerically weaker side remains outside of the
recognized state order.16 In the context of such conflicts, group-level elites face the question of
whether to accept the post-conflict state organization, with authority derived from the central
government, or reject it in favor of their “unrecognized” status quo (Ishiyama & Widmeier
2013). Such conflicts are the most difficult to resolve though, even by the difficult standards of
intra-state conflicts (Gowan & Stedman 2018). As a growing research program on the political
development of unrecognized states demonstrates, they are not simply ungoverned areas as early
works argued (e.g., Kolossov & O’Laughlin 1999; Lynch 2004), but have developed institutional

These “frozen conflicts” are generally taken to include Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and
Transnistria.
16
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structures with reciprocal relations with their populations (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008, 2012;
Bakke et al. 2014).
3.2

Post-Conflict Elites & Institutional Preferences

Local regimes’ choice whether to participate in shared institutions after fighting ends or remain
outside of them as “unrecognized” entities is influenced by their elites’ decisions and strategies.
On the one hand, they face the prospect of new institutional structures to access government and
redress grievances, as well as access patronage through ministerial transfers (Jackson 2021a). On
the other hand, these new structures include mechanisms for bureaucratic oversight,
accountability, and sanctioning (Skendaj 2014; Matanock 2017; Jackson 2021b). Many local
regime elites rise to prominence because of conflict and have greater social roles and values
during conflict than they had before it began or will after it ends (Collier et al. 2004). Accepting
new institutions, especially democratic ones, is costly to such elites’ positions of power or
personal gain from illicit activity (King 2001; Zürcher et al. 2013). Though participation in
central institutions and elections can provide a means of elites accessing patronage from state
institutions or federal structures (Ishiyama & Marshall 2016), it can also adversely affect critical
local constituencies, upset local patterns of distribution or patronage, and conflict with strategies
of ethnic closure. Weak leaders may eschew cooperation as a way of outbidding in-group
opponents, to shore up nationalist support and avoid ousting (Crocker et al. 2004). In the context
of protracted conflicts, there are three means through which elites discourage participation in
state institutions (Table 3.2).
One means of discouraging participation is the use of in-group sanctions and policing to
deter group members from crossing ethnic boundaries to participate in or seek benefits from nonco-ethnic institutions. As Stathis Kalyvas (2008) argues, ethnic group-members are likely to
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defect to the out-group if their group’s resource endowment and ability to distribute resources
declines. Group-level elites seek to deter this with threats of violence. The same mechanisms that
facilitate in-group distribution, increased information and trust, also facilitate in-group policing
and enforcement. Group-level elites can gather information quickly on potential defectors
through community networks and threaten or punish them or ostracize them from the group
(Fearon & Laitin 1996; Habyarimana et al. 2007). In pre-1974 Cyprus the Turkish Cypriot
leaders used local-level legislation and threats of imprisonment or violence to deter Turkish
Cypriots from leaving their cramped enclaves to live in better-served Greek Cypriot areas
(Jackson 2021c). And, in pre-2013 Kosovo, parallel Serb elites used violent attacks and “naming
and shaming” as “national traitors” those Kosovo Serbs who participated in central institutions
(Jackson 2021a).
Another means of discouraging cooperation is through group-level discourse and
narratives. Building on Petersen’s (2011) study of the Western Balkans, these narratives can be
used to manipulate and foster certain emotions and associated actions. In this regard, even undersupplied local regimes can maintain in-group support by embellishing the threats posed by nonco-ethnics, or the state itself - a fear of conquest if group unity is broken (Lynch 2004;
Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2011). Discourse invoking fear of others’ intentions or resentment over loss
of status can contribute to isolation and deter contact. Discourse invoking anger or hatred creates
feelings of an existential struggle, in which the other cannot be reasoned or compromised with
and only “removed” or destroyed (Petersen 2011). While these emotions are not naturally
occurring, groups’ existence in a state of conflict, even very low-intensity conflict with limited
violence, regularly reproduces and reinforces these emotions (Halperin 2008). Individual acts of
violence, or even mundane activities, contribute to narratives of an existential struggle and deter
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cooperation by group members. Discourse by Turkish Cypriot elites construed the Republic of
Cyprus’ weapons imports and security reforms, under peacekeepers’ supervision, as part of a
larger plot to expel Turks from Cyprus after 1967 (Jackson 2021c). Similarly in Kosovo, acts
such as ethnic-Albanian farmers gathering or street crime, were cast as evidence of a plot by a
radical “Albanian National Army” or Al Qaeda to cleanse the Serbs from Kosovo.17 In both
instances, simple acts were cast as part of a broader existential struggle in which cooperation
across the ethnic boundary or letting down one’s guard would lead to destruction of the group.
Lastly, a third means of discouraging cooperation is through acts of spoiling. Following
Stephen John Stedman (1997), spoilers are those actors whose livelihoods, positions, and/or
worldviews are threatened by peace and use violence or sabotage to undermine settlements. This
description maps onto many theoretical expectations about local regime and group-level elites
outlined above. Individual elites who derive their positions of power and resources to maintain
support from illicit markets, commanding militias, or providing public services in the absence of
state institutions, stand to lose their stations within the group in a peace settlement (Collier et al.
2004). They have an incentive, instead, to prolong the status quo to maintain their positions
(King 2001), especially if their influence in the central government will be reduced (Driscoll
2015).
Spoilers can exist inside of the peace process, using institutional means to undermine
settlements or upset talks (Zahar 2006, 2010). Or they can exist outside of the process, often

17

The Albanian National Army was a radical splinter group that formed after the insurgent conflicts in Kosovo,
southern Serbia, and Macedonia with support from radical elements of the demobilized Kosovo Liberation Army
and National Liberation Army. It carried out a few armed attacks in Macedonia after 2001, but was more of a
strawman for Serbian and Macedonian nationalists to attribute individual acts of violence to a larger ethnonationalist plot. See: Phillips (2004); Jackson (2021a, 2021b). Serb officials began claiming that the Albanian
insurgents in Kosovo and southern Serbia were part of a broader campaign by Al Qaeda after the September 11
terror attacks in the US, and continued this claim in response to later episodes violence including the 2004 ethnic
riots. See: Interview with Nebojša Čović, RTS [in Serbian] (23 September 2001); Tanjug [in Serbian] (4 October
2004).
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using more overt means such as violence to undermine support for agreements and to create a
lack of trust, in particular for pro-peace or moderate factions (Stedman 1997; Kydd & Walter
2002). Especially for those external to the peace process, spoiling can be a means of asserting
agency or gaining a voice by signaling their ability to disrupt a settlement (Newman &
Richmond 2006). Targeted or indiscriminate violence during peace talks can have the effect of
manipulating group-members’ emotions, provoking reprisals or reducing support for inter-group
cooperation (Petersen 2011).
Identification of spoilers and the timing of spoiling has been challenging to scholarly
studies of peace processes. The risk of spoiling is greatest when officials commit to a peace
process from which they cannot back out or climb down, and the spoilers themselves have public
support (Aggestam 2006). There is disagreement, however, as to who constitutes a spoiler player
in a peace process. Broad definitions identify spoiling as “any violence committed by those who
oppose an accord” (Sisk 2006), or even more broadly as “actions taken to disrupt, undermine,
hinder, or delay a peace process” (Newman & Richmond 2006). Andrew Reiter (2016) builds on
these broad definitions to add that spoilers may use violence to “modify” peace agreements that
they deem insufficient. These definitions linking violence to peace, however, leave the type and
intention of violence broadly defined. Violence is to be expected in a post-conflict setting,
pursuing various objects that may not be linked to peace processes, such as revenge and personal
grievances (Petersen 2011), or criminality, sometimes construed as “accidental spoiling” (Mac
Ginty 2006). Broad definitions lead to the observation that anybody could be a “potential
spoiler” regardless of intent (Newman & Richmond 2006). David Cunningham (2006) provides a
more nuanced conceptualization of “viable spoilers” as veto players in a peace process whose
agreement is needed in order to reach a settlement. They may signal their viability through
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contentious or violent displays, but other forms of violence such as personal feuds or criminal
turf wars do not constitute spoiling. Accordingly, “potential spoilers” can then be identified by
the necessity of those players' agreement in securing and implementing a settlement.

Table 3.2. Strategies of Deterring Cooperation
Means

Purpose

Examples

In-group
policing

Prevent defection and/or group-members seeking
services from non-co-ethnic institutions

TMT preventing Turkish Cypriots from
moving outside of enclaves.

Discourse

Narrative that evokes emotions in group-members
and casts others’ as existential threats to their
survival who can not be reasoned or cooperated with

Serb leaders’ narrative that violence in
Kosovo was part of a broader civilizational
conflict with Al Qaeda.

Spoiling

Use of violence, sabotage, or contentious displays to
undermine a settlement by veto players whose
agreement is needed. Intended to undermine support
for pro-peace factions.

Colombian paramilitaries attacking FARC
rebels during peace negotiations,
undermines trust that agreement will be
enforced.18

3.3

Diagonal Linkage

Lastly, a critical component of local regimes’ survival is access to resources that elites can use to
protect the group, provide goods and services, or distribute patronage in order to build and retain
the support of group members. One such source of resources is linkage to external patron states,
more often than not ethnic kin-states, that support the subnational group’s political claims and
survival outside of the state organization. Drawing on Rogers Brubaker’s (1995) idea of the
“triadic nexus,” in the absence of a robust hierarchical linkage between a subnational group and
its parent state, that group’s relations with a proximate kin-state or patron state become more
salient.19 I term this relationship a “diagonal linkage” in that it is not a hierarchical linkage in the

18

See case study by Nasi (2006).
The distinction of “patron state” is a more generalizable definition than kin-state, which requires a condition of
shared identity. For example, Russians have a separate ethnic identity from Armenians, but Russia has long been a
patron state to the Armenians who considered Russia to be a protector from the Ottomans. See: Abushov (2019).
19
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traditional sense between a state and a subnational group, but a patron-client relationship
between an external state and the subnational group within a parent state. This linkage between
groups and cross-border patrons has been identified as an important factor in conflict onset,
duration, and political claim-making by ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985). The importance of
diagonal linkages between patrons and subnational groups has been less explored in studies of
peace processes.
In studies of conflict onset and duration, external patrons or proximate cross-border
conflicts are an important variable. On the one hand, there is the risk of conflict in one state
spilling over (“contagion”) into a neighboring state (Buhaug & Gleditsch 2008). Risk of conflict
spillover is particularly high when a receiving state has reduced capacity, especially in peripheral
regions (Braithewaite 2010), although this risk is significantly reduced by the presence of foreign
peacekeepers (Beardsley 2011). On the other hand, patron states can influence groups’ ability to
wage conflict by supplying arms and trained fighters that allow groups to punch above their
weight (Caspersen 2007; Gleditsch 2007; Cederman et al. 2009). This makes conflict
simultaneously intra-state and transnational, or international if multiple patrons become
involved, what Paul Diehl and others (2021) have labeled “international-civil militarized
conflicts.”
Beyond material terms, patron or kin- states also influence political claims made by
groups that lead to conflict onset (Horowitz 1985; Brubaker 1995). For a group to see its ethnic
kin succeed in their claim-making in a neighboring state can influence their own claim-making in
their parent state. For example, in the insurgent conflicts in southern former-Yugoslavia, the
success of the Kosovo Liberation Army, albeit with NATO support, influenced the political
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claims of ethnic-Albanians in southern Serbia and Macedonia seeking to improve their own
political status, triggering armed insurgencies (Jackson 2021a, 2021b).
Patron states are likewise key variables in the survival of groups outside of state
institutions after fighting ends. As Crocker and others (2004) note in their review of intractable
conflicts, external resource endowment can prolong conflicts by extending hardline or
uncooperative leaders’ time horizons or beliefs about future survival. Local regime elites’
legitimacy and in-group support depend upon their ability to provide for group members and
require access to resources from an alternative source than the parent state (Kolstø & Blakkisrud
2008, 2012; Berg & Mölder 2012). This ranges from providing basic services such as protection
or healthcare to more developed institutions such as education, jobs, and economic development.
Inability to meet these needs may result in an elite conceding and accepting a role in state
institutions or being ousted by a challenger capable of providing them. Access to external
resource flows, though, alters this decision about political survival in the status quo. Basic
services require specific equipment, such as weapons, medicine, and funds to pay salaries, while
more advanced services require infrastructure, specialized construction, and loans for
development. Patron states can meet all of these material needs (Bakke et al. 2015, Kanol &
Koprulu 2017). As unrecognized local regimes are constrained in external relations, patron states
are also key conduits of trade and investment, and sources of employment, remittances, and
education for group members (Cantir 2015, Comai 2018).
Patron states’ support for local regimes allows them to survive outside of state orders,
either as unrecognized states or separatist entities, but also constrains their decision-making
capacity. Many such entities demonstrate overreliance on patron states that limits their ability to
act autonomous in their own affairs, whether in security, economic policy, or executive decision-
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making (Kanol 2015; Berg & Vits 2018; Ker-Lindsay & Berg 2018). While Ishiyama and Batta
(2012) argue that unrecognized states fail to consolidate democratic institutions due to the
persistent threat of conquest that favors autocratic or dominant parties, others argue that
institutional consolidation is obstructed by the external influence of patron states (Kanol 2015;
Kanol & Koprulu 2017). In a 1996 ruling, for example, the European Court of Human Rights
pronounced that the TRNC lacked the capacity to act autonomously and was a “subordinate
regime” to Ankara (Risini 2018). The case example of the Serb Republic of Krajina, which
existed autonomously within Croatia from 1991-95, illustrates that its leaders' patrons in Serbia
conditioned their support on certain political demands that ultimately destroyed the linkage
between the Serb elites and local population. Belgrade shifted its material and political support to
group elites aligned with its preferences, which created a conflict between them and the previous
powerholders (Caspersen 2007; Kolstø & Pauković 2014).20
To summarize, diagonal linkage, or the dependent relationship between a subnational
group and an external patron state, affects both the ability of local regime elites to provide sought
after services and constrains their autonomous decision-making ability. As group members may
shift their political support to leaders best able to provide services or patronage (Chandra 2004),
so too may patron states shift their political and material support to local regime leaders best able
to deliver on their preferences. Bearing in mind, though, the ability of local regime elites to
assert agency by spoiling or deterring cooperation, this does not mean that these elites will

20

As this case study further illustrates, this conflict between the two factions of Serb leaders destroyed the Serb
Republic of Krajina’s weak institutions as one side used its support from Belgrade to build its own forces while the
other built local popular support. Respective forces were geared more toward outbidding one another through
predation of the population, protection racketeering, and smuggling that by the time Croatian forces retook Krajina
in Operations Flash and Storm in 1995, the ability of the Krajina administration to organize and defend itself had
been completely undermined. A similar dynamic was observed in Chechnya, where the local regime failed to
consolidate clan-based groups in a single institutional structure, which ultimately led to it being unable to organize a
coherent defense in the Second Chechen War. See: Aliyev & Souleimanov (2019).
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unquestioningly implement patron state preferences. In fact it may bring them directly in conflict
with patron states and fellow group members, as in Krajina. In this sense, the patron state-local
regime relationship approximates a principal-agent problem, especially when one side changes
its policies or priorities, in which the agent (local regime) has its own preferences and strategies
distinct from the principal (patron state). Furthermore this “agent” has become entrenched in
their position with the support of the “principal.”

Table 3.3. Diagonal Linkage Pathways.
Pathway

Influence

Examples

Dictate
preferences

Local regimes as “puppets” of patron
states, change preferences to reflect
interests of patrons; undermined by
increased local agency

Serbian government forcing Kosovo Serbs to
boycott participation on principle in 2004

National
disassociation

Patron state withdraws support for local
regime, claims its identity is not
associated

Russia withdrawing support from
Armenia/Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020

Resource
transfer

Patron states provide material resources
for local regime to survive outside of
parent state institutions

Turkey funding 50-80% of Turkish Cypriot
budget after 1974

Leadership
support

Patron state providing political resources
to one set of leaders in local regime;
could in include material resources or
political campaigning using patron state
facilities and media

Serbian government officials campaigning for
Kosovo Serb Lista Srpska; blacking out media
coverage of other parties

Threatening
withdrawal of
support

Using negative incentives to deter a local
regime position or policy that conflicts
with patron states preferences

Kenan Evren threatening to remove Turkish
Cypriot government if it declared independence
in 1983; AKP threat to withhold financial support
from Turkish Cypriots if Ersin Tatar lost 2020
election

3.4

Identifying Mechanisms

Building on this theoretical overview, mechanisms linking changes in patron states’ policies to
group-level elites’ decision-making to participate in the institutions of their parent state or not,
can be identified. Importantly this decision is taken at the level of the local regime. By
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disaggregating the local regime into actors, institutions, resources, and strategies, specific
changes can be identified at the local regime-level that answers questions of how group-level
elites participate or prevent participation in state institutions, and how their diagonal linkage to
patron states affects their decision making (see Mahoney 2015 on disaggregating mechanisms).
Working backwards, this mechanism that links participation to changes in patron states’ policies
(M2) can further be subdivided into two phases: (1) altering what is obstructing participation at
the local regime level (Table 3.2); and, (2) altering how patron states support and/or constrain
local regimes (Table 3.3).

Figure 3.2. Pathways Linking Patron State Policies to Local Regime Cooperation.
Figure 3.2 identifies five potential mechanisms by which patron states can alter local regimes’
decision-making, and potential mechanisms by which local regimes strategies towards
participation may change. Mechanisms 1 and 2 are expected to be the least likely to be
successful. It is unlikely that a national group in a patron state would precipitously end its
association with a proximate group in order to further a strategic objective, especially in the
context of a protracted conflict in which that national group casts itself as in an existential
struggle. As Jelena Subotić (2016) demonstrates, in Serbia, state-level elites rather reconstructed
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their narrative reaffirming Kosovo as an integral part of Serbian identity, bolstering national
claims, despite simultaneously making concessions. It is likewise unlikely that a patron state can
simply dictate new preferences to local elites which are then implemented in practice, given that
local elites have their own constituents, interests, and strategies. For example, in the early
months after the Kosovo War, the Serb local regime in Kosovo developed specifically because it
refused to accept the authority of officials in Serbia ruling from Belgrade, while they were the
ones providing for the local population. However, this is not to say that these strategies were not
attempted at any point and, though unlikely to succeed, considering evidence of their use and
why they may have failed is also useful.
Mechanisms 3, 4, and 5 then address the more in-depth pathways of diagonal linkage. By
Mechanism 3 the patron state would seek to induce change in the local regime’s decision-making
by altering resource flows that constrict the strategies elites can employ, or by conditioning
resource transfers on certain preferences. By Mechanism 4 the patron state would provide
political support, such as patronage, coveted posts, or campaign support to key local leaders in
exchange for supporting its preferences. Mechanism 5 is then the converse, by which the patron
state uses threats to withdraw support from political leaders who oppose its preferences, such as
threats of withdrawing campaign support, withholding resources, or stripping employment or
posts.
Following a change within the local regime, the question is then what changes in order
for participation to occur. Mechanisms A, B, C, and D (Figure 1) constitute potential paths
through which changes to local regimes result in institutional participation. These include: (A)
new preferences for participation adopted by local regime elites; (B) new leadership in the local
regime that favors participation rather than the status quo; (C) access to resources or distributable
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patronage available through state institutions; and/or, (D) a change to intra-group policing or
enforcement of the status quo in which local regime “violence entrepreneurs” end or reduce
sanctions against co-ethnics for crossing the ethnic boundary or for seeking services from nonco-ethnic institutions.

3.5

Summary

The purpose of this chapter, building on the preceding chapter (Chapter 2), has been to identify
specific ways in which changes to policies and preferences within patron states produce change
in protracted conflicts, particularly with regard to participation in shared institutions. In order to
theorize mechanisms by which this change occurs, it is first necessary to disaggregate the
concept of a local regime as a complex of subnational actors, institutions, resources, and
strategies, and situate it specifically in the context of an identity-based or ethnic conflict. It is
then possible to identify specific ways in which local regime actors gain and maintain local
support, and specifically how they prevent cooperation with non-co-ethnics. Lastly, it is possible
to identify the specific ways in prior case studies and theorize that patron states influence local
regimes, as key sources of necessary resources, political support, and as conduits to the outside
world. Accordingly, building on Chester Crocker and others’ (2004) assertion that intractable or
protracted conflicts persist in large part due to resource endowments and intra-group politics, this
chapter has identified a number of ways in which external patrons can alter political actors,
institutions, and strategies, as well as resource endowments at the local regime level. These
mechanisms are further evaluated, using in-depth historical evidence in the cases of Cyprus
(Chapter 5) and Kosovo (Chapter 7). An important aspect of these analyses is empirically
“reconstructing” local regimes as sets of informal institutions and relationships and identifying
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how specific aspects of those local regimes were altered through “diagonal linkage” at key points
in the conflict resolution process.
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4

GOOD OFFICES & THE MOTHERLAND IN THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

In January 2003, the Turkish Foreign Ministry included support for the United Nations’ “Annan
Plan” - the comprehensive settlement for Cyprus, proposed in November 2002 - in its official
foreign policy strategy, departing from a long-standing position supporting Turkish Cypriot
sovereignty, and more recent policy in the 1990s pursuing increased integration of the TRNC
with Turkey. This change to official policy towards Cyprus was in direct response to external
developments in the mediation of a settlement of the Cyprus conflict. Following the theoretical
outline presented in Chapter 2, this chapter traces changes to Turkey’s policy positions towards
Cyprus as the “patron state” of the Turkish Cypriots. The aim is to identify how different forms
of mediation altered or failed to alter preferences and policies towards Cyprus, and how these
forms of mediation interacted with the domestic political conditions within Turkey.
It is important to note that in addition to Turkey’s governing coalitions during this period,
the Turkish military constituted an additional powerful veto player in Turkish domestic politics.
Beginning in 1960, the military ousted civilian governments four times, ostensibly to safeguard
the republican constitution adopted in 1923 and create stability during periods of economic,
social, and political unrest. With each intervention the military’s role and influence in politics
grew, institutionalized in the National Security Council (MGK). In conceptualizing Turkey’s
domestic political space (Level II in Putnam’s “two-level game”), there were two sets of
domestic veto players constraining possible agreements: the civilian governing coalition and the
MGK. Their relationship had an important bearing on policy outcomes (Aydinli, Özcan, &
Akyaz 2006).
The analysis proceeds chronologically over six periods. The first period, prior to the
initiation of UN mediation in 1964, is intended to provide background and context of the Cyprus
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conflict including the negotiation of independence between Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The
remaining five periods, from 1964-2021, provide an overview of efforts to mediate a solution to
the conflict, focusing specifically on mediators’ strategies, Turkey’s preferences, and policy
changes. Each section concludes by relating the observations to the mechanisms for inducing
policy change outlined in Chapter 2 (restated in Table 4.1 below).

Table 4.1. Mechanisms.
Pathway

Outcome

1.

Facilitation w/ local
regime

Local regime engages in dialogue with
mediator and other side; alters beliefs about
others’ intentions

Joins mutual institutions in parent
state; conveys preference to patron
state

2.

Manipulation w/
local regime

Mediator “buys off” local regime leaders with
payoffs or government positions; individual
benefits payoffs exceed status quo benefits

Joins mutual institutions in parent
state; conveys preference to patron
state

3.

Facilitation w/
patron state

Mediator engages in dialogue with patron state;
provides assurances about other side;
communicates information from other side

Patron state alters beliefs about
other sides’ intentions or
preferences; changes policy to fit
new beliefs

4.

Manipulation w/
patron state:
sanction

Third-party sender imposes economic sanctions
on patron state with condition to alter policy for
sanctions to end

Patron implements new policy inline with conditions for sanctions
relief

5.

Manipulation w/
patron state: one-off
reward

Third-party offers patron state a one-off benefit
such as an aid package in exchange for
concessions

Patron state implements new
policy in order to receive reward;
lasts until reward is dispersed

6.

Manipulation w/
patron state: reward
structure

Third -party organization offers patron state
membership and long-term rewards in
exchange for concessions; membership favored
by key constituency in patron state

Patron state changes policy, if
supported by key elements of
government; credibility of rewards
declines over time.

4.1

Intercommunal Relations & Independence

Cyprus as an independent state was the product of negotiations between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot communities, their national homelands of Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus’ colonial
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ruler, Britain. The island of Cyprus had been under British dominion since 1878 and ruled as a
Crown Colony since 1914. Under British rule, as under Ottoman rule that preceded it (15711878), the Greek and Turkish communities, the island’s largest, existed separate from one
another in public life. Each celebrated its own national holidays, spoke its own language, flew its
own flags, and ran its own schools with teachers and materials imported from respective
homelands (Anastasiou 2008b). There was limited interaction between communities and minimal
common “Cypriot” identity. Rather identity was communal, linked more closely to the respective
homeland nationalisms of Greece and Turkey. These national identities, though, were rooted in
conflict with one another. Modern Greek nationalism was rooted in its struggle against the
Ottomans in the Greek War of Independence (1821-29) and the Balkan Wars (1912-13). And
Turkish nationalism was rooted in the Greco-Turkish War (1919-22) from which the modern
Republic of Turkey was born (see Souter 1984; Mavratsas 1997; Joseph 2009).

Table 4.2. Cyprus Demographics, 1960.
Greek Cypriot

Turkish Cypriot

Other

Percent (total pop.)

78

18

4

Numerical

441,583

103,822

~22,000

Separate and conflictual national identities resulted in irreconcilable visions for a Cypriot
state. Greek Cypriots favored enosis - political union with Greece in a single Hellenic state. In
1947 Greek Cypriot officials petitioned British authorities for enosis and in 1950 held an
unofficial referendum in favor of enosis (Anastasiou 2008a). The Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy
Council, composed of Orthodox Church leaders and led by Ethnarch of Cyprus Archbishop
Makarios III, organized the pro-enosis movement and petitioned Athens for international
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support.21 Greece raised the issue of Cyprus’ independence in the United Nations and sued
Britain over its colonial policing practices in Cyprus at the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) (Heraclides 2011; Ker-Lindsay 2011; Risini 2018).
For the Turks, enosis was a strategic threat to Turkey (50 miles from Cyprus) and an
existential threat to the Turkish Cypriots. They had watched their co-ethnics be forcibly expelled
from Crete when it was annexed by Greece after the Balkan Wars and feared a similar fate in
Cyprus. They instead advocated taksim - ethnic partition of Cyprus between Greeks and Turks
linked to their homelands. Turkey had formally renounced its territorial claims to Cyprus in
1923, but the Turkish government and military believed that enosis threatened the concept of
“territorial balance” that underpinned the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and was a Greek attempt to
revise the regional status quo at Turkey’s expense (Loizides 2007; Heraclides 2011).22
Intercommunal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots began in 1956. The Greek
Cypriot EOKA, an enosist insurgency supplied by Greece and led by Greek General George
Grivas had begun a guerilla campaign against British colonial authorities in 1955. The EOKA
avoided confrontations with the Turkish community, casting itself as strictly anti-colonial
(Fouskas 2001).23 British authorities, though, had disproportionately recruited Turkish Cypriots
as officials and gendarmes, making them EOKA targets (Novo 2012). This, coupled with
international constraints of Britain’s policing practices due to the Greek petition at the ECtHR,

21

The Ethnarchy Council and position of Ethnarch were vestiges of the Ottoman millet system of non-territorial
decentralization through which different nationalities under Ottoman dominion, signified by religious affiliation
were afforded cultural autonomy under religious officials in exchange for tribute to the Sublime Porte. Archbishop
Makarios III, born Michael Mouskos, was elected Ethnarch of Cyprus by the Ethnarchy Council in 1950. He had
adopted the clerical name Makarios III upon his appointment as Bishop of Kition in 1948.
22
The concept of territorial balance, agreed in 1923, was that the borders of Turkey and Greece (and Bulgaria) were
delimited and ethnic populations could be exchanged to those delimited states, but states could not claim new
territory based on a national population residing there.
23
The EOKA had initially distributed Turkish-language pamphlets in Turk-inhabited areas clarifying that its target
was British rule.
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led to the creation of Turkish Cypriot paramilitary protection groups.24 In 1958 they were
consolidated into a single pro-taksim militia, the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) whose
fighters were trained and supplied by the Turkish military (Kadıoğlu and Bezci 2020).25
Simultaneously facing a guerilla conflict, intercommunal violence, and international
pressure the British began negotiating a “short-of-independence” settlement in 1955. Four British
proposals (Table 3) envisioned forms of limited self-rule with Britain retaining authority in
defense, policing, or foreign affairs. The MacMillan Plan (1958), which proposed a seven-year
period of joint rule by Greece and Turkey under British supervision, was particularly unpalatable
to the Greek side and the EOKA, which rightly believed Ankara would never permit enosis after
joint rule ended (Fisher 2001). Unlike Grivas and the EOKA, Makarios was willing to negotiate
independence in the short-term, though he refused to rule out enosis to avoid a split with the
EOKA (Fisher 2001; Ker-Lindsay 2011).
Cyprus’ independence was agreed at talks in Zurich and London in 1959 between Britain,
Greece, and Turkey. Collectively known as the “1960 Treaties,” the Treaties of Establishment
and Guarantee provided for an independent state of Cyprus with power shared between Greek
and Turkish Cypriots at three levels. At the communal-level, each would have a Communal
Chamber to oversee community matters such as religion and education.26 At the state-level,
power would be shared in a proportional assembly and executive council with a Greek Cypriot
President (Archbishop Makarios) and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President (Fazıl Küçük) who both

24

The ECtHR petition against British rule in Cyprus drastically reduced the efficacy of its police, including banning
them from carrying firearms and detaining suspected insurgents.
25
A number of TMT fighters who had been recruited by 1958 had received formal training as gendarmes from the
British authorities. The TMT was overseen by a special military intelligence unit in Turkey named “The Project for
Reconquering Cyprus” run by Turkish FM Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. Turkish army commandos who had officially
“resigned” were smuggled into Cyprus as teachers or temporary workers to train and advise the TMT, and arms were
smuggled from Turkey. After the 1960 coup in Turkey Zorlu was executed and the unit disbanded.
26
This had been a specific preference of the Turkish Cypriot leader Fazıl Küçük, who had long advocated for the
return of the Islamic authority in Cyprus (EVKAF) to communal oversight rather than colonial administration.
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had legislative veto power. Employment in the civil service would adhere to a 70:30 Greek-toTurk ratio, except the security services, which would be 60:40 (Souter 1984; Anastasiou 2008b).
Lastly, at the international level, the Treaty of Guarantee gave Britain, Greece, and Turkey the
role of “guarantors” of Cyprus’ constitutional order, permitting each to station a limited military
force in Cyprus and the right to intervene if the constitution was violated (Fisher 2001; KerLindsay 2011).27
Cyprus became independent in August 1960, but the power-sharing framework
envisioned in the 1960 Treaties was never consolidated. On the Greek Cypriot side, nationalists
believed that the EOKA’s five-year struggle against colonial rule had entitled them to enosis. The
more practical concern, though, was the constitutional system that precluded reform without the
guarantors’ approval - derided by Makarios as “incomplete sovereignty.” On the Turkish Cypriot
side Vice President Küçük believed the constitution had failed to prevent the marginalization of
the Turks and protested failure to meet constitutionally-mandated civil service quotas, including
in the National Guard (army).28

27

This included two Sovereign Base Areas retained by Britain. The presumption of the Treaty of Guarantee was that
violation of the constitutional order would be clearly indicated and the guarantor states would act in concert to
restore order. However it did not rule out unilateral action by any guarantor.
28
Makarios had stated his intention to disregard constitutional mandates on employment and representation
beginning in January 1962, which sparked nationalist responses on both sides. Interviews with Makarios and Küçük
in The Times (9 January 1962, 17 September 1962, 7 January 1963, 1 April 1963).
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Table 4.3. Pre-Independence Negotiations, 1955-60.
Year

Mediator

Outcome

1955

Britain

Eden Plan: self-rule, limited sovereignty

Rejected

1956

Britain

Harding Plan: self-rule, minority protections

Rejected

Britain

Radcliffe Plan: self-rule, limited sovereignty

Rejected

1958

Britain

MacMillan Plan: 7-year joint rule by Greek and Turkey

Rejected

1959

Britain

Zurich-London Talks: Treaties of Establishment and
Guarantee

Accepted, independence
1960

The failure of the power-sharing constitution led to violent conflict in 1963. In protest of
the civil service quotas, Küçük vetoed all legislation including on matters of budget and taxation,
paralyzing the state. Makarios responded by forcing Küçük out of the executive council and
proposing the “13-Points Amendments” in November 1963, which ostensibly aimed to increase
government efficiency at the cost of Turkish Cypriots’ representation and veto power. Amid
these political tensions, violence broke out in December 1963 and by January 1964 both sides
had remobilized their paramilitary forces and the Turkish Cypriots had been forced to relocate to
distinct mono-ethnic enclaves where they were protected by the TMT and supported by Turkey
(UNSC 1964; Jackson 2021).29

4.2

International Intervention: UN Good Offices & UNFICYP

International actors intervened in Cyprus beginning in January 1964 hoping to mediate a solution
to the growing violence. The early British attempt to begin a mediated dialogue failed in January

29

Approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were driven from their homes during fighting, and 95 Turkish Cypriotinhabited villages and neighborhoods abandoned. By the 1960 Agreements, the National Guard was limited to a
strength of 2,000 of which 800 were to be Turkish Cypriots. Ultra-nationalist paramilitaries and ad hoc recruited
auxiliary police operated seamlessly with the National Guard, totaling a fighting force of ~30,000. UNFICYP
officers noted that upon deployment one of the most difficult tasks was identifying what actually constituted the
government security force. UN observers later noted that modern small arms and military hardware purchased by the
government found its way to paramilitary units.
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1964 but provided two points of note. One was the sides’ preferences for a settlement: a
majoritarian political system and the abolition of the Treaty of Guarantee on the Greek Cypriot
side; and on the Turkish Cypriot side a federal system by which the Turkish Cypriots would have
authority over distinct Turkish-majority areas.30 The Greek Cypriots ruled out any communal
rights beyond classification as a national minority, believing federalism was a precursor to
partition. Neither interlocutor, though, proposed enosis or taksim.31 The other notable point was
that the Turkish government selected as negotiator and interlocutor of the Turkish Cypriot
community, Rauf Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber rather than
Vice President Fazıl Küçük. Denktaş was regarded as the more pragmatic leader by Ankara, and
Küçük’s hardline stance on partition and annexation by Turkey had annoyed Turkish Prime
Minister İsmet İnönü, who saw him as attempting to undermine Ankara by whipping up
nationalist supporters in Turkey during a political tumultuous period following the 1960 coup
(Jackson 2021).32
Unsuccessful mediation by Britain in January 1964 led to UN intervention in Cyprus. UN
Security Council Resolution 186 (March 1964) established a dual UN mission of peacekeeping
(UNFICYP) and mediation (Good Offices). While UNFICYP achieved some success in deescalation, the Mission of Good Offices faced numerous obstacles to opening dialogue between
the sides. For one, neither side recognized the other as legitimate. The Greek Cypriots regarded
parallel governance of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves with aid from Ankara, as tantamount to
secession, while the Turkish Cypriots regarded their bypassing and ousting from government as
an unconstitutional fait accompli to take control of the state. Importantly, UNSCR 186

Interview with Turkish Cypriot negotiator, Rauf Denktaş, The Times (8 January 1964, 13 January 1964).
Interview with Greek Cypriot negotiator Glafcos Clerides, The Times (3 January 1964, 5 January 1964, 12
January 1964).
32
Report on meeting between Küçük and İnönü, The Times (3 January 1964).
30
31
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recognized Makarios’ government as the sole legitimate government of Cyprus, undermining the
Turkish Cypriot position. The first UN mediator, Sakari Tuomioja, refused to support any
solution that would undermine a government recognized by the UN or lead to the dissolution of a
UN member state - precluding concessions on federalism from the Greek Cypriot side (Fisher
2001). His successor, Galo Plaza, similarly blamed the Turkish Cypriots for undermining a UN
recognized state, leading both Turkey and Denktaş to end talks and calling for Plaza’s dismissal
as mediator (UNSC December 1965).
The failure of Good Offices under Tuomioja and Plaza in 1964-65 was followed by talks
mediated by Carlos Bernades and Bibiano Osorio Tafall from 1966-73 that produced more
sustained dialogue and made some progress. Bernades involved Greece and Turkey directly in
talks with the aim of ruling out enosis and taksim (UNSC June 1966; June 1967). Denktaş’s
position, though, was unchanged from that expressed in London in January 1964: federalism and
sustained Turkish guarantorship. He ruled out disbanding the TMT and returning to areas under
Greek Cypriot authority as “restoring conditions dangerous to Turkish Cypriots’ security”
(UNSC March 1966; June 1966; June 1967). Though, after a diplomatic intervention by the
United States in November 1967 following another round of violence, the Greek Cypriot side
implemented “de-escalation measures” including ending its blockade of enclaves and
demobilizing paramilitary forces, Denktaş did not reciprocate and continued to insist on
federalism while simultaneously increasing the TMT’s defensive capacity (Jackson 2021).
By 1973, it appeared as though the Greek Cypriot side would be willing to accept some
form of federalism. Both Denktaş and Clerides believed talks had made serious progress since
1968 and UNFICYP reported decreased tensions.33 Clerides indicated a willingness to accept a

33

Report on talks, The Times (26 October 1972).
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federal solution with certain guarantees against partition. Denktaş similarly indicated willingness
to concede the structure of a central government, granting the Greek Cypriots a preponderant
role, in exchange for decentralized authority in security matters (UNSC December 1970; May
1971; May 1974). Clerides, though, backtracked early in 1974 and ruled concessions on
federalism as Makarios’ government came under growing right-wing pressure from the
nationalist EOKA-B - an enosist paramilitary successor to the EOKA, also led by George Grivas.

4.2.1

Turkey’s Preferences

Throughout the early period of UN mediation, Turkey supported a federal solution for Cyprus
and backed Denktaş as negotiator specifically for his preference for federalism. Turkey’s policy
towards Cyprus was threefold. First, Turkey diplomatically aided Denktaş in talks, with Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials sitting beside him during negotiations. The preference for a
federal solution had been formulated jointly by Denktaş and officials in Ankara as early as
December 1963, and Denktaş regularly stopped in Ankara for consultations with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and military ahead of UN-led talks.34 Second, Turkey supplied humanitarian and
financial aid to the Turkish Cypriots via its embassy in Nicosia. This included aid from the
Turkish Red Crescent and funds to construct homes for displaced Turks in enclaves (UNSC
December 1964; June 1967; June 1971). And third, Turkey supplied and maintained the Turkish
Cypriot fighting force, the TMT, by providing weapons, advisors, training, and air support. Prior
to 1960, this had included clandestine weapons transfers and commandos smuggled in Cyprus as
temporary workers to advise and train the TMT (Kadıoğlu & Bezci 2020). After 1963, Turkey
aided the TMT in recruiting and training fighters, mainly Turkish Cypriot students studying in

34

Interviews with Rauf Denktaş and İsmet İnönü, The Times (31 December 1963, 8 January 1964, 26 January 1964).
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Turkey, and the Turkish Air Force carried out strikes on Greek Cypriot forces in 1964 and 1967
to protect enclaves (UNSC December 1964; March 1968).35 Weapons and recruits were
smuggled into Cyprus via Kokkina/Erenköy, the Turkish Cypriots’ only coastal enclave, and UN
observers noted modern Turkish weapons and high levels of discipline present in the TMT, even
after Greek Cypriot de-escalation measures in 1968 (UNSC June 1970; November 1971; May
1972).
Despite Turkey’s measured position on federalism, successive Turkish governments from
1964-68 were under nationalist pressure to invoke the Treaty of Guarantee and invade Cyprus to
protect the Turkish Cypriots. This included pressure from the military. Turkish nationalists saw
Greek Cypriot actions against Turks as an effort to revise the territorial balance of the Treaty of
Lausanne and to repeat the expulsion of Turks from Crete (Loizides 2007, 2016).36 Post-1963
fighting was cast not as a strictly Turkish Cypriot issue, but a “shared national cause.”37 Denktaş
presented the Turkish Cypriots as the “frontier of the Turkish nation” against the Greeks and
İnönü’s successor as Prime Minister described the conflict as a matter of national honor, “that a
Turk can live without bread, but not his honor.”38 These sentiments were further evident in mass
demonstrations, which included senior military officers, in Ankara and Istanbul at which calls
were made to invade Cyprus and effigies of Makarios were burned by protestors.39
Facing the prospect of military escalation by Turkey in direct response to violence in
1964 and 1967, the United States intervened diplomatically. In both 1964 and 1967 the Turkish
military launched airstrikes against Greek Cypriot forces and mobilized for invasion, but stood

35

Report on TMT recruitment, The Times (29 March 1964).
See also: The Times (3 April 1963, 5 November 1965).
37
Interview with Rauf Denktaş, The Times (26 July 1964).
38
The Times (25 October 1964), Süleyman Demirel quoted; New York Times (6 December 1967).
39
The Times (16 August 1964, 1 September 1964).
36
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down under US pressure. In 1964 US President Johnson threatened to withdraw military support
for Turkey and “no longer guarantee Turkey's security against the Soviet Union” if Turkey
invaded Cyprus, which İnönü specifically referenced in his decision to call off the invasion.40
Then in November 1967, US envoy Cyrus Vance persuaded Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman
Demirel to call off an invasion in exchange for Greek Cypriot de-escalation measures and
clandestine Greek forces being repatriated to Greece, including George Grivas (Fisher 2001,
Heraclides 2011). US intervention, including using direct threats against Turkey in 1964
prevented escalation, but did not produce concessions or a settlement.
The decisions to stand down from invasions under US pressure generated domestic costs
for successive Turkish governments and fed anti-American sentiment. İnönü faced calls for his
resignation after calling off the 1964 invasion and harsh criticism from the military and
opposition Justice Party (AP) led by Demirel. The AP ousted İnönü’s Republican People’s Party
(CHP) in the following election, capitalizing on his decision to stand down on Cyprus as dovish
and bowing to foreign threats against Turks.41 Demirel too lost government and military support
after standing down from invasion in 1967. He was censured in the Grand National Assembly for
his decision to call off the invasion. And in both instances, anti-American sentiments in the
public and military increased, including riots at the US embassy in Ankara.42

40

The Times (19 June 1964, 13 January 1966); New York Times (30 November 1967)
The Times (13 January 1966).
42
The Times (23 November 1967); New York Times (4 December 1967)
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Table 4.4. Timeline of Negotiations, 1964-74.
Year

Mediator

Outcome

1964

UN: Sakari
Tuomioja

Intercommunal talks - international law problem

Rejected by Denktaş

1965

UN: Galo Plaza

Good Offices - constitutional law problem, Plaza
Report for reforming constitution

Rejected by Denktaş

1966

UN: Carlos
Bernades

Good Offices - establish dialogue and joint technical
committees

Progress, stalled by 1967
violence

1967

US: Cyrus Vance

Vance Agreement - stops Turkish invasion, repatriates
Greek troops, “de-escalation”

Accepted

1968

UN: Carlos
Bernades

Good Offices - advised by constitution experts

Progress towards
compromise solution

1972

UN: Bibiano
Osorio Tafall

Good Offices - advised by constitution experts

Fails, federalism rejected
by Clerides

1974

UN

Emergency talks in Geneva - Turkey proposed
cantonal settlement

Rejected by Clerides,
second invasion

A final area that bears consideration is then July 1974 when Turkey did not stand down
its forces and invaded Cyprus twice in 24 days. The first invasion on 20 July 1974 was triggered
by a coup d’etat by the nationalist EOKA-B to topple Makarios’ government. The EOKA-B, a
second iteration of the enosist EOKA, was formed by Grivas in 1971 and backed by the military
junta in Greece. It was composed of former EOKA fighters, police, and National Guard troops
loyal to Grivas (Bolukbasi 1995, Kaufmann 2007).43 When Makarios ordered that all military
personnel seconded from Greece leave Cyprus in July 1974, fearing a coup attempt, the EOKA-B
overthrew him and installed Nikos Sampson as President. This was followed by days of intraethnic violence in which the EOKA-B murdered hundreds of Greek Cypriot moderates and
leftists. After Sampson announced victory over his ideological opponents on 19 July, the Turkish

43

Grivas died in early 1974 and control of EOKA-B was passed directly to Dimitrios Ioannidis, leader of the second
Greek junta, which had overthrown the first junta in 1973, and was adamantly pro-enosis and opposed Makarios’
rule, which he believed was too far left and accommodating toward Turks.
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military General Staff believed the EOKA-B would turn its violence on the Turkish Cypriots and
it pressed Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to order the invasion.44 Ecevit’s decision was influenced
by two factors. One, his CHP government had narrowly survived a confidence vote the month
before and was in a very weak position to oppose the military, especially given the costs suffered
by prior governments for standing down (Kaufmann 2007).45 The other was that the US, which
had previously pressured Turkey to stand down, believed it would not take unilateral action
while emergency talks were ongoing and took no measures to prevent an invasion.46 Ecevit
ordered the first invasion on 20 July 1974.
After three days of fighting toppled Sampson’s putschist government, talks resumed, with
Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş assuming the role of chief negotiator. Güneş continued to
push for a federal solution. In August 1974 he proposed a federal settlement in which the Turkish
Cypriots would inhabit six autonomous cantons comprising 34 percent of Cyprus’ territory as a
guarantee of both Turkish Cypriot security and against enosis.47 The EOKA-B coup was regarded
as evidence that the Greek Cypriots could not be entrusted to preclude enosis, even if a given
government guaranteed it. Clerides refused to concede on cantons while Turkish troops were still
deployed in Cyprus, ignoring the ultimatum given by Güneş. In response, Turkey launched a
second invasion on 14 August 1974 partitioning Cyprus into Turkish and Greek zones divided by

44

This belief that the EOKA-B would attack the Turkish Cypriots has been the subject of some debate. Prior to the
Turkish invasion, the EOKA-B had primarily targeted ideological opponents and it was only after July 20 that they
targeted Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Crawshaw (1978) has argued that without Turkish invention and the existing
pattern of segregation, inter-communal fighting may not have resumed in 1974. Kaufmann (2007) argues that given
the adamantly pro-enosis and anti-Turk positions of Sampson and the Athen junta, protracted violence would
eventually target the Turkish Cypriots either to remove an obstacle to enosis or outbid for support. The Turkish
military command was particularly wary of Sampson who had run for parliament by publicly boasting of murdering
Turks in 1963-64 and pledged to “cleanse the island of the stench of the Turks.”
45
There was speculation at the time that once Ecevit gave his approval for the invasion, he had no control over the
courses of action taken by the military, including in ordering the second invasion. Report on confidence vote in The
Grand National Assembly, The Times (18 June 1974).
46
The US Department of Defense and intelligence services publicly blamed the state department for providing
assurance that Turkey would not invade Cyprus as negotiations were ongoing. See: New York Times (20 July 1974).
47
Details of proposal published in The Times (12 August 1974).
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a 180-kilometer ceasefire line. The Turkish military and Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries forcibly
expelled ~200,000 Greek Cypriots to the south and called on Turks living in the south to relocate
north (Kaufmann 2007; Bryant & Hatay 2020).

4.2.2

Observed Mechanisms

This first period of mediation by primarily the UN resulted in little change in the sides’
preferences for a settlement. Though specific points of intervention by UN mediators,
UNFICYP, and the US did result in de-escalation and improved relations, overall preferences for
a solution did not change between the London talks in January 1964 and the emergency talks
convened in July-August 1974. The Greek Cypriots refused to grant the Turks autonomy and
preferred a majoritarian political system and an end to the guarantee system. The Turkish
Cypriots’ primary demands were territorial autonomy in a federal structure that gave them
authority over security, which Denktaş and his patrons in Ankara regarded as the long-term
solution to intercommunal violence and a guarantee against enosis. This was initially proposed
by İsmet İnönü in December 1963, and reaffirmed by Turan Güneş in August 1974.

Table 4.5. Observed Mechanisms, 1964-74.
Mechanism

Observations

Outcome

1.

Facilitation w/ local
regime

Rauf Denktaş as primary negotiator;
engaging directly with UN mediator and
Glafcos Clerides.

Did not press Turkey for concessions;
called for escalation and criticized Turkey
for not escalating.

3.

Facilitation w/
patron state

Turkey as a party to talks since 1955;
included in UN Good Offices after
1966.

No change of position; constrained by
nationalists/military domestically.

4.

Manipulation w/
patron state:
sanction

US intervention in talks in 1964 and
1967 to prevent Turkish
escalation/invasion of Cyprus.

Turkey stood down from invasions;
leaders suffer domestic political costs,
esp. from military.
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Three of the mechanisms theorized in Chapter 2 were observable in the period from
1964-74, but produced little policy change towards the Cyprus conflict within Turkey. The first
observable mechanism was facilitation with the local regime (#1, Table 4.5). Given Denktaş’s
role as primary interlocutor in talks, this was the most common form of mediation, with regular
meetings between he and his Greek Cypriot counterpart Glafcos Clerides facilitated by the UN.
This failed to alter policy in Ankara, and Denktaş himself was highly critical of Turkish
decisions to not invoke the Treaty of Guarantee and escalate the conflict.48
The second observable mechanism was facilitation with the patron state (#3, Table 4.5).
Turkey had always been involved in talks on Cyprus, beginning in the pre-independence talks in
1955, but after 1963 played a key role in Denktaş’s positions, including on federalism and
guarantees. Turkish officials were directly involved in UN mediation and in 1965 urged Denktaş
to reject meditation by Galo Plaza. Facilitation failed to change Turkish positions on Cyprus, due
in large part to the salience of the Cyprus issue in the Turkish public and military, which opposed
concessions and precluded the governments of İsmet İnönü and Süleyman Demirel from making
concessions, domestically cast as “capitulation” to Greece (Loizides 2016).49
The third observable mechanism was manipulation with the patron state: sanctions (#4,
Table 4.5). This was evident during the US interventions in 1964 and 1967 to prevent a Turkish
invasion. These did not leverage concessions in Cyprus, but rather prevented escalation. US
threats and guarantees conveyed in 1964 and 1967 were done to prevent Turkey from escalating
the conflict by invoking the Treaty of Guarantee and invading Cyprus. In both instances, though,
Turkey’s ruling coalition suffered domestic political costs for not escalating, from opposition and

Example in an interview in which Denktaş blames Turkey for “cutting off the windpipe” of the Turkish Cypriots
by accepting UNFICYP control of the strategically important Kyrenia Road linking the two largest enclaves. See:
The Times (11 October 1964).
49
The Times (3 April 1963, 5 November 1965).
48
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from the military, whose senior officers preferred escalation and had issued individual threats to
“wipe out Cyprus” and to “protect the baby fatherland,” and had staged public protests over the
decision to stand down from invasion.50 It was under similar pressure from the military in July
1974, and no manipulation from the US, that Ecevit made the decision to invade.

4.3

Partition in Cyprus & Domestic Instability

UN-led talks resumed shortly after the Turkish invasions in 1974, and continued onto high-level
talks between Denktaş and Clerides in Vienna in 1975. It was the Turkish side that now
negotiated from a position of strength relative to the Greek Cypriots. As Bülent Ecevit stated
“from now on negotiations will be easier… the way to meaningful negotiations has been opened
by this military result” - their preferences of preventing enosis and carving out a Turkish Cypriot
entity had been attained through military action.51 After August 1974, the Turkish Cypriots
inhabited contiguous territory, rather than disparate enclaves, and were protected by ~40,000
Turkish troops stationed in Cyprus. They controlled the ports at Kyrenia/Girne and
Famagusta/Gazimağusa, and the agricultural region of Morphou/Güzelyurt, meaning they were
no longer dependent upon the goodwill of the Greek Cypriots for aid (UNSC June 1976).
Importantly, though, the Greek Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus ( RoC) remained the
internationally recognized government while the UN condemned Turkey’s invasions and the
Turkish Cypriots’ declaration of an autonomous Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) as
undermining Cyprus’ sovereignty (text of UNSCR 367).

50
51

General Staff officers quoted, The Times (25 October 1964, 23 November 1967).
Bülent Ecevit quoted, The Times (16 August 1974).
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Talks convened in Vienna in 1975 by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and his
envoy Javier Pérez de Cuéllar produced a number of technical agreements dealing with
immediate matters of the 1974 violence. This included the Vienna III Agreement, which banned
involuntary population transfers and gave UNFICYP oversight of the Greek Cypriot community
remaining in the TFSC (UNSC June 1975; September 1975; June 1976).52 High-level talks in
1975-76 failed to produce a political agreement, though. On the Greek Cypriot side, Clerides
called for a return to the pre-1974 status quo, which was a non-starter for Denktaş who was wary
of any solution that would see the Turkish Cypriot returned to enclaves and specifically sought
guarantees against a return to pre-1974 conditions. Denktaş instead reiterated his preference for a
federal or confederal system in which federal entities would have preponderant power and be
defined based on nationality - distinct Greek and Turkish Cypriot entities. Clerides rejected
confederation as a precursor to secession, but was now willing to negotiate on federalism (UNSC
June 1976; Fisher 2001).
The sides reached a compromise in February 1977 on the framework for a future
settlement. Known as the “Four-Point Agreement” or “Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines,” it was
agreed that a future settlement would be based on a single Cypriot state that was: (1) a nonaligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic; (2) in which the division of territory between
federal entities would be based on economic viability and land ownership; (3) in which citizens
would have the freedom of movement, settlement, and property ownership; and (4) the central
government would be entrusted to safeguard the bi-communal character of the state (Fisher
2001). Though Denktaş and Clerides agreed in principle to the Guidelines, they failed to agree
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UNFICYP was responsible for conducting interviews with all Greek Cypriots moving south after 1975 to
ascertain if they were coerced into moving; transferring and monitoring formal requests from Greek Cypriot
communities to Turkish Cypriot officials; and, providing humanitarian aid and relief to Greek Cypriot communities.
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on an implementable settlement based on the Guidelines, due primarily to the third point, the
“three freedoms.” Clerides believed that they would both prevent secession and solve the
problem of displaced Greek Cypriots and dispossessed property after 1974 by permitting Greek
Cypriots to resettle and reclaim property in the Turkish Cypriot entity. Denktaş, however, saw
resettlement and property ownership as a means for Greek Cypriots to force Turks back into
enclaves, returning to their pre-1974 status, and dilute the character of a federal state. He instead
proposed implementation of the three freedoms after a set time and fixed caps on resettlement,
which Clerides rejected (UNSC June 1977; December 1977; Ker-Lindsay 2011).
Failure to reach a settlement in line with the Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines precipitated
both the resignation of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as mediator and another US diplomatic
intervention.53 The US, along with Britain and Canada proposed the “ABC Plan” in 1978 as a
12-point framework for a federation, including constitutional principles and territorial
adjustments in exchange for economic aid in implementation - one-off manipulation. It too was
rejected by both sides: the Turkish Cypriots who opposed ceding territory gained in 1974; and by
the Greek Cypriots who viewed it as an attempt to placate Turkey and were already wary of US
power politics (Fisher 2001; Heraclides 2004, 2011).54
Kurt Waldheim persuaded the sides to return to Good Offices, mediated by Hugo Gobbi,
in 1979 to find a solution to the three freedoms and work on intermediate “confidence-building
measures” (UNSC December 1979; Heraclides 2011). The two main confidence-building
measures proposed by the UN were the reopening under UNFICYP authority of (1) the
Nicosia/Lefkoşa International Airport, and (2) the resort town of Varosha/Maraş. Both had been

53

The US had an interest in quickly resolving the conflict to de-escalate tensions between NATO allies Greece and
Turkey. US envoy Clark Clifford had been present at talks since they resumed in 1975.
54
The Greek Cypriot left was already suspicious of the US, which it believed had knowledge of the 1974 coup and
had allowed it to proceed as a way of removing a non-aligned leader and replacing him with a right-wing regime.
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closed since 1974, with UNFICYP in control of the airport, and Varosha/Maraş fenced off and
abandoned, under authority of the Turkish military.55 Denktaş, though, refused to make
concessions on the “federal character of the state,” which meant opposition to the three
freedoms, and likewise refused to concede Varosha/Maraş, which he regarded as a prized
bargaining chip valued by the RoC. Gobbi noted Denktaş’s general unwillingness to engage in
any “give-and-take” style talks, especially on matters conflicting with his interpretation of a bizonal, bi-communal state (UNSC December 1979; December 1980).
Talks then stalled in 1983 when the TFSC unilaterally declared independence as the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Denktaş claimed the eventual aim was
incorporation of the TRNC into a single Cypriot state, but believed that by declaring
independence he was taking the disputed issues of federalism off of the table (UNSC December
1983).56 Despite his pronounced intentions, the declaration of independence was condemned as
illegal by the UN Security Council, criticized by Ankara, and the TRNC was regarded
internationally as an unrecognized pariah state (UNSCR 550; Fisher 2001; Ker-Lindsay 2011).

Prior to 1974 Varosha/Maraş was a modern resort district south of Famagusta/Gazimağusa inhabited by Greek
Cypriots that was a notable tourist destination with modern hotels and beaches. In 1974 the Turkish military seized it
and expelled its residents. The hotels and businesses were looted before the Turkish military fenced it off and left it
abandoned. The UN initially proposed reopening it under UNFICYP control in 1978.
56
Interview with Rauf Denktaş, The Times (18 November 1983).
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Table 4.6. Timeline of Negotiations, 1974-83.
Year

Mediator

1975

UN: Kurt Waldheim, Javier
Pérez de Cuéllar

Vienna Talks - short-term humanitarian
agreements

Accepted

1977

UN: Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Good Offices - Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines
for federal state

Rejected over three
freedoms

1978

US: Clark Clifford

ABC Plan - minority protections/economic aid

Rejected

1979

UN: Hugo Gobbi

Good Offices - endorse Guidelines,
confidence-building measures

Failed, TRNC
declared in 1983

4.3.1

Outcome

Turkey’s Preferences

Turkish policy towards Cyprus following the 1974 invasions and partition aimed to bolster the
TFSC’s position and claims to autonomous governance outside of the organization of the RoC
state. This was pursued primarily through three means. The first, and most overt, was by
underwriting its security. Turkey stationed ~40,000 Land Forces troops in the TFSC, on the
northern side of the UN-controlled ceasefire line, who regulated movement across the line.
The Turkish Cypriot security and emergency management services - the Mühacit (militia
successor to the TMT), the police, coast guard, and fire service - were all placed under the
authority of the Turkish General Staff in Ankara. Senior Turkish officers regularly rotated
through deployments in the TFSC, which was considered a strategic garrison by the military
(UNSC June 1976; December 1976; Bryant & Hatay 2020).57
The second means of supporting the TFSC’s survival outside of the RoC was through
financial assistance. The Turkish lira was the currency of exchange in the TFSC and the Turkish
Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bank) was the primary lender. Turkey provided the majority of the
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Author interview, TRNC, 2021.
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TFSC’s funds in the form of loans and aid, which accounted for 80 percent of the TFSC budget
in 1975 and 53 percent by 1981. This included funding the salaries of a bloated public sector that
included state-run factories, farms, hotels, and schools whose public sector unions were key
political constituents (Hatay 2005; Isachenko 2009; Bozkurt 2014).58
The third means of strengthening the TFSC was through population substitution.
Beginning in 1976, settlers from mainland Turkey, often rural Anatolia, were brought to the
TFSC to increase the Turkish population, and replace Greek Cypriots fleeing to the RoC. These
settlers who were often more religious and had more affinity with the Turkish mainland than
Turkish Cypriots were given expropriated Greek Cypriot property, jobs in state-run enterprises,
and were often settled in close proximity to remaining Greek Cypriot villages where they were
accused of harassment and encouraging ethnic-Greeks to flee, in contravention of the Vienna III
Agreement (UNSC June 1976; December 1982). Many were agricultural laborers and the
families of Turkish military personnel (Hatay 2005).59 From 1975-83, the Greek Cypriot
population in the TFSC declined from 8,707 to 914, while an estimated 49,422 settlers arrived
from Turkey (CoE 2003).
Within Turkey, changing these policies which permitted the TFSC to exist independent
of the RoC was obstructed by two related trends in Turkish politics. One was that, as before
1974, the issue of Cyprus was a salient national issue. The dual outcome of the 1974 invasions in
both protecting the Turkish Cypriots by carving out their own statelet, and preventing the Greek
nationalist goal of enosis was cast as a great national victory for Turkey. Cyprus was the first
time Turkish forces had been victorious and held territory since the birth of the Republic of
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Author interview, TRNC, 2021.
Author interview, TRNC, 2021.
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Turkey in 1923.60 Furthermore, this landmark victory was at the expense of Turkey’s great
historical rival, Greece (Mavratsas 1997; Joseph 2009). Commemoration of the first Turkish
invasion on 20 July became a yearly holiday, “Peace and Freedom Day” on which Turkish
Cypriot leaders would pay homage to Ankara for saving them with remarks such as “if not for
Turkey, we would have suffered the same fate as Crete.”61 And the Turkish military
commemorated the Cyprus invasions as the “honorable victory of a proud nation,” in response to
international condemnation.62 Concessions, or reducing support for the TFSC, was at odds with
this national narrative of victory.
The second and related trend in Turkey was that this period after 1974 was characterized
by political instability, ultimately leading to a coup d’etat in 1980 by MGK chief Kenan Evren
followed by three years of military government, and a longer transitional period under a military
presidential council. Instability was due in part to economic volatility under Turkey’s rapid
industrialization project and import-substitution model, but also to ideological divisions between
the far-right and communists that manifested itself in widespread violence on city streets and
university campuses. Süleyman Demirel and the AP returned to power in elections in 1975,
ousting Ecevit and the CHP, however Demirel was in a tenuous position at the head of a weak
right-wing coalition that included Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist National Salvation Party (MSP)
and Alparslan Türkeş’s ultra-nationalist/fascist National Action Party (MHP). The MHP’s
militant youth wing, the Gray Wolves, was one of the primary culprits of right-wing violence at
the time.
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MHP leader Türkeş, known as Başbuğ (leader) by his followers, hailed from Cyprus
originally and personally held hardline views on the conflict and Cyprus itself as rightfully
Turkish. This was reinforced by the MHP’s Turanist/Eurasianist ideology, which favored an
exclusive pan-Turkic national identity over cooperation with the West, including NATO, and
regarded Turkey as a historical victim of external forces that had cleaved away both its
sovereignty and territory, including Cyprus (Yavuz 2002; Başkan 2006; Kiratli 2015).63 Türkeş
and Erbakan explicitly ruled out concessions on Cyprus in their coalition protocol with the AP.
On two occasions Türkeş threatened to quit the coalition, toppling the government, if Demirel
made any concessions on Cyprus or on confidence-building measures, which he regarded as
Turkey being forced to cede sovereignty.64 Accordingly, Demirel shirked responsibility and
insisted that any territorial concessions, opposed by both Türkeş and Erbakan, were up to
Denktaş. When the CHP briefly returned to power in 1978, it voiced support for the UN
confidence-building measures, but it was ousted again by the AP-MHP before any action was
taken.65
It was in this context that the US again provided a form of negative manipulation during
talks. In 1975, the US Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, banning further sales of
weapons and impounding already purchased weapons awaiting delivery, with the attached
condition that Turkey “actively facilitate a solution” in Cyprus. The US rejected token efforts by
Turkey such as withdrawing a hundred troops or permitting resettlement of some displaced
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families as insufficient.66 This was costly to the Turkish military, and Air Force in particular
which relied on regular supplies of American equipment and parts. In the longer-term this
contributed to economic instability as the military diverted funds to refit its forces, away from
the state-subsidized industries and import-substitution that had kept wages artificially high.67
Despite the cost of sanctions imposed on Turkey, and the politically powerful military directly, it
did not leverage concessions. The importance of the MHP in the ruling coalition prevented
Turkey from making concessions on its policies supporting the TFSC. In response to the
embargo, Turkey instead forced US military bases in Turkey to close.68
It might have been expected then that when Kenan Evren and the MGK overthrew the
Turkish government in September 1980 they would have been in a better position to make
concessions. The military was not constrained by the coalition politics that had hamstrung
Demirel and Ecevit, and it was the military that had faced the costs of the US arms embargo.
Furthermore, Evren’s policy preferences included improving Turkey’s relations with the West
and NATO. However, by the time Evren assumed power, the US had effectively ended its
embargo. In 1978 US President Carter had pushed for a partial lifting in Congress after Ecevit
pledged to accept confidence-building measures. In 1980, following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, the US signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation
Agreement with Turkey, granting 450 million USD in aid and a guaranteed loan program for five
years in exchange for reopening US bases in Turkey that had been closed in 1975.69 Though
Evren did encourage Denktaş to make concessions on confidence-building measures,
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manipulation had effectively ended with the military resupplied by the US, reducing the
incentives for Evren to make more costly concessions on Cyprus.

4.3.2

Observed Mechanisms

The period of the TFSC, 1974-83, was characterized by a new phase of mediation under UN
auspices, necessitated by the post-1974 reality in Cyprus. Prior to 1974, the Greek Cypriots had
had an advantage in talks in that they controlled the internationally recognized state regardless of
any settlement. After 1974, it was the Turkish side that had the advantage in that it had achieved
its preference for an autonomous, ethnically distinct entity via military conquest.70 Accordingly,
a federal settlement, which the Turkish side had favored prior to 1974, but the Greek Cypriots
had rejected, was agreed upon in principle in 1977. The contentious issue then became the
character of the federal entities and the “three freedoms” - movement, settlement, and property
ownership. Denktaş opposed the three freedoms as diluting the authority of the federal entities,
and believed settlement and property ownership would rapidly lead to the Turkish Cypriots’
return to marginalization in enclaves as Greek Cypriots would return north to reclaim property.
His position was backed by Ankara, where nationalist factions opposed any concessions on what
the Turkish military had seized in 1974.

Consider Ariel Rubinstein’s (1982) concept of a “continuation value” in bargaining, by which a side requires
greater concessions to reach an agreement if its current value in respect to its preferences is higher.
70
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Table 4.7. Observed Mechanisms, 1974-83.
Mechanism

Observations

Outcome

1.

Facilitation w/
local regime

Rauf Denktaş as primary negotiator in
UN-led talks.

Agrees in principle to Makarios-Denktaş
Guidelines, not implemented; no policy
change in Ankara.

2.

Manipulation w/
local regime

Rauf Denktaş as primary negotiator in
US-led ABC Plan, offers development
aid for territorial concessions.

Rejected over territorial concessions; no
policy in change in Ankara, shirks
responsibility to Denktaş.

3.

Facilitation w/
patron state

Turkey as a party to UN- and US-led
talks in 1975, 1978, and after.

No policy change; concessions obstructed by
MHP and MSP coalition partners who ruled
out concessions on Cyprus.

4.

Manipulation w/
patron state:
sanction

US arms embargo imposed on Turkey
with attached condition that it
constructively facilitate a solution in
Cyprus.

Limited effect: partial lifting in exchange for
Ecevit supporting CBMs; rally-around-flag
effect led to anti-US position and closing US
military bases.

Four mechanisms, theorized in Chapter 2, were observable during this period. However
there was only limited indication in Ankara of a changed policy towards Cyprus, evident during
Bülent Ecevit’s brief return to power in 1978, and then again during the military rule of Kenan
Evren from 1980-83. Ecevit had accepted the UN-proposed confidence-building measures in
principle in 1978, though they were never implemented as he lost power again by 1979. Evren,
whose military junta sought improved foreign relations, also supported the confidence-building
measures in Cyprus, asked Denktaş to be “more flexible on the issue of territory,” and had
warned Denktaş not to escalate by declaring independence in May 1983.71 Both of these changes
of policy were never implemented in practice.
The first two observable mechanisms were facilitation and manipulation with the local
regime (#1 and #2, Table 4.7). Denktaş remained the chief negotiator in UN-led talks from 197577 and 1979-83, which followed a facilitative strategy during which the sides agreed in principle
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to the Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines. Though Kurt Waldheim was able to convince Denktaş to
return to talks in 1979, progress on implementation of the Guidelines was never realized.
Similarly, Denktaş rejected the US-led ABC plan which offered one-off development aid in
exchange for territorial concessions, which he adamantly opposed. Denktaş’s intransigence in
these two types of talks meant that he did not attempt, let alone affect policy change in Ankara.
On the contrary, he opposed the moderate policy changes under Ecevit and Evren, stalling on
confidence-building measures in 1978 and 1980, and specifically waiting to declare
independence as the TRNC until the interregnum between military and civilian rule in November
1983 when Evren could not punish him, as he had threatened in May 1983.72
The other two observable mechanisms were facilitation with the patron state (#3, Table
4.7), and manipulation with the patron state: sanctions (#4, Table 4.7). Facilitation had little
observable effect, due in large part to the position of nationalists in Turkish domestic politics
who specifically opposed concessions on Cyprus. Concessions during the AP government would
have triggered a coalition collapse, as the MHP and MSP explicitly threatened to quit the
coalition over concessions on Cyprus. As a result, Süleyman Demirel shirked responsibility for
concessions by passing all responsibility to Denktaş to avoid political costs beginning in 1975.73
Manipulation in the form of the US arms embargo, 1975-80, had limited effect in policy
change. While it generated economic costs in Turkey, and the military in particular, it also
hardened the domestic political position. Demirel quit talks in 1976, saying he would not
negotiate under a US embargo, and Turkey retaliated by closing US military facilities in Turkey.
Its limited effect was evident in 1978, when the US partially lifted the embargo in exchange for
Ecevit supporting UN confidence-building measures. However, by the time Evren came to
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power, and the embargo may have been most effective, given Evren’s position on improving
economic stability and relations with the west, it had effectively ended following regional
geopolitical developments. While Evren did press Denktaş to be more flexible in talks, and avoid
escalation, the costly pressure on Turkey to follow through on concessions at a time when the
government could not be punished domestically was reduced.

4.4

The TRNC & Europe, 1984-2000

The period following the declaration of independence by the TRNC demonstrated intensified
efforts by the UN to reach a settlement, intransigence between the sides, and increasing
international pressure on the Turkish side. True to his claim that independence was an interim
status and the TRNC was a de facto federal entity to be reunited with the RoC, Denktaş returned
to UN-led talks in 1984. However, he believed that independence had taken the concessions he
opposed, namely the three freedoms outlined in the Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines, off of the
table and the TRNC would be incorporated as was into a federal state. He and RoC President
Spyros Kyprianou agreed on a “blueprint” for reunification as a bi-zonal federation in which the
TRNC would retain 29 percent of territory and foreign troops would be withdrawn, but
implementation failed again when Denktaş refused to compromise on the three freedoms (UNSC
May 1987; November 1987; Bolukbasi 1995).
Successive UN Secretaries General then proposed comprehensive solutions in 1989 and
1992, but again failed. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s “set of ideas” proposed in 1989 was rejected in
1990 for failing to address previously contentious issues. Denktaş opposed it for not
institutionalizing protections for the TRNC as an equal political entity in a federation, and the
RoC rejected it for failing to protect the three freedoms and remove Turkish troops from Cyprus
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(Bolukbasi 1995; Loizides 2007; Heraclides 2011). Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 proposal
included 100 points for compromise between the sides, but was again rejected over the same
issues. Though Denktaş accepted 91 of the 100 points, he opposed the inclusion of the three
freedoms and territorial concessions envisioned in the proposal, specifically to cede control of
the Morphou/Güzelyurt district to the RoC. Morphou/Güzelyurt contained the TRNC’s
agriculture industry, its main aquifer, and one-third of its population, which Denktaş argued
conflicted with the principle of land distribution based on economic viability and property
ownership included in the Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines (Bolukbasi 1995; Loizides 2007; KerLindsay 2011).74 With these comprehensive solutions having failed, UN Good Offices returned
its focus to confidence-building measures specifically focusing on the Nicosia/Lefkoşa
International Airport, Varosha/Maraş, and development of the ethnically-mixed village of Pyla in
the UN-controlled buffer zone (UNSC June 1993).
Three related regional developments following the rejection of Boutros-Ghali’s proposal
transformed the context in which talks were held and ultimately contributed to a more
intransigent position on the Turkish side. The most salient in the context of negotiations was the
decision by the European Union to accept the RoC’s candidacy for membership in 1994. Both
Ankara and the TRNC opposed this as violating the 1960 Treaties which forbade Cyprus from
joining any international body of which Turkey was not a member.75 Turkey and Denktaş
demanded that the RoC withdraw its EU membership bid as a precondition for resuming talks in
1995.76 The EU’s decision to begin accession negotiations with the RoC in 1997 effectively
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ended talks until 2000.77 In response, Denktaş renounced support for a federal solution beginning
in 1998, calling instead for a confederation (Anastasiou 2008b).78
Shortly after the EU accepted the RoC’s application for membership, the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) ruled that EU member states could not trade directly with the TRNC, effectively
embargoing it. As the EU did not recognize the TRNC, the ECJ ruled that it could not accept the
validity of its customs stamps or health certificates. This meant a 14 percent import tariff on
TRNC goods, pricing them out of European markets. Prior to this ruling, Britain had been the
primary importer of Turkish Cypriot agricultural products (Talmon 2001). This meant that
Turkey was the only conduit for trade for the TRNC and this coupled with the collapse of Polly
Peck Inc., a conglomerate owned by Turkish Cypriot businessman Asil Nadir, drove the TRNC
into further economic dependence on Turkey (Gökçekuş 2009, Bozkurt 2014, Kanol & Koprulu
2017).

Table 4.8. Timeline of Negotiations, 1984-2000.
Year

Mediator

1984

UN: Hugo
Gobbi

Good Offices - Blueprint for federal state

Rejected in 1986 over three
freedoms

1989

UN

Pérez de Cuéllar proposes “set of ideas”; does not
protect TRNC political equality or three freedoms

Rejected

1992

UN

Boutros-Ghali proposes “set of ideas”; 100 points
for agreement and map of territorial adjustments

Rejected

1999

UN

Good Offices

Failed - Denktaş rejects federation
after EU accession talks begin

77
78

Outcome

TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31 March 1998).
Interview with Rauf Denktaş, Turkish Daily News (24 June 1998).
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The third development then came in 1996 when the ECtHR ruled on the case of Loizidou
v. Turkey. The claimant, Titina Loizidou, was expelled from Kyrenia/Girne by Turkish forces in
1974. The ECtHR ruling found Turkey culpable for the deprivation of the claimant’s human
rights by first forcibly expelling her from her property in 1974, and then continuing to violate her
human rights by preventing her from returning to reclaim her property and livelihood. This
ruling opened the door for a flood of similar applications from Greek Cypriots against Turkey
and further damaged the TRNC’s tourism sector, as both proprietors and guests could be found
complicit in the continued violation of human rights (European Commission 2001; Risini
2018).79 It further dealt a blow to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot claims of legitimacy by casting
the 1974 invasions as grounded in human rights violations and pronouncing the TRNC to be an
illegal “subordinate regime” of Ankara.

4.4.1

Turkey’s Preferences

Turkey’s policies towards Cyprus, in response to these developments and others, were
characterized by increased integration of the TRNC into Turkish economic and security
structures. Though military rule in Turkey officially ended in November 1983, Kenan Evren
remained President until 1989, advised by a “Presidential Council” composed of General Staff
officers. As such, the military retained a strong role in politics even after the transition to civilian
rule. This was compounded by the onset of civil conflict against Kurdish insurgents in eastern
Anatolia, beginning in 1984. The military intervened in politics again in 1997 to remove from
power an Islamist government led by Necmettin Erbakan in the “coup by memorandum”
(Aydinli, Özcan, & Akyaz 2006; Patton 2007; Keyman 2010).
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The first civilian government after 1983, led by the Motherland Party (ANAP), pursued
the same policies as the Evren’s junta, in particular improving foreign relations with the West
and economic stability. ANAP’s leader, Turgut Özal who had been appointed by the military
government, implemented neo-liberal economic policies aimed at reducing the economic
instability that had led to the coup in 1980. Özal, who succeeded Evren as President, took Turkey
into the Council of Europe in 1989 (placing it under the ECtHR’s jurisdiction), and in 1986
began consultations on Turkey’s EU membership, believing it would stabilize the economy.80
After 1989, though, Özal withdrew his support for EU membership in opposition to EU political
conditionality. He was discouraged by the EU’s insistence on linking a solution to Cyprus to
Turkey’s membership. The military further opposed EU conditionality that would see troops
withdrawn from Cyprus and its political influence curbed, as well as criticism of its human rights
record during the ongoing Kurdish insurgency (Tocci 2005).81 ANAP’s coalition partners and
successors, Bülent Ecevit’s Democratic Left (DSP, split from CHP) and Süleyman Demirel’s
True Path Party (DYP, successor to the AP), likewise opposed EU political conditionality linking
a Cyprus settlement to membership, with Ecevit responding that “Turkey would never sacrifice
Cyprus for the EU.”82 After the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, at which the RoC’s EU membership
was accepted and Turkey’s rejected, the MGK formally withdrew its support for EU accession
and the government announced the end of relations with the EU. In response the Turkish
government threatened sanctions against EU-based firms operating in Turkey.83
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While Turkey’s relationship with the EU declined during this period, its economic and
security relationship with the TRNC became more consolidated. Beginning in 1986 Turkey
began to export its neoliberal austerity and privatization reforms to the TRNC via conditionality
attached to economic aid (Bozkurt 2014).84 This included Turkey funding and carrying out key
infrastructure projects in the TRNC including the construction of new power plants and grids,
and a fresh water supply from Turkey (Bozkurt 2014; Kanol & Koprulu 2017). Turkey
influenced appointments to key posts in the TRNC, such as in the security forces which remained
under Ankara’s control, and the central bank. In 1998, Ankara declared the TRNC to be a
“priority development area” granting it the same status as underserved regions in mainland
Turkey with government incentives for private investment. This integration was ultimately
institutionalized in 1999 in the Cooperation Council between the foreign ministries of Turkey
and the TRNC, through which aid and development projects were coordinated.85 During the
1980s and 1990s Turkey increased and institutionalized its political leverage in the TRNC,
coming to resemble the dependent regime it claimed not to be.86
The final development during this period was in the security field, and contributed to the
military’s opposition to concessions on Cyprus. In 1996 the RoC purchased Russian S-300
missile batteries as part of security reforms (UNSC June 1998). For the Turkish military, which
had long-viewed Cyprus as a strategic position 50 miles from Turkey's southern coast, the
deployment of missile batteries in the RoC was considered a strategic threat. Military bases on
Turkey’s southern coast were within range of the S-300 missiles and radar systems.87 Though the
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sale of the S-300s was eventually halted in 1999, this drove the military to take an even harder
line on Cyprus and oppose conceding its garrison in the TRNC. In response to this dispute, the
Turkish Air Force began regular flights of bombers and attack aircraft to the TRNC, often
straying over the buffer zone, and in 1998 held war games in the TRNC that simulated surgical
attacks on S-300 launchers (UNSC December 1998).88

4.4.2

Observed Mechanisms

The period from 1984-2000 was characterized by a hardening of intransigent positions in Turkey
and the TRNC, and simultaneous integration of the TRNC into Turkey’s economic and security
structures. This was driven in part by Turkish policies to implement neo-liberal economic
reforms under the post-junta ANAP government which were transferred to the TRNC via
economic aid conditions. It was also driven by four exogenous events that increased the TRNC’s
reliance on Turkey: (1) the RoC’s EU membership bid which was opposed by both the TRNC
and Turkey, who responded by pledging to further integrate or annex the TRNC; (2) the 1994
ECJ ruling that effectively made Turkey the TRNC’s sole conduit for trade; (3) the 1996 ECtHR
ruling that undermined the post-1974 Turkish position as illegal; and (4) the RoC purchase of
missile batteries, considered a strategic threat to Turkey by the General Staff. By 1999 policies
had not changed regarding Cyprus, and if anything the sides had moved further apart with the
Turkish Cypriots proposing a confederation in contrast to the federal solution envisioned in the
Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines.
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Table 4.9. Observed Mechanisms, 1984-2000.
Mechanism

Observations

Outcome

1.

Facilitation w/ local
regime

Denktaş as primary interlocutor
in talks; UNSG proposals in
1989 and 1992.

Both UN proposals rejected; confidencebuilding measures rejected; no change of policy.

6.

Manipulation w/
patron state: reward
structure

EU linking Turkish membership
prospect to Cyprus settlement.

Rejected: opposition to political conditionality;
will not exchange Cyprus for EU; military
withdraws supports for EU membership.

Evidence of two theorized mechanisms can be observed during this period. The first
mechanism is facilitation with the local regime (#1, Table 1), which notably included two
attempts at formulation by UN Secretaries General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in 1989 and Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in 1992. However neither comprehensive proposal successfully managed the
contentious issues of negotiations, specifically the three freedoms, territorial adjustments, and the
federal status of the TRNC. Denktaş ultimately rejected both formulated proposals with the
support of Ankara and refused further talks after 1997.
The second observed mechanism was manipulation with the patron state: reward
structure (#6, Table 4.8), by which the European Union linked Turkey’s membership prospect to
a solution in Cyprus. This, however, failed to alter the Turkish position, due in large part to the
influence of the military. Both the military and Kemalist parties - ANAP, DSP, and DYP favored EU accession for economic reasons but opposed political conditionality. The military in
particular opposed EU conditions that would curb its influence in politics and its ability to fight
the ongoing Kurdish insurgency. In response, Turkish officials ruled out exchanging a Cyprus
solution for EU membership, and by 1997 the MGK withdrew its support for EU membership in
response to the RoC being granted candidate status. Accordingly, given the political context of
Turkey, and the influence of the military in particular, the inducement of potential EU
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membership did not alter Turkey’s policies to favor a settlement, while the four noted events
drove Turkey to further integrate the TRNC.

4.5

The Annan Plan, 2000-2004

The closest the sides came to reaching a settlement was with the “The Comprehensive Settlement
of the Cyprus Problem” proposed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2002. Known
colloquially as the “Annan Plan,” it proposed a slate of compromises based on the sides’
preferences expressed over the course of the UN Mission of Good Offices. Prior to the Annan
Plan’s proposal in November 2002, two attempts by the UN to resume talks had failed, first in
2000-01 when Denktaş set RoC recognition of the TRNC’s independence as a precondition, and
then in April 2002 when the RoC received a deadline for EU accession.89 Denktaş wanted EU
accession delayed until Turkey became a member, thereby preserving the Treaty of Guarantee.
The RoC, led again by Glafcos Clerides, refused to make concessions on EU accession, which
was believed would supersede the 1960 Treaties, and refused recognition of the TRNC.90
At resumed talks in New York in November 2002, the Annan Plan was presented as the
most comprehensive proposal to date. It was an example of formulative mediation derived
directly from the sides preferences expressed during UN facilitation, unlike prior proposals by
Sakari Tuomioja and Galo Plaza that sought to shift blame to one side, or the those by Javier
Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali that proposed specific points of compromise but left
the contentious issues on the table. The initial Annan Plan included:

Interviews with Rauf Denktaş, Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (11 July 2001, 25 August 2001); Radio Bayrak [in
Turkish] (12 September 2001).
90
Interviews with Rauf Denktaş, Radio Bayrak [in Turkish] (8 February 2000); Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (26
February 2000, 21 September 2000, 8 April 2002); Turkish Radio-Television [in Turkish] (4 July 2000); Interview
with Glafcos Clerides, CyBC (18 September 2000).
89

94
•

Character of the state as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation formed of two component
federal entities;

•

International personality as a singular state, in which citizens would possess two
citizenships: one with the common state and one with their constituent federal entity;

•

Executive powers held in a six-member executive council composed of four Greek
Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots elected by the legislature to serve in ten-month
rotating terms as President and Vice President;

•

Legislative powers held in a bi-cameral legislature in which each community would hold
24 of 48 seats in the upper house, and the lower house would be proportional. Any vote
would be required to pass both houses;

•

Communal governance carried out by a legislature elected in each federal entity;

•

Compensation for displaced persons provided at market value adjusted for inflation;

•

Moratorium on resettlement for a set period, followed by caps on the number of citizens
of one federal entity residing in the other;

•

Common state flag and anthem (UNSC April 2003).

Denktaş agreed to consider the Annan Plan as a basis for continued talks, but was
concerned that the TRNC’s poor economic state compared to the RoC would lead to economic
and political domination by the Greek Cypriots, again undermining the federal state.91 Attempts
to overcome this issue in direct talks, including economic aid to the TRNC and restrictions on
economic activities by Greek Cypriots in the TRNC over three rounds of revisions, failed to
placate Denktaş and in April 2003 he rejected the Annan Plan (Anastasiou 2008b; Heraclides

Interviews with Rauf Denktaş, Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (10 December 2002, 8 January 2003, 13 January
2003, 16 February 2003).
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2011).92 Importantly, this meant that the RoC signed its accession agreement with the EU in
April 2003 without the TRNC, and would accede to the EU on 1 May 2004 regardless of a
settlement (Tocci 2007). Talks remained stalled until February 2004. Though Denktaş remained
opposed to the Annan Plan, under pressure from Turkey (see Chapter 5) the TRNC agreed to
hold a referendum on the Annan Plan, simultaneous to one in the RoC. The version of the Annan
Plan, voted on in April 2004 had been revised four times since its initial proposal in November
2002, to include:
•

A larger executive council of nine members with the roles of President and Vice
President rotating twice over three 20-month periods;93

•

A joint central bank and Court of Federal Jurisdiction with primacy over federal entities;

•

Restitution of Greek Cypriot property in the TRNC doubled, with moratorium on
resettlement shortened and compensation for property backed by government bonds;

•

Citizenship for Turkish settlers in the TRNC capped at 45,000 and those not granted
citizenship given five years to leave;94

•

Joint EU membership with the TRNC joining the EU along with the RoC, and special
development aid and a moratorium on Greek Cypriot business ownership in the TRNC to
foster economic parity between federal entities;

•

Community veto power and separate majorities removed from central government;

Denktaş quoted on rejection, Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (8 April 2003).
This was a specific demand of the Greek Cypriot side, intended to create a more permanent executive body with
more consistency especially in foreign affairs.
94
This excluded settlers from Turkey who had married Turkish Cypriots. However it was a contentious issue. The
Turkish Cypriot side had initially demanded 60,000, but estimates on settlers were as high as 120,000 at the time.
See: European Commission (2002), CoE (2003).
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•

The Treaty of Guarantee would remain in place until 2018, when it would either be
voided by Turkey’s EU membership, or renegotiated (UNSC May 2004; Anastasiou
2008b).

Accordingly, the contentious issues that had obstructed talks since 1977 were addressed: the
three freedoms, centralized power, property, and the Treaty of Guarantee. Importantly, the
TRNC ended its opposition to EU membership that had obstructed talks during the 1990s (UNSC
April 2004; May 2004).

Table 4.10. Annan Plan Referendum Results, 2004.
Greek Cypriots (RoC)

Turkish Cypriots (TRNC)

In-favor (YES)

24.2 pct

64.9 pct

Against (NO)

75.8 pct

35.1 pct

In the simultaneous referendums, held on 24 April 2004, the Turkish Cypriots voted in
favor of the Annan Plan, and thereby reunification with the RoC and EU membership. This was
the first time since the start of the conflict in 1964 that (1) the Turkish Cypriot population had
been given a direct say in peacemaking, and (2) the official Turkish Cypriot position was in
favor of a proposed settlement. The Annan Plan failed, however, due to the Greek Cypriot
rejection. RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos, elected in February 2003, had distanced himself
from the proposal, claiming to have inherited it from his predecessor, Clerides, who it was
believed had supported Papadopoulos on the understanding that he would back the Annan Plan.
Instead, though, he campaigned against it as impractical “capitulation” that legitimized Turkish
occupation.95 Importantly, the EU had removed the “Helsinki Tail” from the RoC’s accession
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Papadopoulos campaign speech before referendum, CyBC (22 April 2004).
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agreement in 2002, which the RoC signed in April 2003 without the TRNC, meaning that it
would not incur any punishment for rejecting the Annan Plan - it would join the EU the
following week regardless. If anything, it was believed that the added burden of the
economically unstable TRNC would harm its position in the EU (Tocci 2007; Ker-Lindsay
2011).

Table 4.11. Timeline of Negotiations, 2000-04.
Year

Mediator

2000

UN: Kofi Annan, Alvaro
de Soto

Good Offices resume under pressure from
UNSC for solution

Fail in 2000

2001

UN: Kofi Annan, Alvaro
de Soto

Talks restart without preconditions

Fail in 2002

2002

UN: Kofi Annan, Alvaro
de Soto

Annan Plan proposed in November 2002

Rejected by Denktaş in
April 2003

2004,
Feb.

UN: Kofi Annan, Alvaro
de Soto

Talks on Annan Plan resume in February

Referendum agreed

2004,
April

UN: Kofi Annan, Alvaro
de Soto

Simultaneous referenda on Annan Plan

Rejected by Greek
Cypriots

4.5.1

Outcome

Turkey’s Preferences

Support for the Annan Plan in the TRNC was due in large part to domestic change within
Turkey. The regional context in which the Annan Plan was proposed shifted in late 1999, with
the so-called “seismic rapprochement” that led to improved relations between Greece and
Turkey, as well as between Turkey and the EU, which had undermined talks during the 1990s.
Earthquakes in İzmit and Athens in August and September 1999 led to public outpourings of
solidarity between Greece and Turkey, and reciprocal humanitarian aid and assistance (Evin
2004). In December 1999, at the EU’s Helsinki Summit, Greece committed to ending its veto of
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Turkey’s EU membership application and pre-accession aid. The “Helsinki Tail” was also agreed
by which the EU would take into account any settlement progress prior to accession and grant
special accommodations for Cyprus’ accession in the event of reunification (Anastasiou 2008b;
Heraclides 2011). It was within this context that the EU endorsed a UN settlement in 2000, and
appended support for a UN settlement in Cyprus to Turkey’s accession process (European
Commission 1999; 2000). The EU later specified that a political condition for Turkey’s
accession was support for “the solution for the Cyprus problem proposed by the UN Secretary
General” in direct reference to the Annan Plan (UNSC April 2003; European Commission 2005).
Domestically within Turkey, the primary change came with the rise of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP), as a reformist-Islamist party that won an outright majority in the
Grand National Assembly in 2002. Led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, former
officials in Erbakan’s Welfare Party and Virtue Party, the AKP cast itself as a conservative proEU party in contrast with the anti-westernism associated with Erbakan and his new Felicity
Party.96 The AKP’s rise was attributable to both the growth in Islamic-based welfare following
ANAP’s neoliberal reforms in the 1980s and general disenchantment with the Kemalist-military
establishment after the 1997 “coup by memorandum” that ousted and banned the Welfare Party
(Patton 2007; Keyman 2010; Ozel 2013). In addition to campaigning on a pro-EU reform
platform in the 2002 elections, the AKP leadership regarded EU membership talks as benefiting
their position by curbing the influence of the military in politics. Unlike previous governments
that had supported the economic benefits of EU accession but opposed political conditionality,
the AKP believed that political conditions such as a human rights protections and democratic

Following the 1997 “Coup by Memorandum” Erbakan’s Islamist Welfare Party was disbanded and recast as the
Virtue Party which then collapsed in 2001 and split into the more hardline anti-West Felicity Party led by Erbakan
and the reformist AKP.
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reforms would curb the influence of the military and the “authoritarian tendencies of militant
Kemalism” which had stifled political Islam and constrained democracy in Turkey (Glyptis,
2005; Aydinli et al., 2006; Gürsoy, 2011).
The AKP also sought to distinguish itself from its predecessors, including the Welfare
Party, in its foreign policy and policy on Cyprus. Erdoğan regarded Turkey’s long-standing
intransigent policy on Cyprus, including maintaining a strong military presence and propping up
Rauf Denktaş as “40 years of mistakes” that hindered Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and
the EU and exemplified the military’s parochial influence at cost to Turkey as state. In the 2002
election campaign, Erdoğan ruled out his predecessors’ threats to annex the TRNC and supported
a “Belgian-style federal solution.”97 The AKP supported the Annan Plan when it was proposed in
November 2002 and in January 2003 the Foreign Ministry announced that its Cyprus policy had
been revised in-line with the terms of the Annan Plan, despite Denktaş’s opposition to it.98 AKP
Foreign Minister Yaşer Yakış visited Denktaş during talks in New York in 2002 to persuade him
not to reject the Annan Plan, but accept it as a basis for further talks.99 When Denktaş did reject
the Annan Plan in April 2003, the EU reiterated support for a settlement as part of its political
conditionality, stating that Turkey must “strongly support efforts to find a comprehensive
settlement of the Cyprus problem, building on the initiatives of the United Nations Secretary
General, which remain on the table.”100 Restrictions on movement across the ceasefire line,
maintained by military and police who were commanded from Ankara, were lifted at Ankara’s
behest the following week (UNSC May 2003; November 2003). In the subsequent TRNC

Erdoğan quoted, Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (6 November 2002, 2 January 2003).
Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (16 November 2002, 17 November 2002); Foreign Ministry Press Release, Turkey
Today (9 January 2003).
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Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (16 November 2002, 17 November 2002, 20 November 2002, 24 December 2002,
19 January 2003, 27 January 2003); Radio Bayrak [in Turkish] (24 November 2002).
100
EU Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen quoted, Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (15 April 2003).
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elections in 2003, the AKP backed the pro-EU party that supported the Annan Plan in the TRNC,
the Republican Turkish Party (CTP).101 Even as Denktaş refused to continue talks after April
2003 and again in 2004, AKP Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül continued to support the Annan
Plan and push for continued talks (UNSC May 2004).102
Lastly, the military did not oppose the AKP’s pro-EU agenda outright, as it had opposed
EU membership in the 1980s and 1990s. The military continued to support Denktaş due to a
preference for strategic stability in the eastern Mediterranean, and existing personal relationships
between Denktaş and senior officers (Anastasiou 2008b).103 The military, though, was generally
unpopular after 1997 and less obstinate on the issue of EU membership than it had been when
the MGK withdrew support for accession in 1997 (Yesilada & Sozen 2002). Importantly, this
newfound support for EU accession within the military General Staff, was crucial for it
remaining on the AKP’s side, despite its aversion to Islamist politics. Though EU accession
conditions curbed the political influence of the military and subjected it to civilian control, the
General Staff regarded it as a sustainable remedy to the problems that had led to its interventions
in politics since 1960: economic instability, violent polarization between far-right and far-left,
political Islam, and Kurdish separatism (Aydinli, Özcan, & Akyaz 2006; Taspinar 2011).

4.5.2

Observed Mechanisms

The period from 2000-04 was characterized by a marked shift in Turkish policy towards Cyprus,
best indicated by the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s revision of its policy in-line with the Annan
Plan in 2003. This new policy was facilitated by the ascension of the AKP to power in 2002 as a
party that favored EU accession to which a Cyprus settlement was linked and was critical of
101

CTP leader Mehmet Ali Talat quoted, Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (28 October 2003).
Also: Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (23 April 2004).
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Author interviews, TRNC, 2021.
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prior Cyprus policies. Importantly, the AKP supported EU membership early on as a long-term
means of curbing the influence of the military and Kemalist parties. Simultaneously the military
ended its opposition to EU accession as a solution to the long-term problems that had plagued
Turkish politics. The outcome of this period, despite a Greek Cypriot rejection in April 2004,
was a new Turkish policy in support of a comprehensive settlement. The problem, explored in
more depth in the following chapter, was then inducing the TRNC to support this policy in favor
of the Annan Plan.

Table 4.12. Observed Mechanisms, 2000-04.
Mechanism

Observations

Outcome

1.

Facilitation w/ local
regime

Denktaş as primary interlocutor; Annan Plan
based on preferences conveyed by RoC and
TRNC.

Denktaş rejects Annan Plan in
April 2003.

6.

Manipulation w/ patron
state: reward structure

Turkish prospect for EU membership linked
to support for UN proposal of Cyprus
settlement - Annan Plan.

Turkish Foreign Ministry revised
Cyprus policy in-line with Annan
Plan in January 2003.

During this period, two potential mechanisms were observable. The first was facilitation
with the local regime (#1, Table 4.12), by which Denktaş continued to serve as primary
interlocutor and from which the Annan Plan was formulated. However, despite the Annan Plan
including Denktaş’s preferences, he rejected it in April 2003, though had never fully supported it
since November 2002.
The second mechanism, manipulation with the patron state: reward structure (#6, Table
4.12), led directly to a change in Turkish policy by offering the long-term reward of EU
membership in exchange for a settlement in Cyprus. Previous Turkish support for EU accession
had been undone by linking accession to a Cyprus settlement (among other political conditions),
which both the civilian government and MGK opposed. The same condition was reiterated by the
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EU in 2002, but the difference was the dominance of the AKP in government which supported
EU accession at the time, and held an outright majority leaving it immune to radical coalition
partners (as the AP had suffered from in the 1970s). EU accession then presented long-term
benefits for the two key factions in Turkey. For the AKP government, EU accession appealed to
its supporters and curbed the influence of the military, which had intervened five years earlier to
remove an Islamist government. For the military, EU accession provided a potential remedy to
Turkey’s persistent instability that had triggered its interventions in politics since 1960.
Accordingly, while EU accession provided an inducement for policy change pursuing a
settlement, the appeal of that inducement depended on the preferences of the political factions in
power domestically within Turkey (see Schimmelfennig 2005).

4.6

Post-Annan Plan, 2005-21

The failure of the Annan Plan in 2004 was followed by four years of stalled talks, while Tassos
Papadopoulos remained President of the RoC. Though he and Mehmet Ali Talat, the CTP leader
who was elected to succeed Denktaş as TRNC President in 2005, met on numerous occasions to
discuss practical and humanitarian issues, his preconditions of Turkish troops leaving Cyprus
and the TRNC renouncing its independence obstructed a resumption of talks. Talks under UN
auspices only resumed in 2008 after the election of Demetris Christofias as RoC President, with
the intention of reaching a political solution within the framework of the Annan Plan (UNSC
November 2009).104 In talks mediated by UN envoy Alexander Downer in July 2008 the sides
reaffirmed commitment to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and agreed to 18 confidencebuilding measures. Since 2004, though, a new issue area to be negotiated was alignment of the
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Christofias was leader of the communist AKEL party in RoC and a supporter of reunification who had met with
Talat on many occasions during the 1990s.
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TRNC with EU standards, on which talks began in September 2009. In 71 meetings from 200810 Talat and Christofias agreed to solutions for governance and power-sharing, economic
management, and EU standards, and limited progress was made on the contentious issues of
property ownership and security (UNSC November 2009; May 2010).
Talks broke down from 2012-14 after the RoC assumed the rotating EU presidency in
July 2012, complicated by leadership changes on both sides and a growing dispute over natural
resources. In the RoC, Christofias was replaced by another committed pro-reunification leader in
2013, Nicos Anastasiades, one of the few Greek Cypriot leaders to have supported the Annan
Plan in 2004. In the TRNC, though, Talat was replaced by Derviş Eroğlu, the former hardline
UBP Prime Minister who had opposed federalism in the 1990s and the Annan Plan in 2004
(UNSC May 2010).105 Despite Eroğlu’s previous opposition to the Annan Plan, he promised to
continue talks in 2010, and when talks resumed again in 2014, he did reaffirm commitment to the
parameters for a settlement outlined in the Annan Plan, albeit under pressure from Ankara.106
Eroğlu was ousted as TRNC President in 2015 by Mustafa Akıncı, a long-time peace
activist who had advocated for the Annan Plan alongside Talat. UN envoy Lisa Buttenheim
noted renewed political will for a settlement between Anastasiades and Akıncı who approached
matters constructively and avoided blaming one another (UNSC January 2016; July 2016). They
failed to reach an agreement at a summit in Geneva in November 2016, but reconvened talks in
Crans-Montana, Switzerland in 2017, though Akıncı was losing support for continued talks.107
Though they reached nearly full agreement on federal structure, free movement of persons,
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Anastasiades was leader of the center-right DISY (the same party as Glafcos Clerides), which had viewed the
Annan Plan as a practical solution which could be adjusted over time, especially once both sides were in the EU.
See: AFP (14 May 2012).
106
This statement had been set as a precondition for resuming talks by Anastasiades. Christofias had been critical of
Eroğlu during talks who he believed was delaying an agreement and refused to renounce a supposed “plan B” for
Cyprus. See: Cyprus News Agency (11 February 2014).
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AFP (21 November 2016); Anadolu Agency (26 June 2017); Associated Press (29 June 2017).

104
territory, and property restitution, the Crans-Montana talks ended without an agreement due to
issues of the political status of the TRNC and security guarantees (UNSC September 2017).108
Both Anastasiades and Akıncı supported continuing talks, but Turkey withdrew its
support for the Annan Plan framework after the failure of Crans-Montana (UNSC October 2018).
In October 2020, nationalist leader Ersin Tatar was elected TRNC President, having campaigned
on promises to end talks and pursue a two-state solution, and unilaterally resettle Varosha/Maraş
under Turkish Cypriot control. At the 2021 Geneva Summit, Tatar and Erdoğan announced an
official position in favor of a two-state solution - renouncing the commitment to federalism held
since the 1977 Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines.

Table 4.13. Timeline of Negotiations, 2005-21.
Year

Mediator

2008

UN: Alexander
Downer

Good Offices resume between
Christofias and Talat, then
Christofias and Eroğlu

Fail in 2012 when RoC takes EU
presidency

2014

UN: Alexander
Downer, Lisa
Buttenheim

Talks restart between Anastasiades
and Eroğlu, then Anastasiades and
Akıncı

Lead to Geneva Summit

2016

UN: Lisa Buttenheim

Geneva Summit between
Anastasiades and Akıncı

Fails to produce agreement

2017

UN: António
Guterres, Lisa
Buttenheim

Crans-Montana Summit between
Anastasiades and Akıncı

Fails

2021

UN: Jane Holl Lute

Geneva Summit

TRNC and Turkey announce support for
2-state solution and resettlement of
Varosha/Maraş
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Outcome

Turkey and the TRNC regarded the RoC proposals including a precondition on Turkish troop withdrawals as
nothing new and their position to be based on a “charm offensive” rather than substantive concessions. Turkey had
been willing to withdraw 80 percent of its garrison from the TRNC, which was rejected by the RoC, which
demanded full withdrawal. See: AFP (30 June 2017, 3 July 2017, 8 July 2017); Associated Press (5 July 2017).
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4.6.1

Turkey’s Preferences

The change in talks from 2008-21 reflected a marked change in Turkish domestic politics and
Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Turkey’s declining relationship with the EU has
been the subject of a considerable body of scholarship, and linked to both the consolidation of
autocratic power by the AKP over the course of its rule, and enlargement problems on the EU’s
side. In the years immediately after the Annan Plan referendum, Turkey remained committed to a
solution in the framework of the Annan Plan, as well as EU political reforms. In 2008, Erdoğan
threatened to call fresh elections, despite the AKP’s majority, if the opposition attempted to block
EU reforms included in constitutional amendments (Cagaptay 2009). Importantly, support for
EU accession continued to placate the military which had an uneasy relationship with Erdoğan
and was gradually losing influence in the MGK (Taspinar 2011).109 Simultaneously though,
Turkey was critical of the EU’s position on Cyprus and its failure to end the TRNC’s isolation,
despite its support for the Annan Plan.110 It denied the RoC access to its ports and airports after
2005, in contravention of its EU accession partnership, hoping to force the RoC back into talks
on the Annan Plan. The EU responded, not by pressuring the RoC, but by threatening to suspend
Turkey’s accession negotiations, begun in October 2005, and the RoC then responded by
threatening to block further negotiations.111
Changes to the AKP’s pro-EU/pro-Annan Plan position became more evident after 2010.
Regionally, the AKP supported several Islamist parties during the Arab Spring, supporting the
ousting of secular governments in Tunisia and Egypt, and its foreign policy discourse became
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MGK statement of support for restarting talks within UN parameters, Turkish Daily News (26 April 2008, 21 July
2008).
110
Statements by Turkish Foreign Minister-then-President Abdullah Gül, Turkish Daily News (30 May 2005);
Anadolu Agency (21 January 2006); Associated Press (18 September 2007).
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Associated Press (3 November 2006); Turkish Daily News (9 November 2006); Deutsche Welle (8 December
2006).
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increasingly critical of NATO and Israel (Larrabee 2007; Cagaptay 2009; Akyol 2011). An
undocking from the EU’s regional preferences was made more evident after the outbreak of the
Syrian Civil War, which saw refugee flows to the EU via Turkey. The AKP could leverage
concessions from the EU with transactional deals on the issue of refugees rather than domestic
reforms that curbed the AKP’s power, such as the 2016 deal with the EU by which Turkey
stopped refugee transit to Greece in exchange for 6 billion euro in aid and visa-free
travel (Lepeska 2015; Batalla Adam 2017). Turkey’s relationship with the EU further declined
after the violent crackdown on the Gezi Park protests and increasing curbs on free speech and
critical media that triggered EU human rights sanctions (Danforth & Toygur 2017). While the
AKP initially supported the EU’s democratic political conditionality, including human rights
standards, to curb the military’s influence in politics, these conditions became a hindrance to
AKP rule, and Erdoğan began to cast the EU as an opponent to Turkey, harkening back to the
anti-Western “enemy” rhetoric that had been espoused by the MHP and by Erbakan in the 1970s
and 1990s (Aydın-Düzgit 2016; Cagaptay 2020; Bechev 2022).
Two developments pertaining more directly to Cyprus further influenced change in
Turkey’s policy. The first was a dispute over hydrocarbons in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) beginning in 2006 and escalating after 2011. Turkey and the TRNC disputed the RoC’s
authority to tender contracts for exploration and drilling in Cypriot waters, and when it did award
contracts to EU-based firms, Turkey responded by sending its own exploration ships and naval
warships to the waters off of the TRNC. The gas reserves in Cyprus’ EEZ were estimated to be
negligible. Their extraction, though, was viewed as an issue of sovereignty rather than resource
competition. Turkish warships turned away foreign exploration vessels from Cypriot waters and
resumed wargames in the TRNC, including naval exercises, that had been suspended as a show
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of good faith since 2002 (UNSC July 2013; June 2018).112 As early as 2007, the EU warned
Turkey that unilateral claims over hydrocarbons in Cyprus’ EEZ could lead to a suspension of
membership talks.113 In 2019, after confrontations between French exploration vessels and
Turkish warships, the EU targeted sanctions against Turkey for “aggressive actions towards EU
members” (UNSC November 2019).114
The second development was the domestic resurgence of Turanist/Eurasianist nationalists
within Turkish domestic politics in 2016-17, who opposed concessions on Cyprus, EU accession,
and viewed the West as a predatory opponent of Turks. Following a failed coup attempt in 2016,
Erdoğan purged the military officer corps, most of whom were pro-western/pro-NATO leaning,
and replaced them with high ranking officers more sympathetic to Pan-Turkic or
Turanist/Eurasianist views, many of whom had been purged from the military during the
Ergenekon Trials in 2008. This new officer corps was less supportive of EU reforms, favored a
harder line on Cyprus, and influenced Turkey’s problematic relationship with NATO after 2016
(Koru 2016; Erdemir & Tahiroglu 2017).115 The following year, to pass the new constitutional
referendum in 2017, transforming Turkey to a centralized presidential system, the AKP formed
an alliance with MHP (Tol & Taspinar 2016; Dalay 2017; Genc 2019). The MHP had briefly
tempered its anti-EU rhetoric in the early-2000s, but following the EU’s warnings to Turkey
specifically over Cyprus, it resumed its opposition to concessions on Cyprus (Kiratli 2015). As it
had in coalition with the AP in the 1970s, and it explicitly ruled out security concessions on the
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See official statements on hydrocarbon dispute in Reuters (7 August 2007); AFP (25 November 2008); Cyprus
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for Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
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TRNC, a federal settlement in Cyprus, and a Cyprus settlement as conditional for EU
membership.116
Turkey’s position changed significantly during this period. In the years immediately
following the Annan Plan referendum in 2004, it continued to support a settlement within the
framework of the Annan Plan. Over the following decade this preference shifted back to an
intransigent position that opposed EU conditions linked to resolving the Cyprus conflict as
observed during the 1990s. This was driven in part by domestic changes within Turkey that saw
the AKP consolidate an autocratic hold on power, which EU political conditions would hinder,
and a return of Turanist/Eurasianist forces in the military and ruling coalition after 2016 that
opposed EU political conditions linked to Cyprus. This was further driven by an increasingly
conflictual relationship with the EU. The AKP evolved from casting EU accession as a vehicle
for reforming the autocratic tendencies of militant Kemalism in 2002 to casting it as an enemy of
Turkey, responsible for sanctioning Turkey over human rights violations and naval operations in
the eastern Mediterranean (Aydın-Düzgit 2016; Bechev 2022). Consequently, the inducement of
EU membership that had influenced policy change towards Cyprus in 2002-03 became less
credible as a reward which would actually be received, and less appealing as a reward for the
AKP government.

4.6.2

Observed Mechanisms

As noted above, the post-Annan Plan period, 2005-21, was characterized by a marked shift in
Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus, from supporting continued talks in 2008 to opposing further
talks after 2017 and formally advocating a two-state solution and the unilateral resettlement of
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MHP Party Programs 2015, 2018.
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Varosha/Maraş in 2019-21. The AKP’s rise after 2002 had marginalized the traditional veto
players in Turkey politics, including the military, leaving space for a new Cyprus policy.
However, both regional and domestic developments saw the AKP-led government clash with the
RoC on the issues of ports and hydrocarbons, and with the EU on democratic political reforms
and foreign relations with member states. Ultimately, having marginalized the traditional
Kemalist veto players, AKP-led Turkey returned to the same intransigent position on Cyprus, if
not more extreme, that the Kemalists had held in the 1990s and before.

Table 4.14. Observed Mechanisms, 2005-21.
Mechanism

Observations

Outcome

1.

Facilitation w/ local
regime

TRNC president as primary
interlocutor; constructive talks
from 2008-17.

Near agreement in 2017; Akıncı’s preference for
continued talks after Crans-Montana failed to
alter new Turkish preference.

6.

Manipulation w/
patron state: reward
structure

Turkish prospect for EU
membership linked to support for
UN proposal of Cyprus
settlement.

Declining appeal/prospect of EU, confrontations
with EU members, and return of
Turanist/Eurasianist partners: reward for
concessions decreased

During this period, two mechanisms were observable in talks. The first was facilitation with the
local regime (#1, Table 4.14) by which the President of the TRNC remained the primary
interlocutor in talks. This was influenced by who occupied that office, as well as the presidency
of the RoC. Talks could not resume while Tassos Papadopoulos remained RoC President, due to
his preconditions, and only resumed once Demetris Christofias was elected. On the TRNC side,
talks were reported by UN envoys to be more constructive under Mehmet Ali Talat and Mustafa
Akıncı, two long-standing peace activists, than under the more hawkish Derviş Eroğlu. Even
after the failure of Crans-Montana, Mustafa Akıncı attempted to continue talks without Turkish
support in 2017-18, but this failed to change Turkey’s policy on ending talks, and Akıncı was
ousted in subsequent elections.
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The second observed mechanism was manipulation with the patron state: reward
structure (#6, Table 4.14) by which a settlement in Cyprus was linked to Turkey’s own EU
accession prospect. This was reiterated by the EU in 2006 and 2007 when it issued warnings to
Turkey that disputes with the RoC over access to ports and hydrocarbons would adversely affect
membership negotiations. However, in-keeping with observations of EU conditionality, the
leverage of conditions to induce reforms declined over time as the prospect of membership
became less credible, subject to political changes within member states and aspirants themselves
(see Anastasakis 2008, Freyburg & Richter 2010, Borzel & Lebanidze 2017, Bieber 2020). In the
case of Turkey during this period, the appeal of membership declined. EU membership came to
constitute a threat to AKP rule and anathema to its partners in the government and military after
2016. While the reward for concessions remained the same from 2002-21, the domestic political
value of that reward for the ruling coalition declined, especially after 2016.

4.7

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been threefold. First to provide a detailed overview of the
context and dynamics of the Cyprus conflict, ongoing since before Cyprus’ independence in
1960, as well as external efforts to mediate a solution beginning in 1964. For the majority of the
conflict, the UN acted as mediator with brief interventions by the US, and indirect interventions
by the EU in support of UN mediation. What is also evident from this overview is that within
Turkey the Cyprus conflict was more than a strategic contest over territory, but was an aspect of
national identity for developing nationalism in the Republic of Turkey. While Cyprus, lying only
50 miles from Turkey’s southern coast, did present strategic challenges to Turkey, notable in the
military and evident in the S-300 missile dispute in 1996-99, it was also a salient issue of
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national identity that developed in the 1960s and continued after. Nationalist parties, such as the
MHP, were unwilling to make concessions on Cyprus despite the material costs to Turkey.
The second purpose was to identify specific mechanisms through which internationallyled mediation affected Turkey’s preferences towards Cyprus. As theorized in Chapter 2, there
were a number of potential pathways through which policies could be altered by mediation. For
much of the period considered in this study, Turkey’s policy was largely intransigent on a
settlement: formally calling for a federal solution, but opposing concessions on territory, troop
removals, or the institutional nature of the federal state, while propping up the TFSC/TRNC and
its leaders. For the most part, facilitative mediation involving the RoC, Turkey, the TFSC/TRNC
failed to alter preferences. Only after the Turkish invasions in 1974 was the RoC willing to
accept federalism, as it was the de facto reality after August 1974. Following 1974, Turkey and
the TFSC/TRNC did not change their preferences despite comprehensive settlement proposals in
1977, 1989, and 1992, as that same post-1974 reality allowed them to achieve their objectives
regardless of a settlement: preventing enosis and carving out a Turkish Cypriot entity linked to
Turkey. Additional instances of manipulative mediation did have an effect on preferences,
beginning in 1964 when US threats prevented Turkey from unilaterally invoking the Treaty of
Guarantee and invading Cyprus. The effects of manipulation were most evident during the period
of the Annan Plan, when Turkey’s own EU accession was linked to a Cyprus settlement. And
when the reward from this manipulation became less appealing due to regional and domestic
developments, Turkey’s preference for a settlement ended.
Lastly, the third purpose of this chapter was to identify specific instances of policy
change towards Cyprus within Turkey. Three notable points of change can be identified from
this overview. One was during the late 1970s and early 1980s when the CHP government of
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Bülent Ecevit and the military junta of Kenan Evren supported concessions on UN confidencebuilding measures in response to a US arms embargo. Another was 2002-14 when the AKP
government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, supported a settlement in the framework of the Annan
Plan in official policy after Turkey’s EU accession was linked to a Cyprus settlement. The last
point of policy change was then from 2015-21 when Turkish support for a settlement declined,
culminating in an official policy supporting a two-state solution tabled in 2021. These three
specific instances are further analyzed in the following chapter to identify the specific ways in
which changes to policy in Turkey were translated to the local regime, the TFSC/TRNC.
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5

FROM TAKSIM TO PEACE & BACK AGAIN

The idea of unilaterally declaring independence was first proposed by Turkish Federated State of
Cyprus (TFSC) President Rauf Denktaş in May 1983. He opposed the Greek Cypriot demands
for a solution that guaranteed the freedom of movement, settlement, and property in a federal
state, believing they would dilute the character of federalism, and believed that declaring
independence would remove them from the negotiating table. Independence was subsequently
proposed in the TFSC’s parliament where it gained broad support in May 1983. The head of
Turkey’s military government (1980-83), Kenan Evren, warned Denktaş not to declare
independence, believing it would ostracize Turkey from the West, and threatened to remove him
as Turkish Cypriot leader in June 1983 if he continued his push for independence. Denktaş
complied with Evren, but then in November 1983 unilaterally declared independence, with
unanimous parliamentary support, as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Denktaş had
specifically waited until November, the interregnum between military and civilian rule in
Turkey, when he believed Evren could not punish him and though Evren and the new ANAP-led
civilian government did not approve, they could not remove Denktaş from power.
This anecdote from 1983 illustrates two points about the Turkey Cypriot local regime in
conflict. One is that it was not a strictly subordinate regime that took orders from Ankara and
implemented policy on its behalf. Rather it had its own leaders, who though dependent upon
Turkey for resources and political support, had their own preferences for conflict resolution
outcomes. The other point was that the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş, was a skilled
statesman able to influence and respond to Ankara’s preferences in ways that benefitted his own
interests and preferences. When Ankara’s preferences supported concessions or more
cooperative positions pursuant to a settlement, Denktaş could act as a spoiler to undermine them.
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Building on the previous chapter (Chapter 4) that traced ways in which international
mediation affected Turkish preferences and policy on Cyprus, this chapter traces how Turkey
then sought to influence the policies and preferences of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The
purpose is twofold. First is to disaggregate the Turkey Cypriot local regime and trace its
pathology over the course of the conflict, from 1964-2021. To reiterate (from Chapter 3), the
local regime is the complex of actors, institutions, resources, and strategies that determine the
conduct of subnational politics and how it links to higher tiers of authority. As noted in Chapter
3, one of these links to higher tiers of authority in the absence of consolidated hierarchical state,
is the “diagonal linkage” to a patron state. The second purpose is then to identify the specific
mechanisms for how the patron state, Turkey, enacts its own preferences within the local regime,
and how those preferences affect local regime policies towards cooperation.
The analysis proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the pathology of the Turkish
Cypriot local regime is traced chronologically over four time periods, focusing specifically on
key actors, institutions of exchange, resources, and strategies. The second stage, then builds on
the findings from the previous chapter to identify the specific mechanisms by which Turkey
enforced or failed to enforce its preferences in the TFSC/TRNC after policy change within
Turkey.
5.1

Turkish Cypriot Regime: Enclaves to de facto State
5.1.1

Turkish Cypriot Enclaves Pre-Partition, 1964-74

Cyprus was not partitioned into contiguous ethnic zones until after the second Turkish invasion
in 1974, but a parallel Turkish Cypriot local regime had evolved since 1964. The outbreak of
intercommunal fighting in December 1963 triggered the unmixing of the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot populations. Turkish Cypriot villages and city quarters were targeted by the numerically
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superior Greek Cypriot paramilitaries and the strictly ethnic-Greek National Guard, forcing
~25,000 Turkish Cypriots to flee their homes.117 Turkish Cypriots abandoned 94 villages and
neighborhoods and congregated in defensible enclaves where they were protected by the remobilized Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT), the pro-taksim militia that had fought the
EOKA prior to independence. The largest enclaves were at Kokkina/Erenköy, Kyrenia/Girne,
northern Nicosia/Lefkoşa, and the old city district in Famagusta/Gazimağusa, with smaller ones
scattered around the island. They accounted for only 56 square miles (2-3 percent of total
territory) and became cramped with relocating Turks and underserved with limited access to
resources and basic services, due primarily to a blockade of individual enclaves by Greek
Cypriot forces from 1964-68 (UNSC December 1964; Patrick 1973). This included an embargo
on certain joint-use goods such as winter clothing, fuel, and tents which the Greek Cypriots
claimed would be used by the TMT, but were also needed by displaced Turks to survive the
winters. The boundaries around enclaves, marked by makeshift TMT fortification and Greek
Cypriot checkpoints, became physical manifestations of the ethnic divide between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots (UNSC December 1966; June 1967; March 1968).
Political leadership in the enclaves developed from three groups of officials. One was the
Turkish Cypriot officials who had been elected to central institutions in 1960 before quitting in
1963, including Vice President Fazıl Küçük, former-defense minister Osman Örek, and 19
elected deputies. Another group was the members of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber,
provided for in the 1960 constitution, which was headed by Rauf Denktaş and 15 elected
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One of the earliest challenges noted by UNFICYP was identifying official security forces. The National Guard,
which was constitutionally limited to a force of 2,000, of whom 800 were supposed to be ethnic Turks, was more
than 5,000 strong, commanded by officers seconded from Greece, and operated seamlessly with ~30,000
paramilitaries, many of whom were former-EOKA fighters, who were armed by the National Guard and reinforced
National Guard positions. Official Turkish Cypriot policemen were disarmed and sent home.
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deputies to oversee communal matters. Lastly, pertaining to the smaller enclaves, were the local
village headman, mukhtars. These officials and institutions were consolidated into a single
Provisional Administration in December 1967 composed of an assembly and executive council
headed by Rauf Denktaş. By 1970 Denktaş was re-elected as head of the executive and his
National Solidarity Programme held all of the posts in the Provisional Administration, despite
the emergence of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) in 1970 as an opposition movement
(UNSC March 1968; Patrick 1973; Jackson 2021).
With limited access to resources, due to the Greek Cypriot blockades until 1968, and
subsequent refusal to reintegrate, the enclave and provisional administrations were restricted in
the services they could provide the Turkish Cypriot population. The primary service provided
after December 1963 was physical protection, provided to enclaves by the remobilized TMT. By
the end of 1964 its strength was estimated at 12,000 fighters, primarily manning makeshift
roadblocks or fortifications around enclaves (UNSC December 1964; March 1965). This
included a professional force of ~6,000, and an additional ~6,000 conscripts regulated through
enclave-level conscription policies, which in addition to keeping the TMT at fighting force, kept
a sizeable body of trained former-conscripts in reserve, to be recalled in case of emergencies
(UNSC March 1966). Most TMT fighters had received formal training either as gendarmes
during British rule, from Turkish commandos prior to independence, or more recently as students
studying in Turkey (Novo 2012; Kadıoğlu and Bezci 2020).118 Turkey furthermore supplied the
TMT with weapons. Despite the Greek Cypriot blockades, UN observers noted surplus Turkish
weapons in TMT hands and high levels of command discipline observable in regular patrol

118

Reports on students’ recruitment and training in Turkey, The Times (29 March 1964).
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routes, unit tactics, and public ceremonies (UNSC June 1970; November 1971; December
1972).
Resources available to the Turkish Cypriot enclave elites, including the TMT, were
provided primarily by Turkey or UN humanitarian aid. TMT fighters and weapons were
smuggled into Cyprus via the Kokkina/Erenköy enclave, the Turkish Cypriots’ only access to the
coast (UNSC December 1964; June 1970). Their fighting capacity was boosted by Turkish air
support during fighting in 1964 and 1967 when the Turkish Air Force carried out attacks on
Greek Cypriot forces (UNSC December 1964; March 1968). Funding and limited humanitarian
aid from the Turkish Red Crescent were provided via the Turkish embassy in Nicosia. Red
Crescent aid was limited due to Greek Cypriot restrictions that had to be negotiated by the
embassy and by enclave-level blockades that prevent certain goods from entering enclaves,
ostensibly to deprive the TMT of resources. Humanitarian aid distributed by UNFICYP
supplemented the limited Red Crescent aid, however, bans on items such as fuel, fertilizer, and
construction materials continued to limit the services that could be provided in enclaves (UNSC
December 1964; June 1967). Funds provided from Turkey were used to pay salaries and fund the
construction of 1,400 new homes in enclaves beginning in 1966, but with bans on construction
materials, they were not completed before 1972 (UNSC December 1969; November 1971;
December 1972; May 1973).
Despite the poor provision of services within enclaves, few Turkish Cypriots relocated to
better-served, government-controlled areas despite projects to provide accommodations (UNSC
June 1970; May 1973). This was primarily due to policies and rhetoric designed to deter Turkish
Cypriots from seeking benefits from the Greek Cypriots. Beginning in 1965, Turkish Cypriots
were required to obtain an “exit permit” from the Communal Chamber and register with the TMT
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in order to leave enclaves (UNSC March 1965). The Provisional Administration after 1967
passed seven laws regulating movement in and out of enclaves, that required exit permits and
clearance from the TMT; and, an additional nine laws prohibiting moving residence from an
enclave or sale of property to “persons not of the Turkish community.”119 These enclave-level
laws were annexed with penalties such as monetary fines and imprisonment. Harassment and
threats of violence were also leveled by the TMT against Turkish Cypriots seeking employment
or to resettlement outside of enclaves (UNSC December 1965; March 1968; June 1968; Jackson
2021). This constituted an institutionalized form of in-group policing to deter cooperation across
ethnic boundaries.
In addition to legal sanctions and intimidation being used to deter Turkish Cypriots from
crossing ethnic boundaries to resettle or find employment in the better-served, governmentcontrolled areas, elite rhetoric contributed to their isolation. Elite-level discourse invoked threats
of elimination, expulsion, and the fear of enosis. For example in 1964, Denktaş urged Turkish
Cypriots not to return to “living amongst their persecutors” (UNSC December 1964). In 1965,
Turkish Cypriot officials proclaimed that Greek Cypriot forces were preparing to overrun them
and eliminate them from Cyprus (UNSC March1965). And mundane acts such as Makarios’
government purchasing small arms from Czechoslovakia or reforming the National Guard
structure were reported in Turkish Cypriot papers as evidence of a plot to eliminate them (UNSC
March 1968; January 1972; May 1973).120 As the UNFICYP commander observed, the Turkish
Cypriot public within enclaves lived in a state of anxiety and fear due to beliefs of their
imminent elimination from Cyprus (UNSC March 1965; June 1970).
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Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Assembly Legislative Archives (accessed 9 December 2020); Bozkurt [in
Turkish] (20 May 1969).
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Also: Interviews with Fazıl Küçük, The Times (7 December 1964, 29 December 1966).
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During the pre-partition period of conflict, 1964-74, the Turkish Cypriot local regime
emerged as a parallel system of governance within the enclaves that Turkish Cypriots fled to for
protection after the outbreak of violence in December 1963. The key actors within this regime
were primarily the established elites prior to 1964 drawn from the state, communal, and village
levels of administration. The main service they provided to co-ethnics in exchange for support
was physical protection, provided by TMT whose forces were regulated through conscription
laws, and trained and supplied by Turkey. Provision of other services, such as housing for
displaced persons, utilities, and jobs were limited and dependent upon financial and humanitarian
aid from Turkey and the UN. Few Turkish Cypriots relocated though, due to enclave-level laws
restricting movement, threats of sanctions or violence, and persistent fear of elimination by
Greek Cypriots reproduced through elite discourse and occasional bouts of violence.
Accordingly, there was minimal inter-ethnic cooperation which Rauf Denktaş used to reinforce
his position that any settlement other than federalism was “restoring conditions dangerous to
Turkish Cypriots’ security” (UNSC March 1966; June 1967).

5.1.2

The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, 1974-83

The Turkish invasions of Cyprus in 1974 necessitated change in the Turkish Cypriot local
regime. Most obviously, the Turkish Cypriots came to inhabit a contiguous territory in the
northern 37 percent of Cyprus, which included two major ports at Kyrenia/Girne and
Famagusta/Gazimağusa and the agricultural hub of Morphou/Güzelyurt. This meant they were
no longer confined to disparate enclaves accounting for less than three percent of territory, nor
were they dependent upon humanitarian nor the good will of the Greek Cypriots to allow
delivery of aid. This also meant that physical protection, the service upon which Turkish Cypriot
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elites had based their positions prior to 1974, was no longer as salient for their co-ethnics. There
was no longer the persistent threat and anxiety of enclaves being overrun, ensured by the
protection of ~40,000 Turkish Land Forces troops stationed in Cyprus after 1974. And they were
separated from the Greek Cypriots by a 180 kilometer ceasefire line and buffer zone controlled
by UNFICYP (UNSC June 1976).
The new Turkish Cypriot entity declared itself to be autonomous from the Greek Cypriot
Republic of Cyprus (RoC) as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) in early 1975, and
by 1976 had held its own elections separate from the RoC. Though much had changed for the
Turkish Cypriot community after 1974, its leadership remained largely the same as during the
Provisional Administration. Rauf Denktaş was elected President of the TFSC, and his National
Unity Party (UBP) won 30 of the 40 seats in the National Council (parliament) with his ally
Nejat Konjuk elected as Prime Minister. Konjuk later split with the UBP to form the Democratic
People’s Party (DHP) in 1978 and was replaced as UBP head by Osman Örek, the former
defense minister and Denktaş’s deputy in the Provisional Administration. An important
difference, though, was the existence of a political opposition to Denktaş, notably the left-leaning
Communal Liberation Party (TKP) led by Alpay Durduran and Republican Turkish Party (CTP)
led by Özker Özgür, who were both critical of Denktaş, believing him to be sabotaging talks with
the RoC for personal political gains.121 The early ideological cleavage in the TFSC was based in
part upon the parties’ positions towards a settlement, with the right-leaning parties opposing one
in favor of increased integration with Turkey, and the left-leaning parties favoring a more
cooperative position on a settlement (Bryant & Hatay 2020).122 Both the TKP and CTP gained
increasing support during this period (Table 5.1).
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Özker Özgür quoted, The Times (7 April 1980).
Author interviews, TRNC, 2021.
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Table 5.1. TFSC Election Results.
Party

Results: Pct (Seats)
1976

1981

National Unity Party (UBP)

53.7 (30)

42.5 (18)

Republican Turkish Party (CTP)

12.9 (2)

15.1 (5)

Communal Liberation Party (TKP)

20.2 (6)

28.5 (13)

Populist Party (HP)

11.7 (2)

--

Democratic People’s Party (DHP)

--

8.1 (3)

Turkish Union Party (TBP)

--

5.5 (1)

Increased support of the leftist parties by 1981 was due to the other ideological cleavage
during this period, distribution. Without the public need for protection and the TMT (renamed
Mühacit and transformed into a regular military force under Turkish command), Denktaş and the
UBP built support on the clientelistic distribution of property seized from the ~200,000 Greek
Cypriot expelled in 1974. In addition to private property and residences, this included industry,
farms, businesses, and a well-developed tourism sector. Settlers arriving from Turkey constituted
an additional clientele to whom this property was distributed in exchange for political support by
the UBP (UNSC June 1976; December 1982). This is not to say the leftist parties opposed
seizure and distribution of Greek Cypriot property, but rather that they advocated more equitable
distribution to a different clientele, and opposed the arrival of Turkish settlers, while a high
number of Turkish Cypriots were unemployed, ~50 percent in 1976.123

Opposition to settlers included some rightist factions, including former Cyprus Vice President Fazıl Küçük who
became publisher after 1974. Küçük opposed the arrival of many settlers in the TFSC who he regarded as
backwards, more religious, more socially conservative, and general troublemakers. See Fazıl Küçük quoted in The
Times (26 May 1978).
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By 1979, though, most of the expropriated Greek Cypriot property had been distributed
to UBP clients and the UBP began to lose support, evident in several defections that left the UBP
with only a single-seat majority in 1980.124 This was due in large part to a dispute over
distribution of prized assets in the tourism sectors that led to Konjuk splitting with the UBP.125
Distribution then shifted from expropriated property to public sector posts. While this rapidly
reduced unemployment from ~50 to ~3 percent, it also created a bloated civil service that
included publicly-funded schools, farms, and industry and whose wage bill accounted for more
than 50 percent of the TFSC budget (Bozkurt 2014; Sonan 2014). Importantly, the public sector
unions became powerful political constituents and contributed to increased support for the CTP
and TKP in 1981.126
The ability of the UBP to remain in power, with the coalition support of the DHP after
1981 was dependent upon the ability to provide and fund public sector posts. This was in turn
dependent upon economic aid from Turkey, which funded the majority of the TFSC’s budget
through loans and development projects. In 1975, Turkey had funded 80 percent of the TFSC
budget and by 1980 it still funded 53 percent, the majority of which went to public sector wages
(Bozkurt 2014).127 The UBP and Denktaş, though, retained the support of the Turkish
government and military, which were avowedly anti-communist and wary of the leftist parties,
and favored military stability in Cyprus as a strategic position off of Turkey’s southern coast.
Both the civilian and military governments in Turkey thus continued to fund UBP rule. Ahead of
the 1981 elections, when UBP support had declined, Ankara funded the creation of an additional
~4,000 civil service posts that the UBP distributed, resulting in a spike in party support. It won
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the election and remained in power with the support of the Konjuk’s DHP and the Turkish Union
Party (TBP), a party made up of settlers (Sonan 2014).128
In sum, aspects of the Turkish Cypriot local regime changed from the pre-1974
Provisional Administration to the post-1974 TFSC. While the elites in power remained largely
the same, albeit challenged by left-leaning opposition, the group-based institutions of exchange,
available resources, and strategies for remaining power changed. Elites no longer based their
positions on the physical protection of individual enclaves, but on distribution to in-group
clientele. This started with the distribution of expropriated property, but when that finite resource
ran out, the UBP transitioned to developing a bloated civil service to distribute posts in, which
relied upon Turkish funding to pay wages. Ultimately, this led to both powerful public sector
unions and economic instability linked to Turkey, which with high inflation and a weak banking
sector contributed to support for the leftist parties.129

5.1.3

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 1984-2002

The unilateral declaration of independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC),
passed unanimously by the TFSC National Council in November 1983, had little immediate
effect on the Turkish Cypriot local regime. Despite their threats against Denktaş earlier in 1983,
Kenan Evren and the MGK were out of power and replaced by a civilian government. Denktaş
returned to UN-led talks in 1984 where he agreed to a blueprint on federalism. The UBP
remained in control of the government until 1994. As outlined in the previous chapter (Chapter
4), as this period progressed during the 1990s the TRNC became more reliant upon Turkey for
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survival due to external developments. These further polarized domestic politics within the
TRNC, with the CTP and TKP (and later BDH) becoming more viable parties.

Figure 5.1. TRNC Governments, 1984-2001.

The UBP remained the ruling party in the TRNC from 1984 until an internal split in the
party in 1992. Following a dispute over election laws and continued support for a federal
solution, Rauf Denktaş split from the UBP, led by hardliner Derviş Eroğlu who opposed UN-led
talks, to form the Democratic Party (DP). In 1993, the DP merged with the New Dawn Party
(YDP), a settler party, and entered a coalition with the CTP to oust the UBP from government for
the first time. The UBP had won the 1990 elections handily due to patronage distribution, by
which it had rearranged the civil service pay schedule so public employees receive an extra
paycheck shortly before the election. However, the UBP’s ability to maintain support through
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distribution had been curbed by its reliance on Turkish aid, which had become conditional on
neoliberal economic reforms (Bozkurt 2014; Sonan 2014).
Though it had never been economically self-sufficient since 1974, three exogenous
shocks damaged the TRNC’s economy during the 1990s. First was the collapse in 1991 of Polly
Peck Inc., a British conglomerate owned by Turkish Cypriot businessman Asil Nadir with major
interests in TRNC media, agriculture, industry, and tourism. Second was the 1994 ECJ ruling,
which effectively barred direct trade for EU member states with the TRNC, which included
Britain, the TRNC’s primary export market for citrus (Talmon 2001; Kanol & Koprulu 2017).
Third was the conclusion of the case Loizidou v. Turkey at the ECtHR in 1996, which found
Turkey and the TRNC culpable for continued deprivation of human rights by occupying Greek
Cypriot property after 1974. This case’s precedent damaged the TRNC’s tourism sector by
holding both proprietors and guests of expropriated property complicit in human rights violations
(Risini 2018). These economic shocks were compounded by Turkey’s neoliberal reforms under
ANAP and Turgut Özal, which it began to transfer to the TRNC in 1986 via reform conditions
such as austerity and privatization attached to economic aid (Bozkurt 2014). Austerity and
economic instability, which ultimately led to a banking sector collapse in 2000, adversely
affected the bloated civil service and its public sector unions, lowering wages and privatizing
jobs. This in turn affected the strategy of distribution by which the UBP had maintained support.
The TRNC’s economic decline contributed to the rise of the leftist opposition parties as
viable challengers to the UBP and DP, which after 1996 was led by Rauf Denktaş’s son Serdar.
The CTP in particular, led by Mehmet Ali Talat after 1996, attracted notable support from labor
unions, including the public sector unions, for its opposition to austerity and privatization. The
CTP and Talat organized and joined in protests against austerity and later took up support for
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victims of the banking collapse. In contrast to the UBP and DP which sought to resolve the
economic crises by increasing borrowing from Turkey, the CTP criticized overreliance on
Turkish aid. It cited the poor state of the economy, general strikes, and unpaid sector wages as
evidence against increased economic integration with Turkey and the need to end their
international isolation.
In addition to the CTP’s position on the economy and ending reliance on Turkey, it
favored a settlement with the RoC. As Deputy Prime Minister in 1994 Talat had begun meetings
with Greek Cypriot parties under the auspices of the Slovakian Embassy to share positions and
issue joint statements on talks, and in 1999 Talat invited Greek Cypriot parties to attend the CTP
party conference. He was joined by TKP leader Mustafa Akıncı, who opposed the UBP and
Denktaş as “rejectionists” and ran on a platform of restarting constructive talks with the RoC.
Akıncı had served as mayor of North Nicosia/Lefkoşa from 1976-90, having defeated UBP
candidates and having worked closely with the Greek Cypriot mayor of the city’s southern half.
Both Talat and Akıncı supported a settlement and EU membership, and in 1998 they began
meetings with EU officials. In the 2000 TRNC Presidential election, both Talat and Akıncı ran
on platforms of a settlement with the RoC and EU membership as solutions to the TRNC’s
persistent economic crises.
These positions on a settlement and EU membership were anathema to the UBP, DP, and
Rauf Denktaş. The UBP had taken a harder line on talks under Derviş Eroğlu, who in 1993
rejected the logic of a federal settlement and called for a confederation, citing the collapsing
Yugoslavia as evidence that two ethnic communities could not be forced into a common state
(Bolukbasi 1995). In 1994, the UBP held a vote in the Republican Assembly, supported by the
DP, overturning the TRNC’s formal commitment to a federal settlement. Both the CTP and TKP
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opposed this vote. Similarly, Rauf Denktaş opposed EU membership, which he claimed was an
obstacle to a settlement and set the precondition of the RoC retracting its membership application
to resume talks. He believed that EU membership would sever ties with Turkey in contravention
of the Treaty of Guarantee, and that the RoC’s EU membership, in which it would join an
organization of which Greece was a member and Turkey was not, was tantamount to enosis. The
official position published by the TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998, reiterated these
beliefs:
“The opening, by the European Union, of accession negotiations with the Greek
Cypriot administration in spite of the 1960 Agreements concerning Cyprus
constitutes a serious violation of international law. With this approach, the
European Union is making a historic mistake by destroying the very basis of the
existence of two peoples with equal, political and legal status, on which the
independence of the island is based upon. By leading to the virtual integration of
South Cyprus with Greece, the European Union will bear the heavy responsibility
of a permanent division of the island. The European Union does not have the right
to make one-sided decisions and to create obligations regarding the future of the
island of Cyprus and to destroy the existing balance between Turkey and Greece
in the region. Turkey and the TRNC will not accept the legal, political and
economic consequences that may arise for the island of Cyprus as a result of the
EU's opening of accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration.”
When the EU granted the RoC candidate status after the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, Denktaş
adopted the more hardline UBP position, opposing a federal solution for a confederation, and
vowed to seek further integration with Turkey.
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These disparate positions between the major parties on the issues of a settlement and EU
membership, coupled with the viability of the leftist parties due the economic crisis led to
conflict between them. The TRNC government, led by the UBP from 1996-2001, closed the
crossing points on the ceasefire line and banned intercommunal contact, curbing the ability of the
CTP and TKP to continue intercommunal party meetings or meetings with EU officials (UNSC
June 1999; November 2001; European Commission 2001). The police, under Ankara’s authority,
shut down the critical opposition newspaper Avrupa/Afrika in 2000, arrested its journalists who
were charged with libel against Denktaş and the military, and charged its editors with espionage
on behalf of the RoC.
Furthermore, by fitting the CTP and TKP preferences for a settlement and EU
membership into the historical nationalist framing of enosis, especially during the period of
heightened tensions and nationalism over the RoC’s missile purchases (1996-99) these parties
became targets of ultra-nationalist groups. Most notable were the Gray Wolves, the militant
youth wing of the MHP, organized from Turkey and active on university campuses in the TRNC,
and the Turkish Revenge Brigade (TİT). Leftist parties, trade unions, and civil activists were
denounced in media and harassed as “anti-Turk”; “national traitors”; and “Greek terrorists” often echoing similar rhetoric by the UBP, DP, and Denktaş himself. CTP leaders, trade union
leaders, peace activists, and more generally those critical of closer relations with Turkey were
targeted in attacks by the Gray Wolves and the TİT. Prior to the police crackdown on
Avrupa/Afrika, the newspaper had been a target of harassment and attacks by the Gray Wolves.
In seeking to undermine increasingly viable challengers in the CTP and TKP, the traditional
nationalist power-holders in the TRNC sought to delegitimize them as not true group-members,
giving license to ultra-nationalist groups to harass or attack them.
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In sum, the period from the declaration of the TRNC’s independence to the Annan Plan,
1983-2002, was characterized by economic decline within the TRNC. This was followed by the
rise of viable challengers to Denktaş and the UBP hold on power, who attracted support from the
economically disaffected by equating a settlement with the RoC and EU membership as
economic remedies. Conversely, Denktaş, the UBP, and the newly-formed DP favored increased
integration with Turkey, embodied in the creation of the Cooperation Council between the
Turkish and TRNC Ministries of Foreign Affairs in 1999.

5.1.4

The Annan Plan & After,

The period of negotiations on the Annan Plan and following in which the Annan Plan framework
remained on the table, coinciding with AKP rule in Turkey, was notable in the TRNC for regular
changes to political leadership. While many of the key leaders themselves remained the same as
during the 1990s, and before, Rauf Denktaş and the UBP lost their hold on communal-level
politics that they had maintained since 1964. From 2004-20, control of the TRNC’s Republican
Assembly changed hands between CTP- and UBP-led governments six times, and from 20052020, the TRNC President was held by three different parties, four times (Table 5). Furthermore
a number of new parties emerged during this period, including the Freedom and Reform Party
(ÖRP) and People’s Party (HP), which served as key coalition partners and allowed the major
parties to maintain parliamentary control at their rivals’ expense.
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Figure 5.2. TRNC Governments, 2004-21.

After the presentation of the Annan Plan in November 2002, the CTP made significant
political gains, as did Mustafa Akıncı, who split from the TKP to form the Peace and Democracy
Movement (BDH), which campaigned alongside the CTP. Both supported the Annan Plan with
the backing of civil society activists and trade unions. The CTP’s pro-settlement/pro-EU position
and union support won it control of the three major cities Famagusta/Gazimağusa,
Kyrenia/Girne, and North Nicosia/Lefkoşa in local elections in 2002, and in December 2002 it
held pro-Annan Plan rallies in North Nicosia/Lefkoşa that attracted more than 30,000.130 The
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Annan Plan was the primary issue in the 2003 parliamentary elections, with the CTP pledging to
accept and remove Rauf Denktaş as negotiator, and Denktaş responding that he would never
certify a CTP-led government.131 The CTP emerged victorious from the 2003 elections, winning
19 seats compared to the UBP’s 18, and entered a coalition with the DP which held seven seats,
with confidence supplied Akıncı’s BDH with 6 seats.132 The CTP, which increased its seats after
2004, remained in government until 2009, first in coalition with the DP and then the ÖRP. The
CTP Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer passed a vote in May 2005 reaffirming TRNC
commitment to the Annan Plan.
Mehmet Ali Talat was then elected the TRNC’s second President in 2005, replacing Rauf
Denktaş. His primary aim as president, in contrast to Rauf Denktaş, was to pursue improved
foreign relations with European states and the EU. His presidential campaign in 2005 focused on
ending the TRNC’s international isolation, which fueled the CTP parliamentary gains.133 The
general feeling in the TRNC, as in Turkey, was that the Turkish Cypriots had upheld their end of
the bargain in the Annan Plan and were subsequently being punished for the Greek Cypriot vote,
and it was incumbent on the EU to end the TRNC’s international isolation. Talat visited Brussels
in 2005 where he called upon the European Commission to re-engage with the Turkish Cypriots;
in 2005 and 2007, he won support for the engagement with the TRNC in the European
Parliament and in 2007 hosted a European Parliament and EU member state delegation in North
Nicosia/Lefkoşa; and from 2006-08 opened dialogue with Council of Europe officials in both
Nicosia/Lefkoşa and Strasbourg.134 Facing the intransigent Tassos Papadopoulos, who refused to
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resume talks until Turkey withdrew its troops and the TRNC renounced its independence, Talat
believed direct engagement with the EU would force the RoC back into talks.135 When
Papadopoulos was ousted in February 2008, Talat immediately phoned Demetris Christofias to
congratulate him, and by April talks had resumed and by June new crossing points were opened
on the ceasefire line and the RoC lifted its embargo on trade with the TRNC.136
In contrast to Talat and the CTP, the UBP had opposed the Annan Plan in 2002-04 and
when it failed the Greek Cypriot referendum, it regarded itself as vindicated, that a federal
solution was impossible.137 Prior to the 2004 referendum, the UBP-led government, which was
ousted in the 2003 elections, had rejected the Annan Plan as a basis for a settlement and in
March 2003, a month prior to Rauf Denktaş’s rejection of the Annan Plan, had blocked
legislation on holding a domestic referendum in the Republican Assembly.138 Though the UBP,
and DP, supported Talat’s initiative to end international isolation, they pursued recognition from
non-European states in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and tourism and trade
cooperation with Turkey’s close ally Azerbaijan.139 By the end of the DP’s coalition with the
CTP in 2006, DP leader Serdar Denktaş had taken the position that the RoC would never accept
a federal settlement and the TRNC should pursue other policies.140 The UBP similarly called for
recognition of “the independent reality of the TRNC” when talks resumed in 2008 and opposed
Talat’s re-commitment to federalism as “surrendering” to the RoC.141 It was on this platform and
general dissatisfaction with Talat’s progress in ending isolation that the UBP retook control of

135

Interview with Mehmet Ali Talat, Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (9 February 2006).
Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (2 April 2008); Associated Press (3 June 2008).
137
Turkish Daily News (11 June 2006, 18 June 2006).
138
Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (1 March 2003); Associated Press (7 March 2003).
139
Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (1 February 2005, 4 April 2005, 30 June 2005, 29 July 2005, 6 October 2005);
Dunya [in Turkish] (26 May 2005); Turkish Daily News (1 September 2005, 18 May 2006).
140
Interview with Serdar Denktaş, Turkish Daily News (11 June 2006, 18 June 2006).
141
Turkish Daily News (5 July 2008, 1 December 2008).
136

133
the Republican Assembly in 2009, with support from the DP, and on which Derviş Eroğlu won
the presidency in 2010.142
Though Eroğlu and the UBP had campaigned to end talks on federalism and pursue a
confederal solution and international recognition in 2009-10, Eroğlu resumed talks with
Christofias after his election in 2010.143 However, it was during this period that relations between
the RoC and TRNC worsened. First, Eroğlu ended talks in 2012 in protest of the RoC’s
assumption of the EU presidency, a move that had been agreed beforehand with Ankara and was
not necessarily indicative of Eroğlu’s hardline position. Talks between Eroğlu and Christofias’
successor, Nikos Anastasiades, did resume again in 2014. More damaging to relations was the
escalation of the hydrocarbons dispute during Eroğlu’s presidency. It was Eroğlu and the UBP
government that had, in 2012, disputed the RoC’s hydrocarbon exploration and tendering
contracts with EU firms, claiming that all natural resources must be shared between
communities. It was following this argument that Turkey began its reciprocal exploration and
naval deployments in response to the RoC.144
UBP governance was interrupted after 2013, when the CTP retook control of the
Republican Assembly, and then in 2015 when Mustafa Akıncı ousted Eroğlu as President.
Akıncı had quit the TKP in 2003 to form the pro-Annan Plan BDH, which then in 2007 merged
with the TKP to form the Communal Democracy Party (TDP). He won the presidency in 2015
with the support of the CTP on a platform of reaching a settlement. However he attracted the ire

142

Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (25 February 2010); Cyprus Mail (1 May 2010).
Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (19 April 2010, 23 June 2010).
144
Cihan [in Turkish] (26 September 2012); Anadolu Agency [in Turkish] (30 September 2012).
143

134
of the rightist parties and Turkey for his positions on Turkish aid and Turkey’s military
operations in Syria.145
After the failure to reach a settlement at Crans-Montana, the UBP’s popularity increased
in the TRNC, and more importantly in Turkey, for its position opposing a federal settlement. The
UBP reclaimed control of the government in 2019 with the help of former negotiator and proAnkara official Kudret Özersay’s HP, which defected from a coalition with the CTP to bring
down the government (Ekici & Özdemir forthcoming).146 This was followed, the following year,
in 2020 by the election of the UBP new hardline leader Ersin Tatar who opposed continued talks
with the RoC and ran on a platform of a two-state solution and the unilateral resettlement of
Varosha/Maraş by the TRNC, in contravention of the both the 1975 Vienna Agreements and the
1977 Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines. He also vowed to further integrate the TRNC with Turkey,
harkening back to the UBP position in the 1990s, and to minimize opposition to Turkish policy
within the TRNC.147 It was Tatar, who along with Turkey, proposed a two-state solution to the
UN in 2021.148
In sum, the period after the Annan Plan was characterized by numerous changes to
government in the TRNC, in contrast with the general dominance of Rauf Denktaş and the UBP
prior to 2003. As would be expected, progress in talks and relations with the RoC were improved
under the presidencies of Mehmet Ali Talat and Mustafa Akıncı, two long-time peace activists
who had supported the Annan Plan, as compared to UBP presidencies. Notably, in keeping with
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the conclusions of the previous chapter (Chapter 4), these trends in cooperation in talks and
relations with the RoC co-moved with Turkey’s own preferences for a settlement.

5.2

Diagonal Linkage & Policy Change

Having provided an overview of how the Turkish Cypriot local regime developed from a set of
blockaded, disparate enclaves to an unrecognized proto-state, the second half of this chapter
turns to identifying how Turkey, as a patron state, affected change within the Turkish Cypriot
local regime in-line with its own preferences. As identified in preceding chapter (Chapter 4),
there were three notable points at which Turkish policy and preferences towards the Cyprus
conflict changed: (1) support for confidence-building measures under the Ecevit and Evren
governments in 1978 and 1980-83; (2) the Annan Plan under the AKP, from 2002-12; and then,
(3) the AKP preference for a two-state solution, evident after 2017. For context of these changes,
early support from Turkey to the Turkish Cypriot local regime, in pursuit of its preferences prior
to these changes is also considered.

Table 5.2. Mechanisms of Diagonal Linkage.
Mechanism

Pathway

1.

Dictate Preferences

Patron state conveys new preferences to the local regime, whose leaders follow those
preferences.

2.

National
Disassociation

Patron state ends association with local regime group-members; ends participation in
the protracted conflict.

3.

Resource Transfer

Patron state provides material/monetary resources to local regime for elites to provide
services to group-members

4.

Leadership Support

Patron state supports one specific set of local regime elites over others.

5.

Threats/Loss of
Support

Patron state issues threats, levels sanctions, or withholds support from local regime
over positions.
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In keeping with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3, there are two stages of
the patron state affecting policy change within the local regime. First is the patron state’s means
of affecting the diagonal linkage with the local regime (Table 4), of which there are five
theorized mechanisms. Second are the changes this produces within the local regime that
changes policies and behaviors towards an institutional settlement (Table 5), of which there are
four theorized mechanisms.

Table 5.3. Local Regime Cooperation.
Mechanism

Pathway

a.

New Preferences

Local regime elites adopt new, more cooperative preferences for an institutional
settlement.

b.

New Leadership

New elites emerge that support new positions on a settlement.

c.

Resource Access

Resources and material inducements available through shared institutions are used to
“buy off” local regime elites.

d.

Intra-group
Policing

Local regime policies affect inter-group cooperation or group-members crossing ethnic
boundaries.

5.2.1

Starting Point: Early Preferences for Cyprus

Turkey’s early positions on Cyprus, beginning prior to independence, and continuing relatively
uninterrupted until 1978 and then again after 1983, pursued three interrelated preferences. First
was a preference to prevent enosis, indicated in Makarios’ correct assessment during
negotiations of the MacMillan Plan in 1958 that Turkey would never willingly permit the
realization of enosis (Fisher 2001; Joseph 2009). The second preference was the protection and
survival of the Turkish population in Cyprus, which itself was related to preventing enosis. And
the third preference, evident after 1974 in the military and nationalist parties such as the MHP,
was to retain control of the territory conquered in July-August 1974. All three of these
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preferences were intertwined with aspects of Turkish nationalism, which itself was heavily
influenced by historical conflict with Greece. This including maintaining “territorial balance”
with Greece, achieved in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne from which the Republic of Turkey was
born; preventing the expulsion of Turks at Greek hands as witnessed in Crete after the Balkan
Wars; and, affirming Turkish national sovereignty in the face of predatory external actors who
had historically weakened Turkish sovereignty and seized Turkish territory.
Preventing enosis and ensuring the survival of the Turks in Cyprus resulted in similar
Turkish strategies towards the Turkish Cypriot local regime. At the international-level, these
were most obviously manifested in the Treaty of Guarantee, which gave Turkey veto power over
internal political changes in Cyprus and the right to intervene unilaterally (Fisher 2001; KerLindsay 2011). Within the diagonal linkage framework, this followed four pathways that
facilitated a non-cooperative rather than cooperative position within the local regime. The first of
such pathways was the dictation of preferences (#1, Table 5.4), or more accurately the formation
of joint preferences by İsmet İnönü’s government in Ankara and Turkish Cypriot interlocutor
Rauf Denktaş. This was evident in December 1963 and January 1964, when they consulted
together on the preference of federalism solution for talks in London, which would then continue
into mediation via UN Good Offices.149 It was at Ankara’s recommendation, and with its
support, that Denktaş quit talks mediated by Galo Plaza in 1965 over his recognition of the
Greek Cypriots as the legitimate government and condemnation of the Turkish Cypriot position
as undermining a UN member state’s sovereignty (UNSC December 1965). This was again
evident in August 1974 when Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş proposed a cantonal
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settlement, backed by Denktaş, by which the Turkish Cypriots would receive six autonomous
cantons.150
Dictating preferences to the Turkish Cypriots, occurred in concert with the second
pathway of leadership support (#4, Table 5.4). Notably in early 1964, Ankara supported Rauf
Denktaş as interlocutor over Cyprus’ Vice President Fazıl Küçük. Küçük had annoyed İsmet
İnönü by repeating hardline calls for Turkey to annex Cyprus in response to the 1963-64
violence, and believed that Küçük had built nationalist support in Turkey that was constraining
Ankara’s options (Jackson 2021c). Rauf Denktaş was supported first as interlocutor, despite his
exile from Cyprus after 1964, supported as head of the executive of the Provisional
Administration, which was backed by the Turkish Embassy in Cyprus, and then in 1973 Denktaş
was “elected” unopposed as Vice President of Cyprus (Mirbagheri 2009; Jackson 2021c).151 In
addition to the highest-level leadership, this included Ankara’s support for Denktaş’s key allies
Osman Örek and Nejat Konjuk, the latter who was a former Turkish government employee, who
held key posts first in the Provisional Administration’s executive council then in the UBP, and
both then served as TFSC Prime Ministers.152 Support for Denktaş was similarly evident after
1974, particularly from the military, which viewed him as a pillar of stability and with whom
many senior officers had good relations due to deployments in the TFSC.153
The third pathway was then the opposite of national disassociation (#2, Table 5.4),
national association in linking the position of the Turkish Cypriots, who had not been ruled from
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Turkey (Ottoman Empire) since 1878, with contemporary Turkish nationalism. The Turkish
Cypriots were cast as fighting to protect the frontier of the Turkish nation and the “territorial
balance” between Turkey and Greece. This was evident in outpourings of support and solidarity
for the Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish public and military that ultimately constrained the
Turkish government’s positions on Cyprus. This was also readily evident after 1974, when
victory in Cyprus, particularly defeating the Greek nationalist aim of enosis, constituted the first
major military victory of the Republic of Turkey.154 Subsequently, this was further fit into the
nationalist framing of Turanists/Eurasianists in the MHP that regarded the Turks as historical
victims of external powers and opposed concessions on Cyprus as reaffirming Turkish national
sovereignty against foreign “predators” (Yavuz 2002).
Lastly, resource transfers (#3, Table 5.4) were perhaps the most readily evident path of
diagonal linkage between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot local regime after 1963 in pursuit of
all three of Turkey’s preferences: preventing enosis, protecting Turkish Cypriots, and retaining
political control of the TFSC after 1974. During the pre-partition period, 1964-74, this was most
evident in Turkish support for the TMT, which included providing both weapons and trained
fighters. The TMT allowed the local regime, later embodied in the Provisional Administration, to
maintain the Turkish enclaves as separate de facto jurisdictions and provide physical protection
against Greek Cypriot forces. Though less important to these objectives, but also evident during
this time period was the transfer of limited humanitarian and financial aid to the enclaves to
provide housing and basic goods for displaced Turks, provided through the Turkish embassy
(Jackson 2021c). After 1974, this material and financial support was evident in Turkey’s
underwriting of the TFSC’s budget and security. Turkey provided the majority of the TFSC’s
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budget and ensured its security by stationing ~40,000 troops north of the ceasefire line (KerLindsay 2011; Bryant & Hatay 2020).

Table 5.4. Diagonal Linkage, 1963-78.
Mechanism

Evidence

1.

Dictate
Preferences

Turkish preference for federalism communicated to the Turkish Cypriot local regime;
pursued by Denktaş in talks and in practice.

2.

National
Association

Support for Turkish Cypriots as part of Turkish nationalism; “frontier of Turkish nation”;
inclusion in MHP rhetoric.

3.

Resource
Transfer

Pre-1974 support for TMT and humanitarian aid; post-1974 economic and security aid
for TFSC.

4.

Leadership
Support

Ankara supported Denktaş over Küçük in 1964-74; continued support for Provisional
Administration leaders as UBP after 1974.

The outcome of these early diagonal linkage pathways was to affect local regime
preferences for cooperation in an institutional settlement. Robust support for Denktaş and the
UBP, which supported Ankara’s preferences, precluded new cooperative preferences (a, Table
5.5) and new leadership (b, Table 5.5). New local regime leadership was obstructed by the
resource support provided by Turkey. Prior to 1974, the incumbent leaders had full control of the
TMT and therefore security and movement in enclaves, and after 1974 they controlled
distribution of property seized by the Turkish military and civil service posts funded by Turkish
aid. This was notable in the 1981 TFSC elections when Turkish monetary aid was used to fund
~4,000 new civil service posts to distribute in exchange for UBP support in the election at a time
when UBP’s popularity was declining (Sonan 2014).155 Resource transfers from Turkey also
reduced the inducement of resource access via a settlement (c, Table 5.5). Especially after 1974,
the Turkish aid funded the TFSC budget, and Turkish managed infrastructure projects meant that
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not only survival, but economic development for the Turkish Cypriots was not contingent upon
an institutional settlement by which they could access RoC resources.
Lastly, especially prior to 1974, Turkish support for the TMT facilitated in-group policing
that prevented inter-ethnic cooperation and ethnic boundary crossing. On the one hand, the TMT
served to protect the Turkish Cypriot enclaves from the Greek Cypriot National Guard and its
aligned paramilitaries, especially before Makarios implemented de-escalation measures inkeeping with the agreement negotiated by Cyrus Vance (UNSC March 1968; Fisher 2001;
Joseph 2009). On the other hand, the TMT also prevented movement by Turkish Cypriots outside
of enclaves. Following enclave-legislation by the Provisional Administration, Turkish Cypriots
were required to attain approval register with the TMT, which came to resemble a regular
gendarmerie force after 1968, before exiting enclaves. This legislation was appended with fines
or imprisonment enforced by the TMT, which was also reported to harass and threaten Turkish
Cypriots to deter relocation to better-served, government-controlled areas (Jackson 2021c).

Table 5.5. Local Regime, 1963-78.
Mechanism

Evidence

a.

New
Preferences

Consistent preferences maintained in leadership sponsored by Ankara; cooperation with
Greek Cypriots equated to security threat.

b.

New
Leadership

Material and political support marginalized opposition; Provisional Administration and
UBP access to resources from Ankara including protection and patronage to distribute in
exchange for political support.

c.

Resource
Access

Financial support from Turkey undermined appeal of resources from RoC after 1974.

d.

Intra-group
Policing

TMT prevented inter-group cooperation and relocation to Greek Cypriot areas; later
formalized in the UN ceasefire line/buffer zone.

While this period did not demonstrate notable change in Turkish policy or within the
Turkish Cypriot local regime, outlining the specific pathways of diagonal linkage and how that
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impacted cooperation is useful in two respects. One is to draw direct links between Turkish
support for the Turkish Cypriots and a non-cooperative position in the early rounds of mediation.
The other is to identify the starting position of mediation and how the identified diagonal
linkages were influential. Moving forward in future rounds of mediation it was these specific
linkages between patron state and local regime which then had to be affected to reach more
cooperative preferences towards a settlement.

5.2.2

US Arms Embargo & Confidence-Building Measures, 1978-83

The first indication of changed preferences towards Cyprus in Turkey was evident under the
CHP government of Bülent Ecevit (1978-79) and then the military/MGK government led by
Kenan Evren (1980-83). Both governments publicly called on Rauf Denktaş, as interlocutor in
talks, to accept UN-proposed confidence-building measures. These proposed the reopening under
UN control of both the Nicosia/Lefkoşa International Airport and the resort town of
Varosha/Maraş outside of Famagusta/Gazimağusa. Support for these measures within Turkey
came under the pressure of the US arms embargo on Turkey, running from 1975-80. As noted in
the previous chapter, concessions from 1975-78 despite US pressure were obstructed by the the
nationalist MHP and Islamist MSP in Süleyman Demirel’s AP-led government. Demirel instead
left all discretion for concessions to Denktaş. It was under US pressure that Ecevit called on
Denktaş to accept the confidence-building measures in 1978. And, though the arms embargo had
been effectively lifted by the US in 1980, Evren called on Denktaş to accept the confidencebuilding measures and avoid escalating the conflict. Evren hoped to avoid a return to Turkey’s
isolation and simultaneously sought to improve its relations with the West and NATO.
The primary means through which both Ecevit and Evren sought to influence Denktaş’s
decision-making on confidence-building measures was dictating preferences (#1, Table 5.6).
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They instructed him to accept these measures in UN talks. While this had the effect of partial
embargo relief under Ecevit in 1978, it produced no effect in UN talks under either
government.156 Though Denktaş rhetorically supported making progress on Varosha/Maraş, he
considered it to be a costly territorial concession that would require Turkish Cypriots to be
evacuated, though it was abandoned, and therefore would take considerable time to prepare a
proposal, stalling any direct talks. He set as a precondition in 1978 that resettlement by 30,00035,000 Greek Cypriots could only be done under Turkish Cypriot authority, outside of the
parameters of the confidence-building measures.157 This was then revised down to only
permitting the resettlement of 16,500 Greek Cypriots.158 Both proposals fell short of the
confidence-building proposals and were rejected by the Greek Cypriots, who opposed continued
Turkish Cypriot control over Varosha/Maraş and limits on resettlement (December 1982).159 By
1984 and the end of military government in Turkey, Denktaş had taken Varosha/Maraş off the
negotiating table and outright refused its resettlement.160
Similarly, in 1983, Evren warned Denktaş against unilaterally declaring the TFSC’s
independence, fearful again that it would ostracize Turkey. Independence had been proposed in
the TFSC and supported by Denktaş since 1975 to force the RoC to accept the status quo as the
framework for a federal settlement.161 In May 1983, Denktaş’s position on independence went
beyond bargaining rhetoric when a motion to declare independence was backed by the UBP in
the TFSC assembly. Evren warned Denktaş not to declare independence in May and then in June
threatened to not recognize independence and replace Denktaş as head of the TFSC if he
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declared independence - threatened loss of support (#5, Table 5.6).162 Denktaş instead waited
until the interregnum between military and civilian rule in November 1983 to unilaterally declare
independence. Though Evren remained President and was reportedly angered by the decision,
subsequently refusing to meet with Denktaş, and the incoming Prime Minister Turgut Özal
admitted being surprised, they could not punish Denktaş personally or not recognize the
declaration. Both would have required military intervention in the civilian government
immediately after the transition and triggered a public backlash.163

Table 5.6. Diagonal Linkage, 1978-83.
Mechanism

Evidence

1.

Dictate
Preferences

Ecevit and Evren both press Denktaş to accept confidence-building measures and be
willing to engage on territorial concessions, under pressure from US embargo and
preference to improve relations with Europe/US.

5.

Threats/Loss of
Support

Evren threats to Denktaş over UDI: threatens not to recognize independent Turkish
Cypriot state and to replace Denktaş as leader if he declares independence.

Neither the dictation of preferences on confidence-building measures by Ecevit and
Evren nor threats to Denktaş over a declaration of independence in 1983 had an effect of altering
local regime preferences. Denktaş stalled on confidence-building measures first, by delaying
talks on them as part of larger more delicate territorial adjustments, and then tabled proposals
outside of the UN parameters on Varosha/Maraş agreed with the Greek Cypriots, before
eventually rejecting the proposed confidence-building measures in 1984. Similarly, Evren’s
threats over independence did not deter Denktaş from declaring independence as the TRNC in
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1983. Denktaş simply waited until the government transition in Turkey when Evren could not
follow through on his threats. While this demonstrated Denktaş’s and the Turkish Cypriots’ own
degree of agency to act as spoilers, it also demonstrated that Ankara could not simply convey
preferences to the Turkish Cypriots to be enacted.
Importantly, these two pathways of influence, dictating preferences and threats of losing
support, were not consistent with Ankara’s continued support in both propping up the TFSC and
Denktaş. Preferences for stability and staunch anti-communism within the Turkish military and
nationalist factions precluded support for viable leftist opposition which favored concessions on
confidence-building measures, the TKP and CTP. Rather, Turkish aid in 1981, used to distribute
~4,000 civil service posts, had ensured the UBP’s election victory over these parties. Hence
potential new leadership in the local regime was undermined and the existing leadership
eschewed more cooperative new preferences on confidence-building measures. The outcome was
unchanged policy at the local regime-level, despite changes in Ankara.

Table 5.7. Local Regime, 1978-83.
Mechanism

Evidence

a.

New
Preferences

New preferences dedicated by Ankara; not accepted by Turkish Cypriots elites; Denktaş
spoils talks on confidence-building measures and delays UDI until he can not be punished by
MGK/Evren government.

b.

New
Leadership

Viable opposition in TFSC after 1979 that favored more cooperative/constructive position in
talks; viability in 1981 elections undermined by Turkish support for UBP and Denktaş,
which retain control of TFSC regime.

5.2.3

Annan Plan, 2002-14

The more notable change to Turkish policy towards Cyprus came after the proposal of the Annan
Plan by the UN in November 2002. As the previous chapter outlined, this changed policy came
within a changing regional context and domestic political changes within Turkey. Regionally
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after 1999, relations between Turkey and Greece improved markedly and at the Helsinki Summit
in December 1999, Greece committed to ending its veto on Turkey EU membership application
and EU aid to Turkey. Domestically in Turkey, 2002 was marked by the rise to power of the
AKP, a reformist-Islamist party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül who had split
with the conservative-nationalist wing of Necmettin Erbakan’s Virtue Party in 2000. The AKP
supported a pro-EU reform platform and saw EU accession as a means to curb the influence of
“militant Kemalism” and the MGK in Turkish politics. At the same time, the Turkish military
had ended its opposition to EU membership, seeing it as a sustainable remedy to Turkey’s
persistent problems: economic instability, partisan violence, political Islam, and Kurdish
separatism. Accordingly, while the EU’s political condition of facilitating a settlement in Cyprus
remained the same as when Turkey rejected EU accession in 1989 and 1997, the domestic veto
players - the elected government and military - had changed their positions on the EU and
viewed the benefits of accession as outweighing the political conditions (Yesilada & Sozen
2002; Aydinli, Özcan, & Akyaz 2006). Importantly, though, as the EU reiterated to Turkey in
September 2002 and April 2003, rhetorical support for a settlement was insufficient. Rather
Turkey had to take tangible action to facilitate a settlement, which meant inducing the Turkish
Cypriots to support a settlement - the Annan Plan (UNSC April 2003).164
After the AKP came to power in November 2002, Ankara pressed Rauf Denktaş and the
TRNC government to accept the Annan Plan, also proposed in November 2002, as the basis for a
settlement. Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşer Yakış visited Denktaş at talks in New York and
persuaded him not to reject the Annan Plan outright, but to continue talks on it. Yakış further
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persuaded Denktaş against rejecting the Annan Plan twice in early 2003.165 In January 2003, the
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs revised its official policy on Cyprus to support the Annan
Plan.166
This pressure to accept Turkey’s new preferences on the Annan Plan - dictating
preferences (#1, Table 5.9) - failed to induce change in the Turkish Cypriot local regime. Despite
persuasion from Ankara, directly by Yaşer Yakış and later Abdullah Gül, to continue talks on the
Annan Plan and not reject it, in 2002-03, Rauf Denktaş rejected the Annan Plan at talks in the
Hague in April 2003 and refused further talks on it. He claimed that the proposal was a “trap” to
subjugate and annihilate the Turkish Cypriots via Greek Cypriot resettlement.167 This had been
preceded by the UBP rejecting the Annan Plan. The UBP had staged counter-protests to the
CTP’s pro-unification rallies in December 2002 and January 2003, supported by nationalist
groups, including the Gray Wolves who were believed to also be responsible for bomb attacks on
CTP officials and activists.168 In March 2003, the UBP blocked a vote on facilitating a domestic
referendum on the Annan Plan, something that was under discussion in the UN-led talks.169 Rauf
Denktaş subsequently rejected the idea of separate referendums proposed in talks, claiming that a
settlement “could not be entrusted to the public” before his final rejection of the Annan Plan.170
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In response to the Rauf Denktaş’s rejection of the Annan Plan in April 2003, and the
blocking of legislation to facilitate it within the TRNC, the EU reiterated its condition that
Turkey “strongly supports efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem,
building on the initiatives of the United Nations Secretary General, which remain on the
table.”171 This was followed a week later by restrictions on movement across the ceasefire line
and intercommunal contact, in place in the TRNC since 1999, being lifted at Ankara’s behest.
Denktaş and the UBP opposed this move and attempted to reimpose restrictions on movement
after one day, but were blocked from doing so in the TRNC Republican Assembly. Importantly,
the military and police, responsible for regulating movement across the ceasefire line, were still
under Ankara’s authority and ordered not to reimpose crossing restrictions (UNSC May 2003;
November 2003).172 Despite these changes imposed from Ankara, in security where it had direct
authority, Rauf Denktaş remained intransigent on resuming talks in 2003.

Table 5.8. TRNC Election Results, December 2003.
CTP

UBP

DP

Percentage 35.2

32.9

12.9 13.1

Seats

18

7

19

BDH

6

Ankara’s more critical intervention came after the TRNC general elections in December
2003. The election results (Table 11) produced two natural ideological coalitions and a hung
parliament: the pro-settlement/pro-EU CTP and BDH, and the nationalist UBP and DP, both
holding 25 seats and no majority. Mehmet Ali Talat, charged with forming a government, set
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endorsement of the Annan Plan as a precondition for a coalition. A coalition with the BDH,
which endorsed the Annan Plan, did not provide a majority, and the UBP and DP ruled out a
coalition with the CTP. The DP, led by Rauf Denktaş’s son Serdar, opposed any coalition in
which the UBP did not head the government. Both the UBP and DP supported fresh elections in
2004 with a UBP-led interim government, which would further delay any talks on the Annan
Plan until after the RoC had joined the EU on 1 May 2004.173
With coalition talks at an impasse in January 2004, Erdoğan summoned Talat and DP
leader Serdar Denktaş to Ankara where he brokered a coalition agreement between the CTP and
DP, which had been ruled out by Serdar Denktaş in December 2003. The CTP-DP government
held 26 seats in the Republican Assembly with confidence supplied by the BDH’s six seats. The
coalition protocol formally included the aim of reaching a settlement with the RoC by 1 May
2004 and gave the governing coalition the power to appoint the Prime Minister (Talat) and
Deputy Prime Minister (Serdar Denktaş) as negotiators on the TRNC’s behalf if the President
(Rauf Denktaş) failed to pursue the government’s preferences.174 In a public congratulatory
message to the new government, Erdoğan warned Serdar Denktaş against defecting or spoiling,
reminding him that he was to enact the will of the Turkish Cypriot people and that “Turkey
would not accept insolubility as a solution.”175
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Figure 5.3. TRNC Government, 2004.

The outcome of this coalition engineering in the TRNC by the AKP government in
Ankara was to address the two points of spoiling in the Annan Plan during 2003. Talks resumed
in February 2004, and when Rauf Denktaş rejected it again in March, Talat and Serdar Denktaş
assumed the role of negotiators, aided by Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, appointed by
the Republican Assembly as provided for in the coalition protocol (UNSC May 2004).176 They
agreed to the UN proposal for a referendum, which was accepted by the CTP-DP government,
unlike the UBP-led government which had blocked a referendum the previous year.177
Accordingly, on 24 April 2004, the TRNC held a referendum on the fifth draft of the Annan
Plan, agreed upon by Talat, Serdar Denktaş, and Abdullah Gül in UN led talks. The Turkish
Cypriots voted in favor of reunification and EU membership via the Annan Plan by a margin of
64.9-to-35.1 (UNSC May 2004).
In the years following the rejection of the Annan Plan in the RoC, Ankara continued to
support it as a framework for a solution, and it continued to strategically engineer governments
within the TRNC to support this. There were three notable instances of this from 2006-14. This
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is not to say that these were the only points at which Turkey influenced regime preferences in the
TRNC during this period. As others have noted, this was pursued by Turkey on numerous
occasions to support governments in the TRNC that would enact its economic preferences during
this period (Kanol 2015; Kanol & Koprulu 2017). Rather these three instances pertained directly
to support for a settlement in-line with the Annan Plan.
The first instance was in 2006 when Ankara engineered a government collapse in the
TRNC to preserve the CTP’s position. In 2005, Mehmet Ali Talat had been elected TRNC
President, with Ankara’s backing, and the CTP had increased its share of seats in the Republican
Assembly from 19 to 24 on a platform of ending the TRNC international and economic isolation.
The CTP remained in coalition with the DP after 2005, however, in coalition talks Serdar
Denktaş had set a two-year ultimatum for restarting talks with the RoC, after which the DP
would support alternatives to the Annan Plan. And while as TRNC Foreign Minister, 2005-06,
he lobbied for recognition by non-Western states - notably Azerbaijan and Gambia.178 Talat
regarded this as obstructive to restarting talks and believed more generally that the DP was
pursuing a continuation of the status quo.179 In September 2006, months before Serdar Denktaş’s
deadline for ending support for the Annan Plan in early 2007, Ankara intervened to collapse the
government and form a new coalition. Four elected deputies from the DP and UBP quit their
parties after a meeting with AKP officials organized by an Islamic organization linked to the
AKP, and formed the Freedom and Reform Party (ÖRP).180 The new CTP-ÖRP government
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protocol supported reunification in the framework of the Annan Plan, and Turkey’s bid for EU
membership.181
The other two instances pertained to the leadership of Derviş Eroğlu, who ousted Mehmet
Ali Talat as President in 2010, after being elected Prime Minister in 2009. Ankara had been
largely agnostic towards the elections in 2009-10, as it supported the CTP’s position on talks, but
the UBP’s position on aid.182 Ankara used public pressure and threats against Eroğlu’s position
(#5, Table 5.9) to prevent him from undermining talks after 2009. Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoğlu publicly called for the TRNC government to support Talat’s position in talks
and warned to “refrain from taking steps that may affect the negotiation process negatively.”183
This was reiterated by Erdoğan, who congratulated the new UBP government by warning it
would be “very wrong for the new government to end the negotiations or to continue
negotiations on a basis different than the one that has been followed” - a reference to the agreed
upon UN framework.184 After Eroğlu’s election as President in 2010, Erdoğan issued a similar
warning, that he “did not expect the process to develop in any different way,” and stalling or
protracting talks would not be accepted - a similar warning to that given to Serdar Denktaş in
2003.185 Consequently, despite having campaigned in 2009-10 on a platform rejecting a federal
solution, which he had in the 1990s, Eroğlu agreed to continue talks and began meetings with
Demetris Christofias in June 2010.186
The third instance then came in 2014 while attempting to restart talks after they had been
suspended during the RoC assumption of the rotating EU Presidency. While suspension of talks
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during the RoC’s six-month presidency had been agreed between the TRNC and Turkey and
occurred in July 2012, Derviş Eroğlu obstructed their resumption during 2013. He refused to
issue a joint statement with RoC President Nikos Anastasiades committing to a solution within
the UN framework. In February 2014, Ankara pressed Eroğlu to appoint Kudret Özersay as chief
negotiator in talks with the RoC. Özersay had previously served as negotiator in 2012 when he
resigned over a dispute with Eroğlu and the UBP, and was considered to be “Ankara’s man in the
TRNC,” more accountable to Ankara than the TRNC government.187 Days after Özersay’s
appointment, talks resumed after the TRNC officially committed to the UN framework for a
settlement.188 After Özersay’s appointment, Eroğlu’s presence in talks was formality and
Özersay was treated as the primary Turkish Cypriot interlocutor.189 In both instances, Eroğlu’s
continued participation in talks within the Annan Plan framework was coerced by Ankara. First
by public pressure and threats that warned Eroğlu against ending talks. Second, by bypassing
Eroğlu’s authority with an appointed bureaucratic, supported by Ankara, in talks.

Table 5.9. Diagonal Linkage, 2002-14.
Mechanism

Evidence

1.

Dictate
Preferences

AKP government conveyed new preference in support of Annan Plan to Rauf Denktaş and
UBP in 2002-03; not followed, both reject Annan Plan in 2003.

4.

Leadership
Support

AKP supports CTP position in talks; brokers CTP coalition with the DP to agree to Annan
Plan in 2004, and coalition with ÖRP in 2006 to maintain support for restarting talks on
Annan Plan; has Kudret Özersay appointed to support position in talks.

5.

Threats/Loss of
Support

Ankara publicly warning Serdar Denktaş and Eroğlu against upsetting talks in 2004, 200910; Ankara marginalizing Eroğlu in talks in favor of Kudret Özersay in 2014.
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Turkish association with the Turkish Cypriots, as co-ethnics part of a common Turkish
nation, did not subside during this period, nor did material or financial support for the TRNC. On
the contrary Turkey carried out major infrastructure development initiatives during this period
and continued to fund the TRNC budget (Bozkurt 2014; Kanol & Koprulu 2017). Rather what
changed between this period and the previous attempt to induce concessions on confidencebuilding measures was support for a viable opposition in the CTP, whose interests in a settlement
and EU membership coincided with Ankara’s preferences after 2002. While Ankara attempted to
press Rauf Denktaş and UBP into accepting the Annan Plan in 2002-03, they resisted Ankara’s
preferences as they had done in 1978-83. They stalled the Annan Plan by blocking a domestic
referendum in March 2003 and then ending talks in April 2003. Ankara’s intervention to broker a
CTP-DP coalition in January 2004, despite the latter’s opposition to a coalition the prior month,
both created a pro-settlement government with support for the Annan Plan in the coalition
protocol and a means to marginalize Denktaş in talks. Ankara then maintained support for the
Annan Plan within the TRNC government by ousting the DP from government in 2006 to
prevent it from obstructing talks, by publicly warning Derviş Eroğlu against ending talks, and
then by marginalizing Eroğlu in-favor of an appointed bureaucrat to restart talks in 2014.
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Table 5.10. Local Regime, 2002-14.
Mechanism

Evidence

a.

New
Preferences

Not evident - parties maintained same professed preferences towards a settlement as prior to
2002: UBP and DP opposed settlement/concessions; CTP and TKP/BDH/TDP supported
settlement/EU accession.

b.

New
Leadership

New leadership in CTP and Mehmet Ali Talat came to power during this period; ended the
dominance of UBP and Rauf Denktaş since 1964; preferences for settlement in the Annan
Plan framework and EU accession.

c.

Resource
Access

CTP and BDH support for economic benefits of settlement and EU membership; wins
support of trade unions; banking crisis victims - predated Annan Plan.

d.

Intra-group
Policing

Restrictions on movement across ceasefire line/intercommunal contact lifted in 2003; new
crossing points opened after 2008; Turkish military and police and TRNC government
refuse to reimpose restrictions.

Changes to two of the theorized mechanisms for local regime cooperation in a settlement
were observed during this period. The other two mechanisms, though they did not change during
this period, were important. None of the major parties changed their positions on a settlement (a,
Table 5.10), except for the DP which agreed to support the Annan Plan in a coalition protocol.
The CTP position in favor of both a settlement and EU membership, which it had officially held
since 1999 was a focal point for Ankara inducing support for its preferences. Similarly, it had
been the appeal of the economic benefits of a settlement and EU membership (c, Table 5.10) by
which the CTP and BDH had gained union support and increased political support in 2003.
However, both their preferences and the appeal of resources from a settlement had predated the
AKP’s preferences (and the AKP itself), and these had won the CTP notable support in municipal
elections in July 2002, prior to the AKP’s election in Turkey or any support for a settlement.
The key factor in altering the local regime’s position on a settlement, from favoring
integration with Turkey in 1998 to supporting the Annan Plan from 2002-14, was new local
regime leadership with Turkey’s support (b, Table 5.10). Strategic interventions from Turkey,
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2006-14, then kept the TRNC in support of Turkey’s preferences for a settlement within the
framework of the Annan Plan. Rather than creating support for new preferences within existing
power-holders in the TRNC, Turkey strategically supported actors and parties with existing
preferences that aligned with its own new preferences, and strategically undermined actors and
parties whose existing preferences conflicted with its own. This was reinforced by the reduction
of formal intra-group policing, which prevented intercommunal contact, after 2003 (d, Table
5.10).

5.2.4

Two-State Solution, 2017-

Turkey’s preferences for a settlement changed again after the failure of the 2017 Crans-Montana
talks to produce an agreement, with Ankara ending its support for a settlement based on UN
parameters and supporting a two-state solution instead. TRNC President Mustafa Akıncı had
gradually lost Ankara’s support for talks since his election in 2015, when he ousted Derviş
Eroğlu, and in the lead up to Crans-Montana had been warned by Turkey that it was the last
chance to reach a settlement. Just as regional and domestic contexts had contributed to Ankara’s
support for the Annan Plan after 2002, they also affected its reversal of positions. Regionally,
Turkey’s relationship with the EU worsened after 2011 when the hydrocarbon dispute in Cyprus
escalated. Domestically, the AKP had entrenched itself as an autocratic party, abrogating
democratic institutions and cracking down on critical media and opposition. After the failed coup
attempt in 2016, the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan formed an alliance with the traditionally
anti-Western Turanists/Eurasianists, both within a new military officer corps and with the MHP
in government.
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In all, these changes detracted from the prospect of EU accession, which had been linked
to a settlement in Cyprus via political conditionality since the 1980s, and contributed to
worsening relations with the EU, including EU sanctions against Turkey in 2013 and 2019. EU
membership, which had been appealing to the AKP and military after 1999, had become both
less likely and less appealing as an inducement for the Turkish government. The post-2016
alliance with the MHP further reduced support for a settlement in Ankara, as the MHP had long
opposed concessions on Cyprus. For Ankara, which had spent the prior 15 years facilitating
support for the Annan Plan as a settlement, this change after 2017 meant it had to induce change
within the TRNC to oppose a settlement rather than accept one.
Talks convened in Crans-Montana, Switzerland in July 2017 aimed to resolve the
outstanding issues from the 2016 UN-led Geneva Summit between Anastasiades and Akıncı,
namely territorial adjustments and security guarantees.190 Akıncı, however, was under pressure
from Ankara and had been warned ahead of talks that due to the RoC’s hydrocarbon plans, this
would be the final attempt at a settlement within the UN parameters before Turkey pursued
“alternative options.”191 When talks failed due to disagreement over Turkish troop deployments
and the TRNC’s status, Turkey ended its support for continued talks on a federal solution.192
Though this preference was communicated to Akıncı after Crans-Montana (#1, Table 5.11), he
attempted to restart talks with Anastasiades in September 2017 without Turkey’s support (UNSC
September 2017; October 2018). Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu opposed Akıncı’s
efforts to continue talks unilaterally and his insistence on adhering to the UN framework. Akıncı
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had threatened to resign as President rather than negotiate a two-state solution. To reduce
Akıncı’s influence in talks, Ankara again pressed for Kudret Özersay to be appointed as
negotiator in October 2017, who marginalized Akıncı and held talks without his knowledge or
consent.193
Relations between Ankara and Mustafa Akıncı soured almost immediately after Akıncı’s
election in 2015. This mirrored developments within Turkey whereby Erdoğan and the AKP
were cracking down on critical voices and opposition. Akıncı, a long-time peace activist who had
won international notoriety as mayor of North Nicosia/Lefkoşa for his cooperation with the
Greek Cypriot mayor of the southern half Nicosia, had opposed the TRNC’s dependence on
Turkey, Turkish aid conditions, and the Cooperation Council formed in 1999. After his election
in 2015 Akıncı advocated an independent policy and relations between equals with Turkey to
“resemble less a mother and her child and more two brothers.” Ankara saw this as a slight and
responded by criticizing Akıncı as unrealistic and ungrateful for Turkey’s support for the
TRNC.194 In 2019, Akıncı criticized Turkey’s military operations in Syria, which drew
considerable backlash from Turkey and the MHP in particular. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli
criticized Akıncı as “unpatriotic” and stated that he was “continuously provoking Turkey’s
sensitivities and should move to the Greek part of the island” - casting him as not a true Turk.195
Nationalist parties in the TRNC responded that Akıncı should resign over his criticism of
Turkey, or at minimum no longer serve as negotiator in talks, as he could no longer be trusted to
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represent “Turkish interests.” He received over 6,000 death threats in the four days that followed
this dispute.196
This had followed an episode in 2017 when after the Avrupa/Afrika newspaper published
a caricature of Erdoğan and criticized Turkish operations in Syria, its offices were attacked by a
nationalist mob at Erdoğan’s urging. 197As in Turkey after 2013, opposition activists and
journalists in the TRNC came under attacks after 2017. Officials from the TDP and CTP, prounification civil society organizations, and journalists critical of Turkey were labeled as
“national traitors” and “terrorists” for their pro-reunification positions. Ankara reportedly
compiled a list of such actors who were harassed or barred from crossing the ceasefire line to the
RoC and harassed or arrested if they traveled to Turkey.198 Accordingly, following Ankara’s
preference to end talks after 2017, it further sought to undermine support for Akıncı and factions
pro-settlement by disassociating them from group-membership and building nationalist
opposition to them (#2, Table 5.11).
Growing opposition in Ankara to Mustafa Akıncı’s position in talks and pro-reunification
factions prompted interventions by Turkey in TRNC politics. In 2019, Turkey triggered a
collapse of the governing coalition to oust the CTP. Turkey had previously triggered a collapse
of the CTP-UBP government in 2016 during a dispute over water distribution.199 In 2019, the
TRNC government was controlled by a CTP-DP-TDP-HP coalition and the CTP refused to
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endorse a two-state solution in domestic legislation. In response, Turkey suspended funding to
the TRNC, and encouraged Kudret Özersay’s HP, which held nine seats, to quit the coalition.
The government collapsed and a UBP-HP coalition came to power, which endorsed a two-state
model (Ekici & Özdemir forthcoming).200 Then in 2020, when Özersay disputed Turkey’s and
the UBP’s plans to unilaterally resettle Varosha/Maraş, three HP deputies quit the party,
triggering a government collapse. Those three deputies then joined the governing UBP-DP-YDP
coalition as independents.201 Turkey had twice, in two years, triggered government collapses and
new coalitions directly to support its new preferences: a two-state solution and resettlement of
Varosha/Maraş.
The more notable intervention from Turkey came in the 2020 TRNC Presidential
elections. Turkey had been agnostic towards the Presidential elections in 2010 and 2015, but
favoring stability, the AKP had sent campaign advisors to work for the incumbents, Talat in 2010
and Eroğlu in 2015.202 In 2020, though, Ankara engaged in an unprecedented level of
involvement in favor of the UBP candidate Ersin Tatar. Akıncı’s clash with Ankara over its
relationship with the TRNC and its military operations in Syria had lost him support in the AKP
and MHP. Furthermore his attempts to restart talks with Anastasiades and his refusal to negotiate
on a two-state solution directly conflicted with Ankara’s preferences after Crans-Montana. Ersin
Tatar, on the other hand, ran on a platform of a two-state solution, further integration with
Turkey, and the unilateral resettlement of Varosha/Maraş under TRNC control. He had further
pledged to crackdown on criticism of Turkey and opposition to its policies within the TRNC.203
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Turkey openly supported Tatar over both Akıncı and Özersay in the 2020 election. In
August 2020, Akıncı and Özersay were both polling well and predicted to go to a runoff, if
Akıncı did not win an outright majority in the first round.204 Before the election in 2020, Ankara
announced support for Tatar, and the AKP hosted him in Ankara where they made a joint
statement on increased aid from Turkey on the same night the TRNC presidential debate was
scheduled.205 Tatar’s campaign was subsequently run out of the Turkish embassy and supported
by the military. Media in the TRNC and Turkey was instructed to only cover Tatar’s campaign
and threatened against covering Akıncı.206 Turkey threatened to cut off economic aid to the
TRNC if Akıncı was elected, and allegedly threatened Akıncı personally to deter him from
running. Representatives from the Turkish embassy mobilized in communities primarily
inhabited by settlers and offered payoffs or expedited citizenship in exchange for voting for
Tatar. In other cases, elected Turkish officials from the AKP and MHP visited the TRNC to
campaign on Tatar’s behalf. Tatar was again hosted in Ankara days before the election where he
was endorsed publicly by Erdoğan. While support for Tatar remained relatively low, Turkey was
successful in suppressing support for Akıncı, leading to a runoff, won by Tatar.207
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Table 5.11. Diagonal Linkage, 2015-2021.
Mechanism

Evidence

1.

Dictate
Preferences

Ankara conveys new preferences opposing UN settlement parameters to Akıncı; Akıncı
refuses to accept them, and attempts to restart talks.

2.

National
Disassociation

Ankara labels pro-reunification factions - Akıncı, CTP, TDP - as traitors/not true
Turkish Cypriots; encourages nationalist violence against them.

3.

Resource
Transfer

Ankara conditions economic and material support on who governing elites in TRNC are;
cuts off aid to undermine CTP government in 2019; provides increased
economic/material aid to support Tatar over Akıncı in 2020.

4.

Leadership
Support

Ankara supports governments/presidents that align with its preferences; supports UBP
and HP over CTP in government after 2018; public support and election campaigning
for Tatar over Akıncı in 2020.

5.

Threats/Loss of
Support

Ankara withholding support for CTP over its opposition to position on settlement/twostate solution; publicly advertised threats that TRNC would lose economic support if
Akıncı was elected.

The outcome of this period was a shift back to intransigence in the TRNC, likened to the
1990s, to mirror Ankara’s new preferences in opposition to both a UN settlement and EU
accession. Dictation of these preferences (#1, Table 5.11) to Akıncı after 2017 had been
insufficient, as he’d openly refused to accept them and had popular support in the TRNC. Ankara
thus pursued alternative strategies to undermine the positions of Akıncı and the pro-reunification
factions in the TRNC, including the CTP. The most evident was leadership support, by which
Ankara first supported UBP-led coalitions that supported its preferences, and then openly
supported Akıncı’s challenger to the Presidency, Ersin Tatar, whose preferences on a settlement
converged with Ankara’s. This was complemented by three additional strategies. One was
national disassociation (#2, Table 5.11), not of the Turkish Cypriot community as a whole, but of
moderate and pro-reunification leaders and activists who were cast as not true members of the
group and “anti-Turk.” Another was resource transfers (#3, Table 5.11), by which aid from
Turkey became conditional on the TRNC’s leadership, notably in support of Tatar’s campaign in
2020. And lastly, threatened losses of support (#5, Table 5.11) were evident to prevent
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opposition to Ankara’s preferences, notably to trigger a government collapse and HP defection in
2019 by withholding aid from the CTP, and in the Turkish pro-Tatar campaign in 2020 that
threatened an end to economic aid if Akıncı was elected.

Table 5.12. Local Regime, 2015-21.
Mechanism

Evidence

a.

New
Preferences

Not evident - TRNC parties maintained same preferences as prior period; CTP and TDP
refused to implement new preferences opposing settlement.

b.

New
Leadership

UBP returned to power in government and presidency and supported Turkish preferences
for a two-state solution, resettling Varosha/Maraş, and minimizing dissent.

c.

Resource
Access

Increased economic and infrastructure integration with Turkey made settlement and
integration with RoC and EU membership less appealing to UBP.

d.

Intra-group
Policing

Crackdown on critical journalists and opposition as traitors; nationalist violence/threats
against pro-reunification activists.

At the local regime-level, the outcome after 2019 was then a local regime less supportive
of an institutional settlement and uncooperative in attempting to reach one. As in the prior
period, the existing elites were unwilling to adopt Turkey’s new preferences, so instead new
leadership emerged whose preferences closely aligned with Turkey’s, including a two-state
solution, resettling Varosha/Maraş, and cracking down on dissent. This new leadership,
embodied in the UBP and Ersin Tatar, bolstered its position through increased aid from Turkey
and infrastructural integration with mainland Turkey that made the material benefits of a
settlement less appealing. And their position was reinforced by a return of intra-group policing of
the ethnic boundary between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Political opponents and critical
journalists were cast as traitors and non-group-members and became targets for nationalist
groups, as they had been during the 1990s, discouraging cooperation and providing social
sanctions.
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5.3

Conclusion

The observed change in the Turkish Cypriot position in April 2004, noted in Chapter 1, fit into a
larger pattern of influence by Turkey in the political competition of the Turkish Cypriot
community after 1963. Influence was exerted on the Turkish Cypriot local regime, so its
practices and policies aligned with those held by Ankara. At times this meant providing support
for the local regime elites to remain in power and fend off challengers who espoused different
preferences or worldviews than those favored by Ankara. At other times this meant supporting
challengers to existing local regime elites whose preferences more closely aligned with
Ankara’s.
Early preferences in Ankara to prevent enosis, protect the Turkish Cypriots, and then to
maintain the TFSC translated into early support for Rauf Denktaş as interlocutor, support for the
TMT as an armed resistance to enosis, and, post-1974, to resource and economic transfers that
unwrote the TFSC’s ability to survive. Importantly these resources from Turkey permitted the
more hardline UBP and Rauf Denktaş to stay in power during the 1970s and early 1980s, by
facilitating the creation of a clientelistic system based on distribution of civil service posts. When
Ankara’s preference for concessions, albeit minimal concessions on confidence-building
measures, changed under the pressure of a US arms embargo, it was unable to induce
cooperation from the TRNC, whose regime and leadership it continued to entrench through
economic transfers. Similarly, when Ankara opposed the Turkish Cypriots’ proposal for
independence, and threatened to remove its leadership, Denktaş simply waited until the
government in Turkey changed to declare independence, without fear of removal.
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The rise to power of the AKP in Turkey in 2002 brought with it new preferences for
Cyprus, namely support for the comprehensive UN settlement proposal, the Annan Plan, driven
largely by the AKP’s early preference for EU membership. As the EU clearly communicated in
April 2003, support for a settlement was not enough for Turkey, it had to produce results. Ankara
faced the problem of an entrenched leadership in the TRNC, which opposed the Annan Plan,
despite Ankara conveying clear support for it. Ankara then switched its support in 2003-10 to the
CTP and its leader Mehmet Ali Talat. Talat and the CTP had supported reunification and EU
accession years before the AKP had come to power. Ankara brokered a coalition agreement in
2004 that saw the CTP come to power for the first time, and then again in 2006 triggered a
government collapse and brokered another coalition to keep the CTP with a pro-reunification
agenda in power. As the AKP’s rule became more autocratic and its relationship with the EU
worsened, the leverage of EU accession and support for a UN settlement declined. In contrast to
2003-04, the AKP did not face an entrenched local regime elite that opposed a settlement, but
one that had spent 15 years supporting reunification in the CTP and Mustafa Akıncı, who
likewise refused to accept Ankara’s new preferences. Accordingly, from 2019-21, Ankara
backed the challengers, the UBP and Ersin Tatar, whose preferences aligned with its own, while
simultaneously undermining support for Akıncı and the CTP by providing resources to their
challengers, fomenting nationalists against them, and threatening to cut off support for the TRNC
if they remained in power.
In concluding the Cyprus case study, there are three noteworthy observations. First, as
Ankara’s preferences changed either to increase or withdraw support for a settlement, it could
not simply dictate these preferences to the Turkish Cypriot local regime to be enacted. Rather
Turkish Cypriot elites and political parties could exercise limited agency relative to Ankara,
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which when strategically used, could spoil settlement efforts. Instead to enact new preferences,
Ankara had to support new leadership in the TRNC. Following this, the second observation is
that elites’ and parties’ preferences towards a settlement, often divided between ideological
groupings, existed prior to changes to preferences in Ankara. As such, Ankara shifted its support
to elites and parties whose existing preferences for a settlement aligned with its new preferences.
Lastly, the third observation is the importance of the various components of the local regime actors, institutions, resources, and strategies, in inducing changes to preferences. Elites’ positions
within the local regime were affected by political institutions, particularly coalitions, their ability
to provide public services and clientelistic distribution in exchange for support, and their ability
to enforce ethnic boundaries or foster intercommunal cooperation. Influence of these specific
local regime aspects by Ankara allowed it to induce policy change by affecting local regime
support for the elites whose preferences it supported. As such, in the institutionally-developed
setting of the TRNC, Turkey pursued preferences by manipulating and affecting competition
between established political parties with established preferences for a settlement.
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6

IDENTITY, WAR, & “DIALOGUE” IN KOSOVO

In October 2006, as United Nations Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari was concluding talks on
Kosovo’s final status, the Government of Serbia adopted a new constitution declaring “the
Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of Serbia, that it has the
status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia.”208 Essentially the new
constitution, hastily adopted to precede Ahtisaari’s final status proposal for Kosovo, enshrined
Serbia’s negotiating preference for Kosovo in domestic constitutional law, which would
constrain the possible solutions Serbia could agree to in internationally-led mediation. In
addition to nationalist voices in Serbia that opposed any concessions on Kosovo, this move
seemingly locked in Serbia’s preference for a solution, ruling out other options as
unconstitutional. In keeping with Putnam’s (1988) theory, legal institutions were used
domestically to reduce the possible set of agreements an interlocutor could reach. Following
Chapters 2 and 4, this chapter traces changes to Serbian preferences towards Kosovo since the
beginning of internationally-led talks in 1998. The aim is to identify both how different forms of
mediation affected policy preferences and how those preferences were manifested in domestic
political competition.
Unlike Cyprus, Kosovo was not an internationally recognized state prior to the conflict,
nor was it a republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Concepts of
sovereignty and self-determination had long been contested in Kosovo and were at the heart of
the conflict between the Serbian Government and Kosovo’s ethnic-Albanian majority in the
1990s that escalated to the Kosovo War in 1998-99.209 While Kosovo’s Albanians viewed
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Text of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Preamble
The Kosovo Albanians first declared themselves to be independent in July 1990 as the Republic of Kosova, then
again in February 2008 as the Republic of Kosovo. Neither declaration has been recognized by Serbia or the UN
Security Council. See: Judah (2000, 2008); Ejdus (2020).
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themselves as sovereign, Serbia regards Kosovo as an integral part of the state and of Serbian
national identity. Though Serbia has sought to delegitimize its sovereignty, Kosovo has been a
separate political entity from Serbia since it was placed under United Nations administration in
June 1999 with distinct administrative structures and a “legal personality” to enforce laws and
implement agreements. In this context of contested sovereignty, though, talks have been
intentionally ambiguous to status and referred to as “dialogue” between two capitals - Belgrade
and Prishtina (Bieber 2015). This dialogue has proceeded to address the contested aspects of
Kosovo’s external sovereignty as a state and internal sovereignty through its multi-ethnic
institutional capacity, both of which Serbia has attempted to undermine. While Serbia has vowed
to never recognize Kosovo’s independence (external sovereignty), there have been notable policy
changes from the Serbian Government contributing to the development of Kosovo’s institutions
and thereby its internal sovereignty achieved through mediation.
This chapter proceeds chronologically over five time periods. The first period provides
context of inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo and the Kosovo War, and identifies early preferences
in negotiations. The following four periods then provide an overview of conflict resolution
efforts, focusing specifically on mediators and strategies, and Serbia’s preferences and policies.
Time periods are determined by changes to the structure and context of mediation at which
decisions are made that alter potential future decisions - critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen
2007). Each period concludes by relating observations from domestic competition and policy
changes to the mechanisms theorized in Chapter 2 (restated in Table 6.1).

Table 6.1. Mechanisms.
Pathway

Outcome
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1.

Facilitation w/ local
regime

Local regime engages in dialogue with
mediator and other side; alters beliefs about
others’ intentions

Joins mutual institutions in parent
state; conveys preference to patron
state

2.

Manipulation w/
local regime

Mediator “buys off” local regime leaders with
payoffs or government positions; individual
benefits payoffs exceed status quo benefits

Joins mutual institutions in parent
state; conveys preference to patron
state

3.

Facilitation w/
patron state

Mediator engages in dialogue with patron state;
provides assurances about other side;
communicates information from other side

Patron state alters beliefs about
other sides’ intentions or
preferences; changes policy to fit
new beliefs

4.

Manipulation w/
patron state:
sanction

Third-party sender imposes economic sanctions
on patron state with condition to alter policy for
sanctions to end

Patron implements new policy inline with conditions for sanctions
relief

5.

Manipulation w/
patron state: one-off
reward

Third-party offers patron state a one-off benefit
such as an aid package in exchange for
concessions

Patron state implements new
policy in order to receive reward;
lasts until reward is dispersed

6.

Manipulation w/
patron state: reward
structure

Third -party organization offers patron state
membership and long-term rewards in
exchange for concessions; membership favored
by key constituency in patron state

Patron state changes policy, if
supported by key elements of
government; credibility of rewards
declines over time.

6.1

Centralization & War

Kosovo has a central place in Serbian national identity, and was central in the rise of Serbian
nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s. According to Serbian narratives, it was in Kosovo in 1389
that the Serb Prince Lazar united the weakened Serbian kingdom to fight the invading Ottomans,
and though defeated, achieved a “heavenly kingdom” for the Serbs through his martyrdom. This
narrative of the “Kosovo Myth” became a central pillar in the rise of Serbian national identity in
the 19th century, as Serbs reckoned with the subjugation of their “earthly kingdom” to Ottoman
Dominion for the previous five centuries. Epic poetry glorifying the martyrdom of Lazar and
others became central to narratives of victimhood and injustice, while simultaneously casting
Albanians as nefarious Ottoman collaborators sent to settle Serbian lands in Kosovo. It was then
in Kosovo in 1988, the poorest region of Yugoslavia, plagued by inter-ethnic tensions between
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Serbs and Albanians and persistent protests, that Slobodan Milošević kicked off his nationalist
ascent to the Serbian presidency (Judah 1997; Ejdus 2020).
During the Second World War, Albanian nationalists, pursuing a unified Albanian
nation-state (referred to as the nationalist project of “Greater Albania”), had sided with
Yugoslavia’s German and Italian occupiers to administer the territories of Kosovo and Sandžak
in Serbia. Albanian nationalist forces - the Balli Kombëtar and Vulnetari - had brutalized nonAlbanians, moderates, and communists in these regions. With the victory of the communist
partisans in 1945 and the constitution of the FRY, Kosovo was placed under the direct control of
the Ministry of the Interior (MUP), led by Aleksandar Ranković, who opposed federal
decentralization and favored centralized rule and a particularly oppressive rule in Kosovo, where
the Albanian population was viewed as overly nationalist and potentially seditious.210 Kosovo
was administered under a police state of emergency by Ranković until 1960, before being
granted autonomous status within Serbia in 1974 constitutional reforms (Judah 1997, 2000).
Autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia coupled with the opening of the University of Pristina as
the center of Albanian education contributed to rising Albanian nationalism within Yugoslavia,
and resentment among Serbs in Kosovo and nationalists in Belgrade who called for a return to
centralized rule and feared a lack of protection from Albanian nationalists (Judah 1997; Clark
2000; Hehir 2010; Bećirević 2014).
It was from this disenchanted Serb population in Kosovo that Slobodan Milošević gained
his early support with pledges to protect anxious Serbs and for “Serbia to return to Kosovo.”
Milošević accused the Albanian provincial authorities of having abused their power and
persecuted Serbs, while nationalists claimed Albanians were purposefully “out-breeding” Serbs

Ethnic-Albanians were believed to have greater affinity with Enver Hoxha’s Stalinist regime in Albania, which
was problematic after the 1948 Yugoslav-Soviet Split.
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to replace them in Kosovo (Judah 1997). During his ascendency to the Serbian presidency in
1988-89, Milošević implemented the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution. With the support of his loyal
Kosovo Serb base, he undermined the autonomous governments of Kosovo, Montenegro, and
Vojvodina, revoking Kosovo and Vojvodina’s autonomous status.211 Kosovo’s provincial
assembly officially voted to revoke their own autonomy, in a vote taken under the coercion of
Serbian security forces in Prishtina and paramilitary police in the assembly itself. With the
revocation of autonomy in March 1989 and the dissolution of the assembly in June 1990, ethnicAlbanians were replaced in public administration and the economy by Milošević loyalists.
Following hunger strikes at Kosovo’s Trepča/Trepçë mining complex in 1989 in protest of the
revocation of autonomy, Serbia declared a state of emergency in Kosovo and MUP deployed
large numbers of paramilitary police. By 1991, Milošević had returned centralized control of
Kosovo, which coupled with an oppressive police presence was reminiscent of Ranković’s rule
(Judah 1997; OSCE 1999; Clark 2000).
The return of centralized control in 1989-90 forced Kosovo’s Albanian population out of
public life and led to the creation of a parallel state. Albanians were forced out of employment in
the provincial administration and public enterprises including media, stripped of language and
education rights, and barred from military conscription. Without access to the public sector or
Albanian-language education, a “parallel” administration was formed under the Democratic
League of Kosovo (LDK) and its leader Ibrahim Rugova, an advocate of nonviolent resistance. In
July 1990, Rugova’s parallel state declared itself independent from Serbia as the Republic of
Kosova, rejected by Serbia and ignored by the international community. The Albanian
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Both Kosovo and Vojvodina in northern Serbia had been granted the status of autonomous provinces within
Serbia by the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, which provided for the establishment of a provincial assembly with
substantial authority over internal matters and representation nationally. Serb nationalists had claimed this was a
deliberate move by Tito to weaken Serbia within Yugoslavia.
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population boycotted participation in the Serbian state, boycotting elections and the census and
collecting their own taxes from within Kosovo and the diaspora community. While this parallel
state challenged centralized authority, the nonviolent nature of resistance and the dominant
position of Serbs meant Milošević tolerated it, especially with wars in Croatia and Bosnia &
Herzegovina (BiH) ongoing (Judah 2000; Krieger 2001).
Armed resistance to Serbian authority gained momentum after 1996 in response to three
developments: (1) Kosovo had not been addressed in the Dayton Accords as Rugova had hoped;
(2) Rugova lost support from key advisors who he had ostracized and rural clan leaders,
disenchanted with nonviolent resistance; and (3) in 1997, neighboring Albania’s government
collapsed and its president, Sali Berisha, had opened up the country’s armories hoping his
supporters would take up arms to defend him. Instead they looted military stores and sold the
arms to a nascent insurgent group in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK). Now with the
means to wage an armed struggle, the UÇK began a guerilla campaign targeting Serbian police in
particular. Serbia responded by intensifying its security presence in Kosovo, including the
army’s Priština Corps, special police units (including the infamous JSO), and paramilitary
volunteers organized by the security services (OSCE 1999).212 Fighting escalated from sporadic
acts of terrorism to an insurgent conflict after March 1998 when an attempt to capture UÇK
leaders Hamëz and Adem Jashari resulted in the killing of 58 members of their family in the
village of Prekaz by paramilitary police (Judah 2000)
Foreign involvement in the escalating war began in mid-1998, but was hampered by
competing tensions between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights. Serbian

Due in part to Milošević’s own domestic security worries, the special police units were better equipped and
trained than the regular military and included special paramilitary units that had fought in Croatia and BiH. The
most notorious paramilitary force in Kosovo was the JSO, known as the Red Berets or “Frankies” recruited and
supplied by the State Security Service.
212
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government representatives had refused to entertain talks on Kosovo under the auspices of the
Dayton Accords and the BiH Office of the High Representative, regarding it as a strictly internal
matter. Western states, and the US and EU in particular, feared a repeat of BiH and regarded the
escalating conflict as a threat to regional security. Following the attack on the Jasharis in Prekaz
in March 1998, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared that the US no longer
considered conflict in Kosovo to be a Serbian internal affair and began lobbying for action in the
UN. UN Security Council Resolution 1199, passed in 1998, called for:
•

An end to actions by security forces against the civilian population of Kosovo;

•

The presence of international monitors with guaranteed safety;

•

The return of refugees displaced by fighting; and,

•

Progress towards a diplomatic political solution.

Though UN-authorized force was obstructed by a Russian veto in the Security Council, US
Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke persuaded Serbia to comply with UNSCR 1199 under
the threat of unilateral force, having received assurances from Russia that it would not intervene
on Serbia’s side (Weller 1999; Judah 2000). Milošević agreed to reduce Serbian forces in
Kosovo to pre-conflict levels and remove heavy weapons, and accepted the deployment of OSCE
monitors, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). With the KVM deployed in Kosovo and a
NATO force in neighboring Macedonia, US Ambassador to Macedonia Christopher Hill
proposed a three-tiered solution for decentralization in Kosovo. By Hill’s proposal principal
authority would rest with municipal units, secondary authority with national communities, and
tertiary authority with a weak provincial government. This was rejected in December 1998. The
Albanians saw it as insufficient, but Serbia opposed it for reducing formal centralized authority
over Kosovo (Weller 1999; Judah 2000).
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The diplomatic push for a solution in Kosovo intensified in January 1999 culminating in
the Rambouillet talks in February-March 1999. The killing of 45 Albanians by Serbian police in
the village of Račak/Reçak in January 1999 attracted international media attention and
condemnation from NATO officials who declared that conflict in Kosovo was a direct threat to
international peace and security. Though the Serbian government had initially touted the success
of its special police operation in Račak/Reçak, it backtracked to claim that the KVM had staged
the massacre and declared KVM head William Walker persona non grata. Only under the threat
of NATO force and Russian diplomatic pressure did Serbia agree to the Rambouillet talks
convened by the “Contact Group” - the US, EU, and Russia. The settlement proposed at
Rambouillet included:
•

The end of hostilities in Kosovo and the return of prisoners;

•

Democratic self-governance in Kosovo, including a directly elected assembly with
representation of all national communities;

•

A president of Kosovo;

•

An autonomous government and judiciary, not subject to decisions taken by Serbian or
federal authorities including a ban on the imposition of martial law in Kosovo;

•

International implementation of the agreement by the UNHCR, OSCE, and a NATO-led
security force (KFOR).213

The Serbian/FRY delegation was described as “not serious” and “lacking political will for a
settlement” at the Rambouillet talks, while it perceived the US, Britain, and France as biased
towards the Albanian side. This lack of will to negotiate was evident in the conclusion of talks in
Paris in March 1999 when the Albanian side, represented by both Rugova and UÇK leader
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KFOR had originally been proposed as a part of Holbrooke’s talks with Milošević in October 1998.

175
Hashim Thaçi, accepted the draft settlement, but Serbian President Milan Milutinović rejected it
and refused further talks. Milutinović submitted a counter-proposal which instead of making
revisions, omitted all the provisions negotiated at Rambouillet and removed restrictions on
centralized authority in Kosovo. This counter-proposal reduced the competencies of the
provincial assembly, replaced the presidency with a centrally-appointed council, subjugated the
judicial system to central authority, and removed provisions for implementation including KFOR
and the UNHCR. Serbia refused to continue talks unless its proposal was accepted (Weller 1999;
Judah 2000).214
After the collapse of the Rambouillet talks, US diplomats Holbrooke and Hill gave
Milošević a final warning that NATO would use force if he did not return to talks. Milošević,
though, believed that Russia would come to Serbia’s aid if attacked and refused further talks
while ordering an escalation of police operations in Kosovo. Russia had blocked the
authorization of use of force in the UN Security Council in 1998 and sided with the Serbian
delegation at Rambouillet, but had also assured Holbrooke that it would not enter a military
conflict on Serbia’s side. The FRY Chief of Staff Momčilo Perišić recognized this and opposed
escalation believing it would result in the loss of Kosovo and that Russia would not aid Serbia
against a US attack. Instead of heeding this warning, nationalist SPS-SRS government in power
in Belgrade fired Perišić and replaced him with the more pliant Dragoljub Ojdanić who
supported increased security operations in Kosovo. On 20 March 1999 the KVM withdrew to
Macedonia and on 24 March 1999 NATO began airstrikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo and
Serbia-proper. Simultaneously Serbian forces escalated their ethnic-cleansing campaign in
Kosovo, labeled as “Operation Horseshoe” which aimed to displace or eliminate the Albanian
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The Russian mediator at Rambouillet, Ambassador Mayorski, had refused to attend the signing of the agreement
by the Albanian side, not wanting to convey legitimacy to an agreement only signed by one side.
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population from Kosovo (OSCE 1999, 2001; Petersen 2011).215 Prior to the start of NATO’s
bombing campaign, an estimated ~270,000 people had been displaced by fighting, but by June
1999, an estimated ~860,000 were displaced, the vast majority of whom were Albanians
(UNHCR February 2000).
NATO airstrikes ended on 10 June 1999 with the Kumanovo Agreement signed by the
Yugoslav General Nebojša Pavković and British General Sir Mike Jackson. The Kumanovo
Agreement provided for:
•

The cessation of hostilities;

•

The 11-day phased withdrawal of FRY/Serbian security forces and military assets from
Kosovo;

•

The deployment of international civilian and security forces in Kosovo in accordance
with a draft UN Security Council Resolution; and,

•

Authorization to use force to create a secure environment.

The third point, a draft UN Security Council Resolution, was in reference to UNSCR 1244,
passed the same day, which formally endorsed the presence of a NATO-led peacekeeping force
(KFOR) in Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serbian/FRY forces.216 More importantly, UNSCR
1244 provided for a UN-led civilian interim administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) headed by a
Special Representative (UNSR) appointed by the Secretary General with executive authority.
Kosovo’s status, though, was indeterminate and it would legally remain a part of the territory of
the Republic of Serbia, until a status solution was agreed. UNMIK was charged with the
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Locally-recruited paramilitaries were given weapons and uniforms by the government, but operated on a booty
system whereby they were paid in whatever they could steal from Albanians.
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To secure Russian approval, KFOR was to be a “NATO-led” multinational force with non-NATO contributing
states, including Russia. Despite this agreement there was a standoff between Russian and British forces at the
Prishtina Airport in June 1999 when Russian peacekeepers from BiH took control of the airport and refused to
vacate it or hand control to NATO.
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development of local governance institutions, including the conduct of democratic elections to be
embodied in “provisional institutions of democratic and autonomous self-governance” to which
the UNSR would have the authority to transfer powers (UNSCR 1244, 1999). Serbia, especially
under the DSS would contest this latter point as ambiguous and equated institution-building with
independence. While provision “11d” authorized the transfer of administrative responsibility to
provisional institutions, provision “11e” stated that political authority could only be transferred
upon conclusion of Kosovo’s political status. Accordingly, by subsequently refusing to make
concessions on Kosovo’s status, Serbia regarded any institution-building within Kosovo as
illegitimate and undermining its own sovereignty.

Table 6.2. Timeline of Negotiations/Intervention, -1999
Year

Mediator/Actor

Outcome

Nov.
1995

US

Dayton Peace Accords

End of war in Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Kosovo omitted

Sept.
1998

UN

UN Security Council Resolution 1199:
ceasefire and authorizes OSCE KVM

Violated by November 1998

Oct.
1998

US: Richard
Holbrooke

US-led talks with Milošević: Clinton
authorizes use of military force

Withdrawal of heavy weapons
from Kosovo

Dec.
1998

US: Christopher
Hill

Hill proposal: decentralization and restoration
of pre-1990 status

Rejected by both sides

Feb.
1999

Contact Group

Rambouillet Talks: enhanced autonomy,
restoration of democracy, interim status

Accepted by Albanians,
rejected by Serbia

Mar.
1999

US/NATO

NATO begins airstrikes against Kosovo/Serbia
after Milošević turns down compromise

June
1999

NATO: Mike
Jackson

Kumanovo Agreement

Serbia/FRY withdrawal from
Kosovo

June
1999

UN

UN Security Council Resolution 1244

UNMIK, UN administration of
Kosovo
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6.1.1

Serbian Preferences for Kosovo

Serbian policy towards Kosovo following the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution aimed to re-establish
and maintain centralized political control. The re-establishment of centralized control had been
one of the primary mechanisms of Milošević’s nationalist rise to power in 1988. This reduced
pluralistic decision-making in federal structures by curbing the autonomous power of Kosovo,
Vojvodina, and Montenegro. And this policy of centralized authority and a repressive police
presence to enforce it after the 1989 Trepča/Trepçë strikes, dovetailed with the preferences of the
Serb population in Kosovo which had grown increasingly wary of Albanian nationalism since
the end of emergency rule by Aleksandar Ranković and the granting of autonomy in 1974. The
Kosovo Serbs provided a loyal nationalist support base for Milošević’s SPS and the ultranationalist SRS.
In the broader context of resurgent Serbian nationalism, re-establishing centralized
political control over Kosovo after 15 years of autonomy was cast as Serbia’s “return” to the
heart of its national identity. As Ejdus (2020) details, growing Serbian discourse on Kosovo had
been dismissed by the communist leadership in the 1980s as “dangerous nationalism” counter to
Yugoslavia’s “brotherhood and unity” mantra. However by the late 1980s, it was central in
Serbian discourse as “Old Serbia” and labeled by nationalists as “Serbia’s Jerusalem.”
Milošević’s rise with the rhetoric of “returning to Kosovo” and protecting the Serbs of Kosovo
from “replacement” by Albanians evoked a national resurgence which had been curbed under
communist rule. The “return to Kosovo” was regarded as reclaiming something central to Serbs’
collective identity. As Ejdus (2020) notes, the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle
of Kosovo (1389) was rife with analogies of Serbia reclaiming its “heart” or “soul” or an
“amputated limb” - something integral to national being that had been stripped from it in 1974.
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Milošević himself, in his address commemorating the anniversary referred to Kosovo as the
“pure center of the Serbian nation” (quoted in Judah 1997). Hence while centralization and the
police state of emergency satisfied Serb nationalists in Kosovo for a return to the Ranković-era
status quo, it also satisfied nationalists more broadly, sympathetic to Ranković’s position that
decentralization had weakened Serbia’s position within Yugoslavia (Bećirević 2014).
The centrality of Kosovo to Serbian nationalism during the 1980s and 1990s precluded
concessions on centralized control of Kosovo during internationally-led talks. The Serbian
government from 1997-2000 was led by a SPS-SRS coalition, which drew support from
nationalist supporters for whom Kosovo was central. Furthermore, through its centralized rule,
Kosovo had become a source of both patronage and fraud for both parties. Posts in Kosovo’s
institutions and public enterprises were distributed as patronage to key allies including
paramilitary and criminal elites (Judah 2000), and vote rigging in Kosovo had been used to boost
SPS margins in the 1990s. For example in 1997, SPS candidates claimed to receive 300,000
votes from Kosovo Albanians despite their well-publicized boycott of Serbian elections and
widespread opposition to SPS rule.217 Accordingly, while it was indisputable that Kosovo was a
central component of Serbian nationalism, or an “ontic space” in Serbian identity (Judah 1997,
2000; Ejdus 2020), the more specific policy of centralized political control over Kosovo was
critical to nationalist parties in Belgrade as a manifestation of nationalism in practice.
Resistance to not only conceding Kosovo but limiting centralized control of Kosovo was
evident in efforts to negotiate a settlement prior to NATO intervention in March 1999.
Christopher Hill’s proposal for decentralization, which granted increased political importance to
national communities, was rejected by Belgrade specifically for displacing centralized control

217

Beta [in Serbian] (28 August 2000, 5 September 2000).

180
and granting Albanians increased authority in Kosovo (Judah 2000). Similarly the proposed
settlement at Rambouillet was rejected on the grounds of returning Kosovo’s autonomy relative
to Belgrade: creating a provincial presidency, democratic self-governance, autonomous
administrative and judicial structures not accountable to Belgrade, and a ban on martial law
(Weller 1999; Judah 2000). These provisions reversed the specific provisions for centralization
imposed on Kosovo after the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution and Trepča/Trepçë strikes. Tellingly,
Serbia’s counter-proposal that effectively ended the Rambouillet talks struck all of the provisions
that weakened centralization.
External mediators during this period, officially the Contact Group but with the US acting
as primary interlocutor (Weller 1999; Judah 2000), did not diplomatically affect policy change in
Serbia. The Serbian government was subjected to two primary strategies: facilitation and
manipulation: sanctions. Facilitation was most evident at the Rambouillet talks, in which Serbian
President Milan Milutinović engaged in talks with Albanian leaders Ibrahim Rugova and Hashim
Thaçi, mediated by the Contact Group. However, even the Rambouillet talks were conducted
under the threat of military force from NATO, deployed in neighboring Macedonia, which had
been authorized ahead of talks between Holbrooke and Milošević in October 1998. The threat of
force from NATO did not leverage concessions from Belgrade, with Milutinović rejecting the
Rambouillet proposal, and Belgrade ordering an escalation of operations in Kosovo prior to
NATO bombing. When the military Chief of Staff Perišić protested this escalation to the
government, he was removed from his post (Judah 2000).
What the conclusion of the Kumanovo Agreement and then the passing of UNSCR 1244
meant was that Serbia lost its centralized control over Kosovo by force. Having rejected multiple
diplomatic proposals that weakened centralized control, an outcome was then forced upon Serbia
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which completely removed its administrative and security institutions from Kosovo. UNSCR
1244 essentially imposed upon Serbia the key provisions proposed at Rambouillet, which it
explicitly referenced as the basis for a future settlement, namely autonomous interim authority
vested in democratic institutions, implemented by KFOR, the OSCE, and the UN. By the
provisions of UNSCR 1244, Kosovo remained legally within the boundaries of Serbia, but
administrative authority rested solely with UNMIK, which had the ability to implement or nullify
laws to be enforced by KFOR and an UNMIK police contingent (UNSCR 1244 Annex 1 1999;
UNSC July 1999). Though de jure still a part of Serbian territory, Kosovo de facto ceased to be a
part of the Serbian state after June 1999, physically separated by a NATO-enforced air and
ground safety zone, and institutionally separated by the removal of Belgrade’s administrative and
security structures, the two components of centralization, and replaced by UNMIK. Remaining
in Kosovo, though, was the ethnic-Serb minority, which had originally supported centralization.
A challenge for UNMIK would then be the Serbs’ incorporation in administration and public
life, which would determine UNMIK’s credibility in building multi-ethnic institutions (OSCE
February 2000).

6.2

International Administration & Beginnings of Dialogue

In addition to its authority to build and administer institutions in Kosovo, UNSCR 1244 gave
UNMIK and the UNSR authority to facilitate “a political process designed to determine
Kosovo’s future state, taking into account the Rambouillet accords.” Initiating talks after June
1999 faced four obstacles. One was Serbia’s general intransigence towards Kosovo’s status that
had been evident prior to NATO intervention, persisted after June 1999, and after the ousting of
Milošević in October 2000. As scholars of Serbian politics note, nationalism, and particularly
chauvinistic views towards Kosovo, were not distinguishable by a left-right ideological divide
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but evident across the whole domestic political spectrum (Gordy 2003; Pribićević 2004), and
political anxiety over “losing” Kosovo precluded concessions (Ejdus 2020). A second obstacle
was political instability within Serbia that accompanied Milošević’s ousting, an ethnic-Albanian
insurgency in southern Serbia in 2000-01, and the assassination of reformist Prime Minister
Zoran Đinđić in 2003. Thirdly, talks were obstructed by an unstable security situation in Kosovo
characterized by persistent inter-ethnic violence and reprisals against the remaining Serb and
Roma population (Petersen 2011). And lastly, compromises were obstructed by unresolved
questions of status and sovereignty that prevented agreements on supposedly “technical” matters
aimed to improve everyday life in Kosovo.
In the first 18 months of UNMIK’s deployment there was limited engagement with
Milošević’s government in Belgrade. Zoran Anđelković, an SPS official considered to be
Milošević’s “governor” in Kosovo, was charged with facilitating relations with UNMIK. His
position, though, was undermined by ongoing violence, poor relations with local Serbs, and his
own antagonism towards UNMIK.218 Anđelković was believed to be attempting to secure
privileged access to UNMIK for the SPS, while SPS officials lobbied UNMIK to close Kosovo’s
borders to prevent Albanian refugees returning from Albania and Macedonia, facilitated by
UNHCR. Simultaneously, the SPS sought to undermine UNMIK, calling for its removal after a
month, for the return of Serbian forces to protect Serbs, and denouncing it as part of a Western
plot to “Albanize” Kosovo. Anđelković and fellow SPS functionary Živorad Igić claimed
UNMIK was intentionally altering demographics in Kosovo and that more Albanians were living
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in Kosovo after UNMIK’s deployment than ever before, centering UNMIK in Serbia’s
“replacement” claims after 1999.219
While Milošević and the SPS-SRS government remained in power, UNMIK engaged
more constructively with local Serb political groups, most notably the Serb National Council of
Kosovo and Metohija (SNV-KiM). Based in the Serb enclave of Gračanica/Graçanicë, near
Prishtina, the SNV-KiM was led by Serbian Orthodox Church officials Bishop Artemije and Prior
Sava Janjić, and former administrator of Kosovo of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO),
Momčilo Trajković. Dialogue with the SNV-KiM began in July 1999 and was formalized in the
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) a consultative body that the SNV-KiM intermittently
participated on in 1999-2000.220 UNMIK’s aim was to negotiate participation of the Serb
community in mutual institutions, however the SNV-KiM believed solutions to the security
situation in Kosovo were necessary first and proposed both the creation of distinct Serb cantons
and a “Serb protection corps.” When UNMIK rejected these proposals, Trajković proposed them
to EU and US diplomats, including Holbrooke, who also rejected them, believing cantons and
ethnically-distinct security structures would come to resemble Republika Srpska in BiH.221 The
Serb population in northern Kosovo, north of the Ibar/Ibër River, however, was less inclined to
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cooperate with UNMIK, resisted international peacekeepers, and called for UNMIK to be
removed.
The ousting of Milošević’s government in October-December 2000 by the Democratic
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) increased optimism for cooperation from Belgrade.222 DOS deputy
Nebojša Čović was appointed by Belgrade to oversee matters related to both Kosovo and
southern Serbia. Until May 2001, though, Čović was primarily focused on resolving the UÇPMB
insurgency in southern Serbia, which ended in the “Čović Plan” negotiated with NATO (Jackson
2021a).223 He was then appointed as head of the newly formed Coordination Centre for Kosovo
and Metohija and charged with a mandate to act as interlocutor between the Serbian
Government, the Serbs in Kosovo, and UNMIK.224 While this formalized engagement with
UNMIK and provided a regular channel of communication, Serbia’s position changed little, as it
opposed UNMIK’s institution-building as undermining Serbia’s sovereignty and petitioned the
UN to dismiss the UNSR for prejudging Kosovo’s status. The Serbian government opposed the
creation of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISGs) in Kosovo as precursors to
independence.225
The primary diplomatic issue between UNMIK and Belgrade from 2000-03 was the
participation of Serbs in Kosovo in UNMIK-run institutions and elections, regarded by
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international stakeholders as a potential indicator of UNMIK’s success. The Kosovo Serbs
boycotted the first UNMIK-run elections in October 2000 in protest of security conditions and
limited returns of displaced Serbs. Consecutive UNSRs Bernard Kouchner and Hans Hækkerup
sought Belgrade’s support for Serb participation in Kosovo’s elections. Belgrade did support
participation in the PISG assembly elections in 2001. Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić
verbally supported Serb participation in March 2001.226 The Coordination Centre then endorsed
participation in August 2001 but backtracked and called for “non-participation” in October 2001
in protest of violence against Kosovo Serbs and Albanian parties’ use of independence rhetoric
in campaigning.227 Belgrade did support Serb participation in elections in November 2001
following talks between UNSR Hans Hækkerup and FRY President Vojislav Koštunica, in
which Hækkerup negotiated increased security for Serb villages and gave a formal guarantee
against a declaration of independence by the PISG assembly after elections.228
The following year, Belgrade endorsed participation in Kosovo’s local elections after
negotiations with Hækkerup’s successor, Michael Steiner. In talks between Koštunica and
Steiner in October 2002, Steiner provided guarantees that UNMIK would begin administrative
decentralization by 2003.229 Decentralization became the focus of talks after the 2002 elections.
While Belgrade had resisted decentralization prior to 1999 as weakening centralized control,
after 2000 it was regarded as crucial to Kosovo Serbs’ security and their autonomy from Kosovo
Albanian governance. The first notable proposal was Momčilo Trajković’s proposal for cantons
made to UNMIK in August 1999, which was then adopted by the DOS government in Belgrade
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after 2000, when Trajković was recruited by the Coordination Centre.230 The Coordination
Centre then proposed the ethnic partition of Kosovo into distinct Serb and Albanian zones.231
Though UNMIK rejected both proposals, the Serbian parliament adopted an official position on
Serb local self-governance in Kosovo in 2002 before adopting ethnic partition as its “priority
policy” in March 2004.232
In 2002, UNMIK refocused talks with Belgrade on “technical matters.” Agreements in
2002 provided for the composition of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and judiciary to reflect
the ethnic composition of municipalities where they were based, regarded as a precursor to
decentralization. In 2003, UNMIK proposed seven further areas for technical cooperation:
energy, trade, transportation, vehicle registration, personal documents, and cadastral records.
Čović accepted the invitation to technical talks but attached preconditions of administrative
decentralization and guarantees against independence - inserting political criteria into a technical
agenda.233 The Serbian Government then withdrew from talks after the UNSR transferred
administrative competencies to the PISGs, per UNSCR 1244. In protest of what it claimed were
political violations of sovereignty, the Coordination Centre formally suspended relations with
UNMIK in May 2003 and refused to resume talks while Michael Steiner remained UNSR.234
Talks between Belgrade and Prishtina were again convened in October 2003 with the aim
of establishing “standards for Kosovo.” The intention professed by the UNSR was to establish a
set of mutually acceptable standards for governance to be achieved before Kosovo’s final status
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was considered - labeled “standards before status.” The UN agenda for these talks, held in
Vienna, had intended to focus on “practical matters of mutual interest,” but was undermined by
irreconcilable visions for future status that detracted from intermediate standards. The Serbian
position refused anything more than broad autonomy within the Serbian state, akin to Kosovo’s
status from 1974-89, which Belgrade labeled “more than autonomy, less than independence.”235
Prishtina’s delegation labeled this as a “chauvinistic attempt to reimpose central authority in
Kosovo” through weak guarantees and demanded that Belgrade remove all obstacles to
independence.236 Talks were unproductive with both interlocutors, Čović and Edita Tahiri,
disrupting technical talks to make demands about status.237 While bringing the sides together for
talks was an achievement in itself, it failed to produce an agreement and the Serbian Government
rejected the UNSR’s “Standards for Kosovo” proposal (UNSC January 2004), which included:
•

Consociational governance institutions elected in common elections;

•

Multi-ethnic rule of law institutions;

•

Enhanced minority rights including freedom of movement and language use;

•

Sustainable returns and protection of cultural heritage;

•

Sustained dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina; and,

•

Provision for the Kosovo Protection Corps (UNSC December 2003).

Belgrade claimed that these provisions violated UNSCR 1244, illustrating its opposition to any
institution-building in Kosovo as violating its interpretation of political authority in UNSCR
1244, and therefore its claims to sovereignty (UNSC January 2004).
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The limited progress that UNMIK had made integrating Serbs into the PISGs after the
2001-02 elections was undone by ethnic riots in Kosovo on 17 March 2004. The reported
drowning of a group of Albanian boys in Mitrovica triggered coordinated anti-Serb riots across
Kosovo that destroyed 730 Serb homes and 35 Orthodox sites, and displaced more than 4,000
Serbs.238 In the short-term, the March 2004 riots further isolated the Serbs in Kosovo and
destroyed their limited trust in the PISGs and UNMIK. Serbs in the KPS and other UNMIK-run
institutions quit en masse, and Serbs elected in 2001-02 boycotted further participation (UNSC
May 2004; Dahlman & Williams 2010).
The longer-term effect, though, was to signal the status quo as untenable. The UN
commissioned Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide to review conditions in Kosovo, which concluded
the need for a status settlement and devolution of administrative authority to reformed municipal
units. For Belgrade, this hardened its preferences for administrative autonomy in cantons and
resulted in a boycott of UNMIK-run institutions for the following nine years. Belgrade
furthermore recouped its influence in Kosovo Serb municipalities, implementing more robust
parallel institutions run from Serbia, in contravention of UNSCR 1244 (UNSC July 2004;
November 2004; Dahlman & Williams 2010).
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Table 6.3. Timeline of Negotiations, 1999-2004.
Year

Mediator

July
1999

UNMIK

Interethnic talks begin Kosovo Transition Council

Irregular participation by SNV
KiM, boycotted Sept.-Feb.

July
2000

US

SNV-KiM joins inter-ethnic talks held in US

Airlie Declaration against violence

May
2001

NATO

Serbian government negotiations with UÇPMB

Covic Plan accepted

Oct.
2001

UNMIK

Negotiation of Serb participation in Kosovo
election: Belgrade demands security guarantees

Accepted in Nov. 2001, Serbs
participate as KP

March
2002

US

Cooperation with ICTY and transfers political
prisoners to Kosovo in exchange for US aid

Accepted

May
2002

UNMIK

Serb participation in Kosovo Police Service

Agreed

July
2002

UNMIK

Participation of Serb judges in PISG judiciary

Agreed

Oct.
2002

UNMIK

Negotiation of Serb participation in Kosovo local
elections

Accepted

June
2003

EU

EU-Western Balkans Summit

Serbia promised future EU
membership path

Oct.
2003

UNMIK

Vienna Talks

Fail to reach agreement

July
2004

UN

Kai Eide review of conditions in Kosovo

Concludes need for decentralization
and status review

Sept.
2004

UNMIK

Negotiations for Serb participation in Kosovo
elections

Election boycott

6.2.1

Outcome

Serbian Preferences

Belgrade’s position on Kosovo during the period from 1999-2004 was affected by two domestic
political contests. The first was between Milošević’s SPS-SRS government and the DOS, an
amalgam of 17 parties led by the Democratic Party (DS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS),
ahead of the 2000 elections in Serbia. These parties had attempted to oust Milošević in 1997
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elections, but were unsuccessful due in part to the DSS support for nationalist policies in Kosovo
and a less active role of civil society (Bieber 2003). Though, as Bieber (2003) argues, Kosovo
did not feature centrally in the DOS’s platform, the effects of the Kosovo War were detrimental
to Milošević’s position. Namely he lost the support of the Serbian Orthodox Church, with
Patriarch Pavle calling for Milošević’s resignation and Bishop of Raska-Prizren Artemije, who
headed the SNV-KiM in Kosovo, joining and campaigning for the DOS.
While both the SPS and DOS opposed the notion of Kosovo’s secession, the SPS opposed
the deployment of UNMIK and issued repeated calls for its removal and the return of Serbian
security forces to “protect” the Serbs in Kosovo. This position was also held by the SRS and
supported by predominantly SRS constituents in southern Serbia and Kosovo who cheered the
idea of Serbia again “returning to Kosovo” however unrealistic it was (Gordy 2003; Stefanović
2008).239 The DOS likewise opposed Kosovo’s independence, including in its election platform
in 2000 “retaining Kosovo in the borders of the Serbian motherland” and after coming to power
reiterated it would “never give up Kosovo.”240 Both the SPS-SRS government and the DOS
supported boycotting the UNMIK-run elections in 2000. The distinction between the political
factions regarding Kosovo, though, was that the DOS accepted the reality that Kosovo could not
return to its 1989-99 status as centrally administered by Belgrade. Hence, the DOS governments
after 2000 were willing to negotiate with UNMIK on Serb participation and negotiate for
enhanced autonomy of the Kosovo Serbs, as compared to Milošević’s government, which
campaigned on a “return to Kosovo” (Stefanovć 2008).241
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The second political contest was within the DOS, between its two largest constituent
parties, the liberal-reformist DS led by Zoran Đinđić, who served as Prime Minister from 200103, and the conservative DSS led by Vojislav Koštunica, who served as FRY President from
2000-03. The DS and DSS differed in their approaches to reforms and international cooperation.
While the DS favored more rapid reforms with the professed aim of EU accession by 2010, the
DSS advocated more gradual reforms to avoid alienating nationalists and its own conservative
base. The relationship between the two party leaders, Đinđić and Koštunica, was strained after
the DOS came to power and they ended cooperation within one another in March 2002 in a
dispute over cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY).242 In March 2002, Koštunica opposed domestic legislation on cooperation with the
ICTY, while Đinđić supported both cooperation with the ICTY and the return of Albanian
political prisoners to Kosovo in exchange for the US unfreezing $120 million in aid to Serbia.243
A central objective of the DOS had, after all, been ending Serbia’s economic collapse and
international isolation. They remained in coalition, though, throughout 2002-03 specifically to
keep the SRS out of power, and in the 2002 elections Đinđić supported Koštunica’s candidacy for
President to oppose SRS candidate Vojislav Šešelj. Similarly in 2004, Koštunica supported DS
leader Boris Tadić’s candidacy against SRS candidate Tomislav Nikolić (Gordy 2003; Stefanović
2008).
The DS under Đinđić generally took a more cooperative position towards Kosovo, in
keeping with Đinđić’s preference for improved relations with European institutions. While this
did not translate directly into concessions on Kosovo, with Đinđić himself acknowledging that
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Serbia could not be expected to sacrifice Kosovo for EU membership, he did support more
constructive participation in talks.244 He had negotiated the formation of the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro, brokered by the EU, to avoid a conflict over Montenegro’s
independence (Tocci 2007). And he believed that a solution to Kosovo would be facilitated by
EU membership, with the EU as a guarantor of any settlement.245 It was Đinđić who first
endorsed Serb participation in UNMIK-run elections in 2001, and Đinđić who supported
exchange of political prisoners in 2002, which Koštunica opposed.

Figure 6.1. Serbian Government Coalitions, 2001-07.

Following Đinđić’s assassination in March 2003 by former-paramilitary police, the DS
lost influence relative to the DSS in parliament (Figure 6.1) and the Serbian Government’s
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position in talks became less cooperative and more resistant to UNMIK’s institution-building
(UNSC January 2004). Beginning in April 2003, the Serbian Government protested power
transfers to the PISGs as opposition to institution-building in Kosovo and cut off relations with
UNMIK while Steiner remained UNSR. Serbia then rejected the “Standards for Kosovo”
document in November 2003 and in December 2003 again suspended talks over UNMIK
transferring administrative authority to the PISGs (UNSC January 2004). In September 2003
UNMIK reported an increased functioning of Serbian-run parallel institutions in Serb enclaves in
Kosovo and threats issued by the Coordination Centre against Kosovo Serbs, such as loss of
social benefits or pensions, to deter participation in UNMIK-run institutions (OSCE October
2003; UNSC January 2004). In February 2004, the month before the riots, the Serbian
Government ordered all Serb education and healthcare employees in Kosovo to reject UNMIK
contracts.246 The DSS had also, shortly before the 2004 riots, officially endorsed ethnic partition
in Kosovo and after the riots proposed the creation of autonomous Serb cantons.247 When
UNMIK rejected the cantonal proposal, the Coordination Centre called for a boycott of the 2004
elections, and Koštunica set the condition of UNMIK accepting partition into cantons for lifting
the boycott.248 The division between the DS and DSS on Kosovo was observable ahead of the
2004 Kosovo elections, when Koštunica, elected Prime Minister in 2003, called for a Serb
boycott, and DS leader Boris Tadić, elected President of Serbia in 2004, and vowing to continue
the European path set by Đinđić, endorsed participation in elections (UNSC November 2004).
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6.2.2

Observed Mechanisms

The first period of UNMIK mediation was characterized by political turmoil within Serbia that
obstructed a consistent policy towards a settlement in Kosovo. During the first 18 months of
UNMIK’s deployment (1999-2000), constructive talks were obstructed by Milošević’s SPS-SRS
government in Belgrade that both opposed UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo and pandered to
nationalist supporters with claims that Serbia would again “return to Kosovo” to “protect Serbs.”
That had, after all, been the same claim Milošević had risen to power on, and the preference that
precluded a negotiated settlement prior to March 1999. While the ousting of Milošević’s
government by the DOS in 2000 meant a government more amenable to negotiations with
UNMIK, a clear policy towards Kosovo was contested within the DOS by its two largest
constituent members, the DS and DSS. The balance between the pro-EU reformist DS and the
conservative DSS from 2001-03 resulted in gradual progress towards Serb integration in
UNMIK-run institutions. However after Zoran Đinđić’s assassination in 2003 and subsequent
political gains for the DSS, Serbian Government policy became less conducive to cooperation in
Kosovo and more focused on opposing UNMIK’s institution-building. Even before Belgrade’s
boycott policy that followed the 2004 riots, the DSS-led government had ended talks twice over
UNMIK’s transfers of power to the PISGs and incentivized Serbs to not participate in UNMIK
institutions or take UNMIK contracts.
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Table 6.4. Observed Mechanisms, 1999-2004.
Mechanism

Observations

Outcome

1.

Facilitation w/ local
regime

Interethnic dialogue within Kosovo
facilitated by UNMIK in the KTC;
participation from the SNV-KiM.

SNV-KiM officials joined DOS,
conveyed policy positions.

3.

Facilitation w/
patron state

Regular dialogue facilitated by UNSR. 4
notable instances: 2001 elections, 2002
elections, 2003 Vienna Talks, 2004
elections.

Participation in 2001 and 2002
elections by Serbs; rejection of 2003
Standards for Kosovo; boycott of 2004
election.

4.

Manipulation w/
patron state:
sanction

Sanctions relief offered by US in exchange
for return of Albanian political prisoners to
Kosovo.

Accepted as part of bill on cooperation
with ICTY.

Three mechanisms, theorized in Chapter 2, were observable during this period, however
with only limited effect on policy. The first mechanism observed in Kosovo was facilitation with
the local regime (#1, Table 6.4). During the first months of UNMIK’s deployment, it faced an
intransigent government in Belgrade and engaged directly with the SNV-KiM, a local Serb
political faction that claimed to be filling the role the Serbian state left after June 1999.249 The
SNV-KiM attended inter-ethnic talks facilitated by UNMIK, and direct talks with UNMIK and
Western diplomats throughout 1999-2000 seeking to solve practical problems for the Serbs
remaining in Kosovo, chief among which was security.250 While the SNV-KiM leaders joined the
DOS and campaigned for it in Kosovo, its preferences for a settlement had limited impact. Its
initial proposal, for a cantonal settlement and an ethnic-Serb “protection corps” were rejected by
UNMIK. And though Belgrade adopted these proposals in its official policies between 2001-04,
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UNMIK continued to reject them, even after Koštunica conditioned election participation on the
creation of cantons.
The second observed mechanism was facilitation with the patron state (#3, Table 6.4).
This was most evident in the UNSR’s direct talks with Belgrade seeking Serb participation in
elections. While this had an effect in 2001 and 2002, this cooperative position was not
institutionalized and dependent upon the preferences of the Serbian Government. The
combination of the DSS’s position in 2003 and the 2004 ethnic riots in Kosovo undermined
Serbian Government support for Serb participation and ahead of 2004 elections it called for a
boycott. The third observed mechanism was manipulation: sanctions (#4, Table 6.4) evident in
March 2002 when the unfreezing of US aid to Serbia was partially conditioned on the transfer of
Albanian prisoners to Kosovo. Easing of economic sanctions and improved foreign relations had
been a core aim of the DOS, and the DS in particular, and this mechanism effectively resulted in
cooperation, albeit a limited one on transfer of prisoners.

6.3

Status Talks & Irreconcilable Positions, 2005-09

The conclusion of Kai Eide’s 2004 evaluation of conditions in Kosovo shifted the focus of talks
to settlement of Kosovo’s status, to be mediated to UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari. As ahead of the
“Standards for Kosovo” talks in 2003, the sides’ positions on status were irreconcilable. Prishtina
would accept nothing short of full independence, and Belgrade would accept only autonomy
within the Republic of Serbia, precluding independence (UNSC November 2006). Each side took
unilateral action during this period to bolster their respective positions. For Belgrade, the new
Serbian constitution, adopted in October 2006, enshrined Kosovo as an autonomous, but integral
part of the Republic of Serbia, constraining its negotiating position and making any future
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settlement that conferred independence unconstitutional to accept. For Prishtina, a Russian veto
in the Security Council in 2007 prevented Ahtisaari’s proposal for “supervised independence”
being accepted, and in February 2008 Prishtina unilaterally declared independence from Serbia
with the Ahtisaari Plan as the basis for its constitution.
UN-led talks resumed in March 2005, a year after they had stalled following the 2004
riots. Technical working groups on issues of missing persons and energy reconvened and met
throughout 2005 (UNSC May 2006; June 2006). Ministerial-level talks on decentralization and
local-governance, Belgrade’s priority areas that converged with the conclusions of Kai Eide’s
report, were then convened in September 2005.251 The sides did agree on a protocol for returns of
displaced persons, but decentralization was obstructed by questions of political status. As Eide’s
report had noted, practical implementation of the “Standards for Kosovo” and administrative
decentralization were undermined by uncertain status (UNSC January 2006).252
After October 2005 the question of final status became the focus of talks following a
decision by the UN Security Council to appoint Martti Ahtisaari as special envoy to conduct a
review of Kosovo’s final status (UNSC January 2006). In February-May 2006, Ahtisaari
convened four rounds of talks in Vienna for the sides to share preferences on what he categorized
as “practical matters,” while simultaneously holding parallel discussions with the Contact Group.
In May-August 2006, talks then focused specifically on decentralization and community rights,
while in parallel leadership-level talks in July 2006 the delegations from Belgrade and Pristhina
shared proposals for final status. Ahtisaari reported no convergence of preferences between the
sides. Belgrade refused to make concessions beyond “substantial autonomy” for Kosovo, in
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which Prishtina would have executive authority over Kosovo, but remain a part of the Republic
of Serbia and the Kosovo Serbs would have autonomy within Kosovo for a minimum 20 years.
Prishtina, though, rejected autonomy as a solution and would accept nothing short of
independence (UNSC June 2006; September 2006).253
Between the conclusion of Ahtisaari’s consultations in Vienna in September 2006 and his
final recommendation to the UN Secretary General, Serbia adopted its new constitution
identifying Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia and precluding independence. Its preamble
stated: “that the Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of Serbia,
that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that from
such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state
bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal
and foreign political relations” (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Preamble). This
enshrined Serbia’s negotiating preference, autonomy within the Republic of Serbia, in domestic
constitutional law, constraining the possible settlements the Serbian Government could agree to
and ratify.254 Ahtisaari believed this was hastily done to pre-date his final proposal, which was
scheduled to be reviewed by the Secretary General in early 2007 (UNSC November 2006).
Ahtisaari’s proposal for Kosovo’s final status was presented at the UN on 2 February
2007, and included 15 articles and 12 annexes, developed during seven months of consultations
with Belgrade, Prishtina, and the Contact Group. Its provisions included:
•

A multi-ethnic democracy in Kosovo;

•

International status with the right to negotiate, conclude agreements, and seek
membership in international organizations;
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•

A list of enhanced rights for ethnic communities;

•

Administrative decentralization in which six new Serb-majority municipalities were to be
created with enhanced authority in education and healthcare, fiscal autonomy, and right
to receive transparent funding from Belgrade;

•

Unified multi-ethnic police and judicial systems;

•

Protection for cultural and religious heritage; and,

•

A multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force.

Implementation would be done during a period of “supervised independence” during which an
International Civilian Representative (ICR) as a representative of the EU would have authority
and an EU mission would assist in rule of law development and oversee the multi-ethnic police
and judiciary in place of UNMIK. The Ahtisaari Plan would then serve as the basis of Kosovo’s
constitution (UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo UNOSEK February 2007; UNSC
March 2007; June 2007; Judah 2008; Weller 2008).
The Serbian Government rejected the Ahtisaari Plan outright in February 2007 and
refused further talks with Ahtisaari whom it declared to be biased. Supervised independence,
even with certain provisions for Serbia to support Kosovo Serbs, conflicted with the preferences
that Belgrade had held since 1998, its specific demands for guarantees against independence
from UNMIK from 2001-04, and most recently its constitution.255 UN Secretary General Ban Kimoon recommended endorsement of the Ahtisaari Plan and supervised independence to the
Security Council, but Security Council endorsement was obstructed by the prospect of Chinese
and Russian vetoes. Consultations with the Contact Group on the Ahtisaari Plan in fall 2007
failed to change either side’s preferences. Unable to restart talks and facing a Russian veto, the

255

Associated Press (2 February 2007); RTS Radio Belgrade [in Serbian] (3 March 3007); B92 (30 March 2007).

200
proposed Security Council resolution endorsing supervised independence was withdrawn in
December 2007 (UNSC September 2007; January 2008).
Failure of the Security Council to endorse the Ahtisaari Plan in 2007 led to Kosovo's
unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008 with the Ahtisaari Plan
unilaterally adopted as the basis for its constitution (Judah 2008). Independence was rejected by
Serbia as an illegal act of secession and civil unrest in Serbia targeted Western embassies and
Muslim communities.256 Importantly, though, UNMIK and UNSR did not veto independence,
taken in the Kosovo Assembly, which until that point was an UNMIK-run PISG over which the
UNSR had veto power. Unilateral implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan meant UNMIK was
drastically scaled back, officially deployed but without executive authority, and replaced by the
International Civilian Office (ICO), headed by the dual-appointed ICR/EU Special
Representative Peter Feith to “supervise” independence. Additionally the EU Rule of Law
Mission (EULEX) was deployed in-line with the Ahtisaari Plan, with executive authority in rule
of law matters and a mandate to develop a multi-ethnic police service and judiciary (UNSC June
2008; Radin 2014; Jackson 2020).
Belgrade rejected all aspects of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence,
including unilateral adoption of the Ahtisaari Plan and petitioned the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) to review the legality of Kosovo’s independence under international law. This
included Serbian opposition to the authority of the ICO and EULEX, with both institutions
regarded as tacit recognition of independence by the EU. Belgrade’s official position was to only
recognize the authority of UNMIK under UNSCR 1244 in Kosovo. Accordingly, the deployment
and functioning of EULEX was hampered throughout 2008 as an institution supporting Kosovo’s
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independence in Belgrade’s view. Though Belgrade had been pushing for decentralization since
2002, it rejected Prishtina’s proposal for the creation of nine Serb-majority municipalities in
Kosovo specifically for their institutional basis in the Ahtisaari Plan.257

Table 6.5. Timeline of Negotiations, 2005-09.
Year

Mediator

Mar.
2005

UNMIK

Talks resume with working groups on
technical matters

Working groups on missing persons and
energy meet

Sept.
2005

UNMIK

Ministerial-level talks: decentralization,
local governance

Agreement on returns protocol; no
agreement on decentralization

Nov.
2005

UNSC

UN Security Council authorizes final
status review

Martti Ahtisaari appointed envoy for status
review

Feb.
2006

UN: Martti
Ahtisaari

Talks on technical issues
convened Feb.-May

May
2006

UN: Martti
Ahtisaari

Talks on decentralization convened
May-Aug.

No agreement, Serbia wants 16 Serb
municipalities, 5 proposed

July
2006

UN: Martti
Ahtisaari

Leadership-level talks: sides present
positions on final status

No agreement: Serbia proposed autonomy,
Kosovo proposes independence

Feb.
2007

UN

Proposal for supervised independence
sent to UN Secretary General

Kosovo accepts, Serbia rejects, UNSC
divided

Aug.
2007

Contact Group

EU, Russia, US conduct 120 day
consultations with Serbia and Kosovo

Unable to endorse Ahtisaari Plan: Russian
opposition

Kosovo unilateral declaration of
independence

Serbia rejects

Feb.
2008

Outcome

Sept.
2008

EU

Negotiations with Serbia for
deployment of EULEX

Serbia accepts on condition EULEX not
implement Ahtisaari Plan

Oct.
2008

ICJ

Serbia petitions ICJ to review legality of
Kosovo UDI

ICJ advisory opinion: UDI not in
contravention of international law, July
2010
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6.3.1

Serbian Preferences

During the period from 2005-09, Belgrade simultaneously pursued policies seeking an autonomy
solution for Kosovo and a blanket boycott of UNMIK-run institutions in Kosovo following the
2004 riots. The preference for Kosovo’s autonomy took into account the reality that Kosovo
would not return to its pre-1999 status, accepted by the DOS after 2000, and instead more closely
resembled its 1974-89 status within Serbia. This was in contrast to the position taken by the SRS,
which had won the largest share of seats in the Serbian government in 2003 and 2007 and was
kept out of government only by a DSS-DS coalition. The SRS had proclaimed Kosovo to be a
“foreign occupied territory” in Serbia, and drew significant support in elections from nationalists
in southern Serbia and Kosovo with calls for the security forces to return to Kosovo (Stefanović
2008).258 The DSS-led government (2003-07) was labeled by the UNSR as “opposing
meaningful engagement” due its intransigent position in talks on decentralization and its boycott
policy towards the PISGs (UNSC January 2006).
The boycott policy was enforced by a combination of strengthening parallel institutions
of governance, public services, and security in Kosovo, funded by Belgrade, and by the threat of
sanctions against Serbs in Kosovo who participated in PISGs. In addition to funds from line
ministries which continued to pay Kosovo Serb salaries for those employed in state institutions
or who had lost their jobs after 1999, the Serbian state employment service provided grants and
microloans to Serb groups in Kosovo (UNSC February 2005). An estimated ~28,000 Kosovo
Serbs received regular salaries or unemployment compensation from Belgrade during this
period.259 In December 2005, Belgrade instituted a policy by which Serbs in Kosovo could not
simultaneously hold positions with the Serbian government and UNMIK, and employment with

258
259

B92 (31 July 2006).
B92 (21 September 2005); Glas Javnosti [in Serbian] (10 February 2009); Danas [in Serbian] (10 April 2009).

203
UNMIK would result in loss of accrued social benefits and pensions from Serbia - a
formalization of policy in 2003-04 to discourage Serbs from taking UNMIK contracts.260 This
policy resulted in 70 percent of Serb UNMIK employees (~3250) quitting their UNMIK posts in
2006 (UNSC June 2006; September 2006; November 2006). Ahead of Kosovo’s 2009 elections,
Belgrade explicitly threatened to terminate the contracts and welfare benefits of any Serbs who
voted and called on private employers to do the same.261
The effect of these policies was ultimately to strip the Kosovo Serbs of input in talks,
especially on matters of decentralization. This was notable in the failed decentralization talks in
2005 in which Kosovo Serb representatives agreed with UNMIK to participate in working
groups, but were ordered to discontinue in August 2005 to end discussions on two proposed
“pilot projects” that Belgrade opposed.262 Belgrade had proposed the formation of 16
autonomous Serb municipalities in response to the five proposed by Prishtina. It was moderate
Kosovo Serb leader Oliver Ivanović who proposed a compromise solution of nine Serb
municipalities in addition to the creation of North Mitrovica town as an administrative division,
in a meeting with Martti Ahtisaari. This would become the model of decentralization
implemented under the Ahtisaari Plan in Kosovo in 2009-10. However, Ivanović was
reprimanded by Belgrade for subverting the Serbian Government’s authority in talks.263
The dispute between the DSS and DS in the Serbian Government continued to be evident
in policy on Kosovo during this period. Despite the falling out between Koštunica and Zoran
Đinđić in 2002 and the end of the DOS in 2003, the DSS and DS remained in coalition together
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after the 2003 and 2007 elections specifically to keep the SRS out of power, albeit in a weak
coalition reliant on confidence supply after 2007. While neither party supported concessions on
Kosovo’s independence or on ending the boycott policy, their positions were distinguished by
their relations to the EU.264 Koštunica believed that EU membership would lead to Serbia having
to give up Kosovo (Subotić 2010) and advocated a “no recognition” policy ahead of the
Ahtisaari Plan in 2007, whereby the Serbian Government would not recognize the authority of
institutions within Kosovo, and also end diplomatic relations with any state recognizing
Kosovo’s independence. Conversely, Tadić and the DS advocated a “Kosovo AND the EU”
policy, and believed that EU membership was Serbia’s best opportunity to retain Kosovo by
eliminating questions of borders and precluding future secession.265
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and adoption of the Ahtisaari Plan in
February 2008 brought the DSS and DS into direct conflict due to their orientations towards the
EU, collapsing the Serbian Government in March 2008. The Ahtisaari Plan required the
deployment of two EU institutions in Kosovo, the ICO/ICR and EULEX, to supervise
independence. By Serbian reckoning this supported Kosovo’s independence, and in accordance
with Koštunica’s preferences necessitated ending diplomatic relations with the EU and those
member states recognizing Kosovo. The collapse of the DSS-DS government in 2008 was not
directly brought about by Kosovo’s declaration of independence, but by Tadić’s signing the
Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. Koštunica and the DSS opposed this
and accused the DS of “treason” and “selling Kosovo for EU membership” and ended
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cooperation with it, collapsing the coalition government.266 Koštunica’s successor as DSS leader,
Sanda Rašković-Ivić later stated that the EU’s position on Kosovo in 2008 shifted the DSS’s
Western-oriented centrist position to a staunchly anti-EU party (Subotić 2010; Antonić 2012).267

Figure 6.2. Serbian Government Coalitions, 2008-12.

The DS, which had made considerable electoral gains in 2007 to lead the coalition with
the DSS, won snap elections in 2008 and formed another weak coalition government dependent
on confidence supplied by four minor parties (Figure 6.2). The DSS joined the SRS-led
opposition bloc and during talks in September-October 2008 attempted to block Tadić reaching
an agreement with the EU on EULEX. It submitted a joint petition with the SRS to the Serbian
Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of the SAA and EULEX’s deployment, which was
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based on the Ahtisaari Plan.268 Tadić, however, negotiated EULEX’s deployment on the
conditions that it be supported by a UN Security Council Resolution, be status neutral, and not
implement the Ahtisaari Plan, which whether or not those could be realized in practice, headed
off the DSS-SRS petition that he was recognizing Kosovo’s independence in contravention of the
constitution and allowed the DS to claim it was not recognizing the Ahtisaari Plan.
While there was little change in Belgrade’s policies towards Kosovo under the DS-led
government from 2008-09, namely the boycott policy was continued, it was less capable of
enforcing policies within Kosovo. From 2005-08 the primary interlocutors for the Serbian
Government with Serbs in Kosovo were DSS functionaries - Sanda Rašković-Ivić as head of the
Coordination Centre from 2005-07, and Slobodan Samardžić as Minister for Kosovo and
Metohija from 2007-08. DSS supporters in Kosovo opposed the DS and had burned photos of
Tadić ahead of the 2008 elections, accusing him of treason.269 Though the DS appointed Kosovo
Serb leaders Goran Bogdanović and Oliver Ivanović to head the Ministry for Kosovo and
Metohija, they had poor existing relationships with Serb leaders in northern Kosovo (Chapter
7).270 Following decentralization by Prishtina in 2009, a number of moderate Kosovo Serb
parties, namely the Independent Liberal Party (SLS) ran in Kosovo’s 2009-10 elections and
began participation in Kosovo’s central and municipal governments (Jackson 2021a). It was in
direct response to high Serb turnout in the 2009 Kosovo elections that Oliver Ivanović declared
that it was necessary for Serbia to review and reform its existing policy towards Kosovo.271
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6.3.2

Observed Mechanisms

The period from 2005-09 was dominated by discussions of Kosovo’s final status following Kai
Eide’s evaluation of conditions in Kosovo that followed the March 2004 riots. The Serbian
Government’s position during this period was characterized by a dual policy of opposing
Kosovo’s independence in favor of autonomy and boycotting Serb participation in UNMIK-run
institutions in Kosovo, thereby denying its internal sovereignty. Belgrade’s proposal of
autonomy for Kosovo within the Republic of Serbia was irreconcilable with Prishtina’s demand
for independence. Irreconcilable positions on status resulted in neither side willing to make
concessions and both taking unilateral actions in pursuit of their preferences, most notably
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008. A secondary outcome of this
was Prishtina’s unilateral adoption of the Ahtisaari Plan, which Serbia had rejected outright in
2007. While this was to serve as the basis of Kosovo’s constitution, it also meant that Prishtina
would unilaterally pursue administrative decentralization and minority rights, topics of talks
since 2003, on which Serbia had opposed concessions.

Table 6.6. Observed Mechanisms, 2005-09.
Mechanism

Observations

Outcome

1.

Facilitation w/
local regime

Talks with moderate Serb leaders in
2005-06 on issues of decentralization.

Rejected by Belgrade as undermining
authority.

2.

Manipulation w/
local regime

Benefits of decentralization: funds,
posts, public works available after
2009.

Moderate Serb parties participated in
Kosovo’s 2009 elections; signaled need for
new policy to Belgrade.

3.

Facilitation w/
patron state

UN-led mediation in 2005 and
Ahtisaari-led talks in 2006-07.

No change of position.

Three mechanisms theorized in Chapter 2 were observable during this period (2005-09),
but with only limited impact on Belgrade’s preferences and policies. The first was facilitation
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with the local regime (#1, Table 6.6), whereby UNMIK and later Martti Ahtisaari engaged
directly with moderate Serb leaders in Kosovo on the issue of decentralization. This was most
notable in July-August 2006 when Ahtisaari held consultations with Oliver Ivanović during
which Ivanović proposed the creation of nine Serb-majority municipalities and North Mitrovica
town as a new administrative unit, which would ultimately be included in the Ahtisaari Plan and
pursued by Prishtina in policy in 2009-10. This, however, did not impact Belgrade’s position,
which favored 16 Serb municipalities and Ivanović was reprimanded by Belgrade and the
Coordination Centre for undermining talks.
The second observed mechanism, which would have impact on policy in the years to
follow, was manipulation with the local regime (#2, Table 6.6). Administrative decentralization,
pursued unilaterally by Prishtina in-line with the Ahtisaari Plan in 2009-10, created 10 Serbmajority municipalities in Kosovo, which were distinct electoral districts Serbs were able win in
local elections rather than through minority appointments to larger municipal governments.
Decentralization and the creation of new municipalities in Gračanica/Graçanicë, Klokot/Kllokot,
Novo Brdo/Novobërda, Parteš/Partesh, and Ranilug/Ranillug, in addition to the existing Serbmajority municipality in Štrpce/Shtërpca, and the three northern municipalities of
Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan/Zveçan, meant that Serbs elected in Kosovo’s
elections would gain control of municipal administrations, and have access to funds, public
works, and municipal civil service posts available from Prishtina. While Serbs in northern
Kosovo continued to boycott the 2009-10 elections, Serbs in the other enclaves turned out to vote
in large numbers, openly defying Belgrade’s boycott, and elected local Serb-run administrations,
despite being only a year after Kosovo’s declaration of independence (Jackson, 2021a). These
moderate Serb groups in Kosovo accepted participation in mutual institutions in-keeping with the
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Ahtisaari Plan. While Belgrade opposed this participation in elections and attempted to
delegitimize those who were elected, it also recognized the insufficiency of current policies
towards Kosovo and a need to reform them.
Lastly, the third mechanism observed during this period was facilitation with the patron
state (#3, Table 6.6). This was most evident during the Ahtisaari-led talks in 2006-07, during
which Martti Ahtisaari brought the sides’ interlocutors and political leaders together for
consultations on specific aspects of a settlement, which he then used to formulate his final
proposal - the Ahtisaari Plan. This failed to alter Belgrade’s preferences or policies towards
Kosovo. Belgrade refused to compromise on the issue of decentralization, notably rejecting
Oliver Ivanović’s compromise proposal in 2006. Belgrade refused to consider any solution
beyond autonomy, which it institutionalized in the new constitution in October 2006. Belgrade
then rejected the Ahtisaari Plan on its delivery in February 2007 as unconstitutional and refused
further consultations, confident that Russia would veto supervised independence in the Security
Council. In sum, aside from recognizing the insufficiency of its status quo policies after
Kosovo’s 2009 elections, Belgrade’s preferences did not change during this period. Its dual
policies of autonomy for Kosovo and boycotting institutions remained intact despite changes in
the balance of power between the DS and DSS after 2006, including the latter’s ousting.

6.4

The EU-Facilitated Dialogue, 2010-13

Talks between Belgrade and Prishtina resumed in 2011, mediated by the EU External Action
Service. The Serbian Government had declined to return to talks after 2008, until its petition to
the ICJ seeking an opinion on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence under
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international law was concluded.272 After the ICJ issued an advisory opinion that Kosovo's
declaration of independence did not violate international law in July 2010, Serbia submitted a
resolution jointly with the EU to the UN Security Council supporting a new mediated dialogue
with Prishtina. The Security Council subsequently granted the EU authority to mediate a
dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina (Jackson 2020). Belgrade favored the EU as a mediator
and believed it to be neutral due to five EU member states not recognizing Kosovo’s
independence.273 Importantly, though, for the pro-EU DS-G17 Plus-led Serbian Government,
which had applied for EU membership in December 2009, initiation of a mediated dialogue with
Prishtina was appended to Serbia’s accession.274
The dialogue with Prishtina was initiated under EU mediation on 8 March 2011,
following a delay due to a government collapse in Prishtina (Jackson 2020). The first phase,
labeled “technical dialogue,” aimed at finding cooperation in specific areas to improve living
conditions in Kosovo including telecommunications, public records, travel, and missing persons,
while avoiding issues of status and political institutions. EU mediator Robert Cooper outlined in
his “Principles for Technical Dialogue,” that talks would be structured according to both sides’
EU integration in accordance with the EU Acquis Communautaire; without prejudice of final
status; technical areas agreed upon in full (“nothing agreed until everything is agreed”); the EU
mediator would have responsibility to set the agenda of talks; and, a common approach to
briefing media would be followed by all parties.275 The principles and structure of talks were
aimed at avoiding past obstacles to dialogue under UN mediation, in which technical aspects had
Interview with Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, Večernje Novosti [in Serbian] (20 December 2009).
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been undermined by questions of final status. Cooper strictly adhered to these principles
throughout 2011. For example, when violent unrest broke out in northern Kosovo in 2011, he
forbade talks over the status of northern Kosovo as it was not on the agenda, and he believed it
would inevitably lead to the question of Kosovo’s final status. Instead, parallel talks were
pursued under the initiative of Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, which ultimately led to a
technical agreement on integrated border/boundary management within the technical
dialogue.276
The “Technical Dialogue” demonstrated initial success with the sides reaching
agreements by the second round of talks. An agreement on travel across the Kosovo-Serbia
border/boundary was reached in July 2011, but simultaneous talks on public records and
education credentials stalled over disputed authenticity. Belgrade believed that falsified property
records would be used to strip Serbs of property in Kosovo and accepting education credentials
from the University of Prishtina would be tantamount to recognition of independence.277
Following a postponement in September-October 2011 due to the unrest in northern Kosovo,
agreement was reached on sharing civil registries and education records in which the EU would
act as an intermediary for evaluation.278 The final technical issue to be negotiated in 2012 was
Kosovo’s representation in regional organizations, a problematic area permeated by questions of
status. Belgrade opposed Kosovar officials claiming to represent a sovereign state in
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international forums. This was resolved in the so-called “footnote agreement” in February 2012
by which Kosovo could be represented in regional organizations, but not the UN, and sign
agreements on its own accord, a provision of the Ahtisaari Plan, with a footnote attached to its
name defining its status under UNSCR 1244. By the conclusion of the ninth round of technical
talks in March 2012, agreements had been reached, though not fully implemented, on name
usage, regional representation, civil registries, freedom of movement, education credentials,
cadastral records, customs stamps, and border/boundary management.279
The remaining problematic area, which the EU identified in 2011 prior to the start of the
technical dialogue, was the influence of Serbian parallel institutions in Kosovo and the
distribution of official Serbian documents to Kosovo Serbs. Since 1999 the Serbian Government
had maintained certain administrative and security institutions in Kosovo Serb areas, in
contravention of UNSCR 1244 and the Kumanovo Agreement. While certain public services,
such as healthcare, education, and the post were tolerated as providing basic services to Kosovo
Serbs, other functions such as parallel policing and civil protection, parallel courts, and parallel
administrative institutions including public records maintained by the Serbian MUP were
regarded as contributing to instability, especially in northern Kosovo. The EU, and Germany in
particular whose embassy had been attacked in 2008 and whose KFOR peacekeepers were
attacked in 2011, demanded that Serbia dismantle these parallel administrative institutions in
Kosovo.280 Serbia, though, claimed the issue of parallel institutions and the status of northern

Under the agreement on Kosovo’s name and usage in regional representation, the footnote would read: “This
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Kosovo could not be addressed via technical talks and would require a leadership-level political
dialogue.281
Initiation of political dialogue was delayed until 2013 following general elections in
Serbia in 2012 that saw the DS ousted from government and replaced by a more conservative
coalition of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the SPS. The political dialogue, mediated by
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton convened talks between the sides’ political leaders
with the intention of, above all else, finding a solution to Serb-dominated northern Kosovo that
had been a flashpoint of unrest since 1999.282 Belgrade’s initial proposal for northern Kosovo,
drafted in 2012, approximated previous proposals submitted during UN-led mediation: dual
autonomy in which Kosovo would be autonomous within Serbia and northern Kosovo
autonomous within Kosovo. This was rejected by both Prishtina and the EU.283 A second draft
proposal from Belgrade, also rejected by Prishtina, proposed the division of Kosovo into six
regions with the northern region having its own autonomous institutions run by Belgrade.284
When the “Political Dialogue” commenced in February 2013, Belgrade’s primary
preference was for the Kosovo Serbs to retain “enhanced autonomy” within Kosovo, but the
question of parallel institutions remained. In-line with its prior proposal on regions, accepted in
the National Assembly as the official government position on Kosovo in January 2013, Belgrade
proposed that the parallel institutions remain in place and Prishtina recognize them as
autonomous. After this was rejected, in March 2013 Belgrade agreed that Serbia would
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dismantle parallel institutions in exchange for enhanced Serb autonomy.285 Belgrade then
rejected proposals in March and April 2013 that it believed conferred insufficient autonomy,
especially in matters of local governance, policing, and spatial planning.286 Then on 19 April
2013, the sides agreed to the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of
Relations, the “Brussels Agreement,” provisions of which included:
•

The creation of an Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, with
membership open to any municipality if members are in agreement;

•

Dissolution of the Association/Community can only be done through decision by
participating members;

•

Structures of the Association/Community will be on the same basis as existing Kosovo
municipalities (president, vice president, assembly, council);

•

Municipalities will be entitled to exercise powers collectively and will have full overview
of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning, with additional
competences delegated by central authorities;

•

One police force in Kosovo, and all police in northern Kosovo will be integrated into the
single chain of command with salaries paid only by the Kosovo Police Service;

•

Members of Serbian structures will be offered positions in equivalent Kosovo structures;

•

There shall be a Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb-majority
municipalities, appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs from a list of nominees
provided by the four mayors of these municipalities on behalf of the
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Association/Community, and composition of the Kosovo Police in these municipalities
will reflect their ethnic demography;
•

Judicial authorities will be integrated and operate solely within the Kosovo legal
framework; and,

•

Municipal elections organized in the northern municipalities in 2013 in accordance with
Kosovo law and facilitated by the OSCE.

Further points provided for the Brussels Agreement’s implementation in practice, including
EULEX oversight of integration of Serb police and judicial personnel.287 And, for both sides the
Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities (ZSO) was to be structured in
accordance with regulations on local self-governance within the EU Acquis. Essentially, the
Brussels Agreement ended the parallel governance of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo
and committed the Kosovo Serbs to a single institutional organization in Kosovo, albeit a
decentralized one - accordingly accepting the reality of the post-conflict state organization (see
Call 2008; Ishiyama & Widmeier 2013). Implementation, however, was more problematic. In the
short-term, many Kosovo Serb groups had spent the prior 14 years opposing the authority of
Kosovo’s institutions with Belgrade’s support. In the longer-term, implementation would be
plagued by Prishtina’s resistance to formation of the ZSO and Belgrade’s reluctance to end
parallel structures of healthcare and education.
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Table 6.7. Timeline of Negotiations, 2010-13.
Year

Mediator

July
2010

ICJ

Advisory opinion on legality of Kosovo’s UDI under
international law

Sept.
2010

UN/EU

UN confers authority to mediate between Prishtina and
Belgrade to EU

Mar.
2011

EEAS:
Robert
Cooper

Technical dialogue begins on issues of regional
representation, civil registries, freedom of movement,
education credentials, cadastral records, and customs
stamps

9 rounds of talks:
agreements in all areas
by Feb. 2012

Nov.
2011

Sweden: Carl
Bildt

Parallel dialogue on boundary management and unrest in
north

Both sides agree to IBM

Dec.
2011

EU

European Council Berlin Summit

Serbia denied EU
candidacy status

Feb.
2012

EEAS:
Robert
Cooper

Negotiations on Kosovo’s name and use/representation in
regional organizations

“Footnote Agreement”

March
2013

EEAS:
Catherine
Ashton

Leadership-level political dialogue begins

Brussels Agrement in
April 2013

April
2013

EEAS:
Catherine
Ashton

First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation
of Relations - “Brussels Agreement”

Accepted by both sides

Sept.
2013

EU

EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Agreement

SAA ratified, enters
into force

Jan.
2014

EU

EU-Serbia Intergovernmental Conference

Official start of
accession negotiations

6.4.1

Outcome
Ruled not illegal by 104 decision

Serbian Preferences

Serbia’s preferences and policies on Kosovo changed markedly during this period of EU-led
mediation following the ICJ’s opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence. While this did
not include recognition of Kosovo’s independence (external sovereignty), it did begin to
acknowledge Kosovo as a separate political entity from Serbia’s institutional structure and did
accept certain aspects of the Ahtisaari Plan. This was evident first in “technical agreements”
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reached on customs, records, and Kosovo’s regional representation in 2011-12 - all points which
had been disputed over links to status in previous talks. The more notable outcome was in the
2013 Brussels Agreement by which the Serbian Government ended its boycott policy, standing
since 2004, and agreed to Kosovo Serb participation in Kosovo’s institutions, including the 2013
elections (internal sovereignty). These changes to policy were facilitated by a combination of
linking Serbia’s EU membership prospect to dialogue with Prishtina, and importantly,
consecutive Serbian Governments led by nominally pro-EU parties that had campaigned on a
platform of “Kosovo AND the EU.” This contrasted with the position taken by the DSS which
viewed EU membership as coming at the cost of Kosovo, ultimately transforming it into an antiEU party.
The decision to initiate EU-led dialogue after the ICJ’s advisory opinion in 2010 was
taken by the DS-led government in the interest of EU membership, applied for in 2009. The DS
had identified the goal of EU membership by the end of 2010 early in its tenure in government
and it had been DS President Boris Tadić’s signing of the SAA with the EU in 2008 that ended
its alliance with the DSS. After agreeing to restart talks in 2010, the European Parliament
amended the SAA with Serbia, yet to be ratified, to explicitly link Serbia’s membership progress
to the initiation and progress of a mediated dialogue with Prishtina.288 This was complicated by
Serbia’s rejection of the Ahtisaari Plan in 2007-08 which meant it did not recognize the authority
of either independent Kosovo’s institutions or the ICO, an office held by an EU representative.289
The DS-led government was stuck in an uncertain position on Kosovo, by which it opposed
recognition of Kosovo’s institutions and sought to curb future recognition, but was required to
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engage in direct dialogue with those institutions and make concessions in order to progress
Serbia’s application for EU membership.290 And this included demands from the EU and
Germany issued in 2010, ahead of elections in Kosovo, that Serbia end its boycott policy and
dismantle its parallel institutions on the territory of Kosovo.291
The EU’s demands in 2010 failed to end Belgrade’s boycott policy, but in 2011-12 the
issue of membership was used to keep Serbia at the negotiating table and leverage specific
concessions in technical talks, despite domestic opposition chiefly from the DSS. When talks
stalled in September-October 2011 due to unrest in northern Kosovo, the EU warned Belgrade
that its membership was in jeopardy and persuaded its delegation to return to talks in
November.292 In December 2011, the EU rejected Serbia’s candidacy specifically over the issue
of unrest in Kosovo and failure to implement the agreement on border/boundary management.293
This triggered a split within the DS between factions that believed Kosovo was a lost cause,
undermining Serbia’s EU membership and a more hawkish faction led by Foreign Minister Vuk
Jeremić that believed the EU was requiring Serbia to relinquish Kosovo.294 When the Technical
Dialogue was concluded in March 2012, the EU accepted Serbia’s membership application and
granted candidate status.295 Serbian negotiator, and DS deputy, Borko Stefanović stated that
conclusion of the technical dialogue meant the DS had passed the “Kosovo test” with the EU. It
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had been granted EU candidacy without crossing any red lines, namely avoiding recognition of
Kosovo’s independence as enshrined in the 2006 constitution.296
Stefanović’s position was not universally held, even within the DS which suffered from
an internal dispute over Kosovo after EU candidacy was withheld in December 2011 that
ultimately contributed to its ousting in the 2012 elections. Other parties, namely the SRS and
DSS, opposed concessions during technical talks, especially on border/boundary management
and regional representation as de facto recognition of Kosovo’s independence and the terms of
the Ahtisaari Plan.297 The DSS and SRS opposed EU membership, and EU-led talks as
undermining Serbian sovereignty. SRS members openly threatened Stefanović and Tadić over
talks. The DSS threatened to file treason charges against Stefanović over the first round technical
agreements in 2011, then in 2012-13 filed petitions against the government in Serbia’s Supreme
Court, seeking to overturn agreements, including the Brussels Agreement.298
The SNS, which came to power with the SPS in elections in May 2012, had backed the
DS in the Technical Dialogue in 2011 on the condition that it did not recognize Kosovo.
However, it became critical of the DS after the EU withheld candidacy in December 2011 and
opposed subsequent concessions on border/boundary management and regional recognition as
tacit acceptance of the Ahtisaari Plan to appease the EU. Like the DS, the SNS campaigned in
2012 on a platform of “the EU and Kosovo.” Its officials, though, came from an originally antiEU position, having split from the SRS in 2008 after a dispute with its hardline wing.299 Both it
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and the SPS, which had likewise previously been eurosceptic, opposed dismantling parallel
institutions in Kosovo.300
After the 2012 elections there was both hope from nationalist factions in Serbia and
concern in Brussels that the SNS-led government would renege on the technical agreements. SPS
Prime Minister Ivica Dačić had been especially critical of the DS and the Technical Dialogue,
but conceded that the new government could not simply ignore them or renege on them.301
Similarly, SNS leaders Aleksandar Vučić and Tomislav Nikolić publicly assured the EU that they
would not renege on previous agreements after the EU warned that ignoring the agreements
reached in the Technical Dialogue would be detrimental to EU membership prospects and “only
increase international isolation for Serbia.”302 The EU subsequently praised the willingness of
the SNS-led government to implement agreements and agree to political talks in early 2013,
stating that it engaged more productively in talks in six months than the DS had in four years,
while nationalists condemned the SNS.303
Political talks in March-April 2013 were complicated by differing preferences held by
Ivica Dačić, Aleksandar Vučić, and Tomislav Nikolić. While Dačić had agreed to dismantle
parallel institutions in exchange for autonomy in March 2013, both he and Nikolić, who had
drafted the dual autonomy proposal, rejected the degree of autonomy proposed in Brussels as
insufficient, seeking a Republika Srpska-like arrangement for northern Kosovo.304 Vučić, on the
other hand, viewed a political agreement as paramount to starting Serbia’s EU membership talks,
and his inclusion in the negotiating delegation, despite his role as Deputy Prime Minister, was
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regarded as a pragmatic decision to keep talks on track.305 In early April, following the impasse
on Kosovo Serb autonomy, the EU issued an ultimatum that Serbia accept the proposal
formulated by its mediator by 24 April 2013 to keep its path to accession negotiations open.306
Facing opposition from Dačić, Vučić threatened to collapse the government and call snap
elections, in which he believed the SNS would increase its margins and oust the SPS, and in turn
Dačić as Prime Minister.307 Under pressure from the EU and crucially Vučić, Dačić accepted the
proposed Brussels Agreement on 19 April 2013, which the EU welcomed as opening Serbia’s
path to membership.308 The EU subsequently ratified Serbia’s SAA in September 2013 and
began accession talks in January 2014.
The problem for the SNS-led government following the Brussels Agreement was then
implementation and notable opposition from Serb leaders in Kosovo. Following the stalled
Technical Dialogue and withholding of candidacy in 2011, Catherine Ashton had explicitly
conveyed to Belgrade that agreement in principle was not sufficient, and it was Belgrade’s
responsibility to “exert maximum pressure on those in Kosovo preventing agreements from
being implemented.”309 The same Kosovo Serb leaders who had opposed the Technical
Dialogue, similarly opposed the Brussels Agreement and organized protests against it, drawing
10,000 people in northern Kosovo.310 On the one hand dismantling parallel bureaucracy in
Kosovo, per the Brussels Agreement, such as demobilizing 800 MUP personnel, could be done
by government orders from Belgrade (Jackson 2021b).311 In most cases, parallel bureaucrats
were offered increased pensions from the Serbian system, paid immediately, in exchange for
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accepting positions in Kosovo’s system.312 On the other hand, securing participation in the 2013
Kosovo elections required both marginalizing the existing power-holders, especially in northern
Kosovo, and supporting an electoral list. Belgrade first appointed interim administrators for
northern Kosovo, all of whom were members of parties in Serbia’s governing coalition - two
from the SNS, one from the SPS, and one from New Serbia (NS). It then organized and supported
a single electoral list, the Serb List (SL) to run in 2013. It was only after this participation in the
2013 elections that the EU opened Serbia’s membership talks.

6.4.2

Observed Mechanisms

The period of EU-facilitated mediation between Belgrade and Prishtina demonstrated profound
shifts in the Serbian Government’s position towards Kosovo. In prior periods since 2000, even
purported pro-Western liberal parties had taken intransigent positions towards Kosovo, evident
in facilitated mediation between 2003-07 and Belgrade’s boycott policy that escalated after 2004
to undermine UNMIK’s institution-building in Kosovo and thereby Kosovo’s internal
sovereignty. However, during EU mediation after 2010, consecutive Serbian Governments made
concessions on contentious issues, culminating in the 2011-12 technical agreements and the
landmark 2013 Brussels Agreement, which amongst other things recognized Kosovo’s ability to
independently enter into international agreements, conferring “legal personality,” and ended the
boycott policy, explicitly endorsing Serbs participation in Kosovo’s institutions.
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Table 6.8. Observed Mechanisms, 2010-13.

6.

Mechanism

Observations

Outcome

Manipulation w/
patron state:
reward structure

EU linking initiation and progress
of a dialogue between Belgrade
and Prishtina to Serbia’s EU
membership application.

Technical agreements and Brussel Agreement
reached using leverage of membership bid: used
in 2011-13 to leverage concessions on
border/boundary, regional representation,
autonomy.

The most evident mechanism observed during this period was manipulation with the
patron state: reward structure (#6, Table 6.8), whereby Serbia’s application for EU membership
was directly linked to initiating and making progress in a mediated dialogue with Prishtina. The
European Parliament appended this Serbia’s unratified SAA, agreed with Boris Tadić in 2008.
This was subsequently used by the EU to bring Belgrade back into talks and leverage
concessions in contentious areas. In November 2011, the EU used the threat of blocking Serbia’s
membership to restart talks after unrest in northern Kosovo. In December 2011, the EU withheld
candidacy from Serbia specifically for its failure to implement the agreement on border/boundary
management. It was only after completion of the Technical Dialogue that the EU granted Serbia
candidacy in 2012. After the election of the SNS in 2012, the EU used the threat of blocking
membership and “isolation” to commit the new government to talks. During the Political
Dialogue in April 2013, the EU issued an ultimatum to Belgrade that its membership
negotiations would be blocked if it did not accept the Brussels Agreement. And its membership
negotiations were only begun after Serb participation in the 2013 elections (UNSC April 2014).
For the potential benefits of EU candidacy and future membership to leverage concessions on
contentious issues, it was important that key veto players not only support EU accession, but
regard the benefits of EU accession as outweighing the costs of nationalist backlash. The DSS,
for example, had held a pro-EU position prior to 2008, however its perception that membership
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was linked to relinquishing Kosovo shifted it to an anti-EU position and triggered its split with
the DS as a partner. When the DS made concessions on Kosovo in the Technical Dialogue, but
failed to attain EU candidacy, it suffered an internal split, which damaged its position with
potential coalition partners during the 2012 elections. Conversely, when the SNS-SPS
government was reluctant to make concessions during the Political Dialogue, Vučić used the
threat of toppling the government, and ousting the SPS’s Dačić to minimize opposition.
Accordingly, intra-coalition politics relative to EU accession were an important factor in Serbian
concessions during the Technical and Political Dialogues.

6.5

Post-Brussels Agreement, 2015-21

The period following the Brussels Agreement passed through three phases of negotiation. In the
four years after 2013 which ostensibly ended Serbian parallel governance in Kosovo and
endorsed Serb participation in Kosovo’s institution, EU mediation focused primarily on further
agreements for implementation of the Brussels Agreement. This was followed by a stalling of
talks over issues of implementation and declining relations between Belgrade and Prishtina,
during which both sides’ interlocutors began discussions of potential territorial exchanges. This
was then followed by a resumption of talks on areas of economic cooperation under US
leadership in 2019-20 before a renewed EU effort to restart political dialogue in 2020-21. Within
Serbia, this period was characterized by the autocratic consolidation of power by the SNS, which
retained control of both the government and presidency after 2014. Its Kosovo policies were
non-explicit and janus-faced to appease both the EU through maintaining participation in
Kosovo’s institutions and talks, and nationalist constituents through opposition to Kosovo’s
sovereignty.
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EU-mediated dialogue resumed in February 2015, following the Kosovo Serbs’
participation in both the 2013 Kosovo local elections and 2014 general election. Talks focused
on two primary areas of implementation: dismantling remaining Serbian institutions and the
formation of the ZSO.313 The Serbian MUP in Kosovo had been demobilized and integrated into
corresponding Kosovo institutions following the Brussels Agreement. In addition to police
personnel who were integrated into the KPS under EULEX supervision, this included
administrative personnel in fields such as public records and official documentation who were
integrated into corresponding institutions (Jackson 2021b). Outstanding Serbian institutions in
Kosovo after 2013 included education, healthcare, judiciary, and civil protection.314 The latter
two fields were of particular concern to the EU as they undermined Kosovo’s institutional
organization and authority in Serb-inhabited areas. Parallel courts continued to function in
northern Kosovo with judges and prosecutors paid by Belgrade implementing Serbian law, and
the civil protection corps remained active in Kosovo Serb areas. Civil protection was a supposed
emergency response organization, but regarded by Prishtina and KFOR as a Serb paramilitary
organization responsible for civil unrest and roadblocks, and was regarded by Kosovo Serbs as a
primary security provider (Aktiv September 2015).
In February 2015, Belgrade and Prishtina reached an agreement on a unified judiciary for
northern Kosovo, to be led by a Serb court president and staffed with nine Albanian and nine
Serb prosecutors (UNSC April 2015).315 However, it was not implemented until October 2017,
when Serb judges still refused to be sworn into Kosovo’s judicial system until persuaded by
Belgrade which privately guaranteed Serb judges social benefits, and immediately paid out
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pensions from Serbia, in exchange for signing contracts with Prishtina (UNSC October 2017;
July 2018).316 Agreements on disbanding the civil protection corps were more readily
implemented after their negotiation in March 2015, with members integrated into Kosovo’s
Emergency Management Agency and Corrections Service (Jackson 2021a, 2021b).317
International stakeholders in Kosovo regarded the negotiation and implementation of the
agreement on disbanding civil protection to be a landmark accomplishment in which ~400
Kosovo Serbs were efficiently integrated into Kosovo’s institutions (UNSC April 2016).318
A solution to the other contentious aspect of the Brussels Agreement, creation of the ZSO
was more difficult. Autonomy for the Serb community in Kosovo had been a preference for
Belgrade since talks in 2003 under Koštunica’s government. It had been in exchange for
autonomy that Ivica Dačić had agreed to dismantle parallel institutions in 2013. However as
Bieber (2015) notes, the Brussels Agreement had been intentionally ambiguous to allow the
Serbian Government to cast it as non-independence domestically and the Kosovo Government to
cast it not undermining sovereignty domestically. This ambiguity obstructed implementation.319
Belgrade favored a more autonomous form of governance for the ZSO as a distinct political
entity within Kosovo with executive powers and authority over public enterprises and
services.320 Prishtina opposed this position as undermining Kosovo’s sovereignty by creating a
unique ethnically-defined political institution, and particularly opposed Serbia’s preference for
the ZSO’s executive authority in areas of public services and spatial planning which it believed
could be used to obstruct infrastructure development.321
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The sides did reach an agreement in August 2015 on the structure of the ZSO by which it
would have “enhanced municipal authority” to contribute to development, the same institutional
structure as a municipality (president, vice president, assembly, and emblem), and Serbia would
have the ability to finance healthcare, education, and development untaxed. At the same time, an
agreement on telecommunications granted Kosovo its own country code and permitted a
subsidiary of Serbian telecoms to operate in Kosovo.322 Implementation, though, was stalled by
domestic opposition in Kosovo, primarily from the Self-Determination Movement (Lëvizja
Vetëvendosje), which had opposed the dialogue as a whole and the ZSO in particular. Though
Kosovo’s constitutional court approved the formation of the ZSO under the August 2015
agreement, Vetëvendosje continued public protests and obstructed an assembly vote on it,
notably by setting off smoke bombs in the assembly. The constitutional court then reversed its
decision on the ZSO, declaring it an unconstitutional “ethnically-defined political structure” in
December 2015 (UNSC February 2016; April 2016).323 Belgrade continued to press for the ZSO
throughout 2017-18, accusing Prishtina of reneging on the Brussels Agreement, and after
Prishtina imposed a 100 percent tariff on trade with Serbia, Belgrade pronounced the EU
mediated dialogue to be “killed” in March 2019 (UNSC July 2016; February 2017; November
2018).324
With talks effectively stalled Serbian President Vučić, elected in 2017, and Kosovo
President Hashim Thaçi proposed territorial adjustment of borders between Kosovo and Serbia,
labeled “delimitation” (UNSC November 2018). In addition to the continued dispute over the
ZSO, relations had declined over Kosovo’s arrest of Serbian officials in 2017, and the imposition
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of tariffs on goods from Serbia in response to Serbia’s derecognition campaign and blocking of
Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. Kosovo’s government demanded Serbian
recognition of independence in order to lift the tariffs, which Belgrade refused (UNSC February
2019).325 It was in this context that Vučić and Thaçi began discussions of delimitation, by which
Vučić envisioned Serbia’s annexation of northern Kosovo with a hard border on the Ibar/Ibër
River, which he described as “saving the good parts of Kosovo” (UNSC November 2018).326 The
prospect of delimitation was rejected by the EU and US as destabilizing to the region, and
opposed by Kosovo’s government and Kosovo Serb groups, including the Serbian Orthodox
Church which viewed delimitation as sacrificing Kosovo.327 The notable Orthodox sites in
Kosovo - the Peć/Peja Patriarchy, the Gračanica/Graçanicë Monastery, and the Visoki Dečani
Monastery - were all south of the Ibar/Ibër River.328
The United States intervened in talks in 2020, with an aim of fostering increased
economic cooperation to break the deadlock between Belgrade and Prishtina. Talks initiated by
US envoy Richard Grenell in early 2020 focused on “de-politicized” areas of trade and
infrastructure links starting with direct flights from Belgrade to Prishtina and discussion of new
rail and road links.329 By US reckoning, cooperation in these areas was to be parallel to political
talks facilitated by the EU.330 Economic cooperation, however, required resolution to one of the
contentious issues that had stalled the political dialogue in 2018 - Kosovo’s tariffs on Serbian
imports in response to its diplomatic campaign to have states “derecognize” Kosovo’s
independence. The US pressed Kosovo’s government, led by Albin Kurti and Lëvizja
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Vetëvendosje to lift tariffs on raw materials in March 2020 before supporting a no-confidence
vote against Kurti that led to his ousting and a new government. Though tariffs had been
imposed by the government of Ramush Haradinaj (2017-2020), Kurti supported a
“reciprocation” policy against Serbia, whereby Prishtina would impose reciprocal measures for
Serbian policy and diplomatic initiatives targeting Kosovo.331
With a new LDK-led government in Prishtina, labeled the “government of dialogue,”
Kosovo lifted tariffs in April 2020 and continued US-led talks with Belgrade.332 In September
2020, Belgrade and Prishtina agreed to the so-called “Washington Agreement” brokered by
Grenell. Though touted by the US Trump administration as “historic,” the “Washington
Agreement” contained a number of puzzling and indeterminate provisions, including: Israeli
recognition of Kosovo, Serbia moving its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a ban on
purchasing Chinese telecoms systems, recognition of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and a
feasibility study of Gazivoda/Ujëmani Lake in northern Kosovo. The Washington Agreement did
provide for a one-year moratorium on Serbia’s diplomatic derecognition campaign and Kosovo
seeking membership in international organizations, and commitment to the “mini-Schengen”
trade area, intended to preclude further tariffs. What was notable was the sides did not sign a
bilateral agreement with one another, but each signed a different bilateral agreement with the
US.333
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Table 6.9. Timeline of Negotiations, 2015Year

Mediator

Feb.
2015

EEAS:
Federica
Mogherini

EU-led Political Dialogue resumes

Agreements on judiciary and civil
protection

Aug.
2015

EEAS:
Federica
Mogherini

Political Dialogue on ZSO, telecoms,
energy

Agreement in principle; implementation
stalled by Kosovo domestic politics

Oct.
2017

EEAS:
Federica
Mogherini

Judicial agreement implementation

Low number of Serb judges to join
Kosovo judiciary after uncertainty over
benefits

Vučić and Thaçi parallel discussions of
territorial adjustments/ “delimitation”

Ruled out by EU and US as creating
instability

Aug.
2018

Outcome

Jan.
2020

US: Richard
Grenell

US begins mediation on economic
cooperation areas

Belgrade-Prishtina flight agreed;
commitments for future infrastructure
links

Sept.
2020

US: Richard
Grenell

Washington Agreement

Sides sign parallel bilateral agreements
with the US; Serbia agrees to moratorium
on “derecognition”

Oct.
2020

EEAS:
Miroslav
Lajčák

EU-led Political Dialogue resumes
between Vučić and Hoti

No agreement; talks focus on ZSO

Albin Kurti and Lëvizja Vetëvendosje
return to Kosovo Government

Support “reciprocal measures” against
Serbia

Kurti presents platform for dialogue:
ZSO in exchange for Serbian recognition
of independence

Serbia rejects

Mar.
2021
June
2021
Sept.
2021

EEAS:
Miroslav
Lajčák

Moratorium on “derecognition” ends

While reactions to the Washington Agreement ranged from praise as “historic” from US
and Serbian officials to the EU questioning its results as negligible and irrelevant, to uncertainty
over its terms, it did unblock the sides unwillingness to return to talks and reinvigorated EU
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attempts to restart political dialogue.334 In the context of US-led talks in June 2020, EU envoy
Miroslav Lajčák convened parallel consultations with Vučić and Kosovo Prime Minister
Avdullah Hoti, and in October 2020, EU-led mediation resumed, intended to focus on formation
of the ZSO. The sides met six times for talks on the ZSO in 2020, but in early 2021, Hoti was
ousted in Prishtina and replaced by a Lëvizja Vetëvendosje government.335 Back in power, Kurti
continued talks with Vučić, but set recognition of Kosovo’s independence as a precondition for
the ZSO, which Vučić immediately rejected.336 The one-year moratorium on derecognition and
reciprocal measures ended in September 2021 without notable progress in the EU-led dialogue,
and Prishtina almost immediately instituted reciprocal restrictions on Serbian license plates, and
then in 2022 Kosovo applied for membership in the Council of Europe and Serbia responded by
resuming its derecognition campaign.337

6.5.1

Serbian Preferences

Politically within Serbia, the SNS consolidated autocratic political control, holding the
presidency and an outright majority in the National Assembly from 2014-21, as well as
dominating municipal assemblies. SNS supporters controlled the major media outlets in Serbia,
party functionaries “captured” state resources, critical voices were censored, and public
employment was linked to party support or membership. In all, this contributed to Serbia’s
transitioning into a non-competitive electoral context heavily favoring the SNS and its allies
(Castaldo 2020; Lavric & Bieber 2020). In-keeping with the SNS and Vučić’s strategies of
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appeasing both nationalist constituents and the EU as an external backer (Bieber 2020), the
Serbian Government’s preferences for Kosovo were largely inconsistent and janus-faced. On the
one hand, Serbia continued its strategy of seeking to delegitimize or undermine Kosovo’s
sovereignty, reflected in Vučić and his allies' rhetoric on Kosovo. On the other hand, Vučić
sought to present himself to the EU, and later the US, as a pillar of regional stability and a
reliable partner, continuing to engage in talks and avoiding unilateral regressive steps regarding
existing commitments (Bieber 2018, 2020).
Serbia’s most overt manifestation in policy of its preference to deny Kosovo’s
sovereignty was its diplomatic “derecognition” campaign. Launched in earnest in 2017, the
Serbian Government campaigned for states, generally smaller Caribbean and African states, to
withdraw recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Sao Tome and Principe was the first to
withdraw recognition of Kosovo in 2013, while Suriname became the first in 2017 following a
concerted effort from Belgrade. In some cases, such as the Central African Republic, Serbia
offered development aid to “buy off” or “rent” derecognition, and in others, such as Suriname,
Burundi, Dominica, Grenada, Madagascar and Palau, Russia and Serbia included withdrawal of
Kosovo's recognition in bilateral agreements (Visoka 2019). While the effect of derecognition by
smaller states is likely negligible compared to those, such as the US, UK, and Turkey supporting
Kosovo’s independence, it was regarded by Serbian officials as a “just moral victory” (Foley
2021). What was notable about the 18 cases of derecognition by the conclusion of the
Washington Agreement, was that all purported Kosovo’s independence to be “illegal” under
international law, thus giving credence to Belgrade’s convictions against Kosovo’s
sovereignty.338
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More nuanced rejections of Kosovo’s sovereignty were evident in its opposition to
specific aspects of statehood and sovereign actions taken by Prishtina. This was perhaps most
evident in Belgrade’s opposition to the Kosovo Security Force, the successor of the Kosovo
Protection Corps, an ostensibly “emergency response” formation designed to demobilize the
UÇK, being transformed into a regular army. While the proposed Kosovo Army constituted little
security threat to Serbia, it instead threatened Serbia’s claims to continued sovereignty over
Kosovo, which Belgrade claimed violated UNSCR 1244. Belgrade thus sought to prevent the
formation of the Kosovo Army by calling for a SL boycott of the Kosovo Assembly, to scupper
constitutional amendments, and through harassing or pressuring Serb and Bosniak members of
the Kosovo Security Force to quit.339 Belgrade similarly opposed policy decisions affecting the
Kosovo Serbs taken by Prishtina, including the sacking of a Kosovo Serb minister for hate
speech in 2015 and 2019, efforts to privatize the Trepča/Trepçë mining complex in northern
Kosovo that Belgrade claimed ownership of in 2016, and special police operations in northern
Kosovo in 2017-18 and 2021 (Jackson 2020, 2021a).340
On the one hand, Serbian political elites led by Vučić were vociferous, and at times
conspiracy-mongering, in their opposition to these sovereign policy decisions taken by Prishtina.
For example, Belgrade claimed that special police operations in northern Kosovo were in fact
clandestine UÇK fighters remobilized and disguised as police to ethnically cleanse Serbs, and
that Albanian NATO soldiers deployed with KFOR were secretly pursuing the creation of

Harassment and pressure to quit the KSF was intended to undermine Prishtina’s claims that it was a multi-ethnic
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“Greater Albania.”341 On the other hand, in-keeping with Kostovicova’s (2014) observation that
Serbian political elites engage in anti-EU rhetoric while simultaneously acquiescing to EU
political conditionality, Vučić continued to engage in the EU-mediated dialogue from 2014-18.
While refusing to recognize Kosovo as an EU political condition or sign an “international peace
settlement,” Vučić did engage in talks after 2015 under explicit pressure from the EU that
Serbia’s accession prospects were still linked to political dialogue.342 It was under this pressure
from the EU to continue talks and specifically not renege on previous commitments, including
participation in Kosovo’s elections and dismantling parallel institutions, that the agreements on
telecoms, civil protection, and the judiciary were reached. Though Belgrade did call for boycotts
by SL, and purportedly quit talks, over disputed aspects of sovereignty - Trepča/Trepçë, the
Kosovo Army, police operations, and the creation of the ZSO with executive powers - LS
resumed participation and Belgrade returned to talks whether with the EU or US without their
preconditions being met. In particular, the return of SL mayors in northern Kosovo in 2019 after
quitting in protest of police operations and tariffs was regarded as evidence that Belgrade had
accepted the legitimacy of Kosovo’s institutions and its claims to be “combatting” their
sovereignty were disingenuous.343 Similarly ahead of US-led talks, SL leaders, at Belgrade’s
behest, proclaimed that they stood a better chance of influencing policy if they remained in
Kosovo’s institutions instead of boycotting, implicitly committing to remain in institutions.344
This reflected a preference in Belgrade to reduce instability in Kosovo, and the Serb community
in particular.345
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Finally, in keeping with Subotić’s (2016) argument that Serbian political elites gradually
altered national narratives to cope with the loss of Kosovo since 1999, Vučić and other Serbian
Government elites cast these concessions in talks as “great national victories” converging with
their observed anti-sovereignty rhetoric. For example, regarding the telecoms agreement that
granted Kosovo’s its own country code, contributing to sovereignty claims, head of the Serbian
Office for Kosovo and Metohija Marko Đurić claimed it to be great “5-0 victory” in which
Belgrade had prevented “Albanian thieves” from seizing Serbian telecommunications
property.346 Similarly during discussions of territorial adjustment, Vučić cast the only alternative
as recognizing Kosovo’s independence, and “saving Kosovo’s good parts” as the only route to
stop “Greater Albania.”347 Then during US-led talks in 2020, he responded to nationalist
backlash by casting numerous concessions as “great victories.” For example, in outsourcing
flights between Belgrade and Prishtina to Lufthansa's international carrier, he responded that it
precluded recognition of Kosovo by Serbian domestic carriers and justified the Washington
Agreement to domestic audiences that a moratorium on recognition was a small cost for the
economic benefits it would unlock. Similarly, by signing separate bi-lateral agreements with the
US, Vučić presented this domestically as rebuffing Kosovo’s sovereignty.348

6.5.2

Observed Mechanisms

In sum, Serbia’s policies towards Kosovo after the conclusion of the Brussels Agreement and
Serb participation in the 2013-14 Kosovo elections was to maintain the status quo. On the one
hand, this meant opposition to Kosovo’s independence, attempts to undermine its sovereignty as
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an independent state, and nationalist, at times chauvinistic, rhetoric towards Kosovo to appease
domestic audiences. On the other hand, Belgrade continued to engage in EU-mediated dialogue
from 2014-18, and US-mediated talks in 2020. Though Belgrade called for multiple boycotts of
Prishtina’s institutions in response to sovereign policy decisions and set preconditions for
continued talks, SL boycotts were ended, and talks resumed without those preconditions being
met. Notably, Belgrade did not enforce a boycott of Kosovo’s elections after 2013. These
observations were generally in-keeping with noted trends of Serbia’s behavior towards the EU
under the SNS - that is domestically opposing EU political conditions, especially with regard to
Kosovo, while simultaneously continuing political engagement with the EU in the dialogue
process (Kostovicova 2014; Subotić 2016; Bieber 2020). Accordingly, this dual-facing strategy
precluded concessions for the sake of a settlement, constrained by nationalist constituencies in
Serbia and the SNS’s own nationalist pandering.

Table 6.10. Observed Mechanisms, 2015-21.
Mechanism

Observations

Outcome

5.

Manipulation w/
patron state: oneoff reward

US proposed opening of International
Development Finance Corporation
and the Export-Import Bank of the
US, funding of infrastructure projects
in exchange for Washington
Agreement.

Belgrade accepts Washington Agreement;
economic benefits used by Vučić to deflect
domestic criticism.

6.

Manipulation w/
patron state:
reward structure

EU accession linked to continued
dialogue and implementation of
existing agreements.

Belgrade continues dialogue in 2014-18 despite
preconditions/boycotts against Prishtina’s
sovereign policy and failure to create ZSO;
economic benefits of EU membership used by
Lajčák to restart talks in 2020-21.

Two mechanisms theorized in Chapter 2 were evident during the post-Brussels
Agreement period. Due to the near-seamless links between the SNS and LS (Chapter 7), direct
engagement in talks with the local regime was minimal and policy preferences flowed almost
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entirely from the SNS to the SL, not vice versa. The first mechanism observed was manipulation
with the patron state: reward structure (#6, Table 6.10), by which Serbia’s EU membership
prospect remained linked to continued dialogue and implementation of existing agreements. This
was notable in 2015-17, when EU mediator Federica Mogherini reiterated to Serbia the
conditionality of continued dialogue, especially at points when Serbia threatened to quit talks or
when it set preconditions. Accordingly, even after the Washington Agreement, Belgrade agreed
to continue talks, and it only quit after Prishtina set the unacceptable precondition of recognizing
Kosovo’s independence. Notably, in EU efforts to restart the Political Dialogue after the
Washington Agreement, the EU publicly advertised the long-term economic benefits of EU
integration to Serbia as an inducement.349
The second observed mechanism was manipulation with the patron state: one-off reward
(#5, Table 6.10), evident during the US-led talks. The premise of the talks led by US envoy
Grenell was economic development, while political dialogue was left to be continued by the EU.
However, in Vučić’s telling of the Washington Agreement, the concessions that Serbia was
ostensibly required to make, whether implemented or not, were entirely justified by the
economic benefits it would receive from the US. By the terms of the agreement, the US
International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the US would
open offices in Belgrade to finance infrastructure projects. According to Vučić, this offset the
cost of “not too painful” concessions on Kosovo.350
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6.6

Conclusion

Following Chapter 4, the purpose of this chapter was threefold. First was to provide a detailed
overview of the context of the Kosovo conflict and the contested sovereignty of Kosovo, and
how those affected efforts to reach a diplomatic solution. International mediation of the Kosovo
conflict evolved over three periods: that led by the Contact Group (US, EU, Russia) prior to
NATO’s armed invention in March 1999; that led by UNMIK and the UNSR after Kosovo’s de
facto separation from Serbia in June 1999; and, that led by the EU after Kosovo’s unilateral
declaration of independence and the ICJ’s advisory opinion that that declaration of independence
did not violate international law. Throughout these periods of mediation, talks and subsequent
agreements focused on both strengthening Kosovo’s external sovereignty through international
recognition, membership in organizations, and other trappings of statehood; and internal
sovereignty through the UNMIK-facilitated development of multi-ethnic institutions with
authority over the whole of Kosovo’s territory. Though Serbia would never recognize the
independence of Kosovo, a central feature of Serbian nationalism, the Serbian Government did
agree to intermediate measures contributing to sovereignty such as regional representation and an
international telephone code. Regarding internal sovereignty, Serbian policy wavered between
supporting and opposing Serb participation in Kosovo’s central institutions.
The second purpose was to identify specific mechanisms through which international
mediation affected Serbia’s preferences towards Kosovo in these two areas - external and
internal sovereignty. In the first years of UNSR mediation, aspects of internal sovereignty were
improved via facilitative mediation with Belgrade, notably through Serb participation in
Kosovo’s 2001-02 UNMIK-run elections which the UNSR secured in exchange for guarantees
ruling out independence, improving security, and beginning decentralization of Serb enclaves.
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However after the DSS gained strength in Belgrade after 2003 and worsened security conditions
in Kosovo after the 2004 riots, Belgrade withdrew this support for participation and instituted a
boycott policy for Kosovo’s institutions, effectively enforced with threats over contracts and
social benefits. Manipulative mediation from the EU produced more lasting commitments,
whereby Serbia’s EU membership prospect was linked to both participation in technical and
political dialogues and, crucially, implementation of agreements. This was particularly evident
during talks in 2011 when the EU withheld Serbia’s candidate status specifically for failing to
implement agreements, and in April 2013 when the EU issued an ultimatum to Serbia to accept
the proposed Brussels Agreements in order to open accession talks. This was also evident after
2014, when the EU used the prospect of membership to keep Serbia engaged in talks, despite its
protests over failure to create the ZSO and domestic policy decisions within Kosovo. Similarly,
the US and EU both used the prospect of economic benefits to restart talks in 2020.
Lastly, the third purpose of this chapter was to identify specific instances of policy
change towards Kosovo within the Serbian Government, specifically those changes to internal
sovereignty that directly affected the Kosovo Serb community. There were three notable points
of policy change evident in this overview. First was the decision by the DOS government in
Belgrade in 2001-02 to endorse Serb participation in Kosovo’s UNMIK-run
institutions/elections. Second was the boycott policy enacted by Belgrade after the March 2004
riots in Kosovo by which Belgrade withdrew its support for Serb participation in institutions and
elections, which persisted until the Brussels Agreement in 2013. Lastly, and following the
boycott policy, the third policy change was Belgrade's full support for Serb participation in
Kosovo’s institutions and elections following the Brussels Agreement in 2013. As the EU made
clear to Serbia throughout the technical and political dialogues, rewards would only be realized
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upon implementation of policy change within Kosovo, with EU official Catherine Ashton
asserting that it was incumbent upon Serbia to “exert maximum pressure on those in Kosovo
preventing agreements from being implemented.”351 Accordingly, these three points of policy
change, and specifically how they were enforced within the Kosovo Serb community, are further
analyzed in the following chapter.
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7

SEND ADMINISTRATORS, GUNS, & MONEY: PARALLEL SERB
INSTITUTIONS IN KOSOVO

In December 2009, four years before Belgrade ended its boycott policy on Kosovo after the
Brussels Agreement, Bratislav Nikolić was elected mayor of the Serb enclave of Štrpce/Shtërpcë
in Kosovo’s municipal elections. Nikolić was a member of the Kosovo Serb Independent Liberal
Party (SLS) formed in 2006 to increase Serb participation in Kosovo politics regardless of status.
In defying Belgrade’s boycott, in place from 2004-13, the election of Nikolić in Štrpce/Shtërpcë
and Serb mayors in four other municipalities was regarded a repudiation of Belgrade’s
inadequate policies. As Nikolić argued, the more than 4,000 votes he received from
Štrpce/Shtërpcë’s Serbs far exceeded the 1,270 votes that the parallel SRS mayor Zvonko
Mihajlović had received in Serbian-run parallel elections in 2008.352 In the months following his
election, Nikolić, who had run on a SLS platform of improving living conditions for Kosovo
Serbs and “not surviving on protests alone,” ordered the parallel institutions in Štrpce/Shtërpcë to
close, physically locked its officials out of municipal offices, and was himself denounced by
Begrade and attacked by Serb gunmen. However, he remained in office and was re-elected in
2013 and 2017.
This anecdote illustrates two points about the Kosovo Serb local regime relative to
Belgrade. One is that Serb leaders in Kosovo had their own preferences and needs that did not
necessarily converge with Belgrade’s preferences for rejecting Kosovo’s sovereignty. This was
especially true for rejection of its internal sovereignty, which had translated into Kosovo Serbs
being denied access to certain basic services. This inevitably generated conflict between
Belgrade and Kosovo Serb leaders, as well as other Kosovo Serb political factions. The other
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point is that after Belgrade ended its boycott policy in 2013, it coopted leaders such as Bratislav
Nikolić who had existing support bases and were capable of winning elections. Importantly,
leaders who Belgrade coopted after 2013 were determined by their pre-2013 influence and the
pathology of different Kosovo Serb institutions that developed after 1999.
Building on Chapter 6, which traced ways in which international mediation affected
Serbian preferences and policies on Kosovo, this chapter traces how Serbia sought to enforce
these policies within the Kosovo Serb community. The purpose is then twofold. First, to
disaggregate the Kosovo Serb local regime and trace its pathology during the post-conflict period
in Kosovo, from 1999-2021. Reiterating from Chapter 3, the local regime is a complex of actors,
institutions, resources, and strategies that determine the conduct of subnational politics and how
it links to higher tiers of authority, whether a patron state, a parent state, or both. The second
purpose is then to identify and trace specific mechanisms of how Serbia enforced its own
preferences within the local regime, in-line with its preferences outlined in the previous chapter,
and how those preferences affected local regime cooperation with the institutions of the parent
state, Kosovo.

7.1

Kosovo Serb Local Regime: From Enclaves to Minority Autocracy
7.1.1

Serbs in Post-War Kosovo, 1999-2004

Following the conclusion of the Kumanovo Agreement and UNSCR 1244 on 10 June 1999,
Serbian security and administrative institutions officially left the territory of Kosovo to be
replaced by UNMIK and KFOR. A sizable Serb minority remained in Kosovo, though, after
1999 (Table 7.1), uncertain of its safety and position with centralized rule from Belgrade having
been displaced (Judah 2000). Remaining Serbs were subjected to a wave of violence by returning
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Albanian refugees and remnants of the UÇK. During the 1998-99 Kosovo War, Serbian
paramilitary forces had recruited and armed local Serbs and Roma who were paid with whatever
they could plunder from Albanians (OSCE 1999), making them targets of reprisals. Revenge
violence, though, indiscriminately targeted the whole of the Serb community, and often the most
vulnerable or isolated rather than specific actors who had sided with Serbian forces (Judah 2000;
Petersen 2011).

Table 7.1. Kosovo Demography, post-1999.
Albanians

Serbs

Others (Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani, RAE)

Number

1,616,869

~97,000-140,000 ~92,300

Percent (total pop.)

~90-92%

~5-7%

~4%

*exact numbers unknown due to the boycott of the census in 2011. Estimates based on ICG estimates made between 2001 and
2011.

The formation of a Serb local regime in Kosovo, or more accurately multiple regimes,
was driven in large part by this anti-Serb violence following the Kumanovo Agreement.
Indiscriminate violence and widespread fear of reprisal attacks drove large numbers of Serbs
from their homes, who fled either to Serbia-proper or gathered in Serb-majority areas. These
included the northern Kosovo municipalities of Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok,
Zvečan/Zveçan, and the northern half of Mitrovica town (hereafter Mitrovica North),
predominantly Serb-inhabited villages outside of Prishtina and Gjilan/Gnjilane, or at Orthodox
religious sites (Dahlman & Williams 2010; Jackson 2021a). Serbs in mixed areas, such as
Rahovec/Orahovac and Prizren were confined to specific neighborhoods, unable to leave without
fear of harassment or attack (OSCE July 1999; February 2000; October 2000). Serb leaders in
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Kosovo warned that the failure of KFOR and UNMIK to curb inter-ethnic violence was
immediately destroying trust in international forces.353
In northern Kosovo, and most notably Mitrovica North, Serb protection groups known as
the Bridge Watchers or Bridge Gangs provided protection, often blocking access to northern
Kosovo for UNMIK and KFOR as well as Kosovo Albanians and forcing Albanians to move
south. These groups were loosely organized pseudo-militias that took their name from regulating
or restricting movement across the main bridge in Mitrovica. Some of its members were arrested
for carrying weapons, but more commonly they carried radios to relay information and organize
mobs and roadblocks. KFOR labeled them a paramilitary formation and attempted to displace
them from the northern side of the Mitrovica bridge in March 2000, eventually enforcing a 30meter buffer zone around the bridge (OSCE May 2002).354
In the months following UNMIK’s deployment, three distinct Kosovo Serb political
factions formed. The first, and most moderate, was the Serb National Council of Kosovo and
Metohija (SNV-KiM) in Gračanica/Graçanicë near Prishtina, led by Serbian Orthodox Bishop of
Raška-Prizren Artemije and Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) official and former Kosovo
administrator Momčilo Trajković. Artemije and Momčilo Trajković formed the Pan-Serbian
Ecclesiastical-Peoples' Council in July 1999, based at the Gračanica/Graçanicë Monastery, which
was then renamed the SNV-KiM in October 1999.355 A purported “self-government” of Serbs in
Kosovo included a constituent assembly, the SNV-KiM claimed to be filling the role left by
Belgrade’s administrators and SPS officials who fled Kosovo in June 1999. SNV-KiM officials
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were critical of Milošević’s government, which claimed to be “ruling in exile,” but leaving Serbs
to fend for themselves in Kosovo. Trajković dismissed the SPS’s authority in Kosovo, stating
that officials who had fled for their safety had no right to govern those who stayed.356 The
infrastructure of the Orthodox Church in Kosovo, led by Artemije, was mobilized to provide
services for Serbs fleeing their homes, with churches used as refugee collection centers and the
Church’s radio station as the only Serbian-language source of information.357 The SNV-KiM
supported the DOS in Serbia, and engaged in inter-ethnic talks in Kosovo in 1999-2000,
purportedly seeking to solve practical problems for Serbs, chief among which was security.358
The second political faction was the Serb National Council of Kosovska Mitrovica (SNVM), established in August 1999 to represent Serb-majority northern Kosovo. Led by Oliver
Ivanović, Milan Ivanović, and Marko Jakšić, the SNV-M leadership initially supported the SPS ,
but switched alliances to the DOS in 2000.359 The SNV-M had tentatively cooperated with the
SNV-KiM in 1999, but ended their cooperation after the latter began cooperation with UNMIK.
Following this split, Marko Jakšić claimed the SNV-M to be the sole legitimate representative of
Serb interests in Kosovo.360 This split over cooperation with UNMIK was indicative of the SNV-
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M leadership’s more radical position on opposing UNMIK and KFOR.361 Its leaders were
directly linked to the Bridge Watchers in northern Kosovo and capable of mobilizing civil unrest
in opposition to UNMIK and KFOR, with the expressed aim of restricting their movement in
northern Kosovo. They claimed to be able to mobilize thousands of volunteers to organize mobs
and roadblocks for “the public defense of Mitrovica,” notably organizing mobs of more than
5,000 in 2001. This was organized and regulated by the SNV-M’s “Committee for the Defense of
Northern Kosovo,” led by Milan Ivanović and Jakšić, who opposed all forms of cooperation with
UNMIK and demanded self-rule instead.362
The third faction was the Serb National Assembly, a SPS-backed organization set up by
Belgrade in 1999 to counter the SNV-KiM, chaired by Zoran Anđelković. It had access to
resources from Belgrade, was run out of SPS offices in Kosovo, and supported the SPS position
on resisting cooperation with UNMIK or KFOR. It was criticized as attempting to manipulate
and divide Serbs, and it likewise denounced moderate Serb leaders cooperating with UNMIK as
“traitors” or “NATO collaborators.”363 SPS activists and thugs organized by the Serb National
Assembly attacked DOS-sponsored rallies in Gračanica/Graçanicë and Mitrovica after the SNVM aligned with the DOS in 2000. Similarly, they harassed and attacked SNV-KiM and SNV-M
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officials, who were also purged from voter rolls ahead of the 2000 Serbian elections (UNSC
March 2000).364
Following the ousting of Milošević and the SPS in 2000 the Serb National Assembly
ceased to exist, while the DOS government in Belgrade was supported by both remaining
factions, the SNV-KiM and SNV-M. Support from the DOS for Kosovo Serbs came in two forms.
One was political patronage for local leaders who were recruited into Belgrade-appointed posts,
either in parallel administrative roles, or public enterprises operating in Kosovo. Momčilo
Trajković, for example, stepped down from the SNV-KiM’s leadership and was recruited as an
administrator by the Serbian Coordination Centre. Similarly, Milan Ivanović and Marko Jakšić
were appointed administrators of the North Mitrovica hospital, and SNV-KiM leader Rada
Trajković was appointed head of the Gračanica/Graçanicë hospital, both funded and run by the
Serbian Ministry of Health in Belgrade (OSCE November 1999; October 2001). This was a
continuation of the practice under SPS rule, by which posts in Kosovo were distributed, only
after 2000 it was to DOS allies instead of SPS or SRS officials. Many such appointees were
formally employed, and drew social benefits and salaries from Belgrade, but performed no
functions. They included appointments to districts where Serbs no longer lived, or appointees
living in Serbia-proper (UNSC October 2003).365
The other form of support was transfer of material resources from Belgrade via these
parallel institutions. The most significant transfers were salaries and welfare benefits for public
enterprise employees who had lost jobs in 1999, ultimately keeping ~22,000 Serbs’ livelihoods
linked to Belgrade (UNSC October 2003; November 2006). Serbian line ministries continued to
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fund public services in Serb-inhabited areas. Notably, the healthcare and education systems
became sources of patronage for Kosovo Serb elites. Both were major employers in
municipalities with jobs and funding to dole out, resulting in over-employment in these
institutions and bloated payrolls. Serbs employed in these institutions were paid double the salary
of comparable positions in Serbia-proper, while unnecessary positions were added to employ
local allies and clients. For example, many of the Bridge Watchers were formally employed as
security guards at hospitals and schools in northern Kosovo. Accordingly, many local leaders
who emerged in northern Kosovo, Gračanica/Graçanicë, and Štrpce/Shtërpca worked as hospital
and school administrators, positions with access to patronage resources (OSCE November 1999;
October 2001; February 2002; May 2002; April 2007).
The distinction between moderate Kosovo Serb leaders and the more radical SNV-M
faction that opposed cooperation with UNMIK became more pronounced after Belgrade’s
endorsement of participation in the 2001 election. The Return Coalition (KP) was formed as a
unified Serb list that won 22 seats in the PISG assembly (UNSC June 2001, November 2004).366
The KP supplanted the SNV-KiM as the more moderate political force, though the SNV-KiM
continued to exist, but without Momčilo Trajković and Bishop Artemije who had both stepped
down after the DOS’s victory in Serbia. The KP was headed by Gojko Savić and Oliver
Ivanović, who served in the assembly’s executive committee, engaging with both UNMIK and
the Kosovo Albanian leadership. Though it did boycott participation on occasion, it also used its
institutional veto to affect legislation on numerous instances in 2002-03 (UNSC October
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2003).367 Perhaps most notable was the KP’s negotiation of a new post in 2002 before it would
join the assembly, special advisor to the UNSR on returns, to advise UNMIK on displaced
persons and initiatives for their return, thereby giving a Kosovo Serb official input on one of the
most salient issues in central UNMIK-run institutions.368
The KP was politically supported by Belgrade and the Coordination Centre. Oliver
Ivanović had only agreed to run in elections and join the assembly on the condition that it was
approved by the Serbian Government. Belgrade formally endorsed the KP and its elected
deputies as the “legitimate representatives of the Kosovo Serbs” and in return the KP agreed not
to take unilateral action on matters conflicting with Belgrade’s preferences.369 The KP boycotted
the assembly’s vote for Kosovo’s presidency in January 2002 at Belgrade’s behest, which it
regarded as a symbol of Kosovar sovereignty.370 Similarly, after the Serbian Government
rejected the UNSR’s “Standards for Kosovo” document following the 2003 talks, Belgrade
requested that the KP also oppose it during a vote in Kosovo’s assembly.371 Following Zoran
Đinđić’s assassination and the ensuing political turmoil in Serbia, the Coordination Centre
ordered the KP to remain in the assembly and specifically not to boycott participation to avoid
causing a dispute or unrest in Kosovo.372
The other faction, the more radical SNV-M, opposed cooperation with UNMIK and the
PISGs and sought to limit their influence in northern Kosovo. The SNV-M had denounced the KP
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for running in the 2001 elections and expelled Oliver Ivanović for joining it.373 It had boycotted
elections in 2001-02 and organized an “anti-election” campaign to suppress Serb turnout in
northern Kosovo. Its leaders, Milan Ivanović and Marko Jakšić, opposed Belgrade’s talks with
Prishtina, and proposed northern Kosovo be partitioned as a distinct Serb entity.374 In January
2003, the SNV-M leaders formed the self-declared Association of Serb Municipalities composed
of the four northern mayors, and in February 2003 convened an assembly which declared itself to
be an autonomous entity not subject to the authority of Prishtina or UNMIK, and to “function as
an integral part of Serbia.”375 Though the DOS formally denounced the the Association, its
parallel assembly, and the SNV-M as illegitimate, its leaders Milan Ivanović, Marko Jakšić, and
the mayors of Zubin Potok and Zvečan/Zveçan, Slaviša Ristić and Dragiša Milović, were also
closely linked to DSS
in Belgrade, and received considerable political patronage especially after 2003.376
While Belgrade politically supported the KP in the Kosovo assembly from 2002-04, it
concurrently supported these more radical institutions in northern Kosovo. These northern
institutions were capable of mobilizing large numbers of supporters for protests and roadblocks
against UNMIK and KFOR. This was evident in response to UNMIK’s efforts to establish
customs gates on the border/boundary with Serbia in 2001, to prevent the arrest of Bridge
Watchers in April 2002, in protest of attempts to arrest Milan Ivanović in August 2002, and in
protest of water and power cuts in 2003. These groups of protesters, often employed in parallel
institutions or part of criminal gangs, also threatened and harassed Serb members of the Kosovo
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Police Service (KPS), despite Belgrade having agreed to their deployment in 2002. As a result,
UNMIK and KFOR authority in northern Kosovo was limited (UNSC January 2004).
While Belgrade politically supported the KP in the Kosovo assembly from 2002-04, it
concurrently supported these more radical institutions in northern Kosovo. These northern
institutions were capable of mobilizing large numbers of supporters for protests and roadblocks
against UNMIK and KFOR. This was evident in response to UNMIK’s efforts to establish
customs gates on the border/boundary with Serbia in 2001, to prevent the arrest of Bridge
Watchers in April 2002, in protest of attempts to arrest Milan Ivanović in August 2002, and in
protest of water and power cuts in 2003.377 These groups of protesters, often employed in parallel
institutions or part of criminal gangs, also threatened and harassed Serb members of the Kosovo
Police Service (KPS), despite Belgrade having agreed to their deployment in 2002.378 As a result,
UNMIK and KFOR authority in northern Kosovo was limited (UNSC January 2004).
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Table 7.2. Kosovo Serb Political Factions, 1999-2004.
Organization
Serb National Council
of Kosovo and
Metohija (SNV KiM)

Continued to exist, but less salient after original leadership either quit in protest of
election participation (Momčilo Trajković) or ran as members of KP in 2001.

Serb National Council
of Mitrovica (SNV-M)

Salient political organization based in North Mitrovica. Opposed cooperation with
UNMIK/KFOR and the KP for its participation in elections. Led by Milan Ivanović and
Marko Jakšić.

Serb National
Assembly

Belgrade-run organization backed by the SPS to counter the influence of SNV KiM,
based in Zvečan/Zveçan. Run by Zoran Anđelković along with SPS/Belgrade-appointed
officials in Kosovo. Opposed cooperation with UNMIK. Opposed SNV KiM which it
labeled as a treasonous organization and employed SPS and SRS activists to disrupt
SNV KiM and SNV-M prior to 2000 Serbian elections.

Association of Serb
Municipalities of
Kosovo and Metohija

Political organization formed in January-February 2003 of political representatives of
the Serb-dominated northern municipalities. Convened an assembly of 300 delegates,
15 executive members, and president (Marko Jakšić). Opposed cooperation with
UNMIK, KP, and Prishtina. Supported ethnic partition of Kosovo. Declared itself to be
an autonomous separate political entity within Kosovo that was an integral part of
Serbia. Officially denounced as illegitimate by Belgrade, but its leaders retained support
from the Coordination Centre and their respective parties, primarily the DSS, in
Belgrade.

Koalicija Povratak
(KP)

Kosovo Serb political coalition that participated in 2001 PISG elections. Held one
ministerial post, one position on the executive council, and the post of special advisor
for returns to the UNSR. Leadership included rector of Prishtina University and
Democratic Alternative party official Gojko Savić, former SNV-M leader Oliver
Ivanović, and SNV KiM leaders Ranđel Nojkić and Rada Trajković. Officially endorsed
by Belgrade as legitimate political representatives of Kosovo Serbs and in exchange
agreed not to take unilateral actions at odds with Belgrade’s preferences in Kosovo. Ran
as the SLKiM in the 2004 Kosovo elections.

While Belgrade politically supported the KP in the Kosovo assembly from 2002-04, it
concurrently supported these more radical institutions in northern Kosovo. These northern
institutions could mobilize large numbers of supporters for protests and roadblocks against
UNMIK and KFOR. This was evident in response to UNMIK’s efforts to establish customs gates
on the border/boundary with Serbia in 2001, to prevent the arrest of Bridge Watchers in April
2002, in protest of attempts to arrest Milan Ivanović in August 2002, and in protest of water and
power cuts in 2003. These groups of protesters, often employed in parallel institutions or part of
criminal gangs, also threatened and harassed Serb members of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS),
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despite Belgrade having agreed to their deployment in 2002. As a result, UNMIK and KFOR
authority in northern Kosovo was limited (UNSC January 2004).
Though more salient in northern Kosovo, where UNMIK and KFOR had limited
authority, the parallel institutions operated in most Serb-inhabited areas, with a reportedly
increased presence after the 2003 Serbian elections. Parallel courts were run in unofficial
courthouses by the Serbian Ministry of Justice, staffed by Serb judges and prosecutors, applying
Serbian law, paid by Serbia, and under the authority of high courts in Serbia. Similarly, parallel
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) offices were run in northern Kosovo, providing
administrative functions, public records, and tax services, in addition to parallel police and fire
services (Jackson 2021b). Though KFOR denied the presence of regular Serbian police in
Kosovo, it acknowledged the presence of administrative MUP offices, fire services, and MUP
police in “unofficial functions” residing in Kosovo. Kosovo Serb officials noted that these
unofficial police operated clandestinely and served in a more political capacity to inform on
moderate Serbs and denounce or harass certain leaders. In other instances Serb police employed
by the KPS were simultaneously employed by Serbian MUP (GLPS January 2013; April 2014;
KCSS 2014).379 As noted in the previous chapter, beginning late 2003, Belgrade began to
pressure parallel employees to not accept contracts or cooperation with UNMIK under the threat
of losing accrued benefits. This ultimately discouraged qualified Serbs from accepting UNMIK
contracts in hospitals, schools, police, or the judiciary, leaving those fields primarily in the
purview of parallel institutions (OSCE October 2003; UNSC January 2004).
Conflict between the moderate KP and more radical northern institutions was evident
after March 2004, as were their respective links to parties in Serbia. The northern institutions, led
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by DSS allies, supported Vojislav Koštunica’s call for a boycott after UNMIK refused to accept
his proposal for partition in cantons. In response to Koštunica’s boycott they organized an “antielection” campaign beginning in August 2004 that resulted in low turnout, and virtually no
turnout in northern Kosovo. As Milan Ivanović claimed after the 2004 election, “the boycott won
the election.”380 On the other side, the KP, which rebranded itself as the Serbian List for Kosovo
and Metohija (SLKiM) rejected Koštunica’s boycott policy, accepted Boris Tadić’s position
supporting elections, and ran in 2004. However, with low turnout, the SLKiM accepted that it had
no mandate and withdrew from the Kosovo assembly.381 An unintended consequence of this both the boycott policy and SLKiM’s forfeit of its mandate - was that Civic Initiative “Serbia”
(GIS), a relatively unknown minor Serb party that had registered for elections regardless of
Belgrade’s position, claimed the seats, ministries, and consultative positions reserved for
Serbs.382
In sum, during the first five years of Kosovo’s de facto separation from Serbia two
political groupings of Serbs emerged in Kosovo. On the one side were those who favored
cooperation with UNMIK to maintain a voice in their affairs and solve practical problems faced
by their community. This position was embodied by the SNV-KiM in its early cooperation with
UNMIK and participation in inter-ethnic dialogue, and then by the KP as a formal political
coalition in Kosovo’s assembly and advisory posts to UNMIK. On the other side were those who
opposed cooperation and sought to undermine and obstruct UNMIK and KFOR as rejections of
separation from Serbia, embodied first in the SPS-run Serb National Assembly and then the SNV-
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M and the self-declared Association of Serb Municipalities in northern Kosovo. Both groupings
were supported by Belgrade politically and materially via parallel institutions run by Serbian
ministries. Notably those early Kosovo Serb political elites who emerged, particularly in the
northern Kosovo factions, held key posts in parallel institutions giving them direct links to
Belgrade and distributable patronage resources to build local support bases.

7.1.2

Institutional Divergence Under the Boycott Policy

The March 2004 ethnic riots in Kosovo undid the limited progress that had been achieved in
securing cooperation from the KP. Though the Serbian Government under the DSS had begun to
discourage cooperation through sanctions against Serbs taking UNMIK contracts and
strengthening parallel institutions in 2003, it responded to the 2004 riots by calling for a blanket
boycott policy of UNMIK-run institutions. Serb officers quit the KPS en masse and the KP left
Kosovo’s assembly in protest. The 2004 riots reinforced the hardline position held by the the
northern Kosovo Serb leaders that UNMIK and KFOR could not be trusted to protect them,
something further illustrated by the fact that the riots only marginally affected northern Kosovo
compared to the disparate Serb enclaves south of the Ibar/Ibër River. Furthermore, the
displacement of ~4,000 Serbs and destruction of their homes reinforced the process of ethnic
unmixing and their confinement to distinct enclaves reminiscent of the effects of violence in
1999-2000 (UNSC July 2004; November 2007; Dahlman & Williams 2010).
In the absence of cooperation in UNMIK-run institutions, Belgrade strengthened the
presence of its parallel institutions in Serb-inhabited areas, though UNMIK had reported an
increased presence of parallel institutions beginning in late 2003. Parallel institutions were run
primarily out of northern Kosovo and Gračanica/Graçanicë, which Serbs claimed to be the
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capital of Kosovo, dislocated from nearby Prishtina after 1999 (UNSC February 2005).
Administrative posts in Kosovo were directly appointed by the Coordination Centre and often
rotated as a part of coalition bargaining or “buying off” local elites. Parallel institutions
employed 5,340 Kosovo Serbs in full-time posts in the fields of municipal administration,
healthcare, education, postal service, telecommunications, and the MUP-run fields of records and
documents, police, and emergency response services. In addition, The Serbian Ministry of
Defense operated civil protection units in Kosovo at the municipal-level, often consisting of a
few full-time employees in each municipality, and dozens of part-time employees, who were
often also employed in education or healthcare facilities. Ostensibly an emergency response
force for natural disasters, civil protection was regarded both by UNMIK and Kosovo Serbs as
auxiliary or paramilitary security force with a hierarchical structure and paid personnel capability
of rapidly mobilizing roadblocks or mobs (Wall et al. 2008; Aktiv 2014; KCSS 2014). By the
conclusion of the Brussels Agreement in 2013, civil protection units in Kosovo had 762 paid
personnel (UNSC April 2015).383
Funding for parallel institutions was provided either through official line ministry
budgets or more covert, often fraudulent transfers from Belgrade. For example, the budgets of
Serbia’s Ministries for Health and Education included funding for hospitals and schools in
Kosovo. Less transparent transfers were made via fictitious public enterprises in Kosovo, such as
the Prishtina airport and power plants in Obilić/Obiliq which in reality Serbia had ceased to
operate in 1999, but continued to receive official funding for. Most of these supposedly public
enterprises were registered to the same address in Gračanica/Graçanicë, and funds transferred to
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them disappeared to be used to pay unofficial employees or to be transferred back to local
leaders or back to Serbia as “political contributions.”384 On other occasions, UNMIK stopped
truckloads of Serbian dinars, earmarked for pensions, being shipped to Kosovo (UNSC April
2006).
The majority of parallel funding went to salaries and welfare benefits, with parallel
employees receiving 200 percent salaries compared to employees in Serbia-proper. When the
DS-led government in Serbia attempted to reduce this to 150 percent salaries in 2008, it faced
widespread opposition among Kosovo Serbs. In 2008-09, the reduction of parallel salaries by the
DS government triggered protests in Serb municipalities.385 As the Serbian Government itself
acknowledged in 2008-09, much of this funding was deadweight. Belgrade continued to pay the
salaries of administrators who had fled Kosovo in 1999, purportedly administering municipalities
where Serbs no longer lived or public enterprises no longer operating in Kosovo. Misuse of
parallel funding or fraud was facilitated by a lack of oversight in Serb enclaves where UNMIK
had limited authority and parallel police worked more to protect the status quo and the existing
power-holders than to undermine their influence. Ultimately this system of parallel funding and
institutions kept key Kosovo Serb constituencies and elites tied to Belgrade, and coupled with
the threat of sanctions, such as losing employment or welfare benefits discouraged cooperation
with UNMIK.
The boycott policy from Belgrade was not universally supported amongst Kosovo Serb
factions. While the more intransigent factions and their institutions in northern Kosovo, which
had boycotted elections in 2001-04 and worked to obstruct UNMIK and KFOR operations,
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welcomed the boycott policy, the more moderate SLKiM opposed it. The SLKiM leadership
called for Belgrade to end the boycott in 2005 and engage in serious talks rather than pandering
to nationalists, and opposed the use of sanctions on Serbs who took UNMIK contracts, believing
that it disproportionately harmed Serbs in rural villages or southern enclaves where parallel
institutions had less presence. Oliver Ivanović and Ranđel Nojkić, the SLKiM leaders, believed
Belgrade had sacrificed its position in talks to appease nationalists in the DSS and the boycott
policy was benefitting only hardliners in northern Kosovo. They believed that the Coordination
Centre and later the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, led by DSS officials Sanda Rašković-Ivić
and Slobodan Samardžić, was being used to reward DSS allies in Kosovo and strengthen DSS
support in northern Kosovo.386 Nojkić, who believed the boycott was intentionally stripping
Serbs of their agency in Kosovo, broke with Belgrade in March 2006 and resumed participation
as an independent in Kosovo’s assembly.387 This triggered a split within the SLKiM, between a
faction supporting Belgrade and Nojkić’s faction, leading to the SLKiM’s collapse in
2007.388 Nojkić’s faction, remained active in UNMIK’s institutions, including taking
administrative roles in municipal governments, while many in Ivanović’s faction who supported
Belgrade regardless of opposition to the boycott were appointed to parallel administrative posts
including Ivanović and Goran Bogdanović who were appointed to head the Serbian Ministry for
Kosovo and Metohija after the DS’s victory in Serbia’s 2008 elections.
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The northern Kosovo Serb institutions, the SNV-M and Association, opposed both
UNMIK and KFOR operations in northern Kosovo, and the SLKiM for its moderate/cooperative
position. Serbs participating in UNMIK-run institutions and members or supporter of the SLKiM
were targets of bomb attacks and shootings in 2005-07, attributed by police the “dominant
political structures in the north.” When Ranđel Nojkić broke with the boycott policy in 2006 and
returned to Kosovo’s assembly, he was denounced by the SNV-M leadership as “a traitor
working against the Serbian people.”389 These political elites retained the capacity to mobilize
unrest and violence, often in concert with criminal gangs in northern Kosovo, the most notorious
of which was led by Zvonko Veselinović and his deputy Milan Radoičić. Violence and
criminality was facilitated by politicized policing and availability of unregulated funding from
Belgrade.390 The Association declared a “state of emergency” in northern Kosovo and mobilized
roadblocks to bar UNMIK/KFOR access in 2006 and in protest of the Ahtisaari Plan in 2007.
When Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008, these groups attacked the customs
gates on the border/boundary with Serbia and seized the Mitrovica courthouse.391 After 2008,
they opposed cooperation with EULEX, despite Belgrade agreeing to its deployment in October
2008.392
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Table 7.3. Parallel Mayors, elected 2008.
Municipality (Year)

Mayor (Party)

North Mitrovica

Nenad Topličević (SRS)

Leposavić/Leposaviq (2008)

Vlastimir Ratković (SRS)

Štrpce/Shtërpca

Zvonko Mihajlović (SRS)

Zubin Potok (2008)

Slaviša Ristić (DSS)

Zvečan/Zveçan (2008)

Dragiša Milović (DSS)

Figure 7.1. Parallel Municipal Assemblies, elected 2008.

Institutional divergence between parallel and UNMIK-run institutions, as well as the
dominance of the Serbian nationalist opposition in Kosovo, was reinforced by Belgrade’s
holding of parallel elections in Kosovo in May 2008. Ignoring warnings that holding parallel
elections was a violation of UNSCR 1244, Belgrade organized municipal elections in Serb-

261
inhabited areas of Kosovo as part of the 2008 local and general elections. Prior to 2008, Serb
municipal authorities had been appointed directly by Belgrade, while UNMIK had appointed its
own set of Serb municipal authorities in the absence of election participation. After the 2008
elections, Kosovo Serb municipal-level governance was dominated by the DSS and SRS, both in
opposition to the DS-led government in Belgrade. This included three SRS and two DSS mayors
and a preponderance of seats in the municipal assemblies in northern Kosovo.393 The SNV-M
campaigned against the DS in Kosovo, which they claimed was engaged in “anti-Serb activities.”
Numerous irregularities were reported during the parallel elections, such as moderate and SLKiM
supporters, including Ranđel Nojkić, being purged from voting rolls, and another instance in
which parallel police kidnapped the political opponent of an incumbent.394
Following these elections, the northern municipal governments, convened a joint
assembly which declared itself to be autonomous and denounced the authority of Prishtina and
EULEX as “foreign occupiers on Serbian territory” - closely mirroring the rhetoric of SRS in
Belgrade.395 The new assembly declared opposition to the DS and Tadić as sacrificing Kosovo
for EU accession - the same rhetoric as the DSS in Belgrade. It formally opposed cooperation
with EULEX and petitioned for its withdrawal, including sending a petition to the Russian
embassy in Belgrade, having deemed the DS-led government to be treasonous.396 Tadić and the
DS rejected the authority of the assembly as an “illegitimate opposition-run project” and
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attempted to curb its influence in Kosovo by dissolving the municipal councils and replacing
them with interim administrators. However, their authority was rejected by the northern Serb
leaders and the municipal governments and parallel assembly continued to operate.397
In addition to loss of input in decision-making in Prishtina, noted by the SLKiM, an effect
of the institutional divergence during the period was loss of access to basic utilities and public
services in Serb-majority municipalities and villages. Parallel municipal authorities refused to
sign contracts with Kosovar utility providers, believing it would implicitly recognize Kosovo’s
sovereignty, independent of Serbia. This resulted in certain services being cut off for nonpayment, including electricity from the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) and phone service
from the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications. Power cuts and shutting down illicit
Serbian telecoms equipment in Kosovo resulted in basic services being unable to function in
Serb-inhabited areas, including those provided by parallel institutions such as healthcare and
education, as well as private businesses (UNSC November 2006; June 2007; June 2009). While
this resulted in protests against UNMIK and Prishtina, it was also indicative of a declining
quality of life in Serb-inhabited areas.
In sum, Belgrade’s boycott policy from 2004-09 resulted in further factionalization of
Kosovo Serbs politics. The most cooperative faction of the KP-turned-SLKiM broke with
Belgrade in 2006 and its notable officials returned to UNMIK-run institutions. The other SLKiM
faction favored cooperation but refused to break with Belgrade and was later coopted into
parallel and official positions. The intransigent factions, especially in northern Kosovo remained,
albeit strengthened through increased funding from Belgrade and political patronage from the

397

B92 (26 June 2009, 28 June 2009, 13 July 2009); Politika [in Serbian] (1 July 2009); Koha Ditore [in Albanian]
(3 July 2009); Interview with Goran Bogdanović, RTS Radio Belgrade [in Serbian] (17 July 2009); Kontakt Plus [in
Serbian] (17 July 2009).

263
DSS. Importantly, by the end of 2008, the latter faction had not only diverged from UNMIK-run
or Prishtina’s institutions, but from Belgrade’s as well, rejecting the authority of the DS
government.

7.1.3

Diverging Serb Factions During the EU-Mediated Dialogue, 2009-13

Serbia agreed to EU mediation with Prishtina in 2010 after the ICJ’s advisory opinion upholding
the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. As outlined in the previous
chapter, the progress of mediation was linked directly to Serbia’s EU membership, not only in its
participation, but implementation of mediated agreements within the Kosovo Serb community.
Belgrade continued its boycott policy of Kosovo’s institutions and elections, despite
condemnation from the EU in 2010, and continued to employ large numbers of Serbs in parallel
functions. However, by the time the first phase of EU mediation began in 2011, Belgrade had
lost much of its influence with Kosovo Serbs to two distinct political factions.
Belgrade continued to transfer large amounts of resources and support to parallel
institutions in Kosovo under the DS, despite its recognition in 2009 of wastefulness and fraud
plaguing the parallel system. Its decision to reduce parallel salaries and cut administrative
positions performing no functions were protested by Serbs in Kosovo as “abandonment” or
“surrender” but ultimately implemented.398 Parallel institutions continued to employ ~3450 Serbs
in administrative posts in in Kosovo, with 750 supposedly in municipalities with no Serb
inhabitants, with salaries totaling 13 million euro annually. Since increasing parallel governance
under the DSS in 2003, Belgrade had spent 6 billion euro on parallel institutions, most of which
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went to salaries and welfare benefits.399 This kept large numbers of Serbs, especially in northern
Kosovo, tied to Belgrade and the Serbian state, not only emotionally and through national
affinity, but through economic dependence as well.400
These institutions included parallel security structures in contravention of UNSCR 1244,
which purportedly “policed” Serb-inhabited areas, but were closely aligned with political
institutions, especially in northern Kosovo. Civil protection units were often headed and filled by
party activists as reward for political affiliation and loyalty, and were involved alongside
organized crime groups in mobilizing roadblocks and civil unrest after Kosovo’s declaration of
independence in 2008 and during the Technical Dialogue in 2011.401 Serb members of the KPS
were simultaneously employed by MUP. During a series of organized crime arrests in northern
Kosovo in October 2010, EULEX reported that Serb KPS officers, clandestine MUP officers,
and organized crime groups all operated seamlessly with one another. Clandestine MUP officers,
often operating in plain clothes and unmarked cars were reportedly running unofficial
checkpoints, informing on Serbs to parallel officials, and harassing and threatening moderate
Serbs cooperating with Prishtina.402 Despite the presence of these institutions, especially in
northern Kosovo, two notable Kosovo Serb factions diverged from Belgrade’s preferences.
On the one side was the Independent Liberal Party (SLS) and local moderate parties, or
“Civic Initiatives,” which ran successfully in Kosovo’s 2009-10 local elections and 2010
assembly elections. Formed in 2006 by Slobodan Petrović, the SLS ran with eight smaller Serb
parties in assembly elections in 2007 on a platform of improving living conditions for Serbs
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regardless of Kosovo’s status. This was not to say that it supported independence, and it
boycotted the assembly in 2007-08 in protest of the Ahtisaari Plan and the unilateral declaration
of independence.403 Rather the SLS leadership opposed the parallel institutions as led by selfserving party loyalists and kleptocrats and called for Serbs to vote to solve their own problems in
Prishtina rather than relying on Belgrade. As supporters in Gračanica/Graçanicë argued, they had
followed Belgrade’s boycott for years and received no benefits, being told to reject UNMIK
contracts, but not receiving parallel employment in return, while parallel posts were doled out to
DSS and SRS activists.404 Belgrade branded the SLS as “non serious” and labeled its leaders as
compromised “Albanian-Serbs unable to represent true Serb interests” - hence denying their
membership in the national group. Similarly hardliners and Belgrade-appointed Serbs in Kosovo,
such as Marko Jakšić, denounced the SLS as “national traitors,” informed on its supporters to
Belgrade, and called for SLS supporters and officials to be sanctioned.405 Amid the ongoing
boycott, enforced by parallel officials and the threat of losing one’s livelihood or welfare benefits
from Belgrade, the SLS polled poorly in the 2007 elections, but did claim the seats and posts
reserved for Serbs in the PISGs.406
The position of the SLS and other moderate parties and Civic Initiatives improved
markedly in 2009-10 after the creation of Serb-majority municipalities in Gračanica/Graçanicë,
Klokot/Kllokot, Novo Brdo/Novobërda, Parteš/Partesh, Ranilug/Ranillug, and Štrpce/Shtërpca
in-line with the Ahtisaari Plan. This created smaller administrative divisions in which Serbs
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could form municipal governments and have access to funding via Prishtina, including from
international donors, for development, public works, and distributable posts in the municipal
civil service (Jackson 2021a).407 This change was illustrated by former-SNV-KiM head Rada
Trajković who refused to vote in 2007 specifically because Gračanica/Graçanicë had not been
made a separate municipality/electoral district, but in 2009 ran for mayor of Gračanica/Graçanicë
in Kosovo’s local election.
In the 2009 elections, the SLS campaigned on the insufficiency of Belgrade’s policies,
and that Serbs “could not survive on protests alone.” This was in reference to the power and
telecommunications cuts to Serb-inhabited villages, which had refused to sign contracts with
Kosovar providers in protest of independence, at Belgrade’s urging. SLS officials, including
Slobodan Petrović, had served as intermediaries for smaller Serb villages to negotiate utilities
contracts after 2007.408 In other municipalities, including Štrpce/Shtërpca, thousands of Serbs
had registered for official Kosovo documents and ID cards to qualify for social and welfare
benefits from Prishtina.409 The SLS and Civic Initiatives performed well in the 2009-10 elections,
winning the mayorships and council majorities in the newly formed Serb-majority
municipalities. Bratislav Nikolić, won a runoff election in December 2009 against an Albanian
candidate, receiving more than 4,000 votes, tripled his return in the first round of elections two
weeks before. Nikolić declared himself to be the more legitimate mayor of Štrpce/Shtërpca than
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the SRS parallel mayor Zvonko Mihajlović, who had won only 1,270 votes in the 2008 parallel
election.
The outcome of the 2009-10 elections was that moderate Serbs, who had previously been
marginalized both in Albanian-majority municipalities and by Belgrade under the threat of
sanctions, attained positions of influence in new municipalities with institutionalized hierarchical
linkages to Prishtina (Jackson 2021a). They justified positions as unrelated to geopolitical
questions of Kosovo’s status, and as working to benefit Serbs, especially those in southern
municipalities, after a decade of mismanagement from Belgrade.410 The newly elected
government in Gračanica/Graçanicë rejected the authority of parallel institutions, including
judges and police and affirmed support for the Ahtisaari Plan as a practically beneficial
settlement. While it formally did not recognize Kosovo’s independence, it confirmed that
Gračanica/Graçanicë would pay taxes solely to Prishtina, signed water and power contracts with
Kosovar providers, and initiated 37 centrally-funded infrastructure projects by the end of
2010.411 Similarly in Štrpce/Shtërpca, the new municipal government ordered the parallel
institutions to close, removed Serbian government symbols, and locked parallel officials out of
the municipal offices. When Serbian Minister for Kosovo and Metohija, and former-SLKiM
official, Goran Bogdanović attempted to mediate the dispute between the mayors in
Štrpce/Shtërpca, Nikolić refused to meet with him and the KPS expelled him.412 The newly
elected mayor of Parteš/Partesh likewise kicked out the parallel officials and supported banning
Serbian political officials from visiting Kosovo as a source of instability.413 In the 2010 Kosovo
Interview with Slobodan Petrović, Koha Ditore [in Albanian] (23 April 2010); RTK [in Albanian] (16 April
2012).
411
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assembly elections, 10 Serb parties registered and ran, and Prishtina reported official Serb
turnout at 40 percent, which though disputed by Belgrade, was higher than prior elections,
including those endorsed by Belgrade in 2001-02 (UNSC January 2011).414

Table 7.4. Serb-Majority Municipal Mayors, elected 2009-10.
Municipality

Mayor

Gračanica/Graçanicë

Bojan Stojanović (SLS)

Klokot/Kllokot

Saša Mirković (SLS)

Novo Brdo/Novobërda
Parteš/Partesh

Nenad Cvetković (Zavičaj)415

Ranilug/Ranillug

Gradimir Mikić (Gizor)416

Štrpce/Shtërpca

Bratislav Nikolić (SLS)

Politika [in Serbian] (13 November 2010); Interview with Slobodan Petrović, Danas [in Serbian] (9 December
2010); FoNet [in Serbian] (12 December 2010); Koha Ditore [in Albanian] (13 December 2010).
415
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parallel institutions which he denounced as illegal and signed memorandums on cooperation with Kamenica and
Gjilan/Gnjilane: Koha Ditore [in Albanian] (28 December 2009).
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Figure 7.2. Serb-Majority Municipal Assemblies, elected 2009-10.
While the SLS and other moderate parties had upended Belgrade’s boycott policy in
2009-10 through commitment to Kosovo’s independent institutions, the other faction that
Belgrade had lost control of, was the hardliners in northern Kosovo, embodied in the SNV-M and
parallel assembly declared in 2008. This faction opposed all cooperation with Prishtina and
EULEX, enforced a boycott of the 2010 elections in northern Kosovo, and called for Serb parties
cooperating with Prishtina or running elections to be sanctioned. Additionally, they operated
with criminal gangs to target moderate Serbs and Prishtina’s institutions. Election-related
violence increased in 2010 such as beatings and arson, but included the murder of Bosniak
political leader Šefko Salković in northern Kosovo who was running in the 2010 elections, and
an attack by gunmen on Bratislav Nikolić’s home in Štrpce/Shtërpca.417 When Prishtina opened
an administrative office in Mitrovica North, its Bosniak coordinator Adrijana Hodžić, and its
Serb staff were targeted in attacks.418
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Though northern Serb leaders - Milan Ivanović, Marko Jakšić, Slaviša Ristić, and
Dragiša Milović, all of whom were aligned with the DSS politically - had preferences aligned
with Belgrade’s on certain issues, they generally rejected Belgrade’s authority in northern
Kosovo. For example, both they and Belgrade opposed the authority of the ICO and Prishtina’s
proposals for integrating northern Kosovo.419 However, the northern Serb leaders opposed all
cooperation with the EU from Belgrade, including the deployment of EULEX and the opening of
an EU office in Mitrovica North.420 Criminal gangs, who had attacked moderate Serbs, aligned
with these leaders likewise set up roadblocks and attacked EULEX patrols in northern Kosovo,
notably resulting in the killing of a EULEX customs officer in 2013 attributed to members of
Zvonko Veselinović’s gang (UNSC May 2011; October 2013). This faction opposed Belgrade’s
participation in talks with Prishtina and EU mediation, which its leaders dismissed as “treason”
and “surrendering Kosovo,” and declared Serbian negotiator Borko Stefanović to be persona non
grata.421 As Oliver Ivanović conceded ahead of the Technical Dialogue, this animosity towards
the DS and Belgrade’s policies from these institutions was damaging to Serbia’s position with
the EU and in negotiations.422
This lack of influence in northern Kosovo became problematic and damaging for
Belgrade during the Technical Dialogue. In July 2011, while talks on customs stamps were
ongoing in the Technical Dialogue, northern Serb leaders along with criminal gangs and civil
protection units mobilized violent mobs and roadblocks that destroyed the customs gates on the
border/boundary with Serbia and blocked access to the border/boundary for EULEX, KFOR, and
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KPS (UNSC August 2011; October 2011; January 2012). Belgrade identified Zvonko
Veselinović’s gang as having organized the early mobs and roadblocks to protect its smuggling
interests. Veselinović had previously been arrested in Serbia for fraud and had outstanding
warrants for organizing riots against EULEX. His criminal associates Slobodan Sovrlić and
Milan Radoičić were regarded as local organizers responsible for prior attacks on EULEX and
KPS, and as operating closely with parallel officials.423 Though the trade dispute between
Belgrade and Prishtina was resolved in August 2011, the roadblocks and mobs remained
mobilized in opposition to customs agreements in the Technical Dialogue, and deployment of
ethnic-Albanian KPS officers at the border/boundary.424
It was the inability of the DS government in Belgrade to control these groups that led to
the EU withholding Serbia’s candidacy in December 2011. Goran Bogdanović and Borko
Stefanović were sent to broker an end to the unrest, but their authority was rejected by northern
Serb leaders who opposed them as DS agents and believed that Tadić was giving up Kosovo for
the EU. In response they mobilized more roadblocks and renewed clashes with KFOR and
EULEX in September 2011.425 DS officials believed that the unrest and roadblocks were being
fueled by the DSS and SRS to undermine its position and disrupt relations with the EU. Notably
only the DS mayor of Leposavić/Leposaviq (elected in recall elections in 2009) agreed to end
protests and dismantle roadblocks in October 2011.426 The seventh round of Technical Dialogue
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was subsequently canceled over the unrest in September 2011, which the EU warned was putting
Serbia’s EU accession in jeopardy.427 Roadblocks were removed in December 2011, shortly
before Serbia’s EU candidacy was withheld at the Berlin Summit but remobilized again in 2012
when KFOR and EULEX redeployed to the border/boundary to close unofficial crossings used
for smuggling (UNSC August 2012; November 2012).428
In 2012-13, the northern Kosovo Serb institutions more directly rejected Belgrade’s
authority. In February 2012, the parallel assembly held an unofficial referendum rejecting
Prishtina’s authority. The DS in Belgrade had warned against the referendum as damaging to
talks and its relationship with the EU and rejected it as an opposition-run initiative with legal
basis, but the northern Serb leaders responded by rejecting the DS’s authority and denouncing it
as an “unconstitutional government” working to recognize Kosovo’s independence.429 Then in
April 2012, parallel officials in northern Kosovo held their own parallel elections in violation of
Serbian election law and warnings from Belgrade, which dismissed them as illegal. Northern
Serb leaders had sought to prevent Belgrade from appointing DS-aligned interim administrators.
Though the Serbian Government rejected the results, the SRS and DSS recognized them and
vowed to uphold them if they entered government in Belgrade.430
After the election of the SNS in 2012, these same Kosovo Serb leaders petitioned the new
government not to implement the agreements reached by the DS in the Technical Dialogue and
refused to recognize the agreement on border/boundary management in particular as ending
Serbia’s sovereignty in Kosovo. They opposed Belgrade’s renewed participation in the Political
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Dialogue and opposed Tomislav Nikolić’s proposed solutions for northern Kosovo.431 In
response to the Brussels Agreement in April 2013, they rejected its provisions, vowing not to
recognize them, and mobilized as many as 10,000 protestors in Mitrovica North (UNSC July
2013).432 In defiance to Belgrade’s threats to cut off funding to parallel institutions and hold
parallel recall elections to oust the northern leaders, the parallel assembly reconvened in July
2013 and passed a motion both rejecting the terms of Brussels Agreement and its
implementation, and formally rejecting Belgrade’s authority in northern Kosovo.433 In response
Belgrade dissolved the four municipal governments in northern Kosovo and appointed interimadministrators in August 2013, three months prior to Kosovo’s local elections, which Serbs were
required to participate in by the terms of the Brussels Agreement.434 The elections in November
2013 were marred by unrest and violence, including polling stations in northern Kosovo being
attacked, but were successfully rerun and the Belgrade-supported Serb List (SL) won control of
all four municipal governments and mayorships (UNSC January 2014). These elections were run
as a part of Kosovo’s, not Serbia’s, political system and the municipal governments that were
elected were a part of Kosovo’s institutional organization, per decentralization provided for in
the Ahtisaari Plan.
In sum, the period of EU-mediated dialogue coincided with weakened political influence
for Belgrade within the Kosovo Serb community. On one side, decentralization had attracted and
rewarded moderate Kosovo Serb leaders, such as the SLS, who broke with Belgrade’s boycott to
run in Kosovo’s 2009-10 elections. On the other side, Belgrade’s engagement with the EU, first
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to negotiate for EULEX’s deployment and an EU office in Mitrovica, and then the EU-mediate
dialogue, causes the leaders in northern Kosovo, who primarily supported the opposition DSS
and SRS, to reject Belgrade’s authority. In the context of EU mediation, this latter faction played
spoiler in agreements, notably using violence to undermine agreements in 2011-12, and refusing
to accept the provisions of the Brussels Agreement, including participation in the 2013 elections,
which were subsequently disrupted by violence. The outcome, though, with the victory of the SL
was commitment to Kosovo’s administrative institutional organization.

7.1.4

Minority Autocracy: Serb List Dominance, post-2013

Following the 2013 municipal elections and 2014 assembly elections in Kosovo, the Belgradebacked Serb List (SL) became the dominant Serb political entity. In 2013 its municipal-level
affiliate, Citizens Initiative “Srpska” (GIS) won nine of the ten mayorships in Serb-majority
municipalities and held the most seats in eight of those ten municipalities (Figure 7.5). SL
deputies won all ten Serb seats in the Kosovo assembly in 2014 and all the subsequent assembly
elections in 2017, 2019, and 2021. By 2021, SL held the mayorships of all ten Serb-majority
municipalities and outright majorities in nine of the ten municipal assemblies. In total, from
2013-21, SL achieved a near full monopoly on Kosovo Serb political representation, holding all
national-level Serb seats (10) and 82 percent of seats in Serb-majority municipalities (Figure
7.6).
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Figure 7.3. Serb-Majority Municipal Assemblies, elected 2013.
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Figure 7.4. Share of Seats in Serb-Majority Municipal Assemblies, 2009-21.
While much of SL’s immediate success was due to its backing by the SNS and SPS in
Belgrade ahead of the 2013 elections, its monopoly on Kosovo Serb politics was achieved by
coopting three existing institutions. The first institution was political patronage and support from
Belgrade that had propped up parallel structures in Kosovo since 1999. A component of this had
been the distribution of posts in parallel structures to political allies of Serbian parties. The SPS
under Milošević had appointed party loyalists as administrators, the DSS had appointed party
members in northern Kosovo, and the DS had recruited its supporters in Kosovo into parallel
positions. This practice of patronage was continued after the Brussels Agreement with officials
affiliated with the governing coalition in Belgrade, appointed to municipal posts, and then
elected alongside former parallel administrators who Belgrade supported in the 2013 elections.
For example in August-September 2013, Belgrade dissolved the parallel municipal governments
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in northern Kosovo and appointed interim administrations headed by SNS and SPS appointees.435
Three of the four northern Kosovo mayors elected in November 2013 had been appointed in
September as interim administrators: Krstimir Pantić from the SNS in Mitrovica North, Stevan
Vulović from the SPS in Zubin Potok, and Dragan Jablanović from in the SPS in Leposavić/
Leposaviq. The fourth of these appointees, Ivan Todosijević, headed the SL ticket in 2017, and
was later elected to the Kosovo assembly.436 Other interim officials who were not elected in
2013-17 were appointed to parallel posts in education, healthcare, or local administration to
manage continued transfers and funds from Belgrade after 2013.437
In other cases, in the southern municipalities, former parallel administrators and officials
who had previously worked for Belgrade were recruited by the SL. Branimir Stojanović, the
elected mayor of Gračanica/Graçanicë with SL in 2013, who also stood in the assembly elections
in 2014, had previously been head of the Serbian Office for Kosovo and Metohija in
Gračanica/Graçanicë. In the Gračanica/Graçanicë municipal assembly, the leaders of the SL
ticket had previously been parallel officials appointed by the SNS: Vladeta Kostić and Ljubinko
Karadžić who had been parallel-appointed administrators for central Kosovo, and Jovica Vasić
who had been an appointed hospital administrator.438 Similarly Svetislav Ivanović who was
elected SL mayor of Novo Brdo/Novobërda, and Srećko Spasić elected SL mayor in
Klokot/Kllokot had both previously been parallel administrators appointed by Belgrade.439 The
heads of LS tickets in non-Serb-majority municipalities - Gjakova/Đakovica, Klinë/Klina,
Rahovec/Orahovac, Peja/Peć, Prishtina/Priština - had all been parallel administrators, and the
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head of the SL ticket in Fushë Kosova/Kosovo Polje was the former head of the Serbian
electrical workers’ union in Kosovo.440
The second political institution that was coopted by the SL after 2013 was the faction of
Kosovo Serb political parties and elites who had participated in Kosovo’s institutions during
Belgrade’s pre-2013 boycott policy. While Belgrade and parallel institutions had had a strong
presence in northern Kosovo and Gračanica/Graçanicë, where its appointed officials were
elected, it had less influence in the smaller southern municipalities, officially formed after 2009.
Elites in municipalities elected in 2009-10 had existing local support bases in the absence of
strong parallel institutions and hierarchical relationships with state-level institutions in Prishtina.
The coopting of these moderate elites was most evident in the 2014 assembly elections in which
SL recruited a number of key political elites who had previously participated in Kosovo’s
assembly with the aim of forming the broadest possible Serb coalition.441 This included Oliver
Ivanović who had headed the KP and SLKiM before the boycott, and Rada Trajković who had
also run with both pre-boycott parties. More notably, the SL recruited ten officials from the SLS
to run in 2014, including its leader Slobodan Petrović who had participated in Prishtina’s
institutions since 2006. After the election and government formation, Petrović then split with the
SL after he did not receive a mandate and claimed his recruitment had been a ploy by the SL to
marginalize the SLS and recruit his allies.442
The cooption, or recruitment of moderate elites had begun at the municipal level in 2013.
Gradimir Mikić who was elected mayor of Ranilug/Ranillug in Kosovo’s 2009 elections was reelected mayor with the SL in 2013, and four more members of his party ran for the municipal
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assembly on the SL ticket. The heads of the SL tickets in Parteš/Partesh and Štrpce/Shtërpca in
2013 had likewise run Kosovo’s 2009-10 elections. Following the 2013-14 elections, SL
strategically recruited viable opposition candidates in key municipalities. In the southern
municipalities, this most notably included Bratislav Nikolić, the SLS mayor of Štrpce/Shtërpca
elected in 2013 and his deputy Dalibor Jevtić who the SL appointed to the post of Minister for
Communities and Returns in the central government in 2015, which he had held with the SLS
prior to the Brussels Agreement. In 2014, the head of the Štrpce/Shtërpca municipal government
had split the SLS along with four other deputies and in 2017 they headed the SL ticket in
Štrpce/Shtërpca’s municipal elections.443 In Gračanica/Graçanicë, Novo Brdo/Novobërda, and
Parteš/Partesh, the heads of the SL tickets the 2017 municipal elections had all been runners up
to SL candidates in the 2013 mayoral elections.
This practice was also evident in northern Kosovo where the SL recruited officials from
its main challengers, most notably Oliver Ivanović’s “Serbia, Democracy, Justice” party (SDP).
Ivanović had run for mayor of Mitrovica North in 2013-14, and narrowly lost to SL candidates.
After the 2013 elections the SDP held the same number of seats in the Mitrovica North
municipal assembly as the SL. However, in October 2014, three SDP deputies quit the party to
join SL and ahead of the 2017 elections three more SDP candidates defected to SL.444 Then, in
2019, a year after Oliver Ivanović was assassinated, his successor as SDP head Ksenija Božović
defected to the SL, in exchange for a promise of a national-level post.445 Similarly, ahead of the
2017 elections in Klokot/Kllokot, the opposition leader whose party was preventing an SL
majority in the municipal assembly defected to SL ahead of a run-off election.446 Perhaps most
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notable was the recruitment of the former-DSS mayor of Zvečan/Zveçan, Dragiša Milović in
2021, who had been a central figure in the SNV-M and parallel assembly prior to 2013 and was
considered one of the most respected leaders in northern Kosovo.447 Milović recruitment came
after numerous attacks on him, threats against his wife, and eventually the promise of guaranteed
mayorship in Zvečan/Zveçan if he joined the SL.448

Figure 7.5. Share of New SL Candidates Recruited from Other Parties.
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The third, and related, set of institutions coopted by the SL in Kosovo were networks of
organized crime and patronage that had existed prior to 2013. Candidates who defected to SL
from other parties were “bought off” with political posts, guaranteed positions, access to
campaign resources including media coverage, or jobs.449 For example in December 2019 more
than 20 SL officials were appointed as administrators in local schools and health centers, or to
positions at the university in Mitrovica North.450 Conversely, opposition candidates, particularly
from the SLS and SDP, and their family members and supporters lost jobs or places in schools
for running against SL. Ahead of the 2017 elections, SLS candidates reported losing their jobs
with public utility companies, one SDP defector reported losing his job as a surgeon, and Dragiša
Milović’s wife was fired as director of the Zvečan/Zveçan hospital over his opposition to the
SL.451 EU election monitors reported systematic threats and intimidation against non-SL
candidates and their families to withdraw from elections in 2017, 2019, 2021 (EU EOM June
2017; October 2017; October 2019; November 2021). This was facilitated by the fact that in
2017, still 80 percent of Kosovo Serbs in northern Kosovo were still dependent on salaries,
welfare benefits, or social services provided by Belgrade.452
In addition to the threat of losing employment or access to services for opposing the SL,
criminal organizations were coopted to use physical coercion and violence against challengers
and to mobilize voters for the SL. While the street-level criminal actors were new, replacing
those prior to 2013, criminal organizations and cohabitation with political elites were largely the
same.453 This was evident in the SL’s recruitment of Milan Radoičić, who was later appointed as

449

Author interviews, Prishtina, 2020.
KoSSev [in Serbian] (17 December 2019).
451
Interview with opposition leaders Slobodan Petrović, Nenad Rasić, and Slaviša Petković, KoSSev [in Serbian] (9
June 2017); KoSSev [in Serbian] (23 May 2017, 31 May 2017, 29 September 2017, 5 October 2017).
452
KoSSev [in Serbian] (18 August 2017); Author interview, Mitrovica North, 2022.
453
Author interview, Mitrovica North, 2022.
450

282
the party’s deputy head. Radoičić was believed to be a criminal enforcer or “shadow ruler” in
northern Kosovo and a lieutenant in Zvonko Veselinović’s organization, which also had close
relations with the parallel institutions prior to 2013 and regularly been a target of UNMIK and
EULEX organized crime operations. Between 2014-18, 74 shootings or bomb attacks were
reported in northern Kosovo, with 49 targeting individual politicians, activists, or employees of
Kosovo’s institutions, and another 14 targeting private businesses or public offices.454
Violence specifically targeted opposition officials. This included attacks on the homes
and property of Dragiša Milović whose car was bombed, Aleksandar Jablanović who had split
with SL to form the Party of Kosovo Serbs (PKS) and whose office was shot at and his driver
attacked, and Oliver Ivanović whose home was broken into and car bombed.455 Activists from
the PKS and SDP were attacked and beaten by gangs while campaigning or after rallies, and by
2017 the SLS had stopped holding public campaign events to avoid endangering the safety of its
candidates and supporters.456 The most notable instances of criminal intimidation, though, were
the assassinations of two political leaders in Mitrovica North, Dimitrije Janićijević and Oliver
Ivanović. Janićijević, who ran for mayor of Mitrovica North with the SLS in 2013 was murdered
by gunmen in January 2014 ahead of a mayoral recall election, having previously been the target
of multiple bombings. Similarly, Ivanović who had been a target of SL campaigns ahead of the
2017 mayoral election was murdered in January 2018.457 Milan Radoičić, the primary suspect in
organizing Ivanović’s murder, was made an official in the SL in June 2018.458 Accordingly, the
same mechanisms that had been used to deter cooperation with UNMIK and Prishtina during the
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boycott period - economic sanctions and physical coercion - were coopted and deployed against
political officials opposing the SL.
Monopolization of Kosovo Serb politics by the SL was not to say that opposition
movements did not exist, but rather, as noted above, they were the target of SL campaigns. The
most notable challengers in northern Kosovo were Ivanović’s SDP that drew support particularly
in Mitrovica North and Jablanović’s PKS which drew support from his hometown, Leposavić/
Leposaviq.459 Though the SDP declined after Ivanović’s murder, with its head Ksenija Božović
defected to the SL, its officials and activists continued to oppose the SL and organized the “1 of 5
million” protests against the SL and SNS in Mitrovica North in 2019. Nine such protests drew
modest turnouts with commemoration of Ivanović as a focus, however threats against
participation and SL counter-protests, filled with public employees required to attend, suppressed
opposition turnout.460 Leposavić/ Leposaviq, where Jablanović’s PKS had local support, became
a site of contestation not only politically, but with PKS and SL supporters getting into street
fights and SL officials’ property attacked or bombed, much like non-SL candidates elsewhere.461
Two additional opposition coalitions formed ahead of the 2019 Kosovo assembly
elections. In northern Kosovo, Otadžbina (Fatherland) was formed out of the pre-2013 DSS
structures as a hardline opposition that opposed cooperation with Prishtina and the SL as
implicitly recognizing Kosovo’s independence.462 In the southern municipalities, a more
moderate coalition for leaders from the SLS, the Progressive Democratic Party (PDS), and the

459

KoSSev [in Serbian] (4 June 2017).
The 1 of 5 million protests were a Serbian opposition movement started in Belgrade in 2018 against SNS rule and
increased harassment and violence against opposition politicians and parties, triggered by an assault on former-DS
leader and dialogue negotiator Borko Stefanović. See: KoSSev [in Serbian] (4 February 2019, 4 March 2019, 23
March 2019, 2 April 2019).
461
KoSSev [in Serbian] (9 January 2020).
462
This movement was led by former-Zubin Potok DSS mayor Slaviša Ristić and former-SNV-M leader Marko
Jakšić. See: KoSSev [in Serbian] (3 September 2019, 4 June 2020)
460

284
Serb Democratic Party (SDS) opposed the SL as a self-serving party of kleptocrats more
beholden to Belgrade than to Serbs in Kosovo, and specifically condemned its failure to create
the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (ZSO) after 2013.463 However, facing
intimidation from SL and near media blackout of non-SL parties in Serbian language media,
neither coalition gained support in 2019 or 2021 (EU EOM October 2019; November 2021).464
In sum, while the SL’s monopolization of Kosovo Serb political representation from
2013-21 depended greatly on support from Belgrade, within Kosovo it consolidated control by
coopting three political institutions that had existed prior to its founding ahead of the 2013
elections. One was the parallel system from Belgrade, from which SL candidates were recruited
and or opponents were “bought off” with positions and funding from the healthcare and
education systems which Belgrade continued to fund. Another was the faction of parties that had
cooperated with Prishtina during Belgrade’s boycott policy who had existing support bases and
relationships in Prishtina. Officials from these parties were recruited into the SL, most notably in
the southern municipalities of Novo Brdo/Novobërda, Parteš/Partesh, Ranilug/Ranillug, and
Štrpce/Shtërpca where parallel institutions had a limited presence compared to northern Kosovo
and Gračanica/Graçanicë prior to 2013. Lastly were the existing institutions of distribution and
organized crime, facilitated by continued dependence on Belgrade for livelihoods. Prior to 2013
these had been mobilized to deter cooperation with Prishtina through threats of economic
sanctions or physical violence, but after 2013 were coopted to reduce support for non-SL parties.
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7.2

Diagonal Linkage & Policy Change in Kosovo

Having provided an overview of the Kosovo Serb local regime and intra-communal political
competition, the second half of this chapter turns to the question of how Serbia as a patron state
affected this political competition in line with its own preferences for Kosovo. The Kosovo Serb
political elites differ from the Turkish Cypriot elites analyzed in Chapter 5 in that prior to June
1999 Kosovo was a part of Serbia’s centralized institutional organization and after June 1999,
though Serbian institutions had officially withdrawn from Kosovo per UNSCR 1244, most Serb
elites in Kosovo continued to regard themselves as part of Serbia’s institutions. As a result, many
Kosovo Serb elites had political affiliations both in Kosovo and Serbia-proper. As outlined in the
previous chapter (Chapter 6), there were three junctures at which the Serbian Government
changed its preferences and according policies towards Serb commitment to mutual institutions
in Kosovo: (1) DOS support for initial participation in UNMIK-run elections in 2001-02; (2) the
boycott policy under the DSS and DS governments following the March 2004 riots; and, (3)
participation in Kosovo’s institutions and elections after the 2013 Brussels Agreement.
In keeping with the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3, and the findings from
the Cyprus case study in Chapter 5, there are two stages of the patron state affecting policy
change within the local regime. First is the patron state’s diagonal linkage to the local regime
(Table 7.5). These five mechanisms then affect four aspects of local regime cooperation towards
the parent state’s institutional organization (Table 7.6).
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Table 7.5. Diagonal Linkage Mechanisms.
Mechanism

Pathway

1.

Dictate Preferences

Patron state conveys new preferences to the local regime, whose leaders follow those
preferences.

2.

National
Disassociation

Patron state ends association with local regime group-members; ends participation in
the protracted conflict.

3.

Resource Transfer

Patron state provides material/monetary resources to local regime for elites to provide
services to group-members

4.

Leadership Support

Patron state supports one specific set of local regime elites over others.

5.

Threats/Loss of
Support

Patron state issues threats, levels sanctions, or withholds support from local regime
over positions.

Table 7.6. Local Regime Cooperation.
Mechanism

Pathway

a.

New Preferences

Local regime elites adopt new, more cooperative preferences for an institutional
settlement.

b.

New Leadership

New elites emerge group-level support that support new positions on a settlement.

c.

Resource Access

Resources and material inducements available through shared institutions are used to
“buy off” local regime elites.

d.

Intra-group
Policing

Local regime policies affect inter-group cooperation or group-members crossing ethnic
boundaries.

7.2.1

The DOS & Early UNMIK Elections

Following the ousting of Milošević’s government in 2000, the new DOS government sought to
improve Serbia’s foreign relations and specifically sought to end the sanctions regime against it.
Unlike Milošević and the SPS-SRS government in 1999-2000, the DOS was willing to engage
constructively with UNMIK in Kosovo and talks facilitated by the UNSR, accepting the reality
that Kosovo could not return to its pre-1999 centralized status. Though it opposed Serb
participation in UNMIK-run elections in 2000, citing security incidents and failure to cope with
displaced persons, in 2001 the DOS endorsed Serb participation in elections in exchange for
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guarantees from UNMIK for increased security provisions and against a declaration of
independence by the PISGs.465 In 2002, the DOS government again endorsed participation in
exchange for beginning negotiations on the administrative decentralization of Serb-inhabited
areas.466 However, this facilitative approach to early talks from the UNSR was dependent upon
the political will of the Serbian Government, which did not incur any costs for non-compliance
(with the exception of on the issue of political prisoners which had sanctions relief appended to it
by the US). This was particularly problematic with the more conservative/nationalist DSS wing
of the DOS which opposed UNMIK’s institution-building in Kosovo and in 2003 began to spoil
talks over increased institutional competencies for the PISGs and encouraged non-participation
in Kosovo’s institutions even prior to the 2004 riots.
Implementation of the DOS’s agreement for Serb participation in the 2001-02 election
faced the problem of veto players within the Kosovo Serb local regime, particularly in northern
Kosovo. The Kosovo Serb political entities at this time, the SNV-KiM and SNV-M, had formed
specifically in response to indiscriminate violence against Serbs (see Petersen 2011). The SNVKiM had formed primarily to provide services to Serb refugees fleeing their homes in the
absence of Serbian Government institutions, including using Orthodox Church facilities as
refugee collection points and its radio station to provide Serbian language information.467 The
SNV-M, based in northern Kosovo, rejected the authority of UNMIK and KFOR, and mobilized
both paramilitary groups such as the Bridge Watchers and large mobs to block UNMIK’s
deployment and enforce ethnic divisions (OSCE May 2002). Though the more moderate SNV-
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KiM was willing to engage in talks with UNMIK and inter-ethnic talks, it had opposed
commitment to mutual institutions in favor of the creation of cantons and a distinct security force
encapsulated in the proposal of one of its leaders, Momčilo Trajković.468
The ability of the DOS in Belgrade to dictate its preference for participation in the 200102 elections was limited as the existing Kosovo Serb political institutions were based primarily
on opposing institutional commitment (#1, Table 7.7). This was most evident in the “antielection” or boycott campaigns organized by the leaders of these institutions during the 2001-02
elections. In northern Kosovo, SNV-M leaders Milan Ivanović and Marko Jakšić opposed
Belgrade’s initial support for elections in August 2001 and worked to obstruct the Serbian
Coordination Centre’s registration of local Serbs for elections. In September 2001, a month
before Koštunica endorsed participation in talks with the UNSR, they began campaigning against
participation in elections and the KP, whose leader Oliver Ivanović they expelled from the SNVM.469 Momčilo Trajković led a similar campaign against elections in Gračanica/Graçanicë.470
Serb turnout in the 2002 municipal elections was considerably lower than 2001, estimated at less
than 20 percent, attributed to an SNV-M boycott in northern Kosovo and virtually no turnout in
municipalities where Serbs were the minority (UNSC January 2003).
Instead, participation in the 2001 elections and subsequently in the PISG assembly was
secured through support of the KP, as a common Serb electoral list endorsed by Belgrade (#4,
Table 7.7). In forming the KP, the Coordination Centre recruited notable Kosovo Serb leaders
who had favored cooperation with UNMIK to head its electoral list, including Oliver Ivanović of
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the SNV-M, Rada Trajković and Ranđel Nojkić from the SNV-KiM, and Gojko Savić who had
been rector of the University of Pristina. Once elected in 2001, and sitting in the assembly in
2002, the KP fully supported Belgrade’s preferences in exchange for the Coordination Centre
endorsing it as the “legitimate representatives of the Kosovo Serbs.” It agreed not to take
unilateral action against Belgrade’s preferences, boycotted the vote for Kosovo’s president at
Belgrade’ behest in January 2002, and after Belgrade rejected the UNSR’s “Standards for
Kosovo” in talks in 2003, the KP was ordered to oppose it in the assembly as well.471 Similarly,
the KP did not officially support participation in the 2002 elections until after the Coordination
Centre endorsed them (UNSC January 2003).472 Accordingly, while unable to dictate preferences
to the SNV-M and SNV-KiM elite, the recruitment of local notables who favored cooperation and
political support for the KP from Belgrade created one political institution which it could dictate
certain preferences to within Kosovo.
Cooperation, however, was undermined by the Serbian Government’s other policy of
transferring considerable material and economic resources to Serbs in Kosovo via parallel
institutions (#3, Table 7.7). Financial resources, including salaries to parallel employees,
compensation for public sector employees who lost their jobs in 1999, and welfare benefits such
as pensions kept Serbs in Kosovo more closely linked to Belgrade for their livelihoods and
survival than to Prishtina (KFOS 2021). These resource transfers also kept parallel elites,
including the SNV-M, who opposed cooperation in positions of power within their communities.
These resources, particularly jobs available in the Belgrade-funded healthcare and education
institutions, were valuable sources of patronage for building support and endorsing boycotts.

Interview with Nebojša Čović, RTS Radio Belgrade [in Serbian] (14 January 2002); Tanjug [in Serbian] (3 March
2002, 12 February 2004, 15 February 2004).
472
Tanjug [in Serbian] (21 April 2002); Koha Ditore [in Albanian] (3 May 2002).
471

290
Relatedly, Belgrade sought to punish those elites who opposed the 2001-02 elections, namely
Milan Ivanović, Marko Jakšić, and Momčilo Trajković by suspending them from parallel
positions (#5, Table 7.7). However, their positions as local elites had been cemented by
distribution of patronage and by their roles as local party leaders. By 2003 these elites had been
reappointed and were key local-level actors in the DSS’s opposition to institution-building in
Kosovo (UNSC January 2004).473

Table 7.7. Diagonal Linkage, 2001-04.
Mechanism

Evidence

1.

Dictate
Preferences

Belgrade endorses participation in elections in 2001-02, marginal effect; groups led by
SNV-M reject preference and lead anti-election campaign which suppresses turnout.

3.

Resource
Transfer

Belgrade support for parallel institutions in Kosovo as part of Serbian line ministries;
parallel healthcare and education systems as primary source of resources and jobs for
Kosovo Serbs.

4.

Leadership
Support

Coordination Centre forms KP and recruits local notable moderates, endorses KP as
official representative of Kosovo Serbs.

5.

Threats/Loss of
Support

Belgrade suspends leaders of anti-election campaign after 2001-02; ineffective as they
returned to leadership positions following years.

The outcome of this period was limited cooperation with UNMIK in institutions. On the
one hand, new leadership recruited by the Coordination Centre in the KP provided a moderate
Kosovo Serb voice and an institution through which Belgrade could convey its preferences (b,
Table 7.8). However the KP did not monopolize authority in the Kosovo Serb community,
especially in northern Kosovo where it was rejected by the SNV-M. On the other hand, though,
Belgrade’s material and economic support for parallel institutions marginalized the benefits of
cooperation in mutual institutions (c, Table 7.8) by keeping elites and thousands of Serbs in
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Kosovo linked to Belgrade for financial support, welfare benefits, and social services (OSCE
October 2003; KFOS 2021). This was most evident in Belgrade’s threats against Serbs to reject
UNMIK contracts or lose benefits from Serbia beginning in late 2003. Lastly, Belgrade’s
continued support for status quo elites, especially in northern Kosovo, did not reduce levels of
intra-group policing (d, Table 7.8) that had been established in 1999-2000. Reports from 2001-03
noted violence and intimidation against moderate Serbs who advocated cooperation with
UNMIK or with the Albanian majority. This included anti-election campaigns in 2001-02 with
the intention of suppressing Serb votes (OSCE May 2002; UNSC April 2003; October 2003).

Table 7.8. Local Regime Cooperation, 2001-04.
Mechanism

Evidence

b.

New
Leadership

KP as a moderate party; only partial authority in Kosovo Serb community; disputed by
SNV-M.

c.

Resource
Access

Not evident - parallel institutions, salaries, and welfare benefits kept Kosovo Serbs more
closely linked to Belgrade and Prishtina and UNMIK; Serbs threatened with loss of
benefits/salaries for cooperating with UNMIK.

d.

Intra-group
Policing

Ethnic unmixing in northern Kosovo; violence and intimidation against moderate Serbs who
supported cooperation with UNMIK or inter-ethnic cooperation; anti-election campaigns in
2001-02 to prevent Serbs voting in UNMIK-run elections.

7.2.2

Belgrade’s Boycott Policy

Following the ethnic riots in March 2004 targeting the Kosovo Serb community, the DSS-led
government in Belgrade instituted its blanket boycott policy toward UNMIK-run institutions.
The riots which destroyed 750 Serb homes, 35 Orthodox sites, and displaced more than 4,000
Serbs destroyed the Serb community’s limited trust in UNMIK’s ability to protect them, while
validating more hardline positions such as those taken by the SNV-M opposing cooperation. The
boycott policy was instituted in March-April 2004, when the DSS called on Kosovo Serbs to
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suspend cooperation with UNMIK, both in the PISGs and other bureaucratic bodies including the
police, and was reaffirmed in the DSS’s opposition to participation in the 2004 elections.
Koštunica set the precondition for ending the boycott as UNMIK accepting his proposal for a
cantonal settlement, and when the UNSR Søren Jessen-Petersen rejected his proposal, the
Serbian Government officially endorsed a Serb boycott in Kosovo. This was not universally
supported, though, as DS President Boris Tadić endorsed participation. However, once the DS
came to power in Serbia after 2007, it maintained the DSS-led boycott and opposed participation
in Kosovo’s 2009-10 elections.
Serbia’s dictation of preferences to Kosovo Serb elites had a marginal effect on local
regime preferences regarding its boycott (#1, Table 7.9). The DSS support for a boycott ahead of
the 2004 elections did not affect the KP’s decision to participate as it rebranded as the SLKiM
and ran in 2004 with Tadić’s endorsement. It did, however, suppress turnout and the SLKiM
forfeited its mandate in 2005. This led to a further split within the Kosovo Serb political elite in
2005-06 with one faction of the SLKiM, led by Oliver Ivanović supporting Belgrade’s
preferences for a boycott, and the other led by Ranđel Nojkić opposing Belgrade and returning to
participation in Kosovo assembly or municipal governments.474 Belgrade’s preference for a
boycott, then by the DS, was further undermined in 2009-10 by the participation of Serb parties
and high Serb turnout in the 2009-10 municipal and assembly elections following
decentralization (Jackson 2021a). This was similarly evident in the northern Serb leaders’
opposition to Belgrade during the Technical Dialogue in 2011 that led to months of violent
unrest, which DS officials claimed they were unable to stop as their authority was openly
rejected by the SNV-M and parallel assembly.
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More effective in the early boycott period of DSS governance was support for certain
Kosovo Serb leaders and political factions (#4, Table 7.9). The DSS structures in northern and
central Kosovo gained notable support during this time during which the Coordination Centre
and Ministry for Kosovo were headed by DSS functionaries Sanda Rašković-Ivić and Slobodan
Samardžić. It was during this period that the Coordination Centre reorganized its administration
of Kosovo and DSS allies were appointed to senior posts and their positions cemented with
material resources and funds from Belgrade.475 This was most evident in northern Kosovo where
the DSS and SRS, the two parties in Belgrade most adamantly opposing cooperation in Kosovo,
controlled municipal administrations. The DSS mayors of Zubin Potok, Slaviša Ristić, and
Zvečan/Zveçan, Dragiša Milović, were regarded as the two most powerful and well-supported
officials in northern Kosovo.476 Conversely it was the withdrawal of support for the KP/SLKiM
that led to it forfeiting its mandate in 2005, and ultimately a lack of support from Belgrade that
triggered its collapse in 2006-07.
This support was facilitated by substantial resource transfers from Belgrade to parallel
authorities, particularly in northern Kosovo, which deterred cooperation by elites and kept Serbs
reliant on Belgrade for their livelihoods (#3, Table 7.9). Transfers via parallel institutions of
health and education in particular constituted a key source of political patronage for local regime
elites to distribute. For Serbs living in Kosovo, employment in parallel institutions meant not
only better pay than from UNMIK institutions, but also than employees performing the same
function in Serbia as they received 200 percent salaries for work in “dangerous conditions.” The
material benefits of parallel institutions were coupled with the threat of losing benefits, including
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pensions, from Belgrade (#5, Table 7.9). In late 2003 Belgrade began discouraging cooperation
with UNMIK with the threat of losing social benefits or pay from Serbian institutions. A policy
introduced by Belgrade in 2005-06 required that any Serb working for UNMIK give up any
social benefits or pay from Serbia, resulting in 70 percent of Serb UNMIK employees quitting
UNMIK employment (UNSC June 2006; September 2006).477 Importantly, though, the transfer
of resources via parallel institutions to primarily political allies of parties in Belgrade, focused
primarily in northern Kosovo and Gračanica/Graçanicë, alienated moderate leaders from smaller
municipalities who opposed the parallel elite as self-serving.
The last factor was disassociation with moderate Kosovo Serbs choosing to cooperate
with UNMIK and Prishtina, who Belgrade pronounced as either “national traitors” or
“compromised Albanian-Serbs” (#2, Table 7.9). When the SLKiM declined its mandate in 2005
and the reserved Serb positions were given to members of the Civic Initiative “Serbia” (GIS),
Belgrade denounced the GIS deputies as “collaborators” and declared they were unable to
represent the Serbian nation and could only represent their personal views or interests in
government.478 When Ranđel Nojkić and his faction of the SLKiM broke with the boycott and
returned to Kosovo’s institutions, Belgrade denounced him likewise as a “traitor working against
Serbian interests.”479 Similarly, when the SLS ran in the 2007 and 2009 elections its leaders were
denounced by Belgrade as not “true Serbs.” They were labeled “Albanian Serbs” or “Thaçi’s
Serbs” in reference to Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi. The narrative propagated by
Belgrade cast the SLS and other moderate parties participating in the 2009-10 elections as
Prishtina’s “agents” who had been recruited to infiltrate the Serb community and their votes were
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claimed to have been bought as the only explanation for their support.480 Accordingly, those who
cooperated with Prishtina, even for practical reasons, were disassociated with the group and cast
as not true members or corrupt traitors who had been bought off.

Table 7.9. Diagonal Linkage Mechanisms, 2004-10.
Mechanism

Evidence

1.

Dictate
Preferences

Marginal efficacy - SLKiM ran in 2004 election despite boycott, but did not accept
mandate; SLKiM then split between faction that backed Belgrade’s preferences and
faction that supported cooperation.

2.

National
Disassociation

Evident, but ineffective - Serbian officials opposed Serb elites who joined UNMIK or
Kosovo’s institutions as traitors, but failed to deter cooperation or suppress support in
2009-10 elections.

3.

Resource
Transfer

Parallel institutions run from Serbia provided jobs and resources, and basic services
including security in Kosovo Serb municipalities; transfers via fraudulent public
enterprises also reports.

4.

Leadership
Support

Governments in Belgrade supported allies in Kosovo; entrenched leadership positions
for elites who supported Belgrade’s policies; notable in Coordination Centre support for
DSS-aligned elites in northern Kosovo from 2003-08.

5.

Threats/Loss of
Support

Threat of economic sanctions used to deter cooperation with UNMIK and Prishtina; 70
percent of Serb employees quit UNMIK employment to avoid Serbian sanctions.

The outcome of the linkage between Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs during Belgrade’s
boycott was further political fracturing of the Kosovo Serbs. On one side, the faction supported
by Belgrade, especially by the DSS gained a stronghold in the north, which in line with
Belgrade’s preferences opposed cooperation with Prishtina and UNMIK’s institution-building
practices. Continued material support from Belgrade via parallel institutions, coupled with the
threat of losing social benefits or pay for taking UNMIK contracts reduced the appeal of material
or monetary incentives available via Prishtina, especially since Belgrade paid 200 percent
salaries to parallel employees until 2010 (c, Table 7.10). These leaders, supported from Belgrade
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and funded via parallel institutions, were incentivized not to change their preferences opposing
cooperation and instead were incentivized to deter Serbs from cooperating - in-group policing (d,
Table 7.10). DSS officials in Kosovo, namely Marko Jakšić, reportedly organized harassment
and intimidation of moderates and political opponents, facilitated by narratives from Belgrade
that opposition to the boycott was tantamount to treason.481 Moderate Serbs cooperating with
UNMIK, the Kosovo Police, or running with SLKiM in northern Kosovo were targets of bomb
attacks in 2005-07. SLS officials elected in 2009 were targets of attacks and ahead of the 2010
elections, Bosniak political leader in Mitrovica North Šefko Salković was murdered. All of these
were attributed by police to parallel authorities.482

Table 7.10. Local Regime Cooperation, 2004-10.
Mechanism

Evidence

a.

New
Preferences

Not evident - hardline and moderate factions retained relatively similar preferences as prior
to 2004.

b.

New
Leadership

Evident in smaller southern enclaves due to disenchantment with boycott and failure to
receive resources/benefits from Belgrade, channeled to party allies.

c.

Resource
Access

For parallel elite - support from Belgrade, including jobs with 200 percent salaries reduced
appeal of resources from Prishtina’s institutions.
For cooperative parties - availability of resources after decentralization, including
international aid and access to public utilities, contributed to support.

d.

481

Intra-group
Policing

Moderate Serbs who cooperated with Prishtina, including in police or administrative offices
were targets of attacks in northern Kosovo and in southern municipalities after 2009-10
elections; non-DSS supporters harassed by DSS allies; Šefko Salković murdered for running
in 2010 election.

Politika [in Serbian] (27 January 2007, 9 September 2008); FoNet [in Serbian] (16 July 2007, 18 September
2007, 25 December 2007, 30 April 2008, 23 June 2008, 30 June 2008); Dnevnik [in Serbian] (19 May 2008); Beta
[in Serbian] (19 February 2009, 1 July 2009); Koha Ditore [in Albanian] (31 July 2009).
482
Associated Press (5 February 2005, 4 July 2005); KosovaLive (4 July 2005); RTK [in Albanian] (28 October
2006, 5 July 2010); Interview with Rada Trajković, Dnevnik [in Serbian] (28 December 2006); FoNet [in Serbian]
(16 November 2007); RTS [in Serbian] (13 March 2010); Kontakt Plus [in Serbian] (7 July 2010).

297
On the other side, though, Belgrade’s rigid policy and support for political loyalists in the
parallel institutions, left another faction of Kosovo Serbs disenchanted. Accordingly during this
period, a new group of moderate Kosovo Serb elites emerged (b, Table 7.10), who regarded
Belgrade’s boycott as ruinous and stripping the Serbs of their agency in Kosovo. This faction,
led most notably by the SLS, favored cooperation with UNMIK and Prishtina as a means of
improving living conditions and opposed the parallel institutions as corrupt and self-serving,
especially in the small Serb municipalities. Though these parties existed in the 2007 elections
they received minimal support. During the 2009-10 elections, which coincided with municipal
decentralization through which increased resources were available through commitment to
central institutions, these parties attracted considerably more support both compared to 2007 and
to parallel elections in 2008 (Figure 7.4).

7.2.3

The Brussels Agreement & the Serb List

Lastly, the third juncture at which Serbian preferences and policies towards Kosovo changed was
in concert with the EU mediated dialogue, after 2011. Serbia had agreed to EU mediation after
the 2010 ICJ advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence and before talks began
in 2011 the EU appended the dialogue to Serbia’s EU membership bid, launched in 2009 by the
DS. As was reiterated to the Serbian Government at various points throughout the Technical
Dialogue, EU membership progress was contingent upon progress in the dialogue. This was
reinforced by the EU’s withholding of candidacy status for Serbia in December 2011 over failure
to implement agreements reached in the Technical Dialogue. Similarly, during the 2013 Political
Dialogue, the Serbian Government, led then by the SNS and SPS, was given an ultimatum to
reach a political agreement by 24 April 2013 or have its membership talks indefinitely stalled.
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When Serbia subsequently agreed to the Brussels Agreement on 19 April 2013, the agreement
included the provision that Serbs participate in the 2013 Kosovo elections, and it was only after
these elections that Serbia would open EU accession talks.
Implementation of the Brussel Agreement by Serbia faced the problem of existing local
conditions within the Kosovo Serb local regime. After 2008, the DS government in Serbia had
lost control over the Kosovo Serbs, particularly in DSS/SRS-controlled northern Kosovo where
the parallel assembly declared in 2008 rejected the authority of the DS. This was most evident
during the Technical Dialogue in 2011, when the northern Serb leaders mobilized mobs and
roadblocks to spoil implementation of the technical agreements in August-November 2011.483 It
was ultimately this inability to control events in northern Kosovo that led to the EU withholding
Serbia’s candidacy in December 2011.484 The northern Kosovo Serb institutions then held an
official referendum in February 2012 and parallel elections in April 2012, both in contravention
of Belgrade’s warnings against them.485
The SNS-SPS government after 2012 faced the same problem in northern Kosovo, a class
of local-level leaders who had both opposed mediation by the EU since 2011 and had opposed
participation in elections since 2001 when they led their first anti-election campaign. These same
leaders had petitioned the SNS to end the dialogue and annul the technical agreements in 2012
and rejected the Serbian Government’s proposal for political talks in January 2013.486 Following
the conclusion of the Brussels Agreement, these leaders refused to recognize it, organized
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protests in opposition, and the parallel assembly passed a resolution rejecting the Brussels
Agreement as unconstitutional.487
Belgrade was unable to dictate new preferences to these local-level elites, who had
entrenched their positions in opposition to Prishtina with Serbian support since 1999 (#1, Table
7.11). During the Political Dialogue and after the Brussels Agreement, SNS Deputy Prime
Minister Aleksandar Vučić held talks with the northern Kosovo Serb leaders intended to
convince them to accept negotiated agreements, but he was rebuffed.488 Similarly, the threat of
withdrawing support for these leaders or holding recall elections did not affect their opposition to
the Brussels Agreement (#5, Table 7.11).489 The DS had attempted to curb their influence in
2009-10 by appointing interim administrators and holding recall elections, but had only won
control of Leposavić/ Leposaviq, and DSS officials in Zubin Potok and Zvečan/Zveçan had
rejected the appointment of interim DS officials by Belgrade.490
Instead, Belgrade opted to support new Kosovo Serb leadership (#4, Table 7.11),
however it had no existing political entity to support. The DSS-aligned institutions in northern
Kosovo rejected the Brussels Agreement and the moderate parties in the southern municipalities
had rejected Belgrade’s influence in the 2009-10 elections. Instead, it formed a new political
party the SL, which recruited from parallel institutions, existing moderate parties, and coopted
patronage and criminal networks. While the KP had similarly functioned as a new political entity
in support of Belgrade’s position in 2001-04, Belgrade’s position was non-committal due to the
internal politics of the DOS, between the DS and DSS. In contrast, the SL’s participation in
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Kosovo’s institutions was fully backed by Belgrade, whose EU membership talks were
contingent upon participation in the 2013 elections. The SL was formed in August 2013 with the
support of the SNS and SPS in Belgrade, who supported a single Serb electoral list.491 The
municipal governments in northern Kosovo were dissolved and replaced with administrators who
supported the SL in September 2013.492 Serbian SNS and SPS officials, including Vučić, Prime
Minister Ivica Dačić, and former Minister for Kosovo and Metohija Aleksandar Vulin,
campaigned on behalf of the SL.493 Perhaps most importantly, though, media from Serbia-proper
which constituted the majority of Serbian language media in Kosovo campaigned exclusively for
the SL.494
In the years following 2013, Belgrade bolstered the SL’s dominance of Kosovo Serb
politics using three strategies. One was the continued support for the SL in Serbian media, which
presented it as the only viable option for Kosovo Serbs’ survival, while blacking out any
coverage of other parties. As EU reports noted, the only coverage of non-SL parties came from
Kosovar media (EU EOM June 2017; October 2017; October 2019; November 2021). Another
was the continued transfer of resources to the SL to distribute as patronage to supporters (#3,
Table 7.11), including jobs and funds from healthcare and education institutions, which Belgrade
continued to openly fund after the Brussels Agreement, and housing projects funded by Belgrade
which were distributed in exchange for support. Conversely, as noted early in the chapter,
employment in these institutions or welfare benefits were used to deter support for non-SL
parties, with opposition candidates, their families, and supporters threatened with loss of
employment. And lastly, was the use of national disassociation by Belgrade targeting non-SL
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parties as traitors (#2, Table 7.11). For example, the SLS and PKS were attacked in Serbian
media as “Albanian Serbs” and “agents” of Prishtina - despite the PKS’s leader being the former
head of the SL. Most notable were the attacks on Oliver Ivanović and the SDP prior to the 2017
elections. Ivanović was considered the most trusted politician in northern Kosovo (Aktiv 2016;
2017) and was attacked in Serbian media as a traitor working against Serbia to undermine his
position relative to the SL (EU EOM October 2017).495
The monopolization of Kosovo Serb politics by the SL with Belgrade’s aid meant a new
local regime leadership to which Belgrade could dictate new preferences. As one opposition
leader stated, the SL leaders were previously unknown political actors whose primary
qualifications were subservience to Belgrade.496 Put more subtly, they had fewer connections
with local constituents than with political patrons in Belgrade.497 For example, after SL leader
Aleksandar Jablanović was fired from Kosovo’s government for hate speech in early 2015, SL
refused to decide on participation in the assembly until they met with Vučić in Belgrade.498
When Jablanović refused to step down, obstructing participation while the EU was attempting to
resume the dialogue, he was appointed to a post in Serbia and replaced as head of the SL, thus
avoiding a dispute.499 Similarly, the SL refused to form a position on supporting Kosovo’s census
until after consultations with Belgrade.500 When Belgrade opposed Prishtina’s proposal to
privatize the Trepča/Trepçë mines in northern Kosovo, which conflicted with its preferences in
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talks, it ordered the SL to boycott the assembly.501 Similarly, when Belgrade opposed the
formation of a Kosovo army, it ordered the SL to boycott. When Vučić began discussions on
delimitation in 2018-19, the SL supported it unconditionally and blocked a resolution in
Kosovo’s assembly affirming Kosovo’s existing borders.502 When delimitation was opposed by
the Orthodox Church, the SL criticized the Church and its leaders in Kosovo as “supporting
treason.”503
Belgrade’s most notable influence was in keeping the SL within Kosovo’s institutions.
On numerous occasions, SL leaders and other Serb officials announced boycotts or “selfsuspensions” of cooperation with Prishtina over contentious issues. These included police
operations in northern Kosovo, the sackings of Aleksandar Jablanović and Ivan Todosijević from
the Kosovo government, Prishtina’s imposition of tariffs in 2018, integration of judicial
personnel after 2017, and the long-standing issue of the creation of the ZSO (Jackson 2020,
2021a). In other boycotts over issues of sovereignty that Belgrade opposed, such as
Trepča/Trepçë and the Kosovo army, it could efficiently enforce boycotts by threatening SL
officials with losing their positions or benefits.504 However, when Belgrade opposed boycotts, it
permitted the SL to propose the idea and discuss it publicly to signal nationalist credentials,
however deterred its officials from actually boycotting in meetings in Belgrade. Boycotts would
create political instability in Kosovo, and the Kosovo Serb local regime, which the SNS in
Belgrade specifically wanted to avoid.505 Accordingly, at times the SL would publicly announce
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a boycott over one of these contentious issues, but continue to sit in the assembly, draw pay from
Prishtina, and cooperate in pursuit of Belgrade’s preferences.506

Table 7.11. Diagonal Linkage Mechanisms, 2013-21.
Mechanism

Evidence

1.

Dictate
Preferences

Prior to SL - Belgrade unable to dictate preferences to status quo elites; DSS-aligned
elites opposed Brussels Agreement; had rejected agreements in 2011-12 despite
Belgrade’s preferences for them.

2.

National
Disassociation

Employed against non-SL parties, in Serbian media, to undermine opposition to SL as
opposing Serbian interests and conspiring with Albanians.

3.

Resource Transfer

Continued through education and healthcare institutions, and infrastructure projects;
redirected from parallel elites to SL officials; used to support SL position.

4.

Leadership
Support

Belgrade fully support the SL, campaigned on its behalf in elections; coverage of only
SL in Serbian media.

5.

Threats/Loss of
Support

Evident but ineffective prior to SL - DSS elites in northern Kosovo disregarded threats
from Belgrade to replace them or call recall elections in 2009-10 and 2013.

The outcome of this period in the local regime was a marked change in elites (b, Table
7.12). From 2013-21 the SL established a near monopoly on political representation in the
Kosovo Serb community (Figure 7.6). This made the SL as a political party, by 2021, the only
conduit for hierarchical linkage between the Kosovo Serbs and Prishtina. The same mechanisms
that had been used to deter participation prior to 2013, namely the threat of losing employment
or welfare benefits and the threat of violence (d, Table 7.12), still existed, only instead of being
deployed to prevent moderates from cooperating with Prishtina they were deployed to deter
moderate and hardline parties from challenging the SL, and in turn Belgrade’s preferences.507
This intra-group policing was facilitated by Belgrade’s practice of national disassociation by
which it cast non-SL leaders and entities as treasonous and plotting against the group. Most
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notably, Oliver Ivanović’s murder was preceded by a Serbian media campaign targeting him as a
traitor working against the Serbs. This monopoly by the SL and its close links to the ruling SNS
in Belgrade meant that it could readily adopt new preferences as dictated by Belgrade without
local accountability. This was perhaps most notable in Belgrade’s preferences for stability (see
Bieber 2018, 2020), by which it vetoed boycotts proposed by SL over contentious issues.

Table 7.12. Local Regime Cooperation, 2013-21.
Mechanism

Evidence

b.

New
Leadership

SL takes over as new leadership in Kosovo Serb local regime, as pliant to Belgrade’s
preferences; enacted Belgrade’s different preferences including opposition to certain
developments in Kosovo and participation in all subsequent elections.

d.

Intra-group
Policing

Continued to use violence and intimidation, and economic sanctions to deter opposition to
SL instead of cooperation with Prishtina; most notable in muder of moderate Serb leaders
Dimitrije Janićijević and Oliver Ivanović; contributed to SL consolidation of power.

7.3

Conclusion

The participation of Serbs in Kosovo’s 2013 elections and thereby Kosovo’s institutional
organization, the precipitous change noted in Chapter 1, reflected a change of preferences within
the Serbian Government in Belgrade in pursuit of EU accession. Political changes within the
Kosovo Serb community in 2013 belied a longer-standing pattern of Belgrade working to
enforce its preferences in Kosovo after 1999, with mixed success, but departed from previous
attempts in its efficacy. Previous governments in Belgrade had sought to enforce different
preferences in Kosovo, namely: participation in the 2001-02 elections followed by a boycott of
institutions after the March 2004 riots. Neither policy, though, had been fully accepted and
implemented by Kosovo Serb political elites, who themselves were divided between hardline and
more moderate or cooperation factions. In 2001-02, hardline institutions in northern and central
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Kosovo led an anti-election campaign to suppress Serb turnout despite Belgrade’s endorsement
of participation, resulting in low turnout in 2002. After 2004, Belgrade’s boycott policy alienated
moderate elites who returned to Prishtina’s institutions in 2006-07 before gaining notable support
in Kosovo’s 2009-10 elections following administrative decentralization in-line with the
Ahtisaari Plan.
When Serbia began the EU-mediated dialogue with Prishtina in 2011 it had lost influence
over the Kosovo Serb local regime(s). Five municipalities were controlled by moderate Serb
parties that recognized Prishtina’s authority and 13 Serb deputies sat in Kosovo’s assembly in
contravention of Belgrade’s standing boycott. On the other side, northern Kosovo was controlled
by hardline factions aligned with the DSS and SRS in Serbia who opposed the Serbian DS
government and its participation in EU-led talks. This latter group mobilized violence and civil
unrest to spoil talks in 2011, ultimately leading to the EU withholding Serbia’s candidacy. The
threat of losing support from Belgrade had deterred neither group from pursuing its own
preferences.
When the SNS-SPS government agreed to the Brussels Agreement, which included a
provision for Serb participation in Kosovo’s 2013 elections, it faced the problem of enforcing
this within existing Kosovo Serb factions, including the DSS-aligned leaders in northern Kosovo
who rejected the Brussels Agreement. The primary mechanism through which Belgrade induced
change in the Kosovo Serb local regime was the creation of a party to run as a united electoral
list, the SL which recruited local Kosovo Serb notables including from parallel institutions and
moderate parties elected in 2009-10. While this was similar to the strategy employed by the DOS
in 2001-02 in forming the KP composed of local notable moderates, the difference between the
SL and KP after 2013 was the marginalization of opposition and dissenting voices. This was
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achieved in part by the cooption of three existing institutions within the Kosovo Serb local
regime: parallel institutions, moderate parties engaged with Prishtina’s institutions, and
established organized crime and patronage networks. In this regard, the theorized mechanisms of
national disassociation and resource transfers were secondary mechanisms that supported the
consolidation of the new leadership, the SL, by delegitimizing or “buying off” challengers within
the community. Ultimately, this led to the monopolization of political representation by the SL, a
pliant entity beholden to Belgrade, which enacted Belgrade’s preferences unconditionally.
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8

CONCLUSION

This study started from the observation of two discrete, precipitous changes to protracted
conflicts between identity groups in contested territories. In Cyprus in 2004, the Turkish
Cypriots had voted in a public referendum to reunite the island in accordance with the Annan
Plan, departing from the long-held position of their leaders obstructing reunification, and more
recent position opposing a federal solution. Nine years later, in Kosovo in 2013, the Kosovo
Serbs voted en masse for the first time in Kosovo’s elections, departing from a boycott policy in
place since 2004, and even longer-standing opposition to Kosovo’s institutions in northern
Kosovo since 2001. From these observations as a starting point, this study’s general purpose was
to then to trace specific mechanisms through which changes in these seemingly intractable
conflicts were brought about. Conflicts in both Cyprus and Kosovo have been long-running and
both have been the subject of intensive international conflict resolution efforts. Cyprus has been
the subject of near-continuous UN-led mediation since 1964, making it the longest-standing
issue on the UN Security Council’s agenda. Kosovo has similarly been the subject of intensive
international peacebuilding and statebuilding missions, led by the UN and its interim
administration, UNMIK, since 1999.
The search for specific mechanisms necessitated a qualitative process tracing approach to
construct in-depth, internally-valid case studies to disaggregate the political context in which
international mediation occurred. Importantly, this meant analyses of three separate, yet
interlinked political areas: the international negotiating table between chosen interlocutors, the
domestic politics of patron states who choose to support sides in protracted conflicts, and the
local regimes of sub-state groups within these conflicts. While this three-tiered relationship has
yet to be adequately deconstructed and theorized, scholarship to date has separately analyzed the

308
relationships between international mediation and domestic politics, transnational politics
between states and sub-state groups often in the context of identity formation or conflict
initiation, and the development local-level institutions within ethnic communities in the context
of conflict. Careful review and linking together of these disparate literatures was an important
step in developing the theory guiding the case analyses, an important component of case-based
process tracing.
In linking together these literatures, the theoretical argument I develop in this study,
guiding the case studies themselves, is that change within the context of protracted conflicts, as
observed in Cyprus and Kosovo, is induced in two separate stages. In the first stage external
mediators provide patron states with conditional rewards to change their preferences and policies
towards conflicts. In the second stage, for patron states to receive the benefits of mediation, they
manipulate local-level competition within sub-state “local regimes” engaged in protracted
conflicts in order to produce more cooperative, local-level outcomes. This theoretical argument
necessitated two further questions and, in turn, the identification of two specific mechanisms
linking causes to outcomes. First, how did mediation change preferences within patron states what mechanism linked mediation to changed preferences? And, second, how did patron states
induce change within local regimes - what mechanism linked new preferences in patron states to
policies and behaviors in local regimes?
The findings of this study were accordingly twofold. In the first instance, change to
patron preferences was attained by linking mediation and accompanying concessions to the
prospect of longer-term reward restructures, in both cases EU accession. Importantly, though,
this was not universally applicable within patron states’ domestic politics. Rather in order for the
long-term rewards of EU accession to produce changes to preferences and state policies, EU
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accession had to benefit ruling coalitions who would inevitably incur costs from nationalist
parties and constituents who opposed concession in salient national conflicts. In this regard two
conditions were necessary for mediation to induce policy change: the presence of longer-term
benefits, and, domestic ruling coalitions that stood to gain from those benefits without incurring
too high of costs from domestic nationalist or hawkish factions.
In the second instance, new preferences and policies from patron states were induced
within local regimes through the support of new leadership at the sub-state level. Patron states
could not simply dictate new preferences to their client local regimes and expect that they be
enacted or pursued accordingly. Instead, local regime elites had their own preferences for
opposing cooperation with mutual institutions and had attained and entrenched their leadership
positions with material, economic, and political support from patron states. These elites
possessed their own degrees of agency to act as “spoilers,” either through their participation in
talks, through local institutional constraints, or their ability to mobilize violence during talks. The
primary mechanism through which patron states could then induce support for their new
preferences within local regimes was through supporting new leadership whose preferences
aligned with their own. Additional mechanisms - the transfer of resources, national
disassociation, and the threatened or realized loss of support - were also secondary mechanisms
employed in the service of supporting like-minded local regime leadership.
The findings, especially of the second mechanism, approximate a principal-agent
problem employed in both the study of international relations and comparative politics. In this
context the patron state approximates a “principal”, who adopts a new preference for an
outcome. In order to receive the benefit of that preference, though, the principal is required to
implement new preferences within the local regime. However the local regime leadership, the
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“agent,” has its own preferences and agency to pursue those preferences that may not align with
the patron state. Accordingly, for the patron to implement its preferences, and thereby receive the
benefits of mediation linked to an agreement, it must support a local regime agent whose
preferences align with its own. However, the strategies by which a patron state supports likeminded leadership within a local regime is dependent upon specific context.

8.1

Comparison of Cases

In addition to the individual utility of each case study, Cyprus and Kosovo, adding to the general
knowledge and understanding of those specific cases of long-standing conflict, comparison of
the two cases is also useful. As Chapters 4-7 demonstrate, each case exhibits its own unique
dynamics, nuanced context, and in-case variation longitudinally. Comparison of the two cases,
though, which occurred in different regional and geopolitical contexts, allows for more robust
and generalizable conclusions to be generated from a small sample. Despite their differences in
time period and regional context, both cases exhibit a number of similarities making comparison
both appropriate and useful. Both are cases of inter-ethnic conflict that ended with identity
groups confined to specific locales in which neither group recognized the legitimacy or authority
of the other group’s governance or institutions. In addition to territory, then, political institutional
governance of specific populations was a focus of both conflict and conflict resolution (see
Kaldor 2012).
Additionally, the “input” or “causal variable” in both cases was similar - mediation by a
similar set of actors employing similar mediation strategies. In both Cyprus and Kosovo, the UN
acted as an initial mediator, employing facilitative mediation. This was followed by the US and
NATO allies employing more manipulative mediation in the form of side payments (one-off
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rewards) or sanctions. Then there was EU intervention in which Turkey’s and Serbia’s prospects
for accession were linked to mediation, linking progress in mediation to longer-term reward
structures. This consistency across cases allowed for more nuanced aspects of competition
relative to mediation to be identified at the domestic level in Turkey and Serbia, and the local
regime-level in the Turkish Cypriot and Kosovo Serb communities.
Another useful comparison is between the types of local regimes observed within the
Turkish Cypriot and Kosovo Serb communities. For the Turkish Cypriots, who inhabited a
territorially contiguous de facto state after 1974, first as the TFSC and then as the TRNC, the
local regime was more institutionalized with formal institutions of government, and importantly,
a central role in mediation for its interlocutor. On the other hand, the Kosovo Serb local regime
was less formalized, including illegal structures, and different institutions across the territorially
contiguous northern Kosovo that bordered Serbia-proper and the disparate enclaves south of the
Ibar/Ibër River. Lastly, variation in time and outcomes between cases refutes the simple counterargument that time since hostilities ended resulted in a settlement. Inter-group fighting ended in
Cyprus in 1974, yet the case remains unresolved, while inter-group fighting in Kosovo ended in
1999, with continued violence until 2004, yet the Kosovo Serb local regime accepted mutual
institutions, at least in part, in 2013. To draw more robust conclusions regarding the mechanisms
that were the focus of this study, it is thus useful to compare the two mechanisms, M and M ,
1

2

across cases.
8.1.1

Changes to Preferences in Turkey & Serbia

The primary observation about the first mechanism (M ) that produced changes to preferences at
1

the patron state level, in both Turkey and Serbia, was that changes to preferences were not
systematically induced by international mediation, but rather the effects of mediation were
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moderated by domestic political coalitions. Success of the UN’s facilitative mediation was
dependent upon the political will of domestic coalitions to pursue preferences aligned with the
UN’s preferences for resolution. In Turkey in the 1960s and then again in the 1990s, domestic
security preferences and the influence of domestic nationalism precluded new preferences for
Cyprus and thereby concessions. Decisions to not escalate the conflict by invading Cyprus in the
1960s directly resulted in two incumbent governments being punished, that of İsmet İnönü being
ousted in 1965 specifically because of its standing down from invasion, and that of his successor
Süleyman Demirel being formally censured in the Grand National Assembly for standing down
an invasion in 1967. However, under Kenan Evren’s military government (1980-83), the
domestic preference to improve relations with Europe and the US in particular resulted in
support for UN-proposed confidence-building measures. In Serbia, this was most evident during
the period of DOS rule in which the endorsement of Serb participation in Kosovo’s 2001-02
elections was dependent upon the balance of power between the DS and DSS within the Serbian
Government. When the DSS gained power after 2003, facilitative mediation by the UNSR
became less effective, ultimately leading to Serbia’s boycott policy from 2004-13.
Similarly, the effects of manipulative mediation, either by the US/NATO or the EU were
dependent upon the preferences of domestic coalitions. In Turkey, for example, the influence of
nationalist junior coalition partners in Süleyman Demirel’s government (1976-78), the MHP and
MSP, prevented concessions on Cyprus despite the effects of the US arms embargo. Under the
same conditions, Bülent Ecevit’s CHP government (1978-79) supported concessions on UN
confidence-building measures specifically to ease the US embargo. This was more evident in
both cases in the presence of EU manipulative mediation, linking prospective membership to
mediation and thereby concessions in Cyprus and Kosovo. Turkey initially began to pursue EU
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membership in the late 1980s under Turgut Özal, but reversed course and opposed EU
membership due to the political conditionality of the Acquis Communautaire and the linking of
Cyprus to accession. While the same conditions for EU accession remained constant, including
resolution of the Cyprus conflict, it was supported by the AKP after 2002 which viewed the
Cyprus issue as detrimental to Turkey’s foreign relations and EU membership as a means of
curbing the influence of the military in politics.
Similarly in Serbia, the pursuit of EU membership began under the DOS, and the
initiative of Zoran Đinđić, but specifically ruled out relinquishing Kosovo in exchange for
accession. Đinđić himself stated this in 2002 and it was reiterated ahead of the EU-Western
Balkans Summit in 2003 following Đinđić’s assassination. The linkage between EU accession
and resolving Kosovo, even the perceived linkage, was a salient political issue in Serbia and
became an ideological cleavage that defined parties (Subotić 2010). This was most evident in the
DSS which shifted from supporting European integration in the early 2000s to an avowedly antiEU stance specifically due to the Kosovo issue. This was even evident within parties, such as
when the DS split in December 2011 between a pro-EU faction and a more hawkish faction led
by Vuk Jeremić that opposed concessions on Kosovo. It was the DS and later SNS, though, that
accepted EU mediation and made concessions aligned with the EU’s preferences in exchange for
progress in accession, both having run on platforms of “The EU AND Kosovo.” Despite the
long-term material benefits of EU accession, and pre-accession aid accompanying the process,
the DSS and SRS remained entirely opposed to concessions on Kosovo and EU membership.
This is in part explainable by Frank Schimmelfennig’s (2005) argument that EU
conditionality in third or candidate stantes is effective in the presence of existing pro-European
“party constellations.” Europeanization is then an ideological cleavage and the “constellation” of
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parties on one side accepts EU conditionality as necessary or beneficial to an end goal of
domestic reforms and/or EU membership. This contrasts with Vachudova (2008, 2014) who
argues that EU conditionality can temper nationalist parties’ preferences, ultimately making them
more moderate. However in the context of nationally-salient conflicts, as in Cyprus and Kosovo,
there is another nuanced observation evident in Turkey and Serbia: the linking of EU accession
to conflict resolution can trigger splits within parties, and facilitate the emergence of new parties
supporting EU conditionality out of hardline nationalist parties. In both Turkey and Serbia,
parties that emerged as the most cooperative, whose preferences for conflict resolution aligned
with the EU’s and who were willing to make concessions, originated as reformist factions of
anti-EU nationalist parties.
In Turkey, the AKP formed out of the reformist wing of the Virtue Party led by
Necmettin Erbakan an Islamist nationalist who opposed membership in the EU as a Christian
club and had opposed EU political conditionality and concessions on Cyprus, including when in
coalition with the MHP in the 1970s. Europeanization, and concessions on Cyprus which its
leaders Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül believed was obstructing Turkey’s foreign
relations, were a means of the AKP distinguishing itself as a reformist from the other Virtue
Party faction, the traditionalist Felicity Party led by Erbakan. Similarly in Serbia, though the DS
had long been a pro-EU party, it was ousted from power by the SNS which also ran on a pro-EU
platform in 2012. EU officials noted the willingness of the SNS to engage more productively on
Kosovo than the DS had. Like the AKP, the SNS was formed as the reformist wing of Vojislav
Šešelj’s hardline nationalist SRS. The SRS opposed EU accession and adamantly opposed
concessions on Kosovo, having campaigned on calls for the Serbian military to retake Kosovo
and preventing Kosovo’s independence “at all costs.” SNS leaders Aleksandar Vučić and
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Tomislav Nikolić supported EU accession as beneficial for Serbia, and justified concessions on
Kosovo as “time to focus on earthly Serbia rather than clinging to the heavenly kingdom” in
reference to making practical concessions rather than nationalist historical aspirations.508

8.1.2

Affecting Change in Local Regimes

In both cases the patron states, Turkey and Serbia, were required to not only adopt new
preferences for conflict resolution, which meant changes to domestic preferences and policies,
but also required to enact those new preferences and policies within local regimes in order to
receive the benefits of mediation from the EU, namely progress in membership. The primary
mechanism by which patron states affected change within client local regimes (M ) was support
2

for new leadership whose preferences aligned with its own - in abstract terms appointing a new
“agent” more closely aligned with the “principal.” While this primary mechanism, and secondary
mechanisms employed in support of new local regime-level leadership were similar across cases,
the differing context between cases meant nuanced differences in strategies for affecting change
in local regimes.
By the time of the Annan Plan in 2004, the TRNC had a comparatively developed
institutional structure approximating a sovereign state, albeit an unrecognized one. This included
political institutions such as a presidency responsible for acting as Turkish Cypriot interlocutor
in negotiations, and a legislature contested by political parties dating to 1970. What this meant
was the key veto players in the Turkish Cypriot local regime were in positions of power within
these established formal institutions. And, accordingly, these elites had historically been the ones
to play spoiler in negotiations. Most notable was Rauf Denktaş as TFSC/TRNC President who

508

Vučić quoted, Al Jazeera Balkans [in Bosnian] (10 May 2013).
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opposed concessions in talks and had spoiled numerous rounds of UN-led talks by walking away
from the negotiating table rather than making concessions. He was backed within the TRNC by
the UBP, whose leader in the 1990s Derviş Eroğlu held more intransigent preferences than
Denktaş and opposed continued talks and federalism as a solution.
After Turkey adopted support for the Annan Plan, under the AKP, in official policy in
2003, it faced the challenge of convincing Denktaş and the UBP to accept this preference. Both,
however, had entrenched their positions since 1964 with Turkish support. Turkey had unwritten
the budget and security of the pre-partition enclaves, the TFSC, and the TRNC, at times
strategically using these linkages to keep Denktaş and the UBP in power. However, both
opposed the Annan Plan. Denktaş officially rejected it in April 2003 and refused to resume talks,
and the UBP had overturned the TRNC’s commitment to federalism in 1994 and in March 2003
had blocked legislation facilitating the Annan Plan. To curb their influence in spoiling the Annan
Plan, Ankara coopted pro-settlement/pro-EU parties in the TRNC, the CTP and BDH, which had
gained considerable support during the TRNC’s economic decline in the 1990s. Ankara
supported the CTP in the 2003 TRNC elections, and when the elections produced a hung
parliament, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan brokered a coalition between the
CTP and DP, which had previously declined a coalition, with confidence supplied by the BDH.
Included in their coalition protocol was support for the Annan Plan and EU accession. Also
included in the coalition protocol was a provision that the TRNC government could temporarily
appoint the CTP and DP leaders as negotiators if Rauf Denktaş refused to pursue the
government’s position in talks.
Ankara curbed the influence of the key veto players in the TRNC, acting as spoilers in
talks, by manipulating local-level institutions. The pro-settlement/pro-EU CTP had existed long
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before the 2003 elections, having been formed in 1970, and had long opposed Denktaş and the
UBP as self-serving and working to maintain the status quo for their own benefit. The CTP had
officially supported a settlement and EU membership in its platform since 1998-99, before the
AKP had even existed as a party in Turkey, much less supported a UN resolution and EU
accession. In 2003-04, the CTP’s pre-existing preferences aligned with the AKP’s and it was thus
supported by the AKP to challenge and oust the existing power-holders, Denktaş and the UBP,
whose preferences conflicted with Ankara’s. To ensure that a leadership sharing its preferences
remained in place while attempting to restart talks after the Annan Plan, Ankara again intervened
in the TRNC’s political system to trigger a government collapse and oust the DP which opposed
restarting talks. Conversely, when Ankara’s preferences shifted after 2017, it supported the UBP
whose preferences opposing a settlement aligned with its own new preferences for a two-state
solution.
This differed from Serbia’s strategy in Kosovo. The Kosovo Serb community had
comparatively under-developed political institutions, due in part to the exodus of Serbian
government structures after 1999 and the continued reliance on Belgrade for basic services and
funds via parallel institutions. Precipitated by indiscriminate violence targeting the Serbs
remaining in Kosovo after UNSCR 1244, local-level institutions had formed to provide basic
services, chief among which was security. As Serb parallel institutions, providing services from
security to schooling, were in contravention of UNSCR 1244 and captured by local political
allies, local-level institutions were largely informal and plagued by corruption, political capture,
and patronage networks. While this meant Serbs continued to rely on Belgrade’s funding for
basic services, it also created a class of political elites disenchanted with the mismanagement of
the parallel institutions and a lack of Kosovo Serb input in mediation. This was most evident in
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2008-10 when one group of Kosovo Serb political elites ran as members of Serbian parties in
parallel elections, illegal by the terms of UNSCR 1244 and the Ahtisaari Plan, and another group
ran as distinct Kosovo Serb parties as a part of Kosovo’s elections, illegal under Serbia’s
constitution.
When the SNS-SPS government in Belgrade accepted the Brussel Agreement in April
2013, under an ultimatum from the EU, it faced the problem of a lack of control over these two
factions. The moderate faction which had run in Kosovo’s elections had rejected Belgrade’s
authority and opposed the parallel institutions, with some leaders regarding Belgrade as a
destabilizing force. The other faction, which had run in Serbia’s 2008 elections and then held
unilateral elections in contravention of Belgrade’s preferences in 2012, had rejected Belgrade’s
authority in Kosovo specifically because of its willingness to engage in mediation and make
concessions, beginning with the DS’s negotiations of EULEX’s deployment in 2008. The latter
faction had acted as spoilers during the EU-led Technical Dialogue in 2011-12. Unlike in
Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriot spoilers were included in formal institutions and negotiations
themselves, the Kosovo Serb spoilers existed outside of official institutions and asserted agency
in opposition to agreements by using violence or public unrest to undermine Belgrade’s position
in talks or obstruct implementation. These same spoilers rejected both the Brussels Agreement
and Belgrade’s authority. Problematically for Belgrade, though, these actors had been entrenched
in Kosovo with the support of parallel institutions and more opaque transfers of resources and
funds since 1999, and since 2004 their opposition to a settlement and Prishtina’s authority had
been encouraged and reinforced by Belgrade.
In seeking to curb the influence of these spoilers, Belgrade did not have the same option
as Ankara to support existing pro-settlement/pro-EU factions. For one, Belgrade had no relations
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with the moderate parties that had run in Kosovo’s elections. And, those parties had virtually no
influence in northern Kosovo. Instead, Belgrade created a new, single dominant political
institution to consolidate political power within the Serb community. This new institution, the
SL, coopted the existing political institutions in Kosovo including the parallel system, the
moderate parties from the southern municipalities, and criminal and patronage networks. Instead
of channeling material and economic resources into a parallel system or using violence and
threats over employment and benefits to deter cooperation, these same institutions were used to
channel Serb political support to the SL. The SL which monopolized Serb representation at the
central and municipal levels thus became an institutional “agent” whose preferences aligned with
Belgrades. It pursued Belgrade’s preferences within Kosovo, including simultaneously
participating in mutual institutions, while also opposing aspects of Kosovo’s sovereignty such as
an army. When the SL’s preferences did not align with Belgrade’s, Belgrade intervened to
correct it. For example, when the SL proclaimed it would boycott Kosovo’s institutions over
certain policies or policing actions, Belgrade forced it to return without its demands being met.
Or when individual SL leaders had preferences different from Belgrade, Belgrade removed them.
For example when Aleksandar Jablanović refused to step down and obstructed SL participation
in Kosovo, he was given a job in the Serbian Government that forced him out of the SL.
In both Cyprus and Kosovo, the patron states could not simply dictate new preferences to
the status quo local regimes and expect that they be implemented. Instead they supported new
local-level leadership whose preferences aligned with their own, in order for them to receive the
benefits of mediation, which in these cases was progress in EU accession. The cases, however,
differed in how this strategy was pursued, influenced by local-level institutionalization and
where the spoilers or veto players who needed to be removed existed. In Cyprus where the
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TRNC had a developed political structure which the main spoilers were a part of, Ankara
engineered a new coalition headed by a party that supported its preferences, and a coalition
protocol that locked in those preferences for the junior partner. In Kosovo, where the Kosovo
Serb institutions were fractured between political factions and largely informal or illicit,
Belgrade created a new single institution which coopted existed political institutions and
redirected resources and violence from deterring cooperation with Prishtina to supporting the SL
as the sole conduit of representation in Prishtina.

8.2

Discussion of Ethics

This study, interacting a theoretical framework with internally-valid case studies, is not intended
to make a normative or prescriptive argument for conflict resolution. Rather the intention has
been to identify patterns of local political competition relative to ongoing international
negotiations and more specifically to identify mechanisms by which preferences and policies are
altered as a product of negotiations. That being said these are two long-running conflicts that
continue to both attract international attention and affect regional and local contexts. In keeping
with understanding of protracted conflict (Azar et al. 1978; Crocker et al. 2004), conflicts in
Cyprus and Kosovo have been costly in material terms and also in social terms and become
defining factors of social solidarity and identity for groups within these states. Hence while
desirable outcomes were attained in 2004 and 2013 (though the result in Cyprus was ultimately
negative), it is necessary to consider the ethics of how these outcomes were attained, and the
social impact of the “means” used to attain “ends.”
The theoretical starting point of this study was the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. While
the intention of liberal peacebuilding has been the development or reconstitution of robust
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institutional structures to contain conflict in non-violent means (Walter 2015, Matanock 2017),
participation in the mutual institutional organization of a state after conflict is not an end in itself
(Call 2008), but a means of achieving an end. The theoretical underpinning of mutual institutionbuilding is that disparate social groups are afforded access to the state and governance and means
by which to redress grievances non-violently (Barnett 2006; Call 2008). If institution-building
fails, and groups are stripped of institutional access to the state, then they pursue extrainstitutional means to redress grievances such as initiating conflict and/or secession (Walter
2015).
Findings outlined in the cases of Cyprus and Kosovo, and the context of the study more
broadly, then raise ethical concerns. On the one hand, changes to local regimes in Cyprus and
Kosovo in the context of mediation resulted in conditions more amenable to institutional
settlements, namely institutional support within the TRNC for the Annan Plan and participation
en masse by Serbs in Kosovo’s 2013 elections. On the other hand, though, local-level leadership
was engineered, and at times coerced by patron states to align with their preferences. This, in
part, made local regime leaders more beholden to patron states than to local constituents. Where
their preferences did not align with their patron states, patron states acted to remove them. For
example Aleksandar Jablanović in 2015 or Mustafa Akıncı in 2020. Or consider interventions
such as Turkey triggering the collapse of elected governments in the TRNC in 2006 and 2019 in
order to facilitate governments whose preferences aligned with its own. Or consider the use of
violence, intimidation, and threats of losing one’s livelihood to deter opposition to the SL in
Kosovo. While this did curb hardline nationalist voices in northern Kosovo, it also curbed
moderate voices and led to the murders of moderate political leaders such as Šefko Salković,
Dimitrije Janićijević, and Oliver Ivanović whose own popularity threatened the SL.
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If the underlying purpose of liberal peacebuilding is to create access to the state for
aggrieved groups, then the monopolization of communal representation by parties more beholden
to external patrons than local publics corrupts this access. While the communal leaders in local
regimes may commit to or support mutual institutions, the intended purpose of facilitating access
to the state for groups is not realized. Instead, access to the state is mediated by party affiliation
or loyalty, and more problematically, subservience to the preferences of an external patron. As
one interview participant said, “our leaders were radical and corrupt before 2013, but at least
they were ours and they listened to us.”509

8.3

Contributions of the Study

A strength of the methodological approach employed in this study, in-depth process tracing, is
the careful analysis of internally-valid case studies to locate and analyze nuanced mechanistic
evidence, linking inputs to outcomes (Schmitt & Beach 2015; Beach 2016). The drawback is
then generalizability and the external validity of findings beyond the analyzed cases themselves.
In concluding this study, I consider the contribution of these findings to three broaders fields of
study in international politics: (1) understanding unrecognized states/entities; (2) internationallyled peacebuilding; and (3) international bargaining or negotiations.
First, the study of unrecognized states/entities has developed in recent years beyond early
conceptualizations as criminally governed black holes or satellites of regional powers in
geopolitical rivalries (Kolossov & O’Laughlin 1999; King 2001; Lynch 2004). While there are
certainly elements of criminality and geopolitical rivalry entangled with unrecognized
state/entities, more recent research has turned to their internal political institutions and
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statebuilding. As in recognized states, unrecognized statebuilders require means of internal
legitimacy (Bakke et al. 2014). Similarly, by constructing legitimate institutions that are
representative of populations and capable of enforcing rules, unrecognized statebuilders are
signaling their legitimacy to external audiences who have denied their sovereignty (Berg &
Molder 2012; Berg & Vits 2018). However due to an international environment that is nonpermissive for secession, these statebuilders rely on external patrons for economic survival, at
times resembling external jurisdictions of larger states (Kanol & Koprulu 2017; Comai 2018).
This study contributes a further understanding to factors shaping the political development of
unrecognized states/entities. In addition to constraints of the international system and economic
reliance on patrons, internationally-led peacemaking intended to resolve the conflicts from which
unrecognized states/entities originated are another variable constraining the development of
internal political systems in unrecognized states/entities. While Ishiyama and Batta (2012), for
example, contend that dominant political parties emerge in unrecognized states because of
persistent security fears, the findings of these cases illustrate that the rise of dominant political
parties is in part facilitated by the preferences of external patron states who manipulate political
competition for their own ends.
Second, the study of internationally-led peacebuilding is a well-developed field of
scholarship, providing numerous explanations for the successes and failures of international
peace projects. One such strand of research argues that peacebuilding, and more precisely
institution-building is undermined by international actors with a preference for stability and
limited time horizons (Barnett et al. 2014). In the interest of stability and expediency,
international peacebuilders coopt loyal local allies rather than established local notables or
leaders to head institutions (Lake 2016). These coopted actors may then capture institutions to
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benefit their own supporters and patrimonial networks, ultimately detracting from the
consolidation of institutions and deterring cooperation with institutions from other groups
(Belloni & Strazzari 2014; Ejdus 2017; Jackson 2020). In the context of the Western Balkans,
Florian Bieber (2018) terms this practice “stabilitocracy building” - or sacrificing the liberal
democratic aspects of peacebuilding in favor of fostering stability. The findings of this study
contribute another layer to this understanding of peacebuilding, in which state-level actors are
encouraged to build local regime “stabilitocracies” in pursuit of international peace settlements.
Hence, while the EU may be content supporting Aleksandar Vučić and the SNS in Serbia, despite
their autocratic practices because they provide stability (Bieber 2020), Vučić in turn must
maintain that image as a pillar of stability by creating stable sub-state conditions, thereby curbing
the democratic characteristics of dissent and opposition that would traditionally breed instability
(see Diamond 1990).
Lastly, following these observations about peacebuilding, this contributes to existing
understandings of international negotiations and their relations to domestic-level politics.
Classical liberal scholars of international politics have argued that states’ preferences originate
within domestic coalitions who appoint interlocutors to represent them internationally
(Moravcsik 1993, 1997). As Robert Putnam (1988) theorizes, this creates a “two-level game” in
which the set of possible agreements an interlocutor can reach in international negotiations is
constrained by domestic preferences. A narrow set of domestic preferences means that an
interlocutor can agree to fewer possible agreements, and likewise a broader set of domestic
preferences equates to more possible agreements at the international level. As noted in Chapter 2,
the intention of manipulative mediation can be to expand this set of domestic preferences to
overlap with possible agreement by “compensating” the costs of concessions to alter decision-
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making logic (Carnevale 1986). The contribution this study makes to this field is that in
territorial conflicts a third level of this “game” exists, at which local regime leaders have their
own degrees of agency and veto power. In order to reach a settlement, not only must the
international and domestic levels align, but also the sub-national or local regime level to avoid
spoiling. Accordingly, patron states seek to reduce the possibility of spoiling by favoring local
regime-level leaders whose preferences align with their own.
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